The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
KEITH FOWLER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:26-cv-116-KKM-AEP
AARON HOTHEM et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
Plaintiff Keith Fowler sues Tampa Police Department Officers Aaron
Hothem and Kyle Brown, and a third, unknown officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for claims related to Fowler’s arrest. See Compl. (Doc. 1). Officers Hothem and
Brown move to partially dismiss Fowler’s claims. Mot. (Doc. 14). Fowler
opposes. Resp. (Doc. 15). For the reasons explained below, I grant the
defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 15, 2024, Fowler and his son departed Raymond James
Stadium after a Tampa Bay Buccaneers football game. Compl. ¶ 9. While
Fowler and his son walked to their vehicle, a group of fans “approached
[Fowler] and his son in a threatening manner, attempting to cause violence to
[them].” Id. ¶ 10. All three officers observed the interaction, and Fowler
approached Officer Hothem and asked him to detain the unruly fans. Id.
¶¶ 11–12. Hothem ignored Fowler’s request, and the group of fans “attacked”
Fowler and his son. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Brown “and another uninvolved officer
were able to detain some of the unruly fans,” permitting Fowler and his son to
temporarily escape. Id. ¶ 14. But “[a]s [Fowler] was gathering his steps to leave
from the assault, Defendant Hothem deployed his taser and delivered a long
period of electric voltage to [Fowler’s] body.” Id. ¶ 16. Officer Brown and the
third officer “joined in on the assault” and “began to deliver strikes to [Fowler]
while attempting to place [him] in handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 17. Fowler suffered a
fractured finger. Id. ¶ 18. Hothem then arrested Fowler, who was charged with
resisting arrest without violence. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. The State ultimately dropped
the charge against Fowler “[a]fter reviewing [b]ody [w]orn [c]amera” footage of
the incident. Id. ¶ 21.
Fowler brings four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: unlawful arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment against all defendants (Count I); excessive
force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against all
defendants (Count II); failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments against Officer Brown and the unnamed Tampa
police officer (Count III); and malicious prosecution in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment against Officer Hothem.1 See Compl. ¶¶ 22–87. Brown
moves to dismiss Counts I and III, and Hothem moves to dismiss Count IV. See
Mot. at 1.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This
pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is facially plausible when a “plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s factual
1 Although Fowler originally labeled this claim “Failure to Intervene,” he filed a notice
to correct that label as a scrivener’s error. See Notice (Doc. 6).
allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Officers Brown and Hothem contend that Fowler fails to state claims
against them and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “The qualified
immunity defense shields ‘government officials performing discretionary
functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’ ” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311
(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))
(citation modified).
“To receive qualified immunity, [a] public official ‘must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346
(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Because neither side disputes that the defendants were acting within the scope
of discretionary authority as police officers, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
“To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must make two
showings.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. The plaintiff must first show “that the
defendant violated a constitutional right.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d
1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must then “show that the violation
was clearly established.” Id. “A right may be clearly established for qualified
immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable
facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of
principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes
a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right
was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t
of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (citation modified).
For this second inquiry, the key question “is whether the state of the law gave
the defendants ‘fair warning’ that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.”
Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Ordinarily, “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.’ ” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting St. George
v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Once an officer has
raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden of persuasion on that
issue is on the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337).
A. Count I – Unlawful Arrest
Fowler first alleges that Brown “willfully, unlawfully, and unreasonably,
arrested [Fowler] without probable cause to do so,” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 Compl. ¶¶ 27–29. In response, Brown argues that Fowler fails
to allege “that Brown knew or should have known that arguable probable cause
did not exist.” Mot. at 4 (emphasis in original). I agree that Fowler’s complaint
does not allege the absence of arguable probable cause.
An unlawful or false arrest claim “challenges as constitutionally
deficient an officer’s on-the-spot determination of probable cause.” Sylvester v.
Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2024). So, “[t]o succeed on a
false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) a lack of probable cause and
(2) an arrest.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023). An officer
is entitled to qualified immunity, though, where he had “arguable probable
cause, that is, where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that
probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140
F.3d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation modified); see Wilkerson v. Seymour,
736 F.3d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “what counts is the
information known to the defendant officers or officials at the time of their
conduct”) (citation modified).
2 Elsewhere, however, Fowler alleges that he “was arrested by Defendant Hothem for
Affray and Resisting Arrest Without Violence.” Compl. ¶ 19. Although perhaps
inconsistent, I read Fowler’s complaint to allege that all “three Officers [were]
involved in the unlawful arrest.” Id. ¶ 8.
Here, the facts alleged in Fowler’s complaint do not establish that Brown
lacked arguable probable cause to arrest Fowler. Fowler alleges that the three
officers, including Brown, observed unruly fans threaten Fowler and his son.
Compl. ¶¶ 10–11. Brown then “detaine[d] some of the unruly fans, which
enabled [Fowler] to escape [from] the assault he was receiving from the unruly
fans.” Id. ¶ 14. As Fowler “was gathering his steps to leave from the assault,”
Hothem tased Fowler. Id. ¶ 15. It is unclear from the complaint where Brown
was, or what he was doing, at the precise moment Hothem initiated the use of
force. See Mot. at 7. But at some point while Fowler was “being tased,” Brown
attempted to place Fowler in handcuffs to effectuate his arrest. Compl. ¶ 17;
see also Resp. at 3 (explaining that Fowler was arrested “after attempting to
disengage from the altercation”).
I agree with Brown that these facts suggest, at most, “that Brown arrived
after the fight was already in progress and helped to break it up.” Mot. at 5.
Fowler counters that “[t]he fact that Brown helped [Fowler] escape from the
assault by detaining the actual aggressors supports an inference that Brown
knew or should have known that [Fowler] was . . . acting in self-defense.” Resp.
at 3. Fowler tries to prove too much. Rather, Brown observed an affray
involving Fowler and others, perhaps saw Fowler using some level of force, see
Resp. at 3, and then observed Hothem deploy his taser as Fowler gather[ed]
his steps to leave,” Compl. ¶ 16. In fact, if Brown perceived that Fowler
attempted to flee from Hothem, that reasonable belief—even if mistaken—
would have provided arguable probable cause for the arrest. See Manners v.
Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969–70 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that officers had
probable cause to arrest plaintiff for fleeing police officers even though no
probable cause existed for believing a crime had been committed).
Based on the totality of the circumstances—including Hothem’s use of
force to subdue a fleeing individual—a reasonable officer in Brown’s position
could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Fowler for his part
in the broader altercation. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed without prejudice
as against Brown.
B. Count III – Failure to Intervene
Next, Fowler alleges that Officer Brown “engaged in the conduct of not
intervening during Defendant Andrew Hothem’s excessive use of force,” in
violation of Fowler’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. ¶ 64.
Brown argues that he “reasonably presumed that Hothem had probable cause
for an arrest or sufficient reason to use the taser” in subduing Fowler. Mot. at
7. Again, I agree with Brown.
An officer may be liable under Section 1983 for failure to intervene in
two scenarios. First, “[a]n officer who is present at the scene and who fails to
take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive
force can be liable for failing to intervene, so long as he was in a position to
intervene yet failed to do so.” Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2020) (citation modified); see Byrd v. Clark, 783 F. 2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.
1986) (stating that “[i]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or
refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked
beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section
1983.”). Alternatively, “a non-arresting officer may be liable for failing to
intervene in an unlawful arrest ‘if he knew the arrest lacked any constitutional
basis and yet participated in some way.’ ” Giddens v. Brooks County, No. 21-
11755, 2022 WL 836273, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting
Wilkerson, 736 F.3d at 980)).
Fowler does not allege either scenario here. To be sure, Brown
participated in the arrest and thus did not intervene to stop it. But although
Fowler avers in conclusory fashion that there was no probable cause for his
arrest, he does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Brown was on
notice either that Hothem’s use of force was excessive or that the arrest was
otherwise unlawful. Brown observed Fowler involved in an affray with
multiple “unruly fans” and then saw Hothem deploy his taser as Fowler “was
gathering his steps to leave from the assault.” Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16; see Resp. at 3
(conceding that Fowler “defended himself when attacked, and was then
arrested after attempting to disengage from the altercation”). But it remains
unclear exactly what else, if anything, Brown witnessed. From Brown’s
perspective, then, it would not have been unreasonable to believe that
Hothem’s use of force was justified because Fowler was fleeing from the police
after being involved in some sort of physical altercation with others. See, e.g.,
Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
in a “difficult, tense and uncertain situation the use of a taser gun to subdue a
suspect who has repeatedly ignored police instructions and continues to act
belligerently toward police is not excessive force” (citation modified)). Likewise,
Fowler does not explain why Brown should have known the “arrest lacked any
constitutional basis.” Wilkerson, 736 F.3d at 980. As explained above, the facts
are sufficient to establish arguable probable cause for Fowler’s arrest based on
the conduct discernable to Brown.
In sum, an officer in Brown’s position could have reasonably concluded
that Hothem lawfully deployed his taser to subdue Fowler—who admittedly
used force in some capacity—fleeing “from the altercation.” Resp. at 3. Fowler
thus fails to allege that Brown violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly,
Count III is dismissed without prejudice as against Brown.
C. Count IV – Malicious Prosecution
Finally, Fowler alleges that Officer Hothem “initiated and continued a
criminal prosecution against [Fowler] by arresting him and charging him with
Affray and Resisting Arrest Without Violence, despite lacking probable cause
to believe Plaintiff had committed any criminal offense.” Compl. ¶ 79. Further,
Fowler claims that Hothem “knowingly or recklessly caused the prosecution to
proceed by misrepresenting facts, omitting material exculpatory evidence, and
failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, including disregarding body-
worn camera evidence.” Id. ¶ 80. Hothem rightly argues that Fowler’s
unsupported allegations fail to state a claim. See Mot. at 7–10.
To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove both
“(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a
violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.”3 Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018). In other words,
a plaintiff must prove: (1) “the legal process justifying [the plaintiff’s] seizure
was constitutionally infirm”; (2) the “seizure would not otherwise be justified
without legal process”; and (3) “the criminal proceedings against [the plaintiff]
terminated in his favor.” Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1329 (quoting Luke v. Gulley,
975 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020)). A showing of probable cause or arguable
probable cause defeats a malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 1331.
Fowler fails to plead a malicious prosecution claim against Hothem
because his factual allegations are entirely conclusory. Fowler says only that
3 “The constituent elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution include:
(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with
malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s
favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276,
1285 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003))
(citation modified).
Hothem “misrepresent[ed] facts, omit[ed] material exculpatory evidence, and
fail[ed] to conduct a reasonable investigation.” Compl. ¶ 80. Fowler does not
identify specific facts or exculpatory evidence, nor does he explain how Hothem
failed to investigate. At most, Hothem “disregard[ed] body-worn camera
evidence,” id., although Fowler does not mention whose body-worn camera was
at issue or otherwise describe the evidence. These ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid
of ‘further factual enhancement’ ” necessarily fail to state a claim for malicious
prosecution against Hothem. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557); see Johnson v. Darnell, 781 F. App’x 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution claim where the plaintiff
did not “specifically allege what evidence was fabricated”).
Even had Fowler lodged additional factual allegations, Fowler still fails
to allege that Hothem seized him pursuant to legal process. Unlike false arrest
or failure to intervene claims, a malicious prosecution claim “requires a seizure
‘pursuant to legal process.’ ” Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016)).
“[W]arrant-based seizures fall within this category,” as do “seizures following
an arraignment, indictment, or probable-cause hearing.” Id. A warrantless
arrest, on the other hand, is the quintessential seizure “without legal process.”
Id.; see Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004);
Donley v. City of Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Should he file an amended complaint, Fowler must allege that Hothem seized
him pursuant to legal process to state a malicious prosecution claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.
2. Counts I and III of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as against Defendant Kyle Brown. Count IV of the
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as against
Defendant Aaron Hothem.
3. No later than April 6, 2026, Fowler may file an amended
complaint.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, March 28, 2026.
athryn’ Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge
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