The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RASSOUL “PAUL” SATTERFIELD, : CIVIL ACTION
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: NO. 24-484
PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT :
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
Perez, J. May 7, 2026
MEMORANDUM
This civil rights action arises from Plaintiff Rassoul “Paul” Satterfield’s 1985 murder
conviction, which was later vacated after he served nearly four decades in prison. Following his
release, Plaintiff brought this action asserting malicious prosecution and related constitutional
claims. He advances two theories of civil liability: first, that detectives caused his prosecution by
omitting exculpatory eyewitness information from the affidavit of probable cause; and second, that
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”) maintained a policy or custom of race-based
jury selection that tainted his criminal trial.
Two motions are before the Court. The DAO moves for judgment on the pleadings under
Rule 12(c). ECF No. 72. Defendant Michael Fenerty, as Administrator of the Estate of Detective
William Thomas, moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 81. Both motions are granted.
Count III against the DAO is dismissed with prejudice, and Counts I and IV against Detective
Thomas are dismissed with prejudice. Count II was previously dismissed. ECF No. 52. The claims
against Detective Gallo’s Estate remain pending and are addressed only as necessary to explain
why the allegations against Detective Thomas stand on different footing.
The Court’s disposition of the DAO claim should not be mistaken for indifference to the
constitutional right at stake. The right to a jury-selection process free from racial discrimination is
not a technical rule of trial management; it is central to the promise of equal justice and
fundamental fairness. A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury selection process uninfected by
racial bias, and the community has an equal stake in ensuring that race does not determine who
may participate in the administration of justice. Allegations that prosecutors used peremptory
strikes to exclude black jurors—particularly in a case that resulted in a life sentence—are
incredibly serious, but the question before the Court is narrower.
This case comes to the Court at the pleading stage, where the question is not the moral
seriousness of the allegations, but whether the Amended Complaint states viable claims against
these defendants under the governing law. It does not. Count III fails because the DAO is not a
proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because the pleadings do not plausibly establish
municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The
claims against Detective Thomas fail because the pleadings do not plausibly connect him to the
initiation of Plaintiff’s prosecution or to the alleged constitutional defect in the warrant process.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the First Amended Complaint and are accepted as
true for purposes of the pending motions.
A. The Investigation and Arrest Affidavit
William Bryant was shot and killed in Philadelphia in April 1983. Detective William
Thomas was assigned as the lead detective. ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 12–14. Two brothers, Grady Freeman
and Eric Freeman, reported that they heard gunshots and then saw a man fleeing. Id. ¶¶15–16.
Grady Freeman described the man as light-skinned, approximately 5’7” or 5’8”, with his hair cut
“real close.” Id. ¶ 15. Eric Freeman described the man as approximately 5’9”, white, blond-haired,
clean-cut, and clear-complexioned, and stated that the man fled in a white car. Id. ¶ 16. Such
descriptions did not match Mr. Satterfield, who is black, over six-feet tall, and had dark hair and
facial hair at the time of the murder. Id. ¶ 17. Both Freeman brothers later viewed a photo array
that included Plaintiff, and neither identified him as the man they saw. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.
Mr. Satterfield became a suspect after Bryant’s wife told investigators about a recent
dispute between the two men. According to Bryant’s wife, Mr. Satterfield had hired Bryant to
repair a television, and the encounter ended in an altercation. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. Relying on that
information, Detective Thomas obtained a warrant to search Plaintiff’s home for two possible
murder weapons: a .44 caliber firearm and a .38 caliber firearm, corresponding to bullets recovered
from Bryant’s body. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. The search uncovered no evidence connecting Plaintiff to the
homicide. Id. ¶ 24.
Detective Thomas later learned that Plaintiff had purchased a .44 caliber firearm in 1980.
Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges that this discovery changed the direction of the investigation. Once
investigators learned that Plaintiff did not own a .38 caliber firearm, references to a .38 caliber
weapon disappeared from the investigative record, and the case thereafter focused only on a .44
caliber weapon. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. Even so, an evidentiary gap remained: no eyewitness had identified
Plaintiff, no physical evidence linked him to the shooting, and, consequently, the investigation
stalled. Id. ¶ 31.
Nearly a year later, the investigation revived when an individual named Wayne Edwards
went to police with a new account. Edwards claimed that Plaintiff had confessed to killing Bryant,
including details about the earlier television repair dispute and disposal of the murder weapon. Id.
¶¶ 40–41. According to Plaintiff, Edwards fabricated the account after discovering that Plaintiff
was romantically involved with Edwards’s wife, using information Plaintiff had shared about the
police investigation and recasting it as an admission of guilt. Id. ¶¶ 33–41.
Detective Floyd Gallo then swore out the affidavit of probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest.
The affidavit relied on two pieces of information: Bryant’s wife’s account of the television repair
dispute and Edwards’s report of Plaintiff’s alleged confession. Id. ¶ 47. It did not disclose that the
Freeman brothers had described a fleeing man who did not match Plaintiff, that neither brother
identified Plaintiff when shown a photo array, or that Eric Freeman reported seeing a white car
leave the scene. Id. ¶¶ 47–50. Plaintiff was arrested and prosecuted on the strength of that affidavit.
Id. ¶¶ 43–53.
B. Jury Selection and the DAO Claim
Count III centers on the composition of the jury that convicted Mr. Satterfield and on
broader allegations concerning race-based jury selection practices within the DAO during the
1980s. Mr. Satterfield contends that the prosecutor assigned to his case, Assistant District Attorney
Sandy Byrd, exercised eleven of sixteen peremptory strikes against African American prospective
jurors, resulting in an all-white jury. ECF No. 22 ¶ 57. The Amended Complaint further references
Byrd’s jury selection notes and statements reflecting an effort to “avoid young blacks,” which
Plaintiff identifies as direct evidence of race-conscious jury selection in his own prosecution. Id.
¶¶ 54–58.
The allegations are framed against the backdrop of a broader public reckoning over
discriminatory jury selection practices in Philadelphia courts during that era. Plaintiff points to
proceedings in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, where concerns were raised during post-verdict
proceedings about the exclusion of black jurors in Philadelphia homicide prosecutions. Id. ¶ 61.
Plaintiff relies on those proceedings as evidence that allegations of race-conscious jury selection
were not confined to a single prosecutor or a single case but had become visible within the criminal
justice system itself.
The Amended Complaint also relies heavily on the “McMahon tape,” a jury-selection
training video created by former Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon sometime in 1987 and
made public years afterward. Id. ¶¶ 60, 62. The tape has since become a widely discussed artifact
associated with prosecutorial jury-selection practices in Philadelphia. In it, McMahon instructed
prosecutors on the strategic use of peremptory challenges and openly discussed methods for
excluding black jurors from criminal juries. Pennsylvania courts later described the tape as
containing “offensive” and “racially biased” commentary concerning jury selection. See
Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 276–77, 744 A.2d 717 (2000). The tape’s release
generated substantial litigation and renewed scrutiny of Philadelphia homicide prosecutions from
that period.
Plaintiff invokes the McMahon materials not simply as evidence of one prosecutor’s
conduct, but as proof of what he characterizes as an entrenched office culture within the DAO.
Plaintiff further relies on litigation arising from Basemore, in which courts examined whether
McMahon’s use of peremptory strikes violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). ECF No.
22 ¶ 62. Plaintiff contends those proceedings corroborate the existence of discriminatory jury-
selection practices within the DAO during the same general period as his prosecution.
Plaintiff also cites studies and statistical analyses examining capital prosecutions handled
by Philadelphia prosecutors between January 1987 and April 1991. According to those studies,
prosecutors disproportionately exercised peremptory strikes against African American prospective
jurors in capital cases. Id. ¶ 63. Taken together, Plaintiff contends that Byrd’s conduct in his own
trial, the concerns raised in Hardcastle, the McMahon training materials, the subsequent Basemore
litigation, and the later statistical evidence reveal what the Amended Complaint describes as a
“well-established and adjudicated policy and practice of discrimination” within the DAO. Id. ¶ 59.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After years of post-conviction litigation, Plaintiff ultimately obtained federal habeas relief
in 2022. The habeas court concluded that Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel had been violated because trial counsel failed to investigate and present exculpatory
eyewitness testimony from Eric and Grady Freeman—witnesses whose descriptions of the fleeing
individual did not match Plaintiff and who failed to identify him in a photo array. The court vacated
Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence and ordered the Commonwealth either to retry Plaintiff or
release him within 180 days. When the Commonwealth did not retry the case, Plaintiff was
released after serving approximately thirty-eight years in prison.
Following his release, Plaintiff commenced this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Pennsylvania law against Detective William Thomas, Detective Floyd Gallo, and the DAO. ECF
No. 22. The Amended Complaint asserts four counts: (1) a Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983 against Detectives Thomas and Gallo, based on the alleged
omission of exculpatory eyewitness information from the affidavit of probable cause; (2) a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Detectives Thomas and Gallo; (3) a § 1983
municipal liability claim against the DAO, alleging that Plaintiff’s conviction resulted from a
policy or custom of racially discriminatory jury selection; and (4) a Pennsylvania-law malicious
prosecution claim against Detectives Thomas and Gallo. Id.
Earlier in the case, Detective Gallo’s Estate moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
ECF No. 24. That motion challenged the claims arising from the allegedly deficient affidavit of
probable cause, which Gallo—not Thomas—swore out. The Court dismissed Count II, Plaintiff’s
generalized Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, but allowed the Fourth Amendment
malicious prosecution claim and the parallel Pennsylvania malicious prosecution claim to proceed
against Gallo’s Estate. ECF No. 52. Count III, the separate § 1983 claim against the DAO based
on allegedly discriminatory jury-selection practices, was not before the Court in that motion.
The remaining Defendants now seek dismissal through two separate motions. After
answering the Amended Complaint and asserting immunity as an affirmative defense, the DAO
moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). ECF Nos. 71, 72. The DAO argues that it
is not a proper § 1983 defendant, that it is immune from suit for conduct undertaken in its
prosecutorial capacity, and that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a policy or custom that caused
his injury. Detective Thomas’s Estate separately moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims
asserted against Thomas, arguing that the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege Thomas’s
personal involvement in the allegedly defective arrest affidavit or in the initiation of Plaintiff’s
prosecution. ECF No. 81.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the pleaded facts allow the Court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Although the Court
accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor, it need not accept legal conclusions or unsupported inferences. Id. at 678–79; In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 (3d Cir. 2016).
B. Rule 12(c)
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed under the same standard as
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2017). Judgment on
the pleadings is appropriate only where the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of
fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wolfington v.
Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019). In resolving a Rule
12(c) motion, the Court may consider the pleadings, documents attached to or integral to the
pleadings, matters of public record, and items subject to judicial notice. Buck v. Hampton Twp.
Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The DAO’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is Granted.
Count III alleges that the DAO maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom of
excluding black jurors and that this policy or custom caused Plaintiff’s conviction. ECF No. 22 ¶¶
54–63, 86–90. The DAO moves for judgment on the pleadings on three related grounds: (1) it is
not a suable entity under § 1983; (2) to the extent the claim concerns prosecutorial functions, the
DAO acted as an arm of the Commonwealth rather than a municipal policymaker; and (3) even if
the DAO were a proper defendant, Plaintiff fails to plead a plausible Monell claim. ECF No. 72-
1. The Court agrees that each ground independently supports dismissal.
1. The DAO is not a suable entity under § 1983.
Section 1983 imposes liability on a “person” who, acting under color of state law, deprives
another of federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and local governmental bodies qualify
as “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. States and state agencies,
however, do not. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 (1989). Separate from
the question whether a district attorney acts on behalf of the Commonwealth or the municipality
in a given context, courts in this Circuit have repeatedly addressed a threshold issue: whether a
Pennsylvania district attorney’s office has a legal existence separate from the county or city such
that it may be sued in its own name under § 1983.
The Third Circuit addressed that issue in Reitz v. County of Bucks, explaining that a
Pennsylvania district attorney’s office “is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability.” 125 F.3d
139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997). Although Reitz primarily concerned municipal liability claims asserted
against Bucks County, the court treated the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office itself as
legally indistinct from the county and therefore not a proper standalone defendant. District courts
within this Circuit have repeatedly interpreted Reitz to mean that Pennsylvania district attorney’s
offices lack an independent corporate or juridical existence and therefore cannot be sued separately
under § 1983.
Allen v. District Attorney’s Office of Philadelphia, for example, dismissed claims against
the Philadelphia DAO because “it is clear that the District Attorney’s Office ‘is not an entity for
purposes of § 1983 liability.’” 644 F. Supp. 2d 600, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Reitz, 125 F.3d
at 148). The court reasoned that the proper municipal defendant in a Monell action is the
municipality itself—not one of its internal departments or offices lacking separate legal status. Id.
Similarly, Domenech v. City of Philadelphia held that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
could not be sued under § 1983 because it was not a distinct legal entity capable of separate
liability. No. 06-1325, 2007 WL 172375, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007). Courts have reached the
same conclusion with respect to other Pennsylvania district attorney’s offices, treating them
analogously to police departments or sub-units of local government that lack independent legal
existence. See, e.g., Washington v. Lehigh County District Attorney’s Office, 541 F. Supp. 3d 536,
549 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Miller v. County of Chester, No. 23-3992, 2024 WL 219397, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 19, 2024).
More recent decisions have continued to apply Reitz in precisely this manner. Garcia v.
City of Philadelphia dismissed claims against the Philadelphia DAO both because the challenged
conduct involved prosecutorial functions and because the DAO itself is not a suable entity under
§ 1983. No. 24-6316, 2025 WL 2901074, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2025). Garcia emphasized that
even when plaintiffs frame their allegations as Monell claims arising from systemic prosecutorial
practices, the DAO itself is not a separate juridical body capable of being sued apart from the City
or Commonwealth. Id.
Plaintiff relies on Sourovelis v. City of Philadelphia, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694 (E.D. Pa. 2015),
to argue that district attorney liability must be evaluated functionally and on a case-by-case basis.
However, Sourovelis addressed a different question: whether the District Attorney acted as a
municipal policymaker for purposes of Monell liability arising from civil forfeiture practices. See
id. at 710–11. The claims there proceeded against the City and against officials in their official
capacities—not against the DAO itself as an independent legal entity. Id. Sourovelis therefore does
not undermine the consistent line of authority holding that a Pennsylvania district attorney’s office
lacks separate legal existence for purposes of § 1983 suit.
Accordingly, even assuming that some district attorney conduct may in certain
circumstances constitute municipal policymaking under Monell, the DAO itself is not a proper
standalone defendant under § 1983. Count III therefore fails as a matter of law.
2. The challenged conduct concerns prosecutorial functions undertaken on
behalf of the Commonwealth.
The DAO is also entitled to judgment because the challenged conduct concerns core
prosecutorial functions: jury selection, trial advocacy, and the training or supervision of assistant
district attorneys in performing those functions. Under Pennsylvania law, district attorneys conduct
criminal prosecutions in the name of the Commonwealth. See 16 P.S. § 14302. The Third Circuit
has recognized that, when Pennsylvania district attorneys prosecute crimes or otherwise carry out
policies established by the Commonwealth, they act as state officials, not municipal officials.
Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 352–53 (3d Cir. 1999).
Recent decisions reinforce that distinction. Harris v. Krasner affirmed dismissal of claims
premised on prosecutorial decisions because the challenged conduct was “intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 110 F.4th 92, 101–05 (3d Cir. 2024). Pownall v.
Krasner applied the functional prosecutorial immunity analysis and recognized that prosecutorial
conduct must be evaluated according to the function being performed. No. 23-2049, 2024 WL
4164621, at *3–4 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024). In Garcia, the district court dismissed claims against
the Philadelphia DAO arising from alleged trial and prosecutorial misconduct because those
prosecutorial actions could not support a § 1983 damages claim against the DAO. 2025 WL
2901074, at *6.
Plaintiff is correct that individual prosecutorial immunity and municipal liability are not
the same doctrine. Absolute prosecutorial immunity protects individual prosecutors from damages
liability for advocative conduct. Monell, by contrast, asks whether a municipal policy or custom
caused a constitutional violation. The distinction matters, but it does not save Count III. Count III
does not challenge an administrative policy collateral to prosecution, such as budgeting, personnel
management, or general office administration. It challenges the conduct of prosecutors in selecting
a criminal jury and the alleged training, supervision, or tolerance of prosecutors in exercising
peremptory strikes. Those acts are part of the prosecutor’s courtroom advocacy. They occur in the
judicial phase of a criminal case and are inseparable from the prosecution of the Commonwealth’s
charges. In that setting, the District Attorney acts for the Commonwealth, not as a municipal
policymaker for the City. Plaintiff cannot transform trial-level prosecutorial decisions—and
training directed at those decisions—into a municipal policy claim against the DAO.
Accordingly, even assuming the DAO could be sued in some circumstances, the particular
conduct alleged here does not supply a basis for municipal liability under § 1983.
3. Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead a Monell policy or custom that caused his
injury.
Even if the Court assumes, for purposes of analysis, that the DAO is a suable municipal
actor, Count III still fails on the merits. A plaintiff seeking to impose municipal liability under §
1983 must identify a policy or custom that caused the constitutional injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at
694. A policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir.
2003). A custom may exist when a practice, though not formally approved, is so widespread and
well-settled that it has the force of law. Id. The plaintiff must also plead causation by demonstrating
an affirmative link between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Estate of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Monell liability is intentionally narrow
and cannot rest on respondeat superior liability. Municipalities are not vicariously liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the acts of individual employees solely because those employees acted under
color of law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Liability attaches only where “the action that is alleged to
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or where constitutional injuries result
from governmental “custom.” Id. at 690–91. The municipality itself must be the “moving force”
behind the constitutional violation. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only where—a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives” by
municipal policymakers.); Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“[L]ocal governments
are responsible only for their own illegal acts.”) (cleaned up)).
The Supreme Court refined that principle in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan
County v. Brown, cautioning that courts must apply “rigorous standards of culpability and
causation” before imposing municipal liability. 520 U.S. at 405. A plaintiff cannot establish Monell
liability merely by identifying conduct that is unconstitutional in hindsight or by pointing to
isolated wrongdoing by a single employee. Rather, the plaintiff must plausibly show both that
policymakers were deliberately responsible for the challenged practice and that the policy or
custom directly caused the particular constitutional injury at issue. Id. at 404–07.
A custom may be inferred when the alleged deficiency is not an isolated mistake, but a
recurring and obvious gap in municipal practice that predictably exposes individuals to
constitutional harm. In Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, for example, the Third
Circuit recognized that a custom may arise where practices are “so permanent and well settled as
to virtually constitute law.” 318 F.3d at 584. There, the plaintiff presented evidence of systemic
failures in providing insulin to inmates during intake procedures, including the complete absence
of a policy addressing urgent medication needs. Id. at 584–85. The court concluded that the
absence of such procedures itself could constitute actionable municipal policy because the risk of
constitutional injury was obvious and recurring. Id.
A plaintiff must also connect the alleged custom to the specific injury at issue; broad
allegations of institutional misconduct are insufficient unless they show that policymakers knew
of similar violations and failed to correct them. Estate of Roman v. City of Newark explained that
a plaintiff must demonstrate an “affirmative link” between the alleged policy or custom and the
constitutional violation. 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). There, the plaintiff adequately pleaded
such a link by identifying repeated similar incidents, prior reports, consent decrees, and
documented failures in supervision and discipline that plausibly connected municipal practices to
the unconstitutional stop and arrest at issue. Id. at 798–800. The decision illustrates that Monell
liability requires more than an isolated wrong; it requires factual allegations supporting a
reasonable inference that policymakers were aware of a recurring constitutional problem and failed
to take corrective action.
A municipality’s alleged practices cannot support Monell liability based on speculation or
hindsight alone; the identified custom must plausibly make the plaintiff’s specific constitutional
injury reasonably foreseeable. Bielevicz v. Dubinon explained that municipal liability requires
more than the abstract possibility that institutional practices “may have contributed” to a
constitutional violation. 915 F.2d 845, 850–51 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, prior incidents must be
sufficiently similar in time, character, and subject matter to place policymakers on notice of a
recurring constitutional problem and to support a reasonable inference that the same custom caused
the plaintiff’s injury. Id. The temporal and factual connection between the alleged custom and the
plaintiff’s injury matters. Evidence arising years later, involving different actors, or addressing
materially different conduct may illustrate broader institutional concerns, but it does not
necessarily establish that policymakers were on notice of the precise constitutional risk that
allegedly injured the plaintiff at the relevant time.
The need for a concrete causal link is especially important when the asserted custom
concerns race discrimination in jury selection. The exclusion of citizens from jury service on
account of race “causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are
wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
87 (1986). A prosecutor’s use of race in selecting a criminal jury strikes at the legitimacy of the
trial itself. At the same time, Monell liability requires more than proof that an individual prosecutor
acted improperly in a particular case. Evidence that one prosecutor may have exercised peremptory
strikes discriminatorily does not, standing alone, establish an office-wide policy attributable to
municipal policymakers or demonstrate that such a policy caused another defendant’s conviction.
Pennsylvania courts confronting the later-publicized “McMahon tape” repeatedly
recognized that distinction. In Commonwealth v. Rollins, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the tape itself established discriminatory jury-selection practices in unrelated
prosecutions handled by different prosecutors. 558 Pa. 532, 546 n.10, 738 A.2d 435 (1999).
Basemore drew the same line. There, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court treated the McMahon
training video as potentially relevant to whether McMahon himself exercised peremptory strikes
discriminatorily in a later homicide prosecution. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 283–
85, 744 A.2d 717 (2000). The court did not conclude, however, that the tape established a formal
DAO policy binding all prosecutors or demonstrated that every earlier prosecution conducted by
a different assistant district attorney was infected by unconstitutional jury-selection practices.
Mr. Satterfield’s allegations concerning his own trial are deeply troubling. The Amended
Complaint pleads that ADA Byrd used eleven of sixteen peremptory strikes against African
American venirepersons, resulting in an all-white jury, and that Byrd expressed an intent to “avoid
young blacks.” ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 54–58. If true, those allegations describe serious constitutional
misconduct touching the core promise of equal justice under law. Count III, however, is not a
Batson claim asserted against Byrd individually. It is a municipal liability claim asserted against
the DAO itself. The operative question therefore is not simply whether Byrd acted with
discriminatory intent, but whether the Amended Complaint plausibly connects Byrd’s conduct to
a DAO policy or custom that was the moving force behind the constitutional injury alleged here.
The Amended Complaint fails to plausibly make that connection. Plaintiff relies heavily
on the McMahon video as evidence of a broader DAO culture of discriminatory jury selection.
ECF No. 22 ¶ 60. Judicial decisions discussing the tape explain that it was created “sometime in
1987,” approximately two years after Plaintiff’s 1985 trial. Basemore, 560 Pa. at 276. The tape
also involved a different prosecutor—former ADA Jack McMahon—not ADA Byrd. Those
distinctions matter. Later evidence may sometimes illuminate an earlier practice, but Monell
requires factual allegations supporting a plausible inference that the challenged policy existed at
the time of the plaintiff’s injury and caused that injury. The Amended Complaint does not plead
facts showing that the McMahon tape memorialized a preexisting DAO policy already in force
during Plaintiff’s trial, that DAO policymakers knew before 1985 that prosecutors were engaging
in race-based jury selection, or that Byrd acted pursuant to office-wide direction rather than his
own alleged discriminatory intent. Without those connecting allegations, the McMahon tape
remains too attenuated—temporally, factually, and institutionally—to establish municipal liability
for Plaintiff’s trial.
The remaining materials fare no better. Plaintiff points to comments made during post-
verdict proceedings in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle as evidence of broader discriminatory
practices within Philadelphia homicide prosecutions. ECF No. 22 ¶ 61. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ultimately concluded, however, that the defendant in Hardcastle had not established a prima
facie case of improper peremptory challenges. 519 Pa. 236, 244–46, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988).
Plaintiff also relies on statistical studies examining capital prosecutions between January 1987 and
April 1991. ECF No. 22 ¶ 63. Those studies post-date Plaintiff’s trial. Whatever concerns those
statistics may raise regarding later prosecutorial practices in Philadelphia, they do not plausibly
establish that a DAO policy or custom existed at the time of Plaintiff’s 1985 trial or caused the
strikes exercised in his case.
The allegations against Byrd therefore remain fundamentally case-specific. They do not
plausibly establish that Byrd was implementing an official DAO policy, that a final policymaker
directed or ratified the challenged conduct, or that a widespread and well-settled custom caused
the jury selection in Plaintiff’s trial. Count III rests instead on later developed evidence and
generalized assertions of institutional practice that do not supply the affirmative causal link Monell
requires. Count III is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Detective Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Is Granted.
Plaintiff asserts federal and state malicious prosecution claims against Detective Thomas.
ECF No. 22, Counts I, IV. Detective Thomas’s Estate moves to dismiss on the grounds that
Thomas did not draft or swear out the allegedly defective affidavit, that Plaintiff fails to overcome
qualified immunity, and that Plaintiff fails to plead a material omission sufficient to undermine
probable cause. ECF No. 81. The Court need not reach every argument because the First Amended
Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Detective Thomas initiated or meaningfully influenced the
criminal proceeding that led to Plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution.
1. The law-of-the-case doctrine does not control the claims against Detective
Thomas.
Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior ruling on Detective Gallo’s motion to dismiss should
govern Detective Thomas’s motion because the motions raise similar arguments. The law-of-the-
case doctrine does not reach that far. The doctrine promotes consistency within a single litigation
by discouraging courts from revisiting issues already decided, but it applies only when the same
legal issue was previously resolved, either expressly or by necessary implication. Home Depot
USA, Inc. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 59 F.4th 55, 61 (3d Cir. 2023).
This Court’s prior ruling concerned Detective Gallo, who was the law enforcement official
that actually swore out the affidavit of probable cause. ECF No. 22 ¶ 47; ECF No. 52. Thomas is
differently situated. He is alleged to have led the earlier investigation, obtained a search warrant,
pursued firearm evidence, and shown Plaintiff’s photograph to the Freeman brothers. Those
allegations describe Thomas’s role in the underlying investigation, but they do not allege that
Thomas prepared or swore to the affidavit of probable cause, directed Gallo to omit the Freeman
information from the affidavit, provided false information to secure the arrest warrant, or otherwise
made the decision to initiate criminal charges against Plaintiff.
The Court’s ruling that the claims against Gallo could proceed did not expressly or
necessarily decide whether Thomas personally initiated, influenced, or caused Plaintiff’s
prosecution. The Court evaluates the claims against Thomas on the facts pleaded against him.
2. Plaintiff fails to state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim
against Detective Thomas.
To state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
plead that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding ended in the
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the
defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the
plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d
273, 296–97 (3d Cir. 2014). When the defendant is a police officer rather than a prosecutor, the
plaintiff must allege facts showing that the officer initiated the proceeding, knowingly provided
false information, concealed material information, or otherwise meaningfully influenced the
prosecutor’s or magistrate’s decision. See Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2018);
Henderson v. City of Philadelphia, 853 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
The First Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that Detective Thomas initiated
Plaintiff’s prosecution. The pleaded timeline separates Thomas’s initial investigation from the later
charging decision. Thomas allegedly investigated the Freeman statements, obtained a search
warrant, learned about Plaintiff’s firearm history, and showed the Freeman brothers a photo array
in 1983. ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 13–31. The investigation then stalled. Id. ¶ 31. Approximately one year
later, Wayne Edwards reported an alleged confession, and Detective Gallo swore out the affidavit
of probable cause. Id. ¶¶ 40–47. Plaintiff does not allege that Thomas drafted the affidavit, signed
the affidavit, supplied Gallo with false information for the affidavit, directed Gallo to omit
information, or participated in the renewed 1984 charging process.
Plaintiff’s theory requires the Court to infer that, because Thomas was the initial lead
detective and knew about the Freeman evidence, he must have been responsible for or involved in
the later omission of that evidence from Gallo’s affidavit. That inference is not supported by factual
allegations. Rule 12(b)(6) requires the Court to draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, but
it does not permit the Court to supply essential facts not pleaded. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. The
First Amended Complaint itself attributes the affidavit to Gallo. ECF No. 22 ¶ 47. Without facts
connecting Thomas to the affidavit or to the decision to prosecute, Plaintiff has not pleaded the
initiation element of malicious prosecution against Thomas.
Plaintiff also does not plausibly allege that Thomas concealed the Freeman evidence from
the actors responsible for the prosecution itself. The First Amended Complaint asserts that the
Freeman brothers’ descriptions and non-identifications were omitted from the affidavit of probable
cause, but it never alleges that Thomas suppressed those witness statements from prosecutors,
withheld them from Gallo, or prevented the defense from obtaining them. That omission is
consequential because the history of Plaintiff’s post-conviction proceedings points in a different
direction. Plaintiff obtained habeas relief not because a court found that police concealed the
Freeman evidence, but because trial counsel failed to investigate and present the Freeman brothers
as defense witnesses. See Satterfield v. Dist. Attorney Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 164 & n.5 (3d Cir.
2017); Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). The Third Circuit specifically
described the ineffective assistance claim as arising from counsel’s failure to interview or call
witnesses whose existence was known to the defense. Those rulings sit uneasily with the theory
advanced here—that Thomas concealed the Freeman evidence so completely that it caused
Plaintiff’s prosecution and conviction. At a minimum, the Amended Complaint pleads no facts
plausibly reconciling those competing narratives.
The causation element fails for the same reason. Plaintiff alleges that the omitted Freeman
information was material to probable cause. ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 47–53. Even accepting that premise,
however, materiality alone does not establish Thomas’s liability. Plaintiff must still plead facts
showing that Thomas caused or meaningfully contributed to the omission from the affidavit or
otherwise influenced the decision to prosecute. The chronology pleaded in the Amended
Complaint does not support that inference. It describes an initial investigation led by Thomas, a
case that stalled for nearly a year, a later confession allegation supplied by Edwards, and an
affidavit of probable cause ultimately sworn out by Gallo. What is missing is any factual allegation
connecting Thomas to the later charging decision or to the preparation of the affidavit itself. The
Court cannot bridge that gap through speculation.
The Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that Thomas initiated the prosecution,
concealed material evidence from the relevant decisionmakers, or caused the allegedly
unconstitutional prosecution to proceed, so Count I fails as to Detective Thomas.
3. Plaintiff fails to state a Pennsylvania malicious prosecution claim against
Detective Thomas.
Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania malicious prosecution claim fails for many of the same reasons.
Under Pennsylvania law, a malicious prosecution plaintiff must plead that the defendant instituted
proceedings without probable cause and with malice, and that the proceedings terminated in the
plaintiff’s favor. Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988).
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Detective Thomas instituted the criminal
proceedings. The First Amended Complaint attributes the arrest affidavit and renewed prosecution
to Detective Gallo after Edwards’s statement. ECF No. 22 ¶ 47. It does not plead facts showing
that Thomas procured, directed, or meaningfully influenced that decision. Nor does it plausibly
allege malice by Thomas in the institution of proceedings. Although malice may sometimes be
inferred from lack of probable cause, that inference depends on the defendant’s role in instituting
or procuring the proceedings. Since the First Amended Complaint does not plead that role, Count
IV fails as to Detective Thomas.
C. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.
Leave to amend need not be granted where amendment would be futile. See Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002). Futility exists where the amended pleading would still fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d
Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff has already amended his pleading. ECF No. 22. The defect as to Detective Thomas
is not merely technical or the product of imprecise drafting. The Amended Complaint does not
plausibly connect Thomas to the affidavit of probable cause, the renewed charging decision in
1984, or the alleged concealment of the Freeman evidence from prosecutors or defense counsel.
The chronology pleaded in the Amended Complaint instead places those events with other actors,
most notably Detective Gallo and Wayne Edwards.
Count III against the DAO suffers from more fundamental defects still. The DAO is not a
proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the conduct challenged here, and the Monell theory
pleaded in the Amended Complaint relies on later developed materials and generalized allegations
that remain too attenuated to plausibly establish that a DAO policy or custom caused the jury
selection in Plaintiff’s trial. Further amendment would therefore be futile. The dismissals are with
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the DAO’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 72,
is granted, and Count III is dismissed with prejudice. Detective Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 81, is also granted, and Counts I and IV are dismissed with prejudice as to Detective Thomas.
Count II was previously dismissed by Order dated March 19, 2025. ECF No. 52.