James

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

SHAKKA SHANEAK JAMES CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-00773

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

USA ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are two

motions: (1) a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing [doc. #72] filed by Defendant

City of Natchitoches (“Natchitoches”); and (2) a Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(5) and

12(b)(6) or Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement [doc. #68] filed by Defendant Cleco

Power, LLC (“Cleco”).

For the reasons assigned below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Natchitoches’ Motion to

Dismiss [doc. #72] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER

RECOMMENDED Cleco’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. #68] be GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Shakka Shaneak James (“James”) brought the instant action against Defendants

Cleco, Natchitoches, and the Clerk of Court for the 10" Judicial District Court (“Natchitoches

Clerk”) [doc. #1].! James brings eights causes of action? including: (1) denial of access to

courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); (2) Section 1983 claims against Cleco;> (3)

conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“Section 1985”); (4) retaliation

under Section 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VIL’), 42 U.S.C. §

2000e, et seq.; (5) Section 1983 claim for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by

unlawful taking without just compensation; (6) state law negligence claims; (7) state law abuse

of rights and malfeasance in office claims; and (8) state law intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims.+ [doc. #61]. Specifically, James contends that she has ownership rights in

property in Ouachita and Natchitoches Parishes via the 1848 federal land patent issued by then-

President James K. Polk. Jd. She further asserts that she has been denied quiet title to her

purported property through the actions of the Natchitoches Clerk. Jd. According to James, the

Natchitoches Clerk improperly refused to accept her filings, effectively denying her notice

and/or procedural safeguards protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. She argues that

she is entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive reliefs to prevent them from further

rejecting her state court petitions, a declaratory judgment that the Natchitoches Clerk acted

unconstitutionally, monetary damages, reinstatement of her petitions, and recognition of her

patent rights. Id.

! James initially brought this suit against a multitude of defendants, all of whom were dismissed

on August 18, 2025, except for the three defendants mentioned herein.

2 These are the counts as laid out in the operative pleading, doc. #61.

3 Count Two only alleges that Cleco is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983, but, given

James’ pro se status, the Court construes Count Two as extending all Section 1983 claims

asserted as against Cleco, as well as the other Defendants.

4 James does not specify which claims pertain to which Defendants, so the Court proceeds with

the following analysis under the assumption that all claims are asserted against all Defendants.

In this Court, James has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. Because of her

pauper status, this Court was compelled to order service by the United States Marshals Service

and did so on June 10, 2025. [doc. #11]. Summons has issued as to all three Defendants [doc.

#49], and returns have been filed for the Natchitoches Clerk and Cleco [docs. #71, 84].

On November 20, 2025, Cleco filed a Motion to Dismiss. [doc. #68]. Cleco moves for

dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). Jd. Cleco argues

that James failed to properly serve them as they were served via mail by James herself, which is

improper under Rule 4. /d. Further, Cleco argues that James has failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Jd. Specifically, Cleco argues it is not a state actor to create liability

under Section 1983. Jd. Cleco additionally asserts that James has not presented sufficient facts

to support a claim under Section 1985, nor any of the various state claims asserted in the

Complaint. Jd. In the alternative, Cleco moves for a more definitive statement under Rule 12(c),

clarifying James’ allegations against it.

On December 9, 2025, Natchitoches filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

[doc. #72]. Natchitoches argues that James does not have the requisite standing to bring a claim

against Natchitoches. Jd.

On December 29, 2025, James filed an opposition to both Cleco and Natchitoches’

motions to dismiss. [docs. #77, 78]. James argues that Cleco is a state actor because it exercises

“a power traditionally and exclusively reserved for the sovereign: the power of eminent domain.”

[doc. #77-1, p. 2]. Further, James argues that Cleco is liable as a state actor for purposes of her

Sections 1983 and 1985 claims under the joint action doctrine, as they conspired with state

officials to unconstitutionally seize her land, which additionally supports her state law claims.

Id. In response to Natchitoches’ motion to dismiss, James asserts that she does have standing, as

her injuries are fairly traceable to the Defendants and can be redressed by the courts. [doc. #78].

Neither Cleco nor Natchitoches filed a reply to James’ opposition and the time to do has

elapsed. Accordingly, the matters are now ripe.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by

statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products

Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (Sth Cir. 2012). A motion to dismiss

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d

1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the court may rely on (1) the complaint

alone, presuming the allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts,

or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s resolution of disputed

facts. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (Sth Cir. 2001); see

also Barrera-Montenegro v. USA & DEA, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (Sth Cir. 1996). When examining a

factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction that does not implicate the merits of plaintiff's

cause of action, the district court has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy

itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs.,

104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (Sth

Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings, such as

testimony and affidavits. See Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261. A court’s dismissal of a case for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dismissal does not necessarily

prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561

F.2d 606, 608 (Sth Cir. 1977).

B. Rule 12(b)(5)

A party may raise, by motion, the defense of “insufficient service of process” which

encompasses any challenge to the mode of delivery or the lack of delivery of the summons and

complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5); Baptiste v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's. London,

Civ. Action No. 23-4723, 2024 WL 3291735, at *2 (E.D. La. July 3, 2024) (citation omitted).

Thus, a party may move to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(5) if a plaintiff fails to timely

serve the party within the time limits set forth in Rule 4(m), which, in turn, specifies that, “[i]f a

defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the

action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified

time.” FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m). However, “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the

court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Jd.

Good cause “requires ‘at least as much as would be required to show excusable neglect,

as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually does not

suffice.’” Gartin v. Par Pharm. Companies, Inc., 289 Fed. App’x 688, 692 (Sth Cir. 2008)

(quoting Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 299 (Sth Cir. 1995)).

Nonetheless, even if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate good cause, the court enjoys the

discretionary authority to extend the service period. Jn re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Eye Injury

Products Liab. Litig., Civ. Action No. 23-0683, 2024 WL 3811637, at *2 (E.D. La. July 8, 2024)

(citation omitted). The court’s discretion to dismiss a case for failure to comply with Rule

A(m)’s service deadline is circumscribed when the statute of limitations likely will bar refiling

the suit. Byers v. Navarro Cnty., Civ. Action No. 09-1792, 2011 WL 4471024, at *2 (N.D. Tex.

Sept. 27, 2011) (citing Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326 (Sth Cir. 2008)).

Indeed, although dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims under Rules 12(b)(5) is without prejudice,

“fwJhere further litigation of [a] claim will be time-barred, a dismissal without prejudice is no

less severe a sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, and the same standard of review is used.”

Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (Sth Cir. 1992) (quoting McGowan v.

Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co., 659 F.2d 554, 556 (Sth Cir.1981)).

G. Rule 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim

for relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief...” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible

when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or

probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility simply calls

for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the

court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption

does not extend to legal conclusions. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading comprised of “labels

and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy

Rule 8. /d. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in

order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148,

153 (Sth Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Jd.

(citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual

proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556. Nevertheless, a court is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is

premised upon an invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104

L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989).

D. Frivolity Review

The undersigned granted James leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.

Accordingly, her complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides

for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court determines that it is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

The statute applies to prisoner and non-prisoner cases. See Patel v. United Airlines, 620 F. App’x

352 (Sth Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (applying Section 1915 to non-prisoner pro se litigant); James v.

Richardson, 344 F. App’x 982, 983 (Sth Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“Section 1915(e)(2)(B)

requires dismissal of frivolous IFP actions even if those actions are brought by non-prisoner

plaintiffs.”’).

In reviewing James’ Complaint, sua sponte, the Court must “acceptt ] all well-pleaded

facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[].” Gonzalez v.

Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (Sth Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further,

a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). Nevertheless, her Complaint, or any portion of

her Complaint, may be dismissed as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (Sth Cir. 1997). “A complaint

lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if

the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Jd. (citing

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact “only if it appears that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the

allegations.” McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 160 (Sth Cir. 1995).

U. Analysis

A. Natchitoches’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

Natchitoches argues that James has failed to demonstrate the requisite injury in fact,

causation, and redressability required to bring the instant suit. [doc. #72]. Natchitoches alleges

that James has failed to present more than “generalized grievances and speculative harms” which

are insufficient to satisfy Article III’s threshold to jurisdiction.

“For purposes of standing, the ‘injury in fact’ test requires both ‘an injury to a cognizable

interest’ and that ‘the party seeking review be himself among the injured.’ If the plaintiff was the

‘object’ of the challenged action, then ‘there is ordinarily little question that the action or

inaction has caused him injury.”” Garner v. Moore, 536 F. App’x 446, 449 (Sth Cir. 2013)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-63 (1992)) (citation omitted).

“[W]hether [a plaintiff] has standing to make the argument is distinct from whether the argument

has merit.” United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 538 n.2 (Sth Cir. 2010).

To succeed on a claimed denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must show that she lost an

actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because of the alleged denial.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Sth Cir. 1996)

(holding that to state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access). The “injury

requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353.

Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lack of access prevented her from filing or caused

her to lose a case that attacks either her conviction or seeks “to vindicate “basic constitutional

rights’” in a civil rights action. Jd. at 353-54 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579

(1974)).

However, by James’ own admission, on May 27, 2025, Natchitoches did ultimately

accept her filings after she corrected clerical errors. [doc. #1, p.3]. While James contends that

her filing was only accepted after she submitted a “genealogical link establishing her rightful

claim to the property,” this alleged fact is irrelevant to the underlying Sections 1983 and 1985

claims, as well as the various other claims James has put forth. /d. “As long as the plaintiff is

able to file suit, the right of access is not abridged.” Dupard v. Lopinto, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

54570, 2020 WL 1503619, at *17 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2020); see also Doe v. Dantin, 2015 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 78529, 2015 WL 3772133, at *3 (E.D. La. June 17, 2015). The acceptance of her

filings remedied any injury which James would have suffered as a result of Natchitoches’

“refusal to accept or process Plaintiff’s petitions.” Therefore, James has not established an injury

in fact to satisfy Article II as to her claim under Section 1983 for denial of access to the courts.

James’ claim to the land through the federal land patent spans “one hundred and seventy-

seven...years, multiple generations, and a plethora of heirs” with little in the way of connection

between James and the familial group she asserts have claim to the land calls into question not

only the merits of her claim, but the traceability the courts must examine in determining

standing. [doc. #72-1, p.2]. Taking all facts pled by James as true, the Court must determine the

traceability between Defendants’ alleged actions and the alleged injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-

63; Garner, 536 F. App’x at 449. Regarding the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Takings

claim, James has not demonstrated the necessary traceability to any action by Defendants and

any alleged injury she suffered. Beyond a mere conclusory statement that James is related to the

individual who owned the land nearly two hundred years ago, there is little to support this claim

or that James would now have a claim to the land which has been impacted. James’ claim seems

to be, at best, an attempt to vindicate the rights of a third-party, an alleged ancestor, with any

injury to James herself being too speculative to establish proper standing. Therefore, James also

fails to establish that she has standing to bring her fourth claim, unlawful taking, against

Defendants.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Natchitoches’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. #72]

be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. IT IS RECOMMENDED that

Natchitoches’ motion be GRANTED insofar as it seeks dismissal of James’ Section 1983 claims

for denial of access to the courts and for her claims for unlawful taking via Section 1983.

Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that James’ first count, denial of access to courts, and

10

fourth count, unlawful taking, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The motion is DENIED

insofar as it seeks dismissal of James’ other claims on grounds of lack of standing.°

B. Cleco’s Motions

Cleco first argues that James’ Complaint should be dismissed under 12(b)(5). [doc. #68].

Cleco submits that James’ service of process upon Defendants was insufficient because the

Notice of Mailing [doc. #67] filed by James is not compliant with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Specifically, Cleco argues that the notice confirms that James mailed the

complaint to Cleco and, as a party, James is prohibited from attempting to effectuate process.

[doc. #68-1, p. 8]. .

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), proper service upon a defendant requires:

(1) In General. A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint. The

plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the

time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who

makes service.

(2) By Whom. Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a

summons and complaint.

(3) By a Marshal or Someone Specially Appointed. At the plaintiff's request, the

court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal

or by a person specially appointed by the court. The court must so order if the

plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. $1915 or as a

seaman under 28 U.S.C. §1916.

Here, Cleco is correct that the attempted service of process demonstrated in James’

Notice of Mailing [doc. #67] was not compliant with Rule 4(c). However, since the filing of

Cleco’s motion to dismiss, a summons has been returned executed by the United States marshal

showing that Cleco was properly served on April 4, 2026. [doc. #84]. Because James has been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court was required to order service via a

5 The Court will address the remainder of the claims brought against Natchitoches under its

following frivolity review.

11

marshal. Given the subsequent service by the Marshals Service, Cleco’s immediate claim

regarding service is rendered moot. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that insofar as

Cleco seeks dismissal of James’ claims under Rule 12(b)(5) for improper service, the motion to

dismiss [doc. #68] be DENIED.

Cleco additionally filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). [doc. #68]. The

Court will address the merits of each of the claims made against Cleco in the following sections.

1. James’ Section 1983 Claims for Denial of Access and Unlawful Taking

First, Cleco argues that James has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jd.

Cleco argues that James cannot bring a proper Section 1983 claim against Cleco, as it is not a

state actor, nor has it engaged in any behavior which would be considered state action to open it

to liability under Section 1983. Id. Cleco points to Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., in which the

Supreme Court held that utilities companies, despite the fact that they are subject to state

regulation and provide essential public services, were not state actors. 419 U.S. 350-51 (1974).

Further, Cleco asserts that James has failed to establish that Cleco specifically violated any of her

constitutional rights.

James filed an opposition to Cleco’s motion on December 29, 2025, arguing that Cleco’s

relationship with the state goes beyond mere regulation. [doc. #77-1]. Specifically, James

argues that under the framework of Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622

(1991) the delegation of the state of Louisiana’s expropriation power to private power companies

amounts to the performance of a government function with the assistance of state law. Jd. James

further argues that this expropriation power establishes Cleco’s liability under Section 1985 and

demonstrates Cleco’s taking of James’ property without due process.

12

James does not provide, nor does there appear to be, any precedent which extends Section

1983 and 19835 liability to private entities delegated expropriation power. However, even

assuming arguendo that delegation of such power was sufficient to establish Cleco as a state

actor for purposes of Section 1983 and 1985, James has failed to plead a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

First, James has not alleged an injury that she suffered as a result of Cleco’s actions

which can be remedied by this Court. James alleges that Cleco has violated her right to due

process by occupying land she asserts she has claim to by “denying her access to the state courts

to assert her federally recognized property interests.” [doc. 61]. To the extent James alleges that

Cleco violated her right to due process when they took possession of the land, this claim is

unfounded. Cleco’s “taking” of the land would have at most, been a violation of the rights of

James’ ancestors’ right to the land.® James did not, at the time that Cleco took possession of the

land, have any right to the land and could not, therefore, have due process rights that were denied

by Cleco’s “taking”. Additionally, there is also nothing in James’ pleadings to support that

Cleco has engaged in any action to deny James her due process rights in her most recent court

filings because, as previously noted, James’ pleadings were ultimately accepted by the court.

Thus, insofar as James alleges Cleco is liable for a Section 1983 claim for denial of access to the

courts and unlawful taking without just compensation, she has failed to state a claim against

Cleco, and the Section 1983 claims against it must be dismissed.

6 Further, James has not presented any allegations demonstrating that Cleco would be liable to

any party for unconstitutional taking of land.

13

2. James’ Title VII and Section 1983 Retaliation Claims

James’ final Section 1983 claim against Cleco for retaliation and violations of Title VI

similarly fail. To sue under Title VII, a purported plaintiff must establish statutory standing. See

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011). Unlike Article HI standing,

statutory standing is not jurisdictional. Instead, it asks the “merits question” of “whether or not a

particular cause of action authorizes an injured plaintiff to sue.” Blanchard 1986, Ltd. v. Park

Plantation, LLC, 553 F.3d 405, 409 (Sth Cir. 2008). There are three elements to a prima facie

case of retaliation under Title VII: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII,

(2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the

protected activity and the adverse action. See Evans v. City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 352 (Sth Cir.

2001).

Similar to Title VII, under a Section 1983 retaliation claim, the plaintiff has the burden of

proving that (1) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision; (2) the plaintiff’s speech

involved a matter of public concern; (3) the plaintiff’s mterest in commenting on matters of

public concern outweighs the defendant's right in promoting efficiency; and (4) the plaintiff’s

speech motivated the adverse employment action. Beattie v. Madison Cnty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d

595, 601 (Sth Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Because both of these claims require an employment relationship between the parties,

James must demonstrate via her pleadings that such a relationship existed. Thompson v. N. Am.

Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011); Simmons v. UBS Fin. Servs., 972 F.3d 664 (Sth Cir.

2020) (“It would be a remarkable extension of Thompson—and of Title VII generally—to rule

that a nonemployee has the right to sue.”). James did not allege any such employment

relationship between herself and any of the named Defendants. Without any such relationship,

14

James failed to state a claim under Section 1983 and Title VII, and those claims against Cleco

must be dismissed.

3. James’ Claims under Section 1985

Next, Cleco argues that James failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. [doc. #68].

Cleco reiterates the earlier argument that James has failed to establish a plausible claim that

Cleco worked in conjunction with the other Defendants in order to deprive James of her

constitutional rights. Jd. Given this, Cleco asserts that it can not be found liable for Section

1985, as no facts have been alleged to suggest a conspiracy took place. Jd.

The relevant part of section 1985(3), “making it unlawful to engage in a conspiracy to

deprive individuals the ‘equal protection of the laws’ . . . includes a requirement to plead race-

based animus.” Cervini v. Cisneros, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51761, 2022 WL 867034, at *5

(W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2022); Bryan v. City of Madison, Miss., 213 F.3d 267, 276 (Sth Cir. 2000)

(requires “an allegation of a race-based conspiracy”); Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (Sth

Cir. 2019) (noting that while the Supreme Court has stated this provision may cover other types

of class-based discrimination in additional to race, it has still “never held that nonracial animus is

sufficient. And [the Fifth Circuit] ha[s] held racial animus is required: In this circuit the only

conspiracies actionable under section 1985(3) are those motivated by racial animus.”).

The allegations in James’ Amended Complaint have nothing to do with race. [doc. #61].

James alleges that Defendants “conspired to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights,

including equal protection and due process, by coordinated actions such as denial of court access,

unlawful taking of property, and retaliatory conduct.” Jd. at 4. Beyond this conclusory

statement alleging a conspiracy, there is no mention of James’ race or any alleged conduct that

15

would even remotely suggest racial animus. The section 1985 claims against Cleco must,

therefore, be dismissed with prejudice.

4, James’ Remaining State Law Claims

Finally, Cleco argues that James has failed to state a claim as a matter of law on any of

the additional state law claims put forth in the Complaint: abuse of rights, malfeasance in office,

negligence, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because it is a private power company

and not a public office, Cleco argues that they did not owe James a ministerial duty to accept her

filings for the quiet title action or in any way commit abuse of rights or malfeasance in office.

[doc. #68]. Cleco also asserts that this lack of duty to James precludes the claim of negligence

filed against them. Jd.

The Court agrees. In Louisiana, a plaintiff must prove the following for a claim of

malfeasance:

(1) Intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, as such

officer or employee; or (2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful

manner; or (3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee,

under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully

required of him, or to perform any such duty in an unlawful manner; or (4) Willfully

and knowingly subject any person to the deprivation of any right, privilege, or

immunity secured or protected by the United States Constitution and laws, if serious

bodily injury or death results.

La. R.S. 14:134. Nothing in James’ Complaint alleges that Cleco owed her a duty to “accept and

properly process filings” as a private entity. A plaintiff may not simply allege that a duty

existed, particularly to perform a task which is not within the purview of a private entity. While

a claim of malfeasance in office could permit a claim against a defendant without a duty

prescribed to them specifically, James has still not adequately pled any alternative form of the

claim. Given the lack of any alleged duty owed by Cleco to James, the first two possible

avenues to assert a claim of malfeasance are similarly inadequately pled. Further, as discussed

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above, James has not alleged any facts beyond mere conclusory statements that Cleco was in any

way in a conspiracy involving a public officer, public employee, or other public entity which

would support a claim of malfeasance in office under the third avenue. James has also not

alleged any bodily injury or death which has resulted from any of Cleco’s actions, barring the

fourth and final avenue. Therefore, James has failed to plead a claim for malfeasance in office.

The same result follows for James’ abuse of rights claim. To prove the tort claim for

abuse of rights, the plaintiff must show one of the following:

(1) the predominant motive forthe defendant’s exercise ofa right is to cause

harm; (2) that there is no legitimate motive for the exercise of the

defendant’s right; (3) exercising the right violates moral rules, good faith,

or elementary fairness; or (4) the exercise of the right is for a purpose other

than that for which it was granted.

Shelton v. Bd. of Supervisors of S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 532 F. App’x 558, 563 (Sth Cir.

2013) (citing Steier v. Heller, 732 So. 2d 787, 791 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted)).

James has not pled any right Cleco exercised (which is itself fatal to this claim). Nevertheless,

even if the Court presumes Cleco’s use of the land is the right allegedly causing James harm,’

she has not alleged that Cleco exercised its right to the land for the predominant motive to cause

harm, without legitimate motive, without good faith, or outside of the purpose the right was

granted for. James has made no allegations that Cleco has gone beyond its intended purpose of

providing power and utility services in its use of the land. Further, James has made no

allegations that this purpose is not legitimate or would somehow violate principles of good faith.

Therefore, James’ claims of abuse of rights against Cleco should be dismissed.

7 If James instead meant that Cleco’s alleged refusal to accept her filings was the right exercised

to her detriment instead, this claim would fail for reasons already articulated. James has not

properly alleged that Cleco had any such right, or ability, to affect her ability to access the courts

or that it exercised any such night.

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James’ negligence claim against Cleco also fails. The elements for a negligence claim

under Louisiana law are:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty

element); (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard

(the breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact

of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard

conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and,

(5) proof of actual damages (the damages element).

Farrell y. Circle K Stores, Inc., 359 So. 3d 467, 473 (La. 2023). Again, James has failed to show

that Cleco owed her a duty. Therefore, James failed to properly plead a claim of negligence

against Cleco.

Finally, Cleco asserts that James has not alleged conduct by Cleco which would rise to

the level of “extreme and outrageous” required to support a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. [doc. #68] (citing Nicholas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999-2522 (La. 8/31/00), 765

So.2d 1017, 1024-25). Similar to the analysis above for abuse of rights, it is unclear what

conduct Cleco has engaged in at all, much less how such conduct would rise to the level of

extreme and outrageous the law requires. The undersigned has concluded that James has failed

to establish plausible claims against Cleco of any kind; therefore, it follows that she cannot

establish that their alleged conduct in holding land long ago transferred to it somehow supports

her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Further, James has not alleged any

emotional distress which resulted from the actions of any of Defendants. Therefore, James’

claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cleco should be dismissed as well.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Cleco’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED, and all claims against Cleco be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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Cc. Frivolity Review

The Court will now analyze the remaining claims against the two additional Defendants

under the frivolity standard. As outlined previously, the legal standard applied to a frivolity

review of a plaintiff filing in forma pauperis is identical to the standard applied to a motion under

Rule 12(b)(6). 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (Sth Cir. 1999);

Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733 (Sth Cir.1998).

If this Court finds James’ Complaint or any part of it to be frivolous, it may dismiss the

complaint as such at any time, before or after service of process, and before or after answers

have been filed. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (Sth Cir. 1986);

Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (Sth Cir. 1985).

1. Claims against Natchitoches

Looking first at the remaining Section 1983 claim against Natchitoches, James has failed

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 689 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local

governmental bodies are "persons" within the meaning of Section 1983, but that, since there is

no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, a municipality may not be held liable under

Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a

municipality under Section 1983 is required to identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that

caused the plaintiff’s injury. Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only

for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of

8 The same analysis would apply should James be able to establish standing for her fifth cause of

action for unlawful taking without just compensation.

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those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Board of Cty.

Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 (1997).

James has not alleged a municipal policy or custom which deprived her of her

constitutional rights, but instead only cites the instances in which the clerk of court did not

accept her filings. Since there is no supervisory liability under Section 1983, James has not stated

a claim against Natchitoches that is cognizable under Section 1983, and her claims against the

Natchitoches should be dismissed as frivolous.

Additionally, James has failed to state a claim under Section 1985 and Title VII against

Natchitoches for the same reasons outlined in the analysis of Cleco’s motion to dismiss. James’

merely conclusory statement that some conspiracy existed between Cleco and Natchitoches is

insufficient. Further, James makes no allegation that she was at any point in an employment

relationship with Natchitoches. Without such pleadings, James’ Title VII claim is inadequate on

the face of the complaint. Thus, all remaining federal claims against are frivolous and should be

dismissed.

2. Claims against the Natchitoches Clerk

Finally, James seeks relief from the Natchitoches Clerk in his or her official and

individual capacity. [doc. #1, p. 2]. “[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent... .” Monell, 436

U.S.at 691. Consequently, the Court must conduct a municipal liability analysis under the

Monell framework. See Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Just., 114 F.3d 539, 551 (Sth Cir. 1997)

(noting the § 1983 liability standards for a municipality are the same as those for “an individual

to whom the municipality has delegated responsibility to directly supervise the employee”).

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“(Municipalities cannot be held liable for constitutional torts under § 1983 ‘ona

respondeat superior theory,’ but they can be held liable ‘when execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”” Burge, 187 F.3d at 471 (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 691); Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (Sth Cir. 2003). Under Monell, a

plaintiff must demonstrate ‘(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be

charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving

force’ is that policy (or custom).” Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (Sth Cir. 2002)

(citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001)).

Here, James does not allege that the Natchitoches Clerk implemented an unconstitutional

policy, practice, custom, or procedure that deprived her of any constitutional right. Rather, she

suggests that the Natchitoches Clerk was not authorized by policy to remove her filings, alleging,

“No authorization for removal given ....” [doc. # 12, p. 2].

Instead of describing policy, James simply recounts the effects of some isolated and

unidentified action or omission. See McWilliams v. City of Houston, 2022 WL 17337820, at *6

(Sth Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory insofar as they are only based on

Stephen’s interaction with the individual defendants.”); Ratliff Aransas Cty., Tex., 948 F.3d

281, 285 (Sth Cir. 2020) (finding no custom where “the complaint’s only specific facts appear in

the section laying out the events that gave rise to this action.”); Yates v. Unidentified Parties, 73

F. App’x 19, 20 (Sth Cir. 2003) (“Yates’s complaint amounts to no more than an isolated

incident, which will not trigger official liability on Sheriff Strain’s part.”). Accordingly, the

Court should dismiss these claims.

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As to the claims against the Natchitoches Clerk’s in his or her individual capacity, they

fail for the same reasons as they failed against the earlier Defendants. James admitted in her

complaint that her petition was eventually accepted by the Natchitoches Clerk, barring any

claims stemming from denial of access to the courts. Further, James’ conclusory statements

regarding conspiracies are insufficient to support a claim against any of the defendants. Finally,

James has not alleged the requisite employment relationship with any of the defendants to

support a claim under Title VII.

D. Exercise of Supplemental Jurisdiction over Remaining State Law Claims and

Unlawful Taking Claim

James brought the instant suit under federal question jurisdiction, and all claims which

invoke federal question doctrine have been recommended for dismissal, and, thus, the

undersigned might recommend that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

James’ state law claims. However, James also claims to be a “resident of a foreign state” which

could invoke diversity jurisdiction. Thus, for the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED that

the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss the remaining state law claims for the

reasons stated, infra.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Natchitoches’ Motion to Dismiss [doc. #72] be

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. IT IS RECOMMENDED that

Natchitoches’ motion [doc. #72] be GRANTED insofar as it seeks dismissal of James’ Section

1983 claims for denial of access to the courts and for her claims for unlawful taking via Section

1983. Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that James’ first count, denial of access to courts,

and fourth count, unlawful taking, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER

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RECOMMENDED that the motion is be DENIED insofar as it seeks dismissal of James’ other

claims on grounds of lack of standing.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED Cleco’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. #68] be

GRANTED and all claims against Cleco be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that all James’ remaining claims be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous for failing to state a claim for which relief may

be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of

time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served witha copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish

a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar that party,

except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual

findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d

1415 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc).

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 2nd day of June, 2026.

KAYLG □□□ MCCLUSKY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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