Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

29SC FOUR POINTE LP, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1422

:

v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

JESSICA BROWN, et al., : Magistrate Judge Vascura

:

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on Defendant Jessica Brown’s Motions for Injunction

(ECF No. 2), to Compel (ECF No. 5), and Brown’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 7). (ECF No. 9). In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that this Court remand this action to the Franklin County Municipal Court and deny

Brown’s Motions for Injunction and to Compel. (ECF No. 7). For the reasons that follow, this

Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (ECF No. 7) and OVERRULES Brown’s

Objections (ECF No. 9). This action is REMANDED to the Franklin County Municipal Court.

Accordingly, Brown’s Motions for an Injunction and to Compel (ECF Nos. 2, 5) are hereby

DENIED as MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff, 29SC Four Pointe LP, filed a Petition in Forcible Entry and

Detainer against Defendant, Jessica Brown, in the Municipal Court of Franklin County, Ohio. See

29SC Four Pointe LP v. Jessica Brown, Franklin County M.C., No. 25 CVG 036520. The petition

sought to evict Brown from her residence due to her alleged failure to pay rent in violation of the

lease agreement. (ECF No. 1-1). The parties later reached an agreement memorialized in an Agreed

Judgment Entry dated August 19, 2025, which required Brown to be current with her rent payment

obligations by November 1, 2025. (Id.). On November 10, 2025, Four Pointe filed an affidavit in

Municipal Court contending that Brown had breached the Agreed Judgment Entry. The Municipal

Court issued a writ of restitution and set out on November 14, 2025, requiring Defendant to vacate

the premises. Subsequently on December 17, 2025, Brown filed a Notice of Removal in this Court.

(Id.). In her Notice of Removal, Brown contends that prior to the eviction action against her, she

was approved and began participating in the federally funded Emergency Rental Assistance

Program (ERAP). (Id. at 1). Brown argues that “it was not the intent of Congress to allow landlords

to manipulate federally funded rent programs to wrongfully evict tenants raising the federal

question.” (Id.).

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on December 17, 2025, and

recommended that this Court remand this action to the Franklin County Municipal Court and deny

Brown’s pending Motions. (ECF No. 7). The Magistrate Judge opined that this Court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction and additionally that Brown’s request that this Court intervene in the

state court action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. at 3–4). The R&R specified that

Brown’s Notice of Removal “consists only of state-law claims for eviction under Ohio Revised

Code Chapter 1923, over which this Court does not have original jurisdiction.” (Id.). Further, the

Magistrate Judge instructed that Brown had fourteen (14) days to object to the R&R.

On January 4, 2026, Brown filed untimely objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 7). These

matters are now ripe for this Court’s review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation, “[t]he district judge

must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In so doing, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

magistrate judge with instruction.” Id.

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss” their complaint or

any portion of it that: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary at the pleading stage,

mere “labels and conclusions” are insufficient to state a proper claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but “basic pleading

essentials” still are required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, to survive

screening, a complaint must contain sufficient facts which, if accepted as true, would plausibly

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Brown’s objections were not filed before the December 31, 2025,

deadline as set by the Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 7). Brown contends that she was in an

automobile accident on December 31, 2025, and that is why her objections were delayed, yet

provides no support for the veracity of her claim regarding delay. (ECF No. 9 at 1). On this basis

alone, Brown’s objections are overruled. Even if this Court were to consider Brown’s untimely

objections, her arguments still fail.

In her Objection, Brown contends that she “believes the Agreed Entry was void because

the eviction was unlawful under the federal ERAP guidelines” and further that this case is

removable because the state law claims raise “substantial federal issues.” (ECF No. 9 at 3). Despite

Brown’s contention, the Magistrate Judge is correct that the eviction action at issue only raises a

state law claim and Brown’s attempt to raise a defense based on federal violations of ERAP does

not give this Court authority to intervene. JLL Properties LLC v. Ward, 2021 WL 784324, at *2

(W.D. Ky., 2021) (“Defendants’ attempt to raise federal issues pursuant to the CARES Act simply

does not create federal jurisdiction because they are merely claiming a “‘substantive federal

defense to a state-law claim [which does] not raise a federal question.’”) (citations omitted). Thus,

this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons that follow, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (ECF No. 7) and

OVERRULES Brown’s Objections (ECF No. 9). This action is REMANDED to the Franklin

County Municipal Court. Accordingly, Brown’s Motions for Injunction and to Compel (ECF Nos.

2, 5) are hereby DENIED as MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: May 27, 2026