Opinion

Fowler

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Mar 23, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

KEITH FOWLER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:26-cv-116-KKM-AEP

AARON HOTHEM et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Keith Fowler sues Tampa Police Department Officers Aaron

Hothem and Kyle Brown, and a third, unknown officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for claims related to Fowler’s arrest. See Compl. (Doc. 1). Officers Hothem and

Brown move to partially dismiss Fowler’s claims. Mot. (Doc. 14). Fowler

opposes. Resp. (Doc. 15). For the reasons explained below, I grant the

defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2024, Fowler and his son departed Raymond James

Stadium after a Tampa Bay Buccaneers football game. Compl. ¶ 9. While

Fowler and his son walked to their vehicle, a group of fans “approached

[Fowler] and his son in a threatening manner, attempting to cause violence to

[them].” Id. ¶ 10. All three officers observed the interaction, and Fowler

approached Officer Hothem and asked him to detain the unruly fans. Id.

¶¶ 11–12. Hothem ignored Fowler’s request, and the group of fans “attacked”

Fowler and his son. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Brown “and another uninvolved officer

were able to detain some of the unruly fans,” permitting Fowler and his son to

temporarily escape. Id. ¶ 14. But “[a]s [Fowler] was gathering his steps to leave

from the assault, Defendant Hothem deployed his taser and delivered a long

period of electric voltage to [Fowler’s] body.” Id. ¶ 16. Officer Brown and the

third officer “joined in on the assault” and “began to deliver strikes to [Fowler]

while attempting to place [him] in handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 17. Fowler suffered a

fractured finger. Id. ¶ 18. Hothem then arrested Fowler, who was charged with

resisting arrest without violence. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. The State ultimately dropped

the charge against Fowler “[a]fter reviewing [b]ody [w]orn [c]amera” footage of

the incident. Id. ¶ 21.

Fowler brings four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: unlawful arrest in

violation of the Fourth Amendment against all defendants (Count I); excessive

force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against all

defendants (Count II); failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments against Officer Brown and the unnamed Tampa

police officer (Count III); and malicious prosecution in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment against Officer Hothem.1 See Compl. ¶¶ 22–87. Brown

moves to dismiss Counts I and III, and Hothem moves to dismiss Count IV. See

Mot. at 1.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This

pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible when a “plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s factual

1 Although Fowler originally labeled this claim “Failure to Intervene,” he filed a notice

to correct that label as a scrivener’s error. See Notice (Doc. 6).

allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Officers Brown and Hothem contend that Fowler fails to state claims

against them and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “The qualified

immunity defense shields ‘government officials performing discretionary

functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’ ” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))

(citation modified).

“To receive qualified immunity, [a] public official ‘must first prove that

he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Because neither side disputes that the defendants were acting within the scope

of discretionary authority as police officers, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff

to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.

“To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must make two

showings.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. The plaintiff must first show “that the

defendant violated a constitutional right.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d

1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must then “show that the violation

was clearly established.” Id. “A right may be clearly established for qualified

immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable

facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of

principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes

a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right

was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t

of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (citation modified).

For this second inquiry, the key question “is whether the state of the law gave

the defendants ‘fair warning’ that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.”

Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,

536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

Ordinarily, “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right.’ ” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting St. George

v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Once an officer has

raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden of persuasion on that

issue is on the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337).

A. Count I – Unlawful Arrest

Fowler first alleges that Brown “willfully, unlawfully, and unreasonably,

arrested [Fowler] without probable cause to do so,” in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.2 Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. In response, Brown argues that Fowler fails

to allege “that Brown knew or should have known that arguable probable cause

did not exist.” Mot. at 4 (emphasis in original). I agree that Fowler’s complaint

does not allege the absence of arguable probable cause.

An unlawful or false arrest claim “challenges as constitutionally

deficient an officer’s on-the-spot determination of probable cause.” Sylvester v.

Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024). So, “[t]o succeed on a

false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) a lack of probable cause and

(2) an arrest.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023). An officer

is entitled to qualified immunity, though, where he had “arguable probable

cause, that is, where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and

possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that

probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140

F.3d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation modified); see Wilkerson v. Seymour,

736 F.3d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “what counts is the

information known to the defendant officers or officials at the time of their

conduct”) (citation modified).

2 Elsewhere, however, Fowler alleges that he “was arrested by Defendant Hothem for

Affray and Resisting Arrest Without Violence.” Compl. ¶ 19. Although perhaps

inconsistent, I read Fowler’s complaint to allege that all “three Officers [were]

involved in the unlawful arrest.” Id. ¶ 8.

Here, the facts alleged in Fowler’s complaint do not establish that Brown

lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Fowler. Fowler alleges that the three

officers, including Brown, observed unruly fans threaten Fowler and his son.

Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. Brown then “detaine[d] some of the unruly fans, which

enabled [Fowler] to escape [from] the assault he was receiving from the unruly

fans.” Id. ¶ 14. As Fowler “was gathering his steps to leave from the assault,”

Hothem tased Fowler. Id. ¶ 15. It is unclear from the complaint where Brown

was, or what he was doing, at the precise moment Hothem initiated the use of

force. See Mot. at 7. But at some point while Fowler was “being tased,” Brown

attempted to place Fowler in handcuffs to effectuate his arrest. Compl. ¶ 17;

see also Resp. at 3 (explaining that Fowler was arrested “after attempting to

disengage from the altercation”).

I agree with Brown that these facts suggest, at most, “that Brown arrived

after the fight was already in progress and helped to break it up.” Mot. at 5.

Fowler counters that “[t]he fact that Brown helped [Fowler] escape from the

assault by detaining the actual aggressors supports an inference that Brown

knew or should have known that [Fowler] was . . . acting in self-defense.” Resp.

at 3. Fowler tries to prove too much. Rather, Brown observed an affray

involving Fowler and others, perhaps saw Fowler using some level of force, see

Resp. at 3, and then observed Hothem deploy his taser as Fowler gather[ed]

his steps to leave,” Compl. ¶ 16. In fact, if Brown perceived that Fowler

attempted to flee from Hothem, that reasonable belief—even if mistaken—

would have provided arguable probable cause for the arrest. See Manners v.

Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969–70 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that officers had

probable cause to arrest plaintiff for fleeing police officers even though no

probable cause existed for believing a crime had been committed).

Based on the totality of the circumstances—including Hothem’s use of

force to subdue a fleeing individual—a reasonable officer in Brown’s position

could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Fowler for his part

in the broader altercation. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed without prejudice

as against Brown.

B. Count III – Failure to Intervene

Next, Fowler alleges that Officer Brown “engaged in the conduct of not

intervening during Defendant Andrew Hothem’s excessive use of force,” in

violation of Fowler’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. ¶ 64.

Brown argues that he “reasonably presumed that Hothem had probable cause

for an arrest or sufficient reason to use the taser” in subduing Fowler. Mot. at

7. Again, I agree with Brown.

An officer may be liable under Section 1983 for failure to intervene in

two scenarios. First, “[a]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to

take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive

force can be liable for failing to intervene, so long as he was in a position to

intervene yet failed to do so.” Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th

Cir. 2020) (citation modified); see Byrd v. Clark, 783 F. 2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.

1986) (stating that “[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or

refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked

beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section

1983.”). Alternatively, “a non-arresting officer may be liable for failing to

intervene in an unlawful arrest ‘if he knew the arrest lacked any constitutional

basis and yet participated in some way.’ ” Giddens v. Brooks County, No. 21-

11755, 2022 WL 836273, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting

Wilkerson, 736 F.3d at 980)).

Fowler does not allege either scenario here. To be sure, Brown

participated in the arrest and thus did not intervene to stop it. But although

Fowler avers in conclusory fashion that there was no probable cause for his

arrest, he does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Brown was on

notice either that Hothem’s use of force was excessive or that the arrest was

otherwise unlawful. Brown observed Fowler involved in an affray with

multiple “unruly fans” and then saw Hothem deploy his taser as Fowler “was

gathering his steps to leave from the assault.” Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16; see Resp. at 3

(conceding that Fowler “defended himself when attacked, and was then

arrested after attempting to disengage from the altercation”). But it remains

unclear exactly what else, if anything, Brown witnessed. From Brown’s

perspective, then, it would not have been unreasonable to believe that

Hothem’s use of force was justified because Fowler was fleeing from the police

after being involved in some sort of physical altercation with others. See, e.g.,

Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that

in a “difficult, tense and uncertain situation the use of a taser gun to subdue a

suspect who has repeatedly ignored police instructions and continues to act

belligerently toward police is not excessive force” (citation modified)). Likewise,

Fowler does not explain why Brown should have known the “arrest lacked any

constitutional basis.” Wilkerson, 736 F.3d at 980. As explained above, the facts

are sufficient to establish arguable probable cause for Fowler’s arrest based on

the conduct discernable to Brown.

In sum, an officer in Brown’s position could have reasonably concluded

that Hothem lawfully deployed his taser to subdue Fowler—who admittedly

used force in some capacity—fleeing “from the altercation.” Resp. at 3. Fowler

thus fails to allege that Brown violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly,

Count III is dismissed without prejudice as against Brown.

C. Count IV – Malicious Prosecution

Finally, Fowler alleges that Officer Hothem “initiated and continued a

criminal prosecution against [Fowler] by arresting him and charging him with

Affray and Resisting Arrest Without Violence, despite lacking probable cause

to believe Plaintiff had committed any criminal offense.” Compl. ¶ 79. Further,

Fowler claims that Hothem “knowingly or recklessly caused the prosecution to

proceed by misrepresenting facts, omitting material exculpatory evidence, and

failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, including disregarding body-

worn camera evidence.” Id. ¶ 80. Hothem rightly argues that Fowler’s

unsupported allegations fail to state a claim. See Mot. at 7–10.

To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove both

“(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a

violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

seizures.”3 Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018). In other words,

a plaintiff must prove: (1) “the legal process justifying [the plaintiff’s] seizure

was constitutionally infirm”; (2) the “seizure would not otherwise be justified

without legal process”; and (3) “the criminal proceedings against [the plaintiff]

terminated in his favor.” Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1329 (quoting Luke v. Gulley,

975 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020)). A showing of probable cause or arguable

probable cause defeats a malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 1331.

Fowler fails to plead a malicious prosecution claim against Hothem

because his factual allegations are entirely conclusory. Fowler says only that

3 “The constituent elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution include:

(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with

malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s

favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276,

1285 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003))

(citation modified).

Hothem “misrepresent[ed] facts, omit[ed] material exculpatory evidence, and

fail[ed] to conduct a reasonable investigation.” Compl. ¶ 80. Fowler does not

identify specific facts or exculpatory evidence, nor does he explain how Hothem

failed to investigate. At most, Hothem “disregard[ed] body-worn camera

evidence,” id., although Fowler does not mention whose body-worn camera was

at issue or otherwise describe the evidence. These ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

of ‘further factual enhancement’ ” necessarily fail to state a claim for malicious

prosecution against Hothem. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557); see Johnson v. Darnell, 781 F. App’x 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2019) (per

curiam) (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution claim where the plaintiff

did not “specifically allege what evidence was fabricated”).

Even had Fowler lodged additional factual allegations, Fowler still fails

to allege that Hothem seized him pursuant to legal process. Unlike false arrest

or failure to intervene claims, a malicious prosecution claim “requires a seizure

‘pursuant to legal process.’ ” Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016)).

“[W]arrant-based seizures fall within this category,” as do “seizures following

an arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing.” Id. A warrantless

arrest, on the other hand, is the quintessential seizure “without legal process.”

Id.; see Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004);

Donley v. City of Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

Should he file an amended complaint, Fowler must allege that Hothem seized

him pursuant to legal process to state a malicious prosecution claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

2. Counts I and III of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as against Defendant Kyle Brown. Count IV of the

Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against

Defendant Aaron Hothem.

3. No later than April 6, 2026, Fowler may file an amended

complaint.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, March 28, 2026.

athryn’ Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

13

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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