Keller

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DAKOTA KELLER, #S14303, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-00208-RJD

)

W. LAWLESS, )

T. SHIREY, and )

JOHN BARWICK, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Dakota Keller, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights during his imprisonment at

Pinckneyville Correctional Center. He claims he was subjected to excessive force and denied

mental health assistance, and seeks monetary damages. (Doc. 1).

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A,1 which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): On August 4, 2025,

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint due to Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a

Magistrate Judge (Doc. 3), and the limited consent to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set

forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between this Court and the IDOC.

Plaintiff went to the shower, escorted by Defendant C/O Shirey (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff told Shirey

he felt suicidal and wouldn’t come out of the shower until he talked to a crisis member from mental

health. Shirey asked Plaintiff if he was going to hurt himself. When Plaintiff said “no,” Shirey said

he would not call for crisis and Plaintiff could stay in there all night (Doc. 1, p. 6-7). Plaintiff

explains he took these actions to get on crisis watch so he could get away from the officer (C/O

O’Bear)2 who had been harassing him and placing his life at risk by telling other inmates Plaintiff

was a “baby raper.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff felt he had no other option to get away from O’Bear

because staff had not responded to his requests for help (Doc. 1, p. 8). He wrote letters to Defendant

Warden Barwick but got no response. Id.

After about an hour waiting in the shower, Plaintiff broke a razor apart, stuffed the razor

blade down the drain, and kept the cap and stem (Doc. 1, p. 7). When Shirey returned, Plaintiff

gave him the broken pieces of the razor and acted as if he had swallowed the blade. Shirey

summoned Defendant Sgt. Lawless, who asked Plaintiff if he had swallowed the razor. Plaintiff

said he had, and Lawless told Plaintiff, “Now I have to spray you.” Id. Lawless asked Plaintiff two

more times if he had swallowed the razor. As Plaintiff answered for the last time, Lawless quickly

sprayed him with OC/pepper spray, hitting Plaintiff in his open mouth. Lawless cursed at Plaintiff

and told Plaintiff he should let him die. Plaintiff said he couldn’t breathe and needed to rinse the

spray off, and started to vomit. Lawless refused to let Plaintiff clean himself and said he shouldn’t

have swallowed the razor. Shirey and Lawless placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Lawless bent his hand

the wrong way, inflicting pain.

Plaintiff was put in a wheelchair and taken to Health Care, where he was still not allowed

to clean the pepper spray from his mouth and face. He was taken to an outside hospital.

2 Plaintiff is pursuing a separate lawsuit in this Court against O’Bear for the alleged harassment and

endangerment. Keller v. O’Bear, Case No. 25-cv-1795-GCS (S.D. Ill. filed Sept. 16, 2025).

Plaintiff raises claims against Lawless for the use of force, against Shirey for denying him

mental health help in a time of crisis, and against Barwick for failing to protect him (Doc 1, p. 9).

He also states he wants to sue O’Bear for the harassment that caused this chain of events. Id.

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Lawless for

spraying Plaintiff in the mouth with pepper spray and for painfully

bending Plaintiff’s hand on August 4, 2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious mental health

needs claim against Shirey for refusing to summon a crisis team

when Plaintiff claimed to be suicidal on August 4, 2025.

Count 3: Claim against Warden Barwick for failing to protect Plaintiff,

investigate his complaints, or correct his staff members’

misconduct.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be

considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.3

Preliminary Dismissals

Plaintiff mentions a claim against O’Bear in his summary (Doc. 1, p. 9) but does not include

O’Bear as a defendant in the case caption or list of parties (Doc. 1, pp. 1-3). The Court will not

treat parties not listed in the caption as defendants, thus any claims against O’Bear are dismissed

without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (noting that the title of the complaint “must name all

the parties”); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly

considered a party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). Further, it appears that any

claim in this case against O’Bear would be duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim in Case No. 25-cv-1795-

3 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

GCS.

Discussion

Count 1

“Correctional officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a good

faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

of causing harm.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy,

559 U.S. 34 (2010). Plaintiff’s allegations that Lawless sprayed pepper spray directly into his open

mouth when he was apparently offering no resistance, and then painfully twisted his hand while

applying handcuffs, state a viable claim in Count 1 against Lawless.

Count 2

Prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical or mental health

needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Rasho

v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must plead facts and

allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical/mental health

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical/mental health

needs. Id.

While suicide and self-harm attempts are objectively serious conditions, Plaintiff’s claim

fails on this prong. When Shirey initially placed Plaintiff in the shower, he told Shirey he was not

going to hurt himself. Plaintiff admits that he then faked the suicide attempt and did not actually

swallow the razor blade. He states his motivation for the charade was to be placed on crisis watch

to get away from C/O O’Bear. He does not claim to have actually planned or attempted to take his

own life. By his own admission, Plaintiff did not suffer from a serious mental health condition.

Accordingly, the deliberate indifference claim against Shirey in Count 2 will be dismissed.

Count 3

A prison official who fails to protect a prisoner from violence perpetrated by other

prisoners may be liable under the Eighth Amendment – but only where the plaintiff shows the

official was aware of a specific, impending, and substantial threat to his safety, and was

deliberately indifferent to the danger of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 834 (1994);

Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2001); Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th

Cir. 1996). The same standard may be applied to violence inflicted by a prison guard. Failure to

intervene when another officer abuses a prisoner can be the basis for a constitutional violation

under the Eighth Amendment. See Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). To state

such a claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege a defendant (1) knew that a constitutional violation

was committed; and (2) had a realistic opportunity to prevent it. See Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282,

285 (7th Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff includes no factual allegations to suggest he alerted Barwick to the danger

that excessive force could be used on him by Lawless. Thus, Barwick had no opportunity to

intervene to stop that harm before or while it occurred. To the extent Plaintiff may be claiming that

Barwick failed to protect him from O’Bear’s harassment, that matter is not at issue in this case.

Additionally, Barwick’s status as warden and supervisor of the other defendants does not

impose liability on him for the alleged failure to correct misconduct on the part of his staff. There

is no supervisory liability in a civil rights action under § 1983. See Sanville, 266 F.3d at 740

(quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). And finally, a prisoner has

no constitutional right to an investigation of their grievances or complaints. See See Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Watson v. Dodd, No. 16-CV-1217-NJR, 2017 WL

120951, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2017).

Count 3 and Defendant Barwick will be dismissed from the action without prejudice.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff raises claims against each defendant in his or her individual and official capacities

(Doc. 1, p. 9). Claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their

individual capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823

F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the individual

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

The Complaint states a colorable claim in Count 1 against W. Lawless. Counts 2 and 3,

and Defendants Shirey and Barwick, are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for W. Lawless (Sgt. #12591): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit

and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum

and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign

and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date

the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the

Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the

extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall

furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s

last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above

or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the

Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local

Rule 8.2, Defendant need only respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 2, 2026 —

fo Ns

REONA J. DALY

United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendant of your lawsuit and serve

them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendant will enter an

appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date

of this Order to receive the Defendant’s Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days

or more. When Defendant has filed their Answer, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order

containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions, to give the Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendant’s counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.