Steelman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

CLARENCE STEELMAN PLAINTIFF

V. No. 4:23-cv-1068-DPM

CITY OF SHANNON HILLS,

ARKANSAS and HUNTER SULECKLI, In

His Individual and Official Capacity as a

Police Officer for the Shannon Hills Police

Department DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This is a case about an allegedly unlawful arrest and allegedly

excessive force used in that arrest. Officer Hunter Sulecki pulled over

Cortell Randolph for expired tags. After discovering that Randolph's

driver’s license was suspended, and that he had an active warrant,

Officer Sulecki detained him. Randolph had two passengers in his car,

including a small child. He didn’t want his car to be towed, so he called

his uncle, Clarence Steelman. All this was happening beside a busy

road, just beyond a Dollar General parking lot. When Steelman got to

the scene, he began shouting and causing a ruckus. Officer Sulecki put

him in handcuffs. He walked Steelman over to the curb, and ordered

him to sit down. Steelman didn’t comply immediately.

What happened next is disputed. In the end, though, Officer Sulecki

took Steelman down and broke his leg. Steelman was charged with

several misdemeanors, which were all dropped.

Officer Sulecki and the city of Shannon Hills seek summary

judgment on Steelman’s resulting claims. Officer Sulecki asserts

qualified immunity. Steelman wants a trial. Where some genuine

dispute of material fact exists, the Court takes the record in the light

most favorable to Steelman. Oglesby v. Lesan, 929 F.3d 526, 531-32 (8th

2019). When the body camera and FaceTime videos are clear, the

Court has accepted those videos for the truth of what happened.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Steelman’s Fourth Amendment claim for a warrantless arrest fails

as a matter of law. Officer Sulecki had arguable probable cause to arrest

him. Ulrich v. Pope County, 715 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013).

Steelman approached the traffic stop, shouting at Officer Sulecki while

the officer was arresting Randolph. Doc. 27-3 at 16:00:48-16:01:011.

Even Randolph was encouraging Steelman to stay back. Ibid.

Steelman came towards them anyway. Doc. 27-3 at 16:02:06-16:02:12.

Officer Sulecki was alone. All this provided a reasonable officer at least

arguable probable cause to arrest Steelman for obstructing

governmental operations. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-102(a)(1); Sullivan v.

Richardson, 2026 Ark. App. 145, at 5-6. Steelman kept shouting at and

arguing with Officer Sulecki. These actions provided arguable

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probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-71-207; Ward v. City of Sherwood, 173 F.Ath 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2026)

(Arkansas law). Finally, Steelman pulled his arms away after Officer

Sulecki ordered him to put them behind his back. Doc. 27-3 at

16:02:25-16:03:00. That created arguable probable cause for a resisting

arrest charge. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-103; Pursley v. State, 302 Ark. 471,

474-75, 791 S.W.2d 359, 360-61 (1990). No constitutional violation

occurred in the arrest.

Steelman’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim requires

deeper analysis. Officer Sulecki presses for qualified immunity.

A recent word from the Supreme Court summarizes the applicable law.

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit

under § 1983 unless their conduct violates clearly

established law. A right is clearly established when it is

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right. A right

is not clearly established if existing precedent does not place

the constitutional question beyond debate. To find that a

right is clearly established, courts generally need to identify

a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances

was held to have violated the Constitution. The relevant

precedent must define the right with a high degree of

specificity, so that every reasonable official would interpret

it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.

Principles stated generally, such as that an officer may not

use unreasonable and excessive force, do not suffice.

In short, officers receive qualified immunity unless they

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could have read the relevant precedent beforehand and

known that it proscribed their specific conduct. [. . .]

Whether any particular use of force violates the Fourth

Amendment depends on the facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including whether the officer gave warnings

before using force.

Zorn v. Linton, No. 25-297, slip op. at 3-4 (U.S. 23 March 2026) (per

curiam) (quotations and citations omitted).

Under applicable Eighth Circuit precedent, it’s been clearly

established for some time that an officer can’t take a compliant,

non-threatening pretrial detainee to the ground. E.g., Montoya v. City of

Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 870-73 (8th Cir. 2012); Karels v. Storz, 906 F.3d

740, 744-47 (8th Cir. 2018); MacKintrush v. Pulaski County Sheriff's

Department, 987 F.3d 767, 770-71 (8th Cir. 2021); Cartia v. Beeman,

122 F.4th 1036, 1042 (8th Cir. 2024). But if the person is resisting, the

question gets closer. Though a reasonable officer isn’t required to treat

a detainee as gently as possible, our law doesn’t allow gratuitous

violence. Blazek v. City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2014).

The objective reasonableness of the officer’s judgment about the

amount of responding force depends, for example, on the severity of

the crime, if the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer’s or

others’ safety, and if the suspect was resisting arrest. Graham v. Connor,

490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir.

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2020). More resistance justifies more force. Kohorst, 968 F.3d at 876;

Cartia, 122 F.4th at 1041-42 (surveying the cases).

Looking at this encounter from the perspective of a reasonable

officer, and taking the record in Steelman’s favor, genuine disputes of

material fact exist. MacKintrush, 987 F.3d at 770. Keep in mind that all

this was happening beside a busy road. Officer Sulecki was dealing

alone with two detainees. Steelman was upset. He didn’t prevent

Officer Sulecki from handcuffing him and walking him to the curb, but

he wasn’t happy about it, either. He was fussing. And when Officer

Sulecki told him to sit down, he didn’t do so immediately.

But the parties disagree—and the available video is unclear—

about what happened in the critical moments before Officer Sulecki

took Steelman to the ground. Compare Doc. 27-2 at 2 & Doc. 33-1 at 2-3,

with Doc. 27-4 at 38-41 & Doc. 33-1 at 5-12. In the body camera footage,

Steelman appears to begin sitting before rising back up while finishing

his thought. Doc. 27-3 at 16:03:27-16:03:29. Yet Officer Sulecki

immediately took him down. The FaceTime video doesn’t provide

much more clarity. It shows Steelman putting his leg behind him,

which could be seen as resisting the command to sit down. Doc. 27-7 at

00:00:23-00:00:27. But it could also be viewed as him tripping

backward over the curb after Officer Sulecki started grappling with

him. Everything happened very fast. The amount of force Officer

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Sulecki used on Steelman is also disputed, and the videos don’t clearly

support one side’s version of the events.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Steelman, a jury

could find that a reasonable officer in Officer Sulecki’s position

wouldn’t have thought that Steelman was ignoring his command to sit

down and that Officer Sulecki tackled Steelman. Compare Cartia,

122 F.4th at 1042. If Steelman was cooperating, albeit with some verbal

grousing, the tackle violated his clearly established rights. Karels v.

Storz, 906 F.3d 740, 745-46 (8th Cir. 2018). Officer Sulecki is therefore

not entitled to qualified immunity at this time. Kelley v. Pruett, 163 F.4th

1130, 1134 (8th Cir. 2026).

A jury must decide these disputed facts:

e Did Steelman begin to sit down moments before Officer Sulecki

grappled with him?

e Did Steelman put his foot back to brace himself against sitting

down, or was he trying to not fall backwards?

e Did Officer Sulecki merely put pressure on Steelman’s shoulders

and stomach, or did he tackle him?

Based on the jury’s answers to special interrogatories, the Court will

make a final ruling on qualified immunity. Lee v. Andersen, 616 F.3d

803, 811 (8th Cir. 2010). If Officer Sulecki is not entitled to qualified

immunity, the jury will then decide (after further instruction and a

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second closing argument) whether Officer Sulecki used excessive

force. Ibid.

Steelman’s echoing state law battery claim about the allegedly

excessive force goes forward, too. Battery is wrongful and unpermitted

physical contact. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 156, 121 S.W.3d

164, 170 (2003); HOWARD W. BRILL AND CHRISTIAN H. BRILL, ARKANSAS

LAW OF DAMAGES § 33:6 (Nov. 2025 update). If Officer Sulecki violated

Steelman’s constitutional rights, then his touch was wrongful. E.g.,

Muhammad v. McCarrell, 536 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2008).

Steelman’s many other claims fail as a matter of law. The Fifth

Amendment applies to the federal government’s actions, not the state’s.

Jackson v. Stair, 944 P3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 2019). The Eighth

Amendment applies to convicted prisoners, not pretrial detainees like

Steelman. Ibid. He has abandoned his Fourteenth Amendment race

discrimination claim by not responding to the motion for summary

judgment on this point. Satcher v. University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff

Board of Trustees, 558 F.3d 731, 734-35 (8th Cir. 2009). Because Officer

Sulecki had arguable probable cause to arrest Steelman, his Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim also drops out. Marksmeier v. Davie,

622 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010). His state-law false arrest claim fails

for the same reason. Headrick v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 Ark. 433, 436,

738 S.W.2d 418, 420 (1987). Finally, Steelman’s official-capacity claim

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against Officer Sulecki duplicates his Monell claim. Robb v.

Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 2004). And his Monell claim

fails: Shannon Hills’s policy is to use reasonable force, not excessive

force. Doc. 27-5 at 63-66. Plus there’s no record evidence of a

widespread custom of excessive force. Board of County Commissioners of

Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997).

Motion for summary judgment, Doc. 25, mostly granted and

partly denied. Steelman’s individual-capacity excessive force and

battery claims against Officer Sulecki proceed. Qualified immunity is

denied without prejudice on those claims. All his other claims are

dismissed with prejudice. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate the

city of Shannon Hills as a defendant. This case is first out for trial on

6 July 2026.

So Ordered.

fo

D.P. Marsinall jr.

United States District Judge

27 May abate _

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