Vandyke

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICOLE VANDYKE, No. 4:25-CV-01752

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SUPERINTENDENT NICHOLAS,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE 18, 2026

Nicole Vandyke initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She challenges several denials of parole,

claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s decisions violated her substantive

due process rights. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Vandyke’s

Section 2254 petition.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2020, Vandyke was sentenced to an aggregate term of

incarceration of 2 years and 11 months to 8 years and 6 months after pleading

guilty to simple assault and no contest to aggravated assault and reckless

endangerment.1 Her controlling minimum and maximum incarceration dates are

March 11, 2022, and October 11, 2027, respectively.2

Vandyke was granted parole at the earliest opportunity (on November 30,

2021),3 effective after her minimum incarceration date of March 11, 2022.4 She

was released to an approved home plan on March 23, 2022.5

Approximately eight months later, Vandyke was convicted of a

misdemeanor offense of “Communications with 911”6 by a magisterial district

judge in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania.7 On March 3, 2023, the Parole Board

recommitted Vandyke as a convicted parole violator to serve a recommitment

period of 6 months.8 She was awarded credit for time spent at liberty on parole.9

Vandyke then received a series of reparole denials. She was denied reparole

on May 31, 2023,10 December 11, 2023,11 August 5, 2024,12 and April 16, 2025.13

Vandyke filed the instant Section 2254 petition in this Court in September 2025.14

1 See Doc. 12-3 at 2; Commonwealth v. Vandyke, No. CP-08-CR-0000320-2019 (Pa. Ct. Com.

Pl. Bradford Cnty.).

2 See id.

3 See Doc. 12-4 at 2.

4 See id. at 3.

5 See Doc. 12-5.

6 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5310(a).

7 See Doc. 12-6.

8 See Doc. 12-7.

9 See id.

10 See Doc. 12-8.

11 See Doc. 12-9.

12 See Doc. 12-10.

13 See Doc. 12-11.

14 See generally Doc. 1 (dated September 14, 2025).

Respondent was served with Vandyke’s petition and timely filed a response.15

Vandyke filed a traverse16 after seeking and receiving an extension of time. Her

Section 2254 petition is therefore ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

Vandyke contends that the Parole Board’s parole denials violated her

substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The Court

disagrees.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive

component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of

the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”18 With respect to parole

determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held

that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process

rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of

parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”19 Specifically, the specter of a

substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a

15 Doc. 12.

16 Doc. 15.

17 Doc. 1 at 5.

18 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

113, 125 (1990)).

19 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love,

89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using

arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in

grounding its action on constitutionally impermissible reasons.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”20 If, however, there is “some basis” for the

parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or

conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.21

Vandyke’s substantive due process challenge does not warrant relief. In her

petition, she appears to take issue with many of the reasons provided by the Parole

Board in its denials of reparole.22 For example, she maintains that the disciplinary

misconduct she received—which was provided as one of the reasons for the Parole

Board’s May 2023, December 2023, and August 2025 denials—was wrongfully

charged.23 Yet simply because Vandyke believes that she should not have received

a misconduct does not make the Parole Board’s reliance on this factor “arbitrary”

or “conscience-shocking.” Quite the opposite: it is simply one of the factors, i.e.,

“institutional behavior,” that the Parole Board may (and did) consider.

Beyond the misconduct, the Parole Board provided a host of other relevant

reasons for its denials of reparole after Vandyke was paroled and then

recommitted. Those reasons include her “level of risk to the community,” her

“prior unsatisfactory supervision history,” her “minimization/denial of the nature

and circumstances of the offense(s) committed,” and her “need to participate in and

20 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782).

21 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).

22 See Doc. 1 at 5-20.

23 See id. at 6, 8, 17-18.

complete additional institutional programs.”24 None of these factors are egregious,

arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, as Vandyke claims.

The Court does not trivialize Vandyke’s assertion that she has made

significant progress toward rehabilitation during her incarceration.25 Such efforts

are commendable. But her disagreement with the Parole Board’s decisions does

not establish a right to habeas corpus relief. “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review,

are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive due

process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”26 The Parole

Board clearly provided “some basis” for its denials of reparole, and Vandyke’s

various disputes with its reasoning does not provide this Court with a basis to

“second-guess” those decisions.

Finally, the Court would be remiss if it did not highlight the fact that

Vandyke was granted parole by the Parole Board as soon as she was eligible. The

fact that she reoffended and was recommitted is yet another appropriate factor that

the Parole Board may (and did) consider when denying reparole.27 Again, there is

nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional about the Parole Board’s conduct in this

regard.

24 See Docs. 12-8 through 12-11.

25 See Doc. 1 at 13, 14.

26 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487).

27 See, e.g., Doc. 12-9 (denying reparole and citing Vandyke’s “prior unsatisfactory supervision

history”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Vandyke’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a

certificate of appealability, as Vandyke has failed to make a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right,28 or that “jurists of reason would find it

debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.29 An appropriate

Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

28 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

29 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).