Major

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AARON MAJOR, No. 4:25-CV-02156

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

K. BRITTAIN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE 12, 2026

Plaintiff Aaron Major filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action, alleging

constitutional violations by officials at the State Correctional Institution, Frackville

(SCI Frackville) regarding his conditions of confinement. The Court dismissed

Major’s initial complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a

claim but granted him leave to amend. Major filed an amended complaint, but that

pleading does not cure the deficiencies in his Section 1983 claims. The Court will

therefore dismiss Major’s case with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In his initial complaint, Major alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights

were violated by being housed in a double cell that was not in compliance with

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

certain prison standards. He additionally raised an undeveloped Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claim.2

The Court screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and

held that he had failed to state a claim for relief for multiple reasons. First, Major

had failed to allege personal involvement for any of the named Defendants.3 Next,

the Court explained that Major had not plausibly alleged an equal protection claim

because he had not identified other similarly situated prisoners who were treated

differently than him without a rational basis.4 Finally, the Court dismissed his

Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim because he had failed to

allege (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation or (2) deliberate indifference by any

Defendant.5

The Court granted Major leave to amend and provided him with specific

directions for amendment.6 He timely filed an amended complaint,7 which is the

operative pleading in this action. As part of that amended complaint, Major cites

several exhibits that he attached to his initial pleading. The Court will thus

consider the cited exhibits during Section 1915A screening, as Major relies on

those documents in his amended complaint.

2 See Doc. 10 at 4.

3 See id. at 5-6.

4 See id. at 6-7.

5 See id. at 7-9.

6 See id. at 9-11.

7 Doc. 12.

In his amended complaint, Major primarily asserts an Eighth Amendment

claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. He also appears to raise a

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim regarding the failure of a

prison official to respond to his grievance.8 Major names seven defendants:

Superintendent K. Brittain, Grievance Coordinator B. Lazusky, “CFMM2” S.

Kane, T. Sokaloski, S. Kephart, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (DOC) Dr. L. Harry, and the American Correctional Association

(ACA).9 He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief

in the form of a transfer to a different prison and abatement of the allegedly

unconstitutional conditions.10

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.11 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted[.]”12 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

8 See id. at 2.

9 See id. at 1-3.

10 See id. at 10.

11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

12 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).13

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”14 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.15 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.16

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.17 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”18 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

13 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

14 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

15 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

16 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

17 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

18 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.19 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”20

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”21

Because Major proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”22 This is

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Major, is incarcerated.23

III. DISCUSSION

Upon review of Major’s amended complaint, he once again fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will address his numerous

pleading deficiencies in turn.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”24 Rather, a Section

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal

19 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

20 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

22 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

23 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

24 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context).

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”25 Personal involvement can include direct

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”;

however, such averments must be made with particularity.26 Furthermore, it is

equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does

not give rise to Section 1983 liability.27

Major does not include any specific allegations of wrongdoing that would

establish personal involvement by Dr. Harry, the Secretary of the DOC, in the

purported constitutional violations. As to Dr. Harry, Major broadly alleges only

that she “oversees the policies governing over every state facility and the[ir]

administrative staff.”28 This is a quintessential assertion of vicarious liability (or

respondeat superior), which does not apply to Section 1983 claims. Accordingly,

the Court must dismiss the Section 1983 claim (or claims) against Dr. Harry

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal involvement.

25 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

26 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).

27 See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal involvement

when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”);

Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v.

Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144

F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims against

certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against them “merely

assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”).

28 Doc. 12 at 3.

B. Claim Against American Correctional Association (ACA)

In his amended complaint, Major sues the ACA, apparently for “collud[ing]”

with the DOC regarding the size of cells at SCI Frackville.29 This Section 1983

claim targeting an outside, private agency is not legally viable and must be

dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.”30 Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983;

private agencies like the ACA do not qualify.31

Additionally, Major has not alleged any facts demonstrating that the ACA is

a state actor for Section 1983 purposes. Only state actors can be subject to Section

1983 liability.32 Major has proffered no plausible factual allegations for why this

outside organization should be deemed a state actor or why its accreditation could

29 See id. at 4.

30 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).

31 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989) (explaining that a state

is not a “person” for Section 1983 purposes); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.

1973) (explaining that a state agency may not be sued under Section 1983 because it is not a

“person”); Metroka v. Pa. State Law Enforcement, Nos. 23-2004, 23-2220, 23-2847, 2024 WL

4164272, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024) (nonprecedential) (“[T]he Pennsylvania State Police is

a state agency, not a person within the meaning of § 1983.”); Foye v. Wexford Health Sources

Inc., 675 F. App’x 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (dismissing Section 1983 claims

against prison and Department of Corrections because they “are not persons subject to suit

under” Section 1983).

32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).

be considered action “of the State itself.”33 “Action taken by private entities with

the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.”34

For both the foregoing reasons, any Section 1983 claim against the ACA

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

Major appears to assert a procedural due process claim against Grievance

Coordinator Lazusky. He alleges that he filed a grievance on October 10, 2025,

but that Lazusky failed to respond to it, thereby violating his “due process.”35

However, a prison official’s failure to respond to a grievance or a complaint

does not establish a constitutional violation. It is well settled that prisoners have

no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process.36 Thus,

Lazusky’s alleged failure to respond to Major’s October 10 grievance does not

33 See Kach, 589 F.3d at 646.

34 Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (citation omitted).

35 See Doc. 12 at 2, 4.

36 See Davis v. Samuels, 608 F. App’x 46, 48-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (nonprecedential)

(citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728,

729 (8th Cir. 1991)); Woods v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011)

(nonprecedential) (citing Flick, 932 F.2d at 729); Speight v. Sims, 283 F. App’x 880, 881 (3d

Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential) (quoting Massey, 259 F.3d at 647); see also Jones v. N.C.

Prisoners’ Lab. Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 138 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that,

while grievance procedures are “applaud[ed],” they are not “constitutionally mandated”);

Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to

grievance procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.”).

implicate a due process infringement because Major has not identified a Fourteenth

Amendment protected interest that is at stake.37

Additionally, if Major is attempting to raise a First Amendment Petition

Clause claim, he is also out of luck. Although it is true that inmates have a First

Amendment right to seek redress of grievances as part of their right of access to

courts,38 there is no concomitant First Amendment right to receive a response to a

grievance or complaint.39

Consequently, Major has failed to plausibly state a Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claim or a First Amendment right-to-petition claim against

Grievance Coordinator Lazusky (or any other Defendant).

D. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . .

which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.”40

Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment

37 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

234-35 (3d Cir. 2006).

38 See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 297-99 (3d Cir. 2016)

39 See Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2010); Booth v. King, 346 F. Supp. 2d

751, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“[A]lthough prisoners have a constitutional right to seek redress of

grievances as part of their right of access to courts, this right is not compromised by the failure

of prison officials to address these grievances.”); see also Am. Bus Ass’n v. Rogoff, 649 F.3d

734, 739 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Far from holding that the Petition Clause requires the possibility

of a remedy, . . . the clause does not even guarantee[] a citizen’s right to receive a government

response to or official consideration of a petition for redress of grievances.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)).

40 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).

or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like

“food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety[.]”41

To state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a prisoner-

plaintiff must plausibly allege both objective and subjective elements.42

Objectively, the inmate must allege that “the prison official deprived the prisoner

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as a

“sufficiently serious” deprivation.43 Subjectively, the prisoner must show that “the

prison official acted with deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or

safety.”44 Deliberate indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act

despite having knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would

subject the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.”45 Deliberate indifference

is a high bar and requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant “recklessly

disregard[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm.”46

The thrust of Major’s amended complaint is that he was purportedly

subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. He first alleges that he

was denied single-cell status.47 He additionally asserts that the double-occupancy

41 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citation omitted).

42 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015).

43 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

44 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

45 Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

46 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

47 See Doc. 12 at 5.

cells “fall short of the standards set by the American Correctional Association,”48

apparently referring to the 2017 finding by the “Commission on Accreditation for

Corrections” that SCI Frackville’s general population cells are “three square feet

short” of the “25 square feet of unencumbered space per occupant” required by the

Commission for compliance with its standards.49 In a different section of his

amended complaint, Major also raises the issues of the bunk beds not having a

ladder or “roll bar,” the lack of a sprinkler system or fire extinguishers, as well as

the cells not having “emergency call buttons.”50

The Court will assume, without deciding, that the circumstances Major

alleges—when taken together—could rise to the level of a sufficiently serious

deprivation. Nevertheless, Major’s amended complaint fails to state an Eighth

Amendment claim because he has not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference by

any Defendant. That is, Major has not plausibly pled that any Defendant had

knowledge of the multiple alleged conditions of confinement and acted with

deliberate indifference toward a substantial risk of serious harm to him.

48 See id.

49 See id.; Doc. 1-2 at 9 (Exhibit “E”); Doc. 1-2 at 8 (Exhibit “D”).

50 See Doc. 12 at 4, 7. Major additionally discusses an incident that occurred in 2021, where he

developed a blood clot in his leg, was taken to an outside hospital, and upon his return was

placed in a psychological observation cell because SCI Frackville does not have an infirmary.

See id. at 5. He avers that he spent two weeks in this observation cell, which had a “urine and

fecal matter stench,” and during which time he was not permitted phone calls or showers. See

id. Any Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim related to this 2021 incident is

facially barred by the two-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in Pennsylvania.

See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(2). Thus, any

such claim must be dismissed under Section 1915A(b)(1).

The Court begins with Major’s complaint of being housed in a double cell

and being denied single-cell status. He plausibly alleges that defendants Brittain,

Kephart, and Sokaloski were aware that he was housed in a double cell and that

these Defendants refused his requests for single-cell status.51 However, as the

Court has already explained,52 it is well-settled that double (and even triple)

celling—in itself—is not per se unconstitutional.53 Thus, the denial of a request for

a single cell and the mere knowledge that a prisoner is double-celled—without

more—does not implicate deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s health or safety.

Major next alleges that the general population cells at SCI Frackville are too

small, apparently falling 3 square feet short of the 25 square feet recommended by

the ACA’s Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. He plausibly alleges

that CFMM2 Kane was aware of this space issue because Kane sought a waiver for

the noncompliance in January 2020.54 Again, however, Kane’s alleged conduct of

51 See id. at 5-6.

52 See Doc. 10 at 8 & n.37.

53 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d

Cir. 1996); see also Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 232-36 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that

triple celling pretrial detainees for three to seven months did not violate the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (“It is

clear that double or triple celling of inmates is not per se unconstitutional.”); Camps v. Giorla,

843 F. App’x 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential) (triple celling pretrial detainees did

not violate Fourteenth Amendment); Parkell v. Morgan, 682 F. App’x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2017)

(nonprecedential) (same); North v. White, 152 F. App’x 111, 113 (3d Cir. 2005)

(nonprecedential) (noting that triple celling is not per se unconstitutional and holding that triple

bunking inmate, in the absence of other unconstitutional conditions, did not amount to an

Eighth Amendment violation); McCree v. Sherrod, 408 F. App’x 990, 992-93 (7th Cir. 2011)

(holding that triple celling does not “constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se”).

54 See Doc. 12 at 3, 6; Doc. 1-2 at 8 (Exhibit “D”). Although Major alleges that Brittain, Kephart,

and Sokaloski were also aware of this compliance issue, his allegations in this regard are

seeking a waiver for the square footage shortfall at SCI Frackville (due to “SCI

Frackville being constructed in 1986” and thus “a physical plant change is not

possible”)55 does not reflect deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to

prisoners in general or to Major specifically. As the Court previously held, this

condition alone simply does not implicate “wanton and unnecessary infliction of

pain,”56 and thus Kane could not have acted with the scienter necessary to violate

Major’s Eighth Amendment rights.

As to the other alleged cell conditions (i.e., the lack of a ladder or roll bar on

the bunk bed, the absence of an emergency call button in the cells, and the lack of

certain fire safety devices), Major’s amended complaint is completely silent

regarding any Defendant being aware of or being made aware of these purported

conditions. The amended complaint is also completely silent as to any Defendant

acting with deliberate indifference toward Major’s health or safety by failing to

address these alleged conditions.

In sum, Major’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim falls

short at the second element because he has failed to plausibly allege deliberate

indifference by any Defendant to a serious risk to Major’s health or safety. The

entirely speculative and conclusory. See Doc. 12 at 6 (stating, in conclusory fashion, that

“Brittain, Kephart and Sokaloski were made aware of or should have been made aware of the

cells in ‘their’ facility” falling short of “the standards set by the American Correctional

Association” (first emphasis added)). This is the standard for negligence, not deliberate

indifference.

55 See Doc. 1-2 at 8 (Exhibit “D”).

56 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

few conditions that Major plausibly claims SCI Frackville officials were aware of

and disregarded are not the type of unconstitutional deprivations of life’s

necessities that could put a prisoner’s health or life in jeopardy. As such, no

Defendant could have acted with the requisite deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to Major by undertaking the actions alleged in the

amended complaint. Major’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement

claims, therefore, must be dismissed.

E. Official Capacity Claims

Major sues all Defendants in their official capacities. However, any official

capacity claim seeking monetary damages from state officials is barred by

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Additionally, the official capacity

claims fail because there is no underlying constitutional violation alleged.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state.57 This immunity from private suit extends to state

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”58 States may waive

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

57 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

58 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.59 There are two

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”60

Major seeks compensatory and punitive damages. To the extent these

monetary damages are sought against state-actor Defendants in their official

capacities, such claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

And while Major also seeks prospective injunctive relief, because he has failed to

allege an underlying constitutional violation, his official capacity claims for

injunctive relief fail, too.

F. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”61 Further leave to amend will be

denied because Major has failed to cure numerous deficiencies with his pleadings

59 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

60 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

61 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114.

even after “amendments previously allowed.”62 The Court will therefore dismiss

this case with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Major’s

amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because he fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

62 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).