Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROOSEVELT LASHAWN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Hon. Paul L. Maloney

GOOGLE, INC., et al., Case No. 1:26-cv-1471

Defendants.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Roosevelt Lashawn Williams filed a pro se complaint on May 4, 2026, against

Google, Inc. (named as Google Corporation), Facebook Meta, David Crash Partain, and City-

Data.com invoking the Court’s federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Williams

alleges that Defendants have used his name without authorization and he seeks an injunction

directing Defendants to remove his name from their databases and to refrain from further

unauthorized use of his name. He also requests compensatory damages. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.29.)

On May 6, 2026, I granted Williams’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.)

Accordingly, I have conducted an initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

For the following reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss the complaint because it fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. Background

Williams alleges that he sent a series of notices to Defendants Google, City-Data.com, and

Facebook Meta advising them of Privacy Act violations and unauthorized use of his intellectual

property. (Id. at PageID.7.) He alleges that on May 5, 2025, he sent a Privacy Act of 1974 Violation

Notice to Google. (Id.) Google acknowledged receipt of his notice on October 16, 2025. (Id.)

Williams alleges that on “numerous occasions” he sent notices to City-Data.com advising it that it

had violated intellectual property rights laws and his privacy rights under the United States

Constitution through its use of his intellectual property. The notices also demanded that City-

Data.com cease further use of his intellectual property and remove it from its website. (Id.) Finally,

Williams alleges that on March 14, 2026, and on numerous other occasions, he sent similar notices

to Facebook Meta, but it constantly responds that it has violated no law or policy. (Id.) Although

Williams does not identify his intellectual property in his complaint, he does so in his Privacy Act

of 1974 Violation Notice to Google (ECF No. 1-1) and his Common Law Copyright Notice (ECF

No. 1-6): his name, Roosevelt Lashawn Williams.1

II. Failure to State a Claim

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s

allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations

and footnote omitted).

As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain “sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility standard “is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

1 Williams makes no factual allegations about Defendant David Crash Partain in his complaint,

which provides a separate basis for dismissal as to this Defendant.

has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a

court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a

notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of

a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with

nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible

claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged— but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).

Because Williams is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleading more liberally

than is usually the case for formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). But this liberal pleading standard “is not without its limits, and does not ‘abrogate

basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.’” Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 817 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently, “[l]iberal

construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf.” Erwin v.

Edwards, 22 F. Appx 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). To require otherwise “would not only strain judicial

resources . . . but would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the

improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies

for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

III. Discussion

Although the complaint contains an extensive discussion of laws pertaining to intellectual

property, Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code, the United States Constitution, and various

privacy laws, Williams fails to allege any cognizable claim.

Turning first to Williams’s Privacy Act Notice (ECF No. 1-1), he cannot maintain a Privacy

Act violation as that law “applies to federal agencies, not private entities,” such as Defendants.

Sharwell v. Best Buy, No. 00-3206, 2000 WL 1478341, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000); see also

Williams v. First Merit Bank, No. 5:05CV1939, 2005 WL 2416933, at * (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30,

2005) (“By the express terms of the statute, the Privacy Act only applies to federal agencies, not

private entities.”).

Next, despite Williams’s numerous references to the United States Constitution in both his

Privacy Act Notice and in his complaint, Defendants cannot be held liable for violating the

constitution because they are not state actors. Courts have repeatedly dismissed constitutional

claims against Google, Facebook, and other social media companies on the basis that they are

private companies not subject to suit under Section 1983. See Handlon v. Google, Inc., No. 23-

13795, 2024 WL 4824355, at *1 (11th Cir. June 18, 2024) (observing that “any appeal of the

district court’s orders would be frivolous” because “Google’s conduct was that of a private entity,

and Handlon failed to allege facts that would render it a state actor for the purposes of a § 1983

suit”); McWaters v. Houston, No. 2:21-cv-57, 2022 WL 395309, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2022)

(noting that “Facebook, as a social media company, does not become a state actor based solely on

the availability of its social media network to the public, even if Facebook is alleged to have

discriminatorily regulated speech on its forum”); Rutenburg v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00548-

YGR, 2021 WL 1338958, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2021) (“It is undisputed that Twitter is a private

company.”) (citing, among others, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018

WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018), aff’d, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding

that YouTube did not perform a public function simply by hosting speech on a private digital-

video platform for the public); Nyabwa v. Facebook, No. 2:17-CV-24, 2018 WL 585467, at *1

(S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to state a First Amendment claim

because Facebook was not the government); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057,

2007 WL 831806, at *13–15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (holding that Google was not a state actor

for constitutional claims); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631–32 (D. Del. 2007)

(ruling that Google is a private entity not subject to the plaintiff’s constitutional claims)). Because

Defendants are private companies and a private individual, and because Williams alleges no fact

indicating how they became state actors for purposes of Section 1983, see Lugar v. Edmonson Oil

Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), he fails to state any constitutional claim. Moreover, even if

Defendants could be considered state actors—which they are not—Williams fails to allege how

their use of his name that is in the public domain violated the constitution.

Next, Williams fails to state a claim under the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act defines a

trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof” used by a person

“to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured

or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 15 U.S.C.

§1127. To state a claim for trademark infringement, “a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that:

(1) it owns the . . . trademark; (2) the defendant used the mark in commerce; and (3) the use was

likely to cause confusion.” Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009).

Williams does not come close to alleging a Lanham Act claim. He does not allege that he uses his

name to identify and distinguish a good or service from those manufactured or sold by Defendants.

Moreover, nothing in his complaint alleges that Defendants’ use of his name is likely to cause

confusion. Rather, his concern appears to be that Defendants have identified him as a registered

sex offender—a true and publicly-known fact. (ECF No. 1-3.) However, “courts have consistently

held that a plaintiff cannot make out a claim for infringement where, as here, the use of a mark is

for the purpose of identifying the markholder.” Manchanda v. Google, No. 16-CV-3350, 2016 WL

6806250, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016) (citing Cintas Corp. v. Unite Here, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571,

579 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Next, Williams appears to allege claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright

Act and common law. Williams has no claim for infringement under the Copyright Act because

he does not allege that he obtained a copyright registration for his name prior to filing his

complaint. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. 296, 301 (2019)

(“[A]lthough an owner’s rights exist apart from registration, . . . registration is akin to an

administrative exhaustion requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce

ownership rights.”). More problematic for Williams, though, is that he cannot obtain a copyright

registration for his name. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a); see also Trapp v. Holder, No. 2:14-CV-12235,

2014 WL 2780079, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2014) (“A person’s name or likeness is not

considered a ‘work of authorship’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and is therefore not

subject to copyright protection.” (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1004

(9th Cir.2001))); see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2000)

(noting that “personal identity” is “an inchoate ‘idea’ which is not amenable to copyright

protection”). Finally, Williams has no common law copyright infringement claim because “[t]he

Copyright Act of 1978 . . . preempted the doctrine of common law copyrights.” Buemi v. Lewis,

No. 94-4156, 1995 WL 149107, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1995); see also Univ. of Pittsburgh v.

Townsend, No. 3:04-CV-291, 2004 WL 7338343, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2004) (“The plain

meaning of [17 U.S.C.] § 301 is that the Act abolished common law copyright by preemption.”).

Williams also refers to Article Nine of Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code and attaches

a UCC-1 Financing Statement identifying Williams as the secured party and R.L. Williams

(himself) as the debtor and purporting to list his name as the collateral.2 Any suggestion that such

document creates any cause of action against Defendants is frivolous.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.

1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and

an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an

arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.

2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis

for an appeal and recommend that, should Williams appeal this decision, the Court assess the

$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.

Date: May 18, 2026 /s/ Sally J. Berens

SALLY J. BERENS

U.S. Magistrate Judge

2 To the extent Williams asserts the Uniform Commercial Code as a state-law claim, he fails to

properly allege diversity jurisdiction as nothing in the compliant indicates that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Moreover,

Williams fails to allege complete diversity as he does not list Defendant Partain’s citizenship.

OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court

within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file

objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).