ALLAH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JUSTICE RASIDEEN ALLAH,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 11-3153 (MAS) (TJB)

Vv.

OPINION

GREG BARTKOWSKL, et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the undpposed summary judgment motions filed by

Defendant DeFilippo (ECF No. 305) and the remaining Defendants (ECF No. 306). Despite being

provided more than two years in which to do so, Plaintiff did not file formal opposition! to the

' Defendants’ motions were filed in December 2023. (ECF Docket Sheet.) Plaintiff subsequently

filed multiple extension requests, which the Court granted. (See ECF Nos. 308-313.) Plaintiff

later filed correspondence suggesting that he filed opposition papers that were never received by

the Clerk. (ECF Nos. 314-15.) Plaintiff then failed to file opposition in response to an extension

granted by the Honorable Georgette Castner, U.S.D.J., who was previously assigned to this matter.

Instead, Plaintiff filed purported emergency motions, which the Court construed as extension

requests and granted. A final extension permitted Plaintiff's opposition to be filed by January

2025. (See ECF Nos. 315-24.) In February 2025, Defendants requested that the Court treat their

motions as unopposed (ECF No. 323) and the Court granted the request (ECF No. 324).

Notwithstanding that Defendants’ motions were deemed unopposed, in September 2025, Judge

Castner ordered Defendants to provide the full transcripts of Plaintiff's deposition and a statement

of material facts supporting all their claims. (ECF No. 329.) Defendants complied. (See ECF

Nos. 332-35; 342.) The Court later provided Plaintiff with a final opportunity to file his opposition

and a statement of material facts in dispute in response to Defendants’ supplemental filings.

Plaintiff, however, only filed correspondence opposing Defendants’ extension request. (ECF No.

337.) The correspondence contained brief arguments regarding summary judgment issues but

contained no counter statement of material facts. Because Defendants’ motions have already been

deemed unopposed and Plaintiff failed to respond to them in a timely fashion and to produce a

counter statement of material facts, the Court treats Defendants’ motion as unopposed, and finds

that Plaintiff failed to provide actual opposition to the summary judgment motions.

motions, nor did he file a responsive statement of material facts. (ECF Docket Sheet.) Also before

the Court is Plaintiff's purported emergent motion for access to Plaintiff's legal papers. (ECF No.

336.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions shall be granted in part and denied in part,

and Plaintiff's Motion shall be denied without prejudice as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn largely from Defendants’ unopposed statement of material

facts, which are deemed undisputed for the purposes of this Opinion. Plaintiff is an inmate who

has been confined in New Jersey State Prison since 2003. (ECF No. 306-2 at 1; ECF No. 330-1 at

12.) Following the confiscation of a letter which revealed an apparent scheme by Plaintiff to

smuggle and sell a number of cell phones and other contraband to other inmates, Plaintiff was

confined to the prison’s Management Control Unit (“MCU”) in November 2006. (ECF No. 306-2

at 1-2.) “The MCU is ‘a close custody unit’ in the [prison to which an] inmate may be assigned

... ifthe [MCU] Committee ([“JMCURC[”]) finds that the inmate poses a substantial threat to the

safety of others, of damage or destruction of property; or of interrupting the operation of the”

prison. Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. A-4422-06T1, 2008 WL 2245599, at *1 (N.J. App. Div.

June 3, 2008). The MCURC determined that Plaintiff fit this standard in light of his contraband

smuggling scheme following a hearing on January 25, 2007. (ECF No. 306-2 at 2.) Plaintiff

appealed this determination, but the decision was upheld by the prison’s warden in March 2007.

(Id.) The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the placement decision. (/d.) Since his initial

placement, Plaintiff has received a number of annual and routine review hearings which extended

his time in the MCU, which have in turn been affirmed by the Appellate Division. (/d. at 3-4.)

In 2016, during an appeal of one of those hearings, Plaintiff raised to the Appellate

Division, for the first time, a 2009 deposition in which Defendant DeFilippo testified that she had

not seen herself as a member of the MCURC despite attending its meetings, and had not weighed

+

any evidence or participated in the MCURC’s ultimate decision in Plaintiffs initial MCU

placement in 2007. See Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 2016 WL 4821207, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. Sep. 12, 2016). The Appellate Division, based on this testimony, remanded the matter

for a new initial placement decision by the MCURC. The Appellate Division found that

DeFilippo’s testimony established that she had failed to fulfill her role as one of the three members

of the MCURC in Plaintiffs initial placement. Because all MCURC members were required by

state regulation to consider and weigh all evidence before a placement decision issued, Plaintiff

was entitled to a new initial placement hearing. Jd. Despite this finding, the Appellate Division

permitted Plaintiff to remain in the MCU until the hearing could be conducted considering the

“substantial evidence” that Plaintiff's 2007 initial placement was warranted in light of the

smuggling scheme and Plaintiffs significant history of prison infractions. /d Although the

Appellate Division ordered that any hearings prior to 2009 in which DeFilippo had participated

should be reconducted, the Appellate Division upheld all of Plaintiff's later proceedings, finding

that they had comported with the requirements of the relevant state procedural rules. /d at 10-11.

Plaintiff received his new initial placement review on May 8, 2017. (ECF No. 306-2 at 8.)

Based on the substantial evidence available in the record and Plaintiff's history, the MCURC again

found that Plaintiff's placement in the MCU was warranted. (/d. at 8-9.) Plaintiff appealed this

finding, and the Appellate Division affirmed the MCU placement. (Ud at 9.) The Appellate

Division again remanded, however, for rehearings of any remaining review hearings in which

DeFilippo had participated prior to June 2009. (Ud) Because MCURC records indicated that

DeFilippo did not participate in any of Plaintiffs remaining annual or routine reviews prior to

2009, no further rehearings were held. (/d. at 10.) Although the MCURC did conduct this

remanded initial review as instructed, Plaintiff was ultimately released from the MCU into the

prison’s general population on March 18, 2016. (Ud. at 15.)

In addition to the Due Process claims related to his MCU placement, Plaintiff asserts that

he was exposed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his MCU placement. At his

deposition, Plaintiff asserted that: (1) his Eighth Amendment claims arose from limited access to

bathroom or water during his recreation periods, which normally ran approximately ninety

minutes, three times a week; (2) there were, at times, mice infestations in the MCU, including in

the unit’s showers; (3) an adjacent cell inhabited by a special needs inmate produced noxious odors

and occasional bug problems because of abandoned food items left on the floor by the other inmate;

and (4) the unit would sometimes otherwise smell of urine or feces. (See ECF No. 330-1 at 89-

97.) Although Plaintiff alleged in his operative complaint that he had sleeping difficulties based

on loud and frequent noises from other inmates, he did not testify to this at his deposition. Plaintiff

also did not provide clear deposition testimony regarding the length of time any of these conditions

existed or how frequently they occurred. (/d.)

Prison records indicate that when Plaintiff complained about the smells from a nearby cell,

prison officials responded by cleaning the cell with bleach. (ECF No. 342 at 3; ECF no. 342-1 at

129.) Plaintiffs letters to prison staff also reflect that when he complained about water access

during recreation, water coolers were provided, although Plaintiff found them inadequate. (See

ECF No. 342 at 18.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’ 56, a court should grant a motion for summary

judgment where the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears

the initial burden of “identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

* All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is material “if it bears on an essential element of the

plaintiff's claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.”

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for

summary judgment, a district court must “view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” id., but must not make

credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, [however,] there is no genuine [dispute] for

trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the

non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat'l

Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F. Supp. 3d 546, 550

(D.N.J. 2014).

A nonmoving party has created a genuine [dispute] of material fact

if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its

favor at trial. However, the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment cannot rest on mere allegations; instead, it must present

actual evidence that creates a genuine [dispute] as to a material fact

for trial.

Serodio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 550.

Pursuant to Rule 56(e)(2) and Local Civil Rule 56.1, where the moving party files a proper

statement of material facts and the non-moving party fails to file a responsive statement of disputed

material facts, the Court is free to consider the moving party’s statement of material facts

undisputed and therefore admitted for the purposes of resolving the motion for summary judgment.

See, e.g., Ruth y. Sel. Ins. Co., No. 15-2616, 2017 WL 592146, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017).

&

Even where the defendants’ statement of material facts is deemed admitted and unopposed, a

district court is still required to “satisfy itself that summary judgment is proper because there are

no genuine disputes of material fact and that [defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of

law” in order to grant summary judgment. /d. at 2 (citing Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax

Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990)).

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Emergent Relief

Although Plaintiff did not file formal opposition in this matter, on October 23, 2025, he

filed a purported motion for emergent relief. (ECF No. 336.) Plaintiff contended that he had been

placed in investigatory detention and did not have full access to his legal materials and requested

a Court order directing that he be provided with those materials for the litigation of this matter.

(id.) On November 3, 2025, however, Plaintiff filed correspondence informing the Court that:

(1) he had been cleared of any institutional charges; (2) he was being released from investigative

detention; and (3) prison officials had returned his property, although he had not had access to it

yet because of a prison lockdown unrelated to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 339.) Plaintiff did not thereafter

assert that he was unable to access his property or that he was still being denied his legal materials.

As Plaintiff's motion sought only access to his legal materials in investigative detention, and as

Plaintiff is no longer in investigative detention and has apparently had all of his possessions and

materials returned to him, Plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 336) appears to be moot and must be denied

as such at this time.

B. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Conditions Claims □

Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment conditions of confinement claims because Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient

evidence to show that Defendants were personally involved in the alleged conditions and has, in

any event, failed to provide evidence to support the proposition that any named Defendant had the

necessary mental state to support liability.

A defendant may only be held liable in a civil rights proceeding where he was personally

involved in the alleged wrong. Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (d Cir.

2015); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Because supervisory

defendants may not be held vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates and must have

personal involvement to support a claim for relief, supervisors may generally only be held liable

if: (1) they were directly involved in wrongful deeds; (2) had actual knowledge of and acquiesced

in the deeds of their subordinates; or (3) they created a policy or custom which was the moving

force behind the alleged wrong. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222; see also Natale v. Camden Cnty.

Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). That a particular individual reviewed or

responded to a grievance or letter complaint is generally insufficient to establish personal

involvement. See, e.g., Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 372-74 (3d Cir. 2020) (agreeing that

alleging a defendant’s involvement arises out of reviewing or responding to grievances “fail[s] to

adequately state a claim against [that] specific individual[]’””); Stuart v. Lisk, 645 F. App’x 197,

200-01 (3d Cir. 2016).

The claims at issue here relate to the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement while in the

MCU, which Plaintiff contends were inhumane. To succeed on a claim for a violation of the

Eighth Amendment based on unduly harsh conditions of confinement, a prisoner must establish

that he was exposed to “objectively, sufficiently serious” conditions which denied the plaintiff the

“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and that the defendants, through their acts or

omissions, were “deliberate|ly]| indifferen|t] to [the plaintiff's] health or safety.” See Porter v. Pa.

Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994)). Deliberate indifference in this context requires a showing that the official in question

“knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it.” Jd. at 445. Such knowledge can be shown through evidence

that a “risk of harm was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison

officials in the past such that defendants must have known about the risk.” /d. (quoting Betts v.

New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010)).

In this matter, Plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) temporary deprivations of bathroom

and water access during thrice weekly, ninety-minute recreation periods;’ (2) smells and vermin

infestations resulting from inmates in nearby cells failing to clean up after themselves in relation

to uneaten food and bathroom use; and (3) having to endure the sounds of special needs inmates

in neighboring cells banging on doors and cell walls. Except for the recreation facilities

limitations, Plaintiff does not contend that these issues are the result of actions by prison officials.

Instead, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that each of the conditions-related issues he raised in

this matter were the result of the other inmates at the MCU, either by allowing their cells to become

putrid or infested, or by making themselves a nuisance and thereby impacting Plaintiffs

day-to-day life. Plaintiff's claims thus do not rest on the idea that Defendants directly caused any

of the challenged conditions other than the bathroom and water limitations during recreation

periods but instead rest on Defendants’ alleged failure to ameliorate the conditions of the MCU.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs conditions were sufficiently serious, Plaintiff □□□

failed to provide sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact finder to infer that Defendants

3 Plaintiff does not allege that he was completely deprived of bathroom or water access, only that

he lacked them during recreation. Courts have frequently found that temporary deprivations of

access to facilities or running water for a few hours at a time generally are not severe enough to

amount to Eighth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Evans-Salter v. Wetzel, No. 19-950, 2020 WL

5819764, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 30, 2020) (collecting cases finding no constitutional violation for

denial of bathroom access for periods of between twenty minutes and eight hours at a time);

Shoffler v. City of Wildwood, No. 17-4859, 2019 WL 4165305, at *12 (D.N.J. Sep. 3, 2019); Cook

v. Wetzel, No. 13-6575, 2015 WL 2395390, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2015).

were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff named as Defendants

a number of high-level state officials—such as former Governor Christie and former NJDOC

Commissioner Lanigan—as well as a number of supervisory officials at New Jersey State Prison

and a several individuals who had been members of the MCURC at various times. At his

deposition, Plaintiff connected these Defendants to his claims only through grievances or letter

complaints he wrote, or through statements that he had private conversations with some of the

Defendants about his issues with the MCU. Plaintiff, however, did not elaborate as to what those

conversations involved, what issues were discussed, or whether he specifically made Defendants

aware of any of the conditions of confinement issues that are the focus of this matter. Indeed,

Plaintiff's deposition testimony instead suggests that he was chiefly interested in reasserting his

challenges to the procedures used to confine individuals to the MCU rather than any specific

condition of his confinement apart from possibly the issue of the water and bathroom access during

recreation periods.

Plaintiff has also not provided any clear evidence as to how long the conditions in question

were in place or how obviously noticeable any of the conditions were to those not in the MCU on

a regular basis. Instead, Plaintiff connects Defendants to his claims chiefly through the filing of

grievances or letter complaints. Given the lack of clear evidence that Plaintiff discussed any of

these conditions of confinement issues with Defendants directly or in detail, and any clear evidence

that the issues in question were patently obvious during the few instances in which the named

Defendants were briefly present in the MCU, the record does not permit the inference that

Defendants knew of the conditions in question or knew that they presented a serious risk of harm

to Plaintiffs health or safety.

The record further undermines Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims because various

documents, including Plaintiff's own grievances and letters, indicate that steps were taken to

address Plaintiff's complaints. For example, although Plaintiff complained that certain cells in the

unit smelled strongly of bodily waste, the same complaint admits that the “medical [department]

clean[ed the cell] with bleach,” even though it had not entirely removed the smell. (See ECF No.

342-1 at 129.) Likewise, when Plaintiff complained about lack of access to water during recreation

periods, prison staff provided Plaintiff and other similarly situated inmates with “cold water in

coolers” during recreation. (See id. at 132.) These direct responses to Plaintiff's complaints about

the MCU’s conditions do not demonstrate deliberate indifference; instead, they indicate that prison

staff were responsive to Plaintiff's complaints and sought to address the issues in question.

Plaintiff has likewise not identified any specific prison policy for any issue other than the

yard bathroom and yard access issues that could be said to have contributed to the conditions

Plaintiff seeks to challenge. Plaintiff has also not identified any clear policy that should have been

adopted which would have meaningfully responded to the conditions faced by Plaintiff in the

MCU. Considered in its entirety, the record before the Court does not permit a reasonable trier of

fact to find that Defendants were either directly involved in the alleged harsh conditions—most of

which Plaintiff readily admits were caused by other inmates placed in the MCU rather than by

prison staff themselves—or were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff.

Defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims.*

C. Plaintiff's Due Process Claims

In his remaining claims, Plaintiff contends that he was denied Due Process in various ways,

such as: (1) in his MCU placement hearings; (2) regular custody reviews; and (3) annual review

4 Because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment claims for the reasons expressed above, the Court does not address Defendants’ issue

and claim preclusion arguments as to the Eighth Amendment claims. Likewise, because

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims, the

Court need not address at this time Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff cannot seek compensatory

damages for his Eighth Amendment claims for lack of a concrete injury.

nh

hearings. Defendants contend that Plaintiff received all process which was due, and that they are

therefore entitled to summary judgment.

A prisoner only has a right to Due Process related to specific prison placement decisions

where those decisions impugn the prisoner’s liberty interest in avoiding “atypical and significant

hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Allah v. Bartkowski,

574 F. App’x 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that indefinite placement in a restrictive housing

unit—amounting to solitary confinement for the vast majority of the prisoner’s stay with

significant restrictions not shared by the prison’s general population—will trigger a liberty interest

and result in an entitlement to Due Process. /d.; see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143-44

(3d Cir. 2000) (finding placement in solitary confinement for years at a time sufficient to require

Due Process protections).

In their motions, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff's placement in the MCU posed a

significantly atypical hardship to affect a recognized liberty interest and entitle Plaintiff to Due

Process protections but, instead, argue that Plaintiff received sufficient process to meet the

requirements of Due Process. Given the considerable restrictions placed on MCU inmates, as well

as the significant amount of time spent in what essentially equates to solitary confinement with

little interaction beyond short periods of time spend in recreation, and Plaintiff's years’ long

indefinite placement in the MCU, the Court finds that Plaintiff was entitled to Due Process

protections in relation to his placement. See, e.g., Obataiye v. Lanigan, No. 14-5462, 2016 WL

5387626, at *7 (D.N.J. Sep. 26, 2016); see also Allah, 574 F. App’x at 139-40; Layton v. Beyer,

953 F.2d 839, 846-47 (3d Cir. 1992).

That Plaintiff had a protected liberty interest, however, is not the end of the issue. Instead,

the question becomes what procedures were required to protect that interest. At minimum, inmates

14

subjected to lengthy and indefinite placement in a unit such as the MCU are entitled to notice of

the intended placement decision, an opportunity to present their positions regarding the placement

question—either written or in person—and a good faith review of the relevant evidence by the

decision maker issuing the final placement decision. Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144-45. The Due Process

Clause does not require full adversarial proceedings for such placements. Jd. For indefinite, long

term solitary placements, prisoners are likewise entitled to regular review of their placement that

is not a “sham” or “perfunctory” in nature. Jd. at 145-47; Green v. Johnson, No. 15-8531, 2017

WL 3784034, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2017). The touchstone of Due Process in this context is thus

notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, even if in an informal, non-adversarial

proceeding. Allah, 574 F. App’x at 140; Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144-45.

Regulations controlling placement in the MCU provide for exactly these protections. As

the Third Circuit explained, “there are explicit substantive predicates that must be met before an

inmate may be placed in the [MCU] or Prehearing [MCU] under the New Jersey regulations. The

inmate must present a threat to the safety of others, a threat to property, or a threat to the operation

of the facility. Absent these substantive predicates, the administrative officials have no discretion

to place an inmate in [MCU] or Prehearing [MCU].” Layton, 952 F.2d at 846-47. State regulations

and relevant Due Process interests also require that the MCURC make its initial placement

decision within a reasonable time of a prisoner being placed in prehearing MCU status. /d. at 850

(noting a regulation requiring the initial decision within ftve working days but finding that Due

Process only required that this initial decision be provided within a reasonable time).

Inmates are entitled to notice at least twenty-four hours in advance of an MCURC hearing

on a placement decision, an opportunity to be heard as part of the placement decision process, and

an opportunity to present evidence and witnesses if deemed appropriate and reasonably available

by the MCURC. See N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:5-2.6. Regulations also provide for the development

1%

of a record of proceedings, a written notice of decision, and both regular and annual review

hearings at least every ninety days. /d. Additionally, inmates are entitled to appeal the MCURC’s

placement decision within the prison, see N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:5-2.7, and thereafter to the

Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. See N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2).

The facts before the Court indicate that the process Plaintiff received essentially complied

with these requirements. After Plaintiff was placed into Prehearing MCU custody, he was

provided with written notice and an initial placement hearing, which was slightly delayed to

provide for a hearing before a sufficient number of MCURC members. See Allah, 2008 WL

2245599, at *1-2. Plaintiff was provided with a memorandum detailing the evidence against him

that indicated he was placed into the MCU based on the smuggling scheme, which had brought

phones and contraband into the prison, as well as a written decision finding that Plaintiff was a

threat to the safety and security of the prison. /d. at *2-3. Plaintiff appealed, and the Associate

Administrator, Defendant Ricci, upheld the placement decision. Jd. Plaintiff appealed to the

Appellate Division, which rejected as meritless his contentions that the MCURC decision was

contrary to state regulations. /d, at *3-4. Plaintiff thereafter received regular routine and annual

reviews and was able to appeal the decisions continuing his MCU confinement. See Allah v. □□□

Dep't of Corr., No. A-3837-10T1, 2012 WL 2345390, at *1-5 (N.J. App. Div. June 21, 2012);

Allah v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. A-0330-12T1, 2016 WL 4821207, at *1-11 (N.J. App. Div. Sept.

12, 2016).

With respect to these reviews, the only clear fault the state courts found in the process

Plaintiff was provided was that in his initial placement, Defendant DeFilippo did not actually serve

her role as a MCURC member insomuch as she did not weigh the evidence against Plaintiff herself,

and was apparently unaware that she was intended to be a decisionmaker in that process. See

Allah, 2016 WL 4821207, at *8-9. The Appellate Division, however, remanded for Plaintiff to

19

receive a new initial placement hearing with a full complement of MCURC decisionmakers to

reconsider the evidence supporting his initial placement. /d. at *9-10. Plaintiff received this

rehearing, was provided with the necessary procedural protections during the hearing and was

afforded a full appeal to the Appellate Division, which upheld the rehearing’s determination that

Plaintiff was properly placed in the MCU. Allah, 2020 WL 1189745, at *1-7. Apart from

DeFilippo’s failure to properly serve her role in his initial placement hearing, then, it appears that

Plaintiff received all the process to which he was entitled related to his MCU placement.

In his deposition, Plaintiff expressed a generalized sentiment that his placement

proceedings did not comport with his own personal interpretation of the state regulations to support

his contention that his hearings did not comport with Due Process. He did not provide specific

testimony about violations of the regulations or clearly indicate which hearings directly suffered

from any alleged procedural faults. Rather, Plaintiff expressed general disagreement with the rules

applicable to MCU placements. Plaintiff only provided clear testimony regarding three

Defendants: (1) DeFilippo, who did not properly serve in her role as a MCURC member in

Plaintiff's initial placement hearing; (2) Defendant Ismail, who Plaintiff asserts did not weigh

evidence or render a decision at any review hearing of which she was a part based on an

interrogatory response in which she stated that she did not “vote, review evidence or provide input

with respect to any MCURC hearing that was attended for Plaintiff Allah” (see ECF No. 342-1 at

75-77, ECF No. 236-1 at 37); and (3) Defendant Raupp, who Plaintiff believes misstated the facts

in acting as the recordkeeper who made a written record of Plaintiff's MCU review hearings. Cd.

at 67-70.)

Because Plaintiff appears to have received all of the process that was required by the

regulations and Due Process, and he has failed to point out any specific instance in which

Defendants other than Raupp, DeFilippo, or Ismail failed to meet the requirements of the

applicable regulations, all Defendants other than Raupp, DeFilippo, and Ismail are entitled to

summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Due Process claims.

As to Defendant Raupp, Plaintiff testified that she included in the hearing record of one

hearing that Plaintiff's continued placement was based, in part, on a failure to complete all assigned

programs, which Plaintiff believes was inaccurate considering Raupp’s knowledge that he had

completed at least some of the assigned programs. (/d. at 74-75.) Having reviewed the records of

the decisions of the MCU regarding Plaintiff, it does appear that on certain occasions the failure

to complete ail assigned programs was noted. It is not clear, however: (1) whether this alleged

failure had any actual bearing on the outcome of Plaintiffs placement (see ECF No. 306-5 at 1-29);

(2) that Plaintiff had completed all programs required of him, or if he had only completed a single

program with others to follow; or (3) that Raupp’s records were actually inaccurate. Even if the

written records of the decisions Raupp prepared were inaccurate to the extent that they misstated

that Plaintiff had not completed all assigned programs, that alone is not sufficient to indicate that

Plaintiff was denied Due Process because Plaintiff was provided administrative and Appellate

Division appeals in which he was provided ample opportunity to correct what he may have

perceived as misstatements in the records of his hearings. As such, Raupp’s alleged inaccurate

record keeping does not appear to have deprived Plaintiff of Due Process and thus is insufficient

to support a claim for relief against her. As no reasonable factfinder could find that Plaintiff was

deprived of Due Process by the alleged mistakes in the record, which Plaintiff had ample

opportunity to address on appeal, Defendant Raupp is entitled to summary judgment as to

Plaintiff's Due Process claims.

As to Defendants DeFilippo and Ismail, however, Plaintiff has provided testimony that

they stated on the record that they did not weigh evidence or render a decision during their service

as MCURC members attending Plaintiff's hearings, and the record of this matter and Ismail’s

□□

interrogatory response support this testimony. In so doing, they essentially deprived Plaintiff of

one-third of the decision-making body to which he was entitled under the appropriate regulations.

Indeed, the Appellate Division, in remanding’ for a new review hearing in light of DeFilippo’s

testimony that she had not weighed the evidence and helped to render a decision, essentially

determined that Plaintiffs procedural rights as to MCU placement had not been met in the original

proceeding. As a rational fact finder could therefore potentially find in Plaintiffs favor that the

failure of DeFilippo and Ismail to serve as a decisionmaker during MCU placement and review

hearings deprived Plaintiff of process, Defendants DeFilippo and Ismail are not entitled to

summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Due Process claims.

Defendant Ismail contends, nevertheless, that she should still be entitled to summary

judgment as to Plaintiff's Due Process claim because she is entitled to qualified immunity as the

right in question was not clearly established at the time of the proceedings. The doctrine of

qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions “‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Santini v. Fuentes, 795

F.3d 410, 417 Gd Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow vy. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “When

properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Spady y. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015)

> That Plaintiff eventually received a new hearing in relation to DeFilippo’s failure to weigh the

evidence does not negate the Due Process issue of being denied part of the decision-making body

to which he was entitled in his placement procedure. Even assuming the re-done initial placement

hearing rendered any request for injunctive relief moot by providing new process sufficient to

support a continued MCU placement, it does not undo the fact that Plaintiffs rights may have been

violated in his initial proceeding and that Plaintiff may therefore be entitled to, at least, nominal

damages. See, e.g., Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 694 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (the availability of

nominal damages for procedural due process violations does not require actual injury; a plaintiff

who is able to receive relief from the alleged consequences of a due process violation through

other means can still obtain nominal damages for the due process violation itself through a civil

rights proceeding).

14

(quoting Ashcrofi v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)). In determining whether immunity applies,

courts use a two-pronged test: first, “a court must decide ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has...

shown make out a violation of a constitutional right’[, a]nd second, the Court must determine

‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged

misconduct.’” /d. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

As explained above, a rational fact finder could find a violation of Plaintiff's Due Process

rights as to Defendants Ismail and DeFilippo in this matter. The remaining question is whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. For a claim to be clearly established,

“existing precedent [must have] placed the . . . constitutional [right in] question beyond debate.”

id. at 638. Except for cases involving “obvious violations” of prior Supreme Court rulings, a

plaintiff's claim will only be “clearly established” where “the violative nature of the particular

conduct [was] clearly established.” James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020).

The conduct in question must therefore be defined at an “appropriate level of specificity,” Spady,

800 F.3d at 638, and, when so defined, the plaintiff must identify “a case where an officer acting

under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated” the constitutional provision in question.

James, 957 F.3d at 169-70.

The right at issue in Plaintiff's claims against DeFilippo and Ismail is the right to have the

appropriate decisionmaker in an indefinite solitary confinement prison placement actually weigh

the evidence presented and reach an appropriate decision. Where inmates have protected liberty

interests at stake, the right to an appropriate decisionmaker who actually weighs the evidence

presented and reaches a conclusion after the inmate is provided notice and an opportunity to be

heard has been a cornerstone of clearly established federal law for decades. See, e.g, Wolf v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1974); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1983);

Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144-45. It was thus clearly established that inmates, in situations sufficiently

17

analogous to Plaintiff's in this instance, do have a right for the decisionmaker in their placement

hearings to actually consider, weigh, and reach a decision on the evidence presented. Ismail’s

qualified immunity arguments must therefore fail as to Plaintiff's remaining Due Process claims

against Ismail and DeFilippo.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's remaining Due Process claims against Ismail and

DeFillipo are barred by the principles of res judicata and New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine.

As the Third Circuit has explained,

The entire controversy doctrine is essentially New Jersey’s specific,

idiosyncratic, application of traditional res judicata principles. The

doctrine embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal

controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court;

accordingly all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least

present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are

related to the underlying controversy. The purposes of the entire

controversy doctrine are threefold: (1) the need for complete and

final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions;

(2) fairness to the parties to the action and those with a material

interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste

and the reduction of delay.

In determining whether a claim is barred by the doctrine, a court’s

central consideration is whether the claim arise[s] from related facts

or the same transaction or series of transactions. It is the core set of

facts that provides the link between distinct claims against the same

or different parties and triggers the requirement that they be

determined in one proceeding. Additionally, the entire controversy

doctrine applies only when a prior action based on the same

transactional facts has been tried to judgment or settled.

However, the doctrine is constrained by principles of equity. It

remains an equitable rule of preclusion whose application is left to

judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual

cases. Accordingly, the entire controversy’s equitable nature bars’

its application where to do so would be unfair in the totality of the

circumstances and would not promote its objectives, namely, the

promotion of conclusive determinations, party fairness, and judicial

economy and efficiency.

United States ex rel. Charte v. Am. Tutor, Inc., 934 F.3d 346, 351 (Gd Cir. 2019) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

12

A basic requirement of the doctrine, however, is that “the forum of the earlier action...

must have been able to provide all parties with the same full and fair opportunity to litigate the

issues and with the same remedial opportunities as the [later] forum.” McDade v. P&P Assocs.,

Inc., No. A-0683-21, 2023 WL 8743169, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 19, 2023). Here,

the prior actions were all appeals to the Appellate Division from administrative prison proceedings,

not civil actions. Those appeals provided only a single potential remedy — the reversal and remand

for further proceedings. The chief remedy remaining to Plaintiff in this matter—damages of at

least a nominal character—was entirely unavailable in his appeals of prison administrative

decisions, nor could Plaintiff bring claims against any of the numerous named Defendants in such

an appeal seeking at least nominal damages. As the remedial opportunities were entirely different

between the administrative appeals and this civil rights proceeding, the prior administrative

appeals do not bar Plaintiff from seeking damages from Defendants DeFilippo and Ismail under

the entire controversy doctrine.

Defendant DeFilippo also argues that general res judicata principles bar Plaintiff's Due

Process claims against her separate and apart from the entire controversy doctrine. The doctrine

of res judicata generally bars claims where there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior

suit which involved the same parties or their privies and the subsequent suit raises claims based

on the same causes of action. Riley v. DeCarlo, 532 F. App’x 23, 26-27 (3d Cir. 2013). In Jones

v. Holvey, 29 F.3d 828, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1994), the Third Circuit held that it would be inappropriate

to apply res judicata to bar a section 1983 claim for damages because of an earlier prison

disciplinary appeal raising similar claims where the damages claims would most likely not have

been heard or considered on the merits by the Appellate Division had the plaintiff sought to raise

them. The current situation is analogous in that the prior proceeding here was an administrative

appeal to the Appellate Division from Plaintiff's MCU proceedings, and it is almost certain that

10

the Appellate Division would not have considered Plaintiff's section 1983 damages claims in

deciding that appeal had Plaintiff sought to raise them. Thus, here, as in Jones, application of res

judicata to bar Plaintiff's current claim for, at least, nominal damages would be inappropriate.

DeFillipo is therefore not entitled to judgment at this time on res judicata grounds. /d. Defendants’

motions for summary judgment shall therefore be granted in part and denied in part.

IV. CONCLUSION

The moving Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 305, 306) are granted

in part and denied in part. Judgment shall be entered in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiff's

Eighth Amendment claims, and as to all Defendants other than DeFilippo and Ismail as to

Plaintiff's Due Process claims. Plaintiff's Motion for emergent relief (ECF No. 336) is denied.

An appropriate order follows.

MICHAEL A. SHIPP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: Sl28/ae

an