Caba

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAUL SALOME CABA,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-01720

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

JASEN BOHINSKI, .,

Respondents.

ORDER

Saul Salome Caba, incarcerated at SCI-Dallas, proceeds on a

petition for writ of pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging the denial of parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation

and Parole (the “Board”). (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, the Court

will deny the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 9, 1999, Caba received an aggregate sentence of 25½ to

51 years incarceration after he pled guilty to Involuntary Deviate Sexual

Intercourse, robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm without a

license. , No. CP-15-CR-0002543-1998

(Chester Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.); (Doc. 12-2 at 2). He became eligible for parole

on November 11, 2024, and has been reviewed for parole twice. After his

most recent review, the Board denied parole in a written decision dated

August 15, 2025, citing the following factors: his “reports, evaluations

and assessments” indicating a risk to the community; his

“minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s)

committed”; his lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility for

the offenses committed; the nature of his crime; and his prior criminal

history. (Doc. 12-4 at 2).

On August 17, 2025, Caba filed an application for parole pursuant

to 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139. Among other points, he argued that he had been

“denied parole due to [his] ethnic race”; that inmates of other races had

been “parole[d] with similar charges”; and that he had “completed

everything asked of [him].” (Doc. 12-5). The Board exercised its discretion

not to consider Caba’s application because it was filed within three years

of his last parole review. (Doc. 12-6); 61 Pa.C.S. § 6139(a)(3.3).

Caba filed this petition on September 15, 2025, essentially

renewing arguments he made in the August 17 application. In the

petition and supplemental filings, he argues that the denial of parole is

a violation of his due process rights because he “follow[ed all] parole

rules”; that the Board’s reasons for denial “bear no rational relationship

to rehabilitation or deterrence”; and that the denial reflects racial

discrimination because unspecified “African-American[ ] and Caucasian

men . . . with the same or similar charges” were granted parole. He also

claims that the Board has “no standing in this matter to state he is a risk

to anything” because the Board “is not the victim or the victim’s family.”

II. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the respondent argues that the Court lacks

jurisdiction because Caba has not exhausted available state remedies.1

The application of the exhaustion requirement to parole challenges is

disputed among courts in this circuit.

, No. 1:25-CV-00943, 2025 WL 2178422, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. July 31,

2025) (reviewing case law and concluding that exhaustion is not

required). Because the record demonstrates that Caba is not entitled to

relief, we resolve the petition on the merits.

“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person

to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor

1 Although Caba appears to consider his August 17 application for

parole as exhaustion of available remedies, full exhaustion would likely

require a petition for writ of mandamus in the appropriate state court.

, 263 A.3d 1220, 1232

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021).

has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right.

, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979);

, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing the general

principle that the Pennsylvania parole statute does not create a liberty

interest in the right to be paroled); , 770 A.2d 287, 289

(Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that [an inmate] does not have a clear legal

right to the grant of parole, nor does the board have a corresponding duty

to grant the same.”).

Pennsylvania law grants the Board vast discretion to deny parole,

61 Pa.C.S. § 6137, and Pennsylvania courts have affirmed the Board’s

complete discretion to parole a convict. , ,

, 514 A.2d 967, 971 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1986). The parole

statute indicates that the Board “shall consider”: the nature and

circumstances of the offense; any recommendations made by the trial

judge and prosecuting attorney; the general character and background of

the inmate; the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any,

together with such additional information regarding the nature and

circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence was imposed;

and the conduct of the person while in prison along with his physical,

mental and behavioral condition and history and his complete criminal

record. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6135(a).

When a prisoner claims that the Board’s review violated his due

process rights, a federal court’s role is limited to reviewing the decision

to determine whether the Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary,

capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. , 631

F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). To show a violation of substantive due

process rights, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he was

arbitrarily denied parole for impermissible reasons such as race, religion,

or political beliefs; or (2) the Board failed to apply appropriate, rational

criteria in reaching its determination. , 631 F.2d at 236. “[F]ederal

courts are not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess

parole boards and the requirements of substantive due process are met if

there is some basis for the challenged decision.” , 251 F.3d at 487.

The “relevant level of arbitrariness required to find a substantive due

process violation involves not merely action that is unreasonable, but,

rather, something more egregious, which we have termed at times

‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately indifferent.’” ,

308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Here, Caba claims the Board’s most recent denial was not justified

because he has “follow[ed all] rules” of parole. We construe him to mean

that he has completed all required prison programming and has not been

cited for misconduct in prison. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Caba presents no

evidence of this, but even assuming it as true, those “rules” were factors

to be considered in future reviews, (Docs. 12-3, 12-4), not checkboxes

that would entitle him to parole as a matter of law. The Board has denied

parole based in part on Caba’s risk to the community and the nature of

his crimes, among other factors. Those factors are appropriately

considered in a parole review, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6135(a), and Caba does not

explain how they have “no rational relationship to rehabilitation or

deterrence.” The Board does not lack “standing” to evaluate his risk to

the community, nor is there any requirement to defer to anyone else in

assessing that risk. , , , No. 3:23-CV-225, 2025 WL

524301, at *9-10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2025).

Caba also claims that the Board’s decision reflects racial

discrimination because “African-American[ ] and Caucasian men . . . with

the same or similar charges” were granted parole. However, he offers no

evidence supporting this allegation, nor any evidence indicating that the

Board’s decision was in any way based on race. , , ,

No. 4:24-CV-00825, 2024 WL 5096221, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2024)

(petitioner’s “bald assertions” of parole denial on racial grounds were

“conclusory and lack[ed] any supporting evidence, statistics, or

comparator information”).2

Although Caba believes his conduct in prison warrants greater

weight in the parole analysis, the Board’s judgment to prioritize other

factors, such as his risk to the community, is not a violation of his

constitutional rights. , 251 F.3d at 487 (“[T]he requirements of

substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged

decision.”). Ultimately, Caba has not presented evidence of arbitrary,

irrational, or “conscience shocking” considerations by the Board that

would entitle him to habeas relief. , 308 F.3d at 247.

2 Caba also frames this argument as an equal protection claim, but

any such claim would fail on the same grounds. Caba’s vague allegation

about inmates with “similar charges” does not establish that those

individuals were similarly situated to him for purposes of a parole review.

, 53 F.4th 67, 73-74 (3d

Cir. 2022) (for an equal protection claim, a similarly situated person must

be “alike in all relevant respects,” which requires more than “broad

generalities”) (quotations and citations omitted).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Caba’s petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

2. A certificate of appealability shall not issue, because Caba has

not demonstrated “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

Dated: June 10, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge