The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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STEVEN METZ, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01511-JNW
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Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
9 JEFFREY LEEPER’S MOTION TO
v. DISMISS
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JEFFREY LEEPER, et al.,
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Defendants.
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14 1. INTRODUCTION
15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Jeffrey Leeper’s motion to
16 dismiss pro se Plaintiff Steven Metz’s complaint. Dkt. No. 18. Metz was found guilty
17 of criminal trespassing in a state court prosecution. He alleges that Leeper, the
18 prosecutor in that case, violated federal law by depriving him of his constitutional
19 rights and prosecuting him without probable cause and with malice. Because these
20 allegations involve Leeper’s role as a prosecuting attorney, absolute immunity
21 attaches, and Metz’s claims against Leeper are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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1 2. BACKGROUND
2 The Court takes the following facts from the complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and
3 considers them true for purposes of ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.
4 On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff Metz was detained and arrested in front of the
5 Department of Licensing in Oak Harbor. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. On January 21, 2025,
6 Defendant Leeper, acting in his role as Prosecuting Attorney for Island County,
7 Washington, charged Metz with one count of Criminal Trespass in the Second
8 Degree. Dkt. No. 23-1. Metz was found guilty of that charge on June 12, 2025. Dkt.
9 No. 23-2.
10 On August 7, 2025, Metz sued Leeper, along with other individuals and
11 municipalities involved in his arrest. Dkt. No. 1. He generally alleges that the
12 Defendants “subjected [him] to a campaign of harassment, retaliation, negligence,
13 judicial abuse, prosecutorial misconduct, and unlawful arrest and assault,” in
14 violation of state and federal law. Id. The only specific allegations directed at
15 Leeper are (1) that he charged Metz “despite video and testimonial evidence
16 confirming that Plaintiff remained in a public space and was conducting legitimate
17 business,” id. ¶ 14, (2) that his “actions constitute malicious prosecution and
18 intentional infliction of emotional distress,” id. ¶ 19, and (3) that he prosecuted
19 Metz “without probable cause and with malice, resulting in damages,” id. ¶ 23.
20 Leeper moved to dismiss under Rule 12(c). Dkt. No. 18.
21 3. LEGAL STANDARD
22 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are
23 closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the
1 pleadings.” “Judgment on the pleadings is proper ‘when there is no issue of material
2 fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
3 Scanlon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 92 F.4th 781, 796 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Fleming
4 v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Analysis under Rule 12(c) is
5 ‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a
6 court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true,
7 entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793
8 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102,
9 1108 (9th Cir. 2012)).
10 The Court will grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the complaint fails to allege
11 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
12 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When considering a motion to dismiss, the
13 Court accepts factual allegations pled in the complaint as true and construes them
14 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th
15 Cir. 2021). Additionally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(e), “pleadings
16 must be construed so as to do justice.” See also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
17 (2007). Therefore, a “document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se
18 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
19 than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. But even under this liberal standard,
20 a pro se plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support the elements of a claim; the
21 Court cannot supply essential elements not initially pled. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents
22 of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
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1 4. DISCUSSION
2 Leeper moves to dismiss Metz’s complaint on several grounds, including
3 absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Heck v. Humphrey bar, and failure to state a
4 claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before reaching the merits of
5 the motion, the Court addresses Metz’s objection to Leeper’s declaration. Because
6 the Court finds that absolute prosecutorial immunity resolves the motion, it
7 addresses immunity before turning to leave to amend.
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4.1 The Court may consider the public records attached to Leeper’s
declaration.
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Metz objects to the Declaration of Jeffrey Leeper, Dkt. No. 23, which attaches
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the state court criminal complaint, judgment, and docket. Dkt. No. 25. On a motion
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to dismiss, a court may consider documents “‘whose contents are alleged in a
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complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically
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attached to the plaintiff’s pleading.’” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.
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2005) (quoting In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th
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Cir.1999)). Metz’s claims rest on the criminal prosecution and the existence of the
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charge and conviction are referenced in the complaint. The Court may also take
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judicial notice of these public records, including the docket, under Federal Rule of
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Evidence 201. That said, the Court considers them for the limited purpose of
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establishing two undisputed facts—that Metz was charged and convicted of
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Criminal Trespass in the Second Degree. Metz’s objection is OVERRULED.
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1 4.2 Leeper’s action served a judicial function, and therefore is protected
by absolute immunity.
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Prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability under both common
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law and § 1983 claims for conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial
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phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)
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(extending the “well settled” complete prosecutorial immunity at common law to §
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1983 claims). “Absolute immunity does not protect prosecutors merely because they
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are prosecutors; rather, immunity turns on ‘the nature of the function performed,
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not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Gibson v. City of Portland, No. 24-
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1663, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 235118, at *10 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (quoting Kalina
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v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)). The official seeking absolute immunity bears
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the burden of demonstrating that absolute immunity is justified for the conduct in
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question. Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Leeper’s decision to prosecute Metz falls squarely within the “judicial phase
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of the criminal process” that prosecutorial immunity is designed to protect. Imbler,
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424 U.S. at 430. Metz alleges that Leeper prosecuted him “without probable cause
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and with malice, resulting in damages.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. However, a prosecutor’s
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immunity extends to all decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute a given case.
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Botello, 413 F.3d at 976 (citations omitted). A prosecutor may claim absolute
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immunity for “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler,
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424 U.S. at 431. This principle encompasses suits like Metz’s which allege federal
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violations of state malicious prosecution. See Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008
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(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416).
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1 In Imbler, the Supreme Court acknowledged that protecting prosecutors from
2 litigation serves the motivating principles behind such immunity, noting that fear
3 of litigation would “deflect[] . . . the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties” and
4 may cause the prosecutor to “shade his decisions instead of exercising the
5 independence of judgment required by the public trust.” 424 U.S. at 423. In doing
6 so, the Court accepted that absolute immunity may insulate bad faith prosecutorial
7 action from civil redress, but elevated the importance of the “vigorous and fearless
8 performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of
9 the criminal justice system.” Id. at 427–28.
10 Metz asserts that “[q]ualified immunity cannot be resolved prior to discovery
11 when factual disputes exist regarding an officer’s conduct and state of mind.” Dkt.
12 No. 24 at 2. However, because the decision whether to prosecute is protected by
13 absolute rather than qualified immunity, the prosecutor’s state of mind when
14 making the decision to prosecute is irrelevant to this inquiry. See, e.g., Patterson v.
15 Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that absolute immunity
16 applies to the prosecutor’s “performance of prosecutorial functions, even if the acts
17 in question were committed in bad faith.”).
18 The Court recognizes that absolute immunity does not extend to a
19 prosecutor’s investigatory or administrative functions, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
20 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993), and that in his supplemental brief and surreply, Metz
21 tries to recharacterize his claims as challenging conduct outside Leeper’s advocacy
22 role—asserting that Leeper engaged in “investigatory, administrative, and
23 retaliatory conduct,” including “[c]onspiring with or directing law enforcement,”
1 “[f]abricating or misrepresenting evidence,” and “[a]busing his authority in a
2 retaliatory manner,” Dkt. No. 25 at 3. But having carefully reviewed the complaint,
3 the opposition briefs, and the surreply, the Court finds no factual allegations to
4 support these theories. As stated in the background section above, every allegation
5 directed at Leeper concerns his decision to charge and prosecute Metz, which are
6 the core advocacy functions protected by Imbler. No filing identifies what
7 investigatory conduct Leeper supposedly undertook, when any pre-filing
8 communication with law enforcement occurred, what evidence was purportedly
9 fabricated or misrepresented, or how any retaliatory conduct manifested. These are
10 legal conclusions, not factual allegations, and they are insufficient to overcome
11 prosecutorial immunity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
12 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
14 Absent any factual allegations to support that Leeper’s conduct was
15 investigative or administrative in nature, Leeper is absolutely immune from all
16 claims asserted against him and dismissal of all claims against him is warranted.1
17 Leeper also moves to dismiss on the grounds that, since Metz’s conviction has
18 not been reversed or invalidated, his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
19 U.S. 477 (1994), and that Metz’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
20 fails to allege extreme and outrageous conduct. Because the Court resolves this
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22 1 Defendants Oak Harbor and James Hoagland have a separate motion for
summary judgment pending, Dkt. No. 32, which the Court will address in a
23 separate order.
1 motion on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, it need not reach these
2 alternative grounds for dismissal.
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4.3 Leave to amend.
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Courts are not to “dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless
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it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
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amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
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Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)). The Court takes this
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obligation seriously and has given Metz every benefit of the doubt, including
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consideration of his unauthorized surreply.2 See Dkt. No. 31.
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Having reviewed the complaint, the opposition briefing, the supplemental
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brief, and the surreply, the Court finds that the deficiencies here cannot be cured by
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amendment. The complaint’s only allegations against Leeper concern his decision to
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charge and prosecute Metz. These are advocacy functions for which Leeper has
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absolute immunity, and no amendment can change the nature of the conduct
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alleged. Moreover, although Metz took three opportunities to articulate facts
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supporting an investigatory or administrative misconduct theory—in his opposition,
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supplemental brief, and surreply—he offered only conclusory assertions lacking any
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supporting factual content. At no point did Metz identify any specific acts by Leeper
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outside the prosecutorial advocacy function. The Court is satisfied that it is
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21 2 Under LCR 7(g), a surreply may be filed only to request that the Court strike
material contained in a reply brief, must be filed within five days of the reply, and
22 must be limited to that request. Metz's surreply is a substantive response to
Leeper's reply, filed thirteen days later. Nevertheless, the Court has considered it in
23 the interest of justice.
1 “absolutely clear” that amendment would be futile. Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039. Metz’s
2 complaint against Leeper is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
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5. CONCLUSION
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Leeper’s motion to dismiss, and DISMISSES
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Metz’s complaint against Leeper WITH PREJUDICE.
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Dated this 24th day of February, 2026.
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A
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Jamal N. Whitehead
United States District Judge
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