Stroud

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRADLEY STROUD,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-00610

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

This Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) matter is before the court

on the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) filed by the United States

of America. The matter stems from the plaintiff’s claim for negligence

against the government concerning a motor vehicle accident between the

plaintiff and a United States employee. (Doc. 1). The motion has been

briefed by the parties (Doc. 25; Doc. 26; Doc. 27; Doc. 28; Doc. 29; Doc. 30;

Doc. 31) and it is now ripe for review.

I. Background1

On December 8, 2022, Megan Gorsline, an employee of the United

States Postal Service (USPS), was operating her USPS Long Life Vehicle

1 The facts are taken from the United States’ “Statement of Material

Facts” (Doc. 25) and admitted by the plaintiff. (Doc. 29).

at the intersection of Church Street and Frederick Street in Athens,

Pennsylvania. It was a clear and sunny day without any precipitation.

Ms. Gorsline was performing a USPS auxiliary route to assist another

route that had fallen behind, and she typically traveled on Frederick

Street in the area of the intersection with Church Street about two to

three times per week. On the date of the accident, Ms. Gorsline had been

traveling west on Frederick Street before reaching a stop sign at the

intersection of Frederick Street and Church Street. Ms. Gorsline came to

a complete stop at the stop sign. A two-way stop sign is located on

Frederick Street traveling east to west at the intersection of Frederick

Street and Church Street; no stop sign exists heading north and south on

Church Street.

On the same date, the plaintiff was operating his ZX6R motorcycle

in the vicinity of the intersection of Frederick Street and Church Street.

The speed limit on Church Street near the intersection with Frederick

Street is twenty-five (25) miles per hour. The plaintiff was traveling in

the direction of his house because his daughter’s mother was waiting for

him at that location. At some point, he turned onto Church Street and

began to approach the intersection with Frederick Street.

After coming to a complete stop, Ms. Gorsline looked right, left, and

right again before proceeding through the intersection. Despite looking

down Church Street, Ms. Gorsline did not see or hear the plaintiff’s

motorcycle prior to entering the intersection. After passing through the

halfway point of the intersection, Ms. Gorsline saw something in her

peripheral vision and heard a loud noise approaching her vehicle. She

then felt an impact on the left side of her vehicle which caused her vehicle

to go up on two wheels. After exiting the vehicle, Ms. Gorsline observed

that the plaintiff’s motorcycle had struck her USPS vehicle at the

midway point immediately before the back left tire.

From the plaintiff’s perspective, the plaintiff was traveling on

Church Street and approaching the intersection with Frederick Street at

an estimated forty (40) to forty-five (45) miles per hour. The plaintiff

observed the USPS truck at the stop sign of Church Street and Frederick

Street and attempted to make eye contact with the USPS driver to get

her attention. The plaintiff, however, was unsuccessful. As the USPS

truck proceeded into the intersection, the plaintiff, continuing to travel

down Church Street, hit his brakes to avoid hitting the USPS truck, but

collided with the side of the truck near the front of the rear tire on the

left-hand side of the vehicle.

At some point, police officers from the Athens Borough Police

Department arrived on the scene of the accident and investigated the

crash. Following the investigation, the officers issued the plaintiff traffic

citations for the following violations of the Pennsylvania Vehicle and

Traffic Law: (1) Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed in violation of Title 75 Pa.

C.S.A. Vehicles § 3361; (2) Careless Driving in violation of Title 75 Pa.

C.S.C. Vehicles § 3714; (3) Improper Classification of License in violation

of Title 75 Pa. C.S.A. Vehicles § 1504; (4) Operation of a Motor Vehicle

Without Valid Inspection in violation of Title 75 Pa. C.S.A. Vehicles §

4703; (5) Operation of a Motor Vehicle Without Required Financial

Responsibility in violation of Title 75 Pa. C.S.A. Vehicles § 1786; and (6)

Driving an Unregistered Vehicle in violation of Title 75 Pa. C.S.A.

Vehicles § 1301. The plaintiff was subsequently found guilty of each

traffic violation. Ms. Gorsline, however, was never issued a traffic

citation.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the government

has also introduced the testimony of two witnesses. First, the United

States cites the testimony of Tiffany Derrig, who has lived at the corner

of the intersection of Frederick Street and Church Street for

approximately eleven years. Ms. Derrig testified that she could observe

the intersection of Frederick Street and Church Street from her

residence, and on the date of the accident, she was in her kitchen with a

clear view of the intersection. She testified that she observed the USPS

truck stopped at the stop sign located at the intersection of Frederick

Street and Church Street, and that when she turned away to complete

tasks in the kitchen, she heard a motorcycle going very fast followed by

the sound of a collision. When she turned around, she testified that she

saw the USPS truck and the motorcycle had collided in the middle of the

intersection at Frederick Street and Church Street.

Second, the government introduced the testimony of Ms. Derrig’s

son, Timothy Derrig, who was working in the yard at his residence at the

time of the accident. Mr. Derrig testified that he had an unobstructed

view of the intersection of Frederick Street and Church Street, and that

he observed a USPS truck stopped at a stop sign at the intersection with

its driver looking both ways before pulling into the intersection. Mr.

Derrig further testified that as the USPS truck pulled into the

intersection, he heard a motorcycle driving at an alarming speed towards

the intersection. He stated that the motorcycle then hit the USPS truck

on the back quarter of the truck. At his deposition, Mr. Derrig estimated

that the motorcycle was traveling at a speed of forty-five to fifty miles per

hour.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates summary

judgment should only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” at

248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be

drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the

non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-

movant’s must be taken as true.” , 24 F.3d

508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

Parties seeking summary judgment bear “the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and

demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.

, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a

showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the

record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury.” , 477 U.S. at

251–52. A court must first determine if the moving party has made

showing that it is entitled to summary judgment when evaluating

such a motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331. Only

once that showing has been made does the burden shift to the

nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331.

Parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to

support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is

inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of

admission at trial.” , 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599

(M.D. Pa. 2014); , 192 F.3d

378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary

judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).

III. Discussion

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives the United States’

sovereign immunity by granting federal district courts jurisdiction over

certain claims that are:

[A]gainst the United States, for money damages …. For

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances

where the United States, if a private person, would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the

place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The United States is liable under the FTCA “in

the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under

like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Therefore, “[t]he cause of action …

must come from state tort law.” , 535 F.3d 132, 141

(3d Cir. 2008) (citing , 510 U.S. 417, 478 (1994)).

Here, the plaintiff brings a cause of action for negligence against

the United States. A claim for negligence under Pennsylvania law

contains four elements: “(1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law …

(2) a failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a causal connection

between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or

damage resulting in harm to the interests of another.”

, 430 F.3d 121, 139 (3d Cir. 2005). To recover under a

negligence claim in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff “must establish that a

particular defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of her

injuries.” , 547 690 A.2d

169, 172 (Pa. 1997); , 209 A.2d 261, 263

(Pa. 1965) (finding that proximate causation is the “vitally important

link” necessary to impose tort liability.).

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “uses a modified comparative

negligence approach, permitting the plaintiff to recover damages

proportionate to the defendant’s negligence so long as she was not more

than 50% negligent.” , No. 4:21-CV-00702, 2025 WL

2677533, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2025) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102);

, 136 A.3d 984, 988–89 (Pa. Super

Ct. 2016) (“Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa.C.S. §

7102, reflects Pennsylvania’s policy of providing plaintiffs with a right to

at least a partial recovery when they are found 50% or less negligent.”).

However, “[c]omparative negligence is ordinarily an issue for the jury; it

is a ‘rare situation where it can be said that the plaintiff is more than

50% negligent as a matter of law.’” , 196 F.

App’x 65, 70 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting , 623 A.2d

873, 876 (1993)). “Therefore, summary judgment may only be granted

where ‘facts so clearly reveal the plaintiff’s negligence [such] that

reasonable minds could not disagree as to its existence.’”

, No. CV 20-1641, 2022 WL 3867908, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug.

30, 2022) (quoting , Civ. A. 19-03214, 2020 WL

3934971, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2020)).

Here, the United States argues that this action constitutes one of

the rare instances in which summary judgment is warranted because “it

cannot be disputed that [the plaintiff] was the actual cause of the motor

vehicle collision on December 8, 2022[.]” (Doc. 26, at 20). First, the

government cites the plaintiff’s own testimony that he was driving at

least fifteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit of twenty-five

miles per hour in support of its contention. ( , at 20). The government

has further supplemented that testimony with the testimony of Ms.

Gorsline and her son, Mr. Derrig, who estimated that the plaintiff may

have been going at least twenty miles per hour over the posted speed

limit. ( , at 20–21). Second, the government cites the testimony of Ms.

Gorsline, Ms. Derrig, and Mr. Derrig, who all confirm that Ms. Gorsline

stopped at the stop sign and looked both ways before proceeding into the

intersection. ( , at 21). Ms. Gorsline testified that she did not see the

plaintiff approaching on his vehicle when she looked both ways. Third,

the government notes that the plaintiff was found guilty of six violations

due to his role in the accident, including speeding and careless driving.

( ). Therefore, the United States concludes that the record adequately

proves that the plaintiff, not Ms. Gorsline, caused the accident, and at a

minimum, surpasses the 50% negligence bar for comparative negligence.

( , at 17).

But we note that at this stage, all inferences “should be drawn in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” ,24 F.3d at 512,

and applying that standard, we find there remain genuine issues of

material fact precluding us from granting summary judgment at this

stage. While the government argues that its evidence proves conclusively

that the plaintiff caused the accident, that evidence is only probative, not

dispositive, of how much negligence is assigned to the plaintiff, if any at

all. Indeed, while the government’s interpretation of the accident may

prove correct, an equally plausible conclusion is that Ms. Gorsline

stopped for too long at the stop sign, allowing the plaintiff time to turn

onto and travel up the street towards the subject intersection, as the

plaintiff argues. (Doc. 30, at 8). Therefore, a fact finder could reasonably

conclude that Ms. Gorsline had ample time to proceed before the plaintiff

reached the intersection and did not do so, or that Ms. Gorsline failed to

properly observe and assess the roadway before the accident. That

determination, however, is better left for a jury, not the Court, and

therefore, the granting of summary judgment is not warranted in this

case.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion for summary

judgment will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June 12, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge