Chatmon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

ROLANDIS CHATMON, PLAINTIFF

ADC # 140078

v. 4:26CV00368-JM-JTK

AARON ROGERS, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District James M.

Moody, Jr. Any party may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you

do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your

objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

I. INTRODUCTION

Rolandis Chatmon (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Division

of Correction. He filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. (Doc. No.

1).

Plaintiff did not submit a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Asking Plaintiff to do so

would be futile, because Plaintiff is a “three striker” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”).

II. SCREENING

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. '1915A(a).1 Additionally, the

PLRA, 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g), provides that:

[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil

action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on three (3) or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Plaintiff has had at least three complaints dismissed for failure to state a claim.2 The Court

finds that Plaintiff is a “three-striker” within the meaning of the PLRA. Gonzalez v. United

States, 23 F. 4th 788, 789-91 (8th Cir. 2022).

1 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims

that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is

appearing pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v.

Sargent, 780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se

complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal

construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all

factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

Additionally, to survive a court’s screening, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-7. The plausibility

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with”

a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement

to relief.” Id.

2 Chatmon v. Kemp, et al, 4:20cv00883-BRW (E.D. Ark.) (no appeal filed); Chatmon v.

Plaintiff may, however, be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis if he falls under the

“imminent danger” exception to the three strikes rule set forth above. 28 U.S.C. '1915(g). This

exception does not apply to allegations of past danger, and the alleged harm must be “real and

proximate” and occurring at the time the complaint is filed. Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531

(7th Cir. 2002). In the Eighth Circuit, the exception does not apply unless the plaintiff alleges

“specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct

evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048,

1050 (8th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff sued Emergency Response Team Member Aaron Rogers, Sergeants J. Merrill and

Chyna Thomas, and Corporal Jimmy Kilgore, Jr. alleging violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff explains that on November 10, 2024, Defendants Rogers and

Merrill used a chemical agent against Plaintiff after Plaintiff was accused of flooding his cell. (Id.

at 6). Plaintiff was placed on behavior control for 72 hours. (Id.). Plaintiff was told Defendant

Rogers “would have to take [Plaintiff] off” of behavior control. (Id.). On November 14, 2024,

Plaintiff flooded his cell because he still had not received his property back despite the 72-hour

behavior control period having passed. (Id. at 8-9). Later, when being escorted to the shower,

Defendants Rogers and Merrill slammed Plaintiff to the ground while Plaintiff was in full

restraints. (Id. at 10). Defendant Kilgore held Plaintiff’s legs while Defendant Merrill held

Plaintiff so that Defendant Rogers “could get accurate and direct punches to Plaintiff’s face.”

(Doc. No. 1 at 10). Defendant Rogers then threw Plaintiff into the shower. (Id.).

Henry, 4:23cv00689-LPR (E.D. Ark.) (appeal dismissed May 3, 2024, for failure to prosecute);

and Chatmon v. Faulkner County, Arkansas, et al., 4:24cv00179-BRW (E.D. Ark.) (no appeal

filed).

Plaintiff makes additional allegations about receiving false disciplinaries, filing grievances

about the incident, and filing a complaint with the Arkansas Claims Commission about the

incident. (Id. at 11-14). Plaintiff also filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County,

Arkansas, in connection with the alleged use of excessive force. (Id. at 13).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Rogers continues to “threaten, intimidate, write fictitious

disciplinaries, interfere with legal mail & [the] mailing process.” (Id. at 14). Plaintiff maintains

Defendants Merrill and Kilgore “failed to protect Plaintiff from harm by failing to intervene when

Rogers was beating Plaintiff.” (Id.). Plaintiff says that Defendant Thomas was not in a position

to protect Plaintiff from harm but “is a proper party needed to adjudicate this case.” (Doc. No. 1

at 14).

Plaintiff cannot establish imminent danger through his allegations in this case. Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendants Merrill and Kilgore are limited to allegations of failure to protect that

took place roughly a year-and-a-half in the past. Plaintiff alleges no additional action by these

Defendants. Plaintiff alleges no unlawful behavior against Defendant Thomas. Plaintiff cannot

show that he is in imminent danger of harm from Defendant Thomas.

Plaintiff says that on March 13, 2026, Defendant Rogers walked past Plaintiff’s cell

threatening physical harm “if Plaintiff continues to seek legal redress.” (Id. at 3). Defendant

Rogers also threatened to take Plaintiff off the step-down program, wrote Plaintiff a false

disciplinary, and interfered with Plaintiff’s legal mail. (Id. at 3-5). Plaintiff’s allegations against

Defendant Rogers are disturbing but are not enough to establish that Plaintiff is in imminent danger

of serious physical harm. Nearly one-and-a-half years have passed after Defendant Rogers

allegedly used excessive force against Plaintiff and Plaintiff has not claimed any further incidents

of force involving Defendant Rogers. Considering the substantial time that has passed since the

alleged use of excessive force, the Court finds Plaintiff's allegations do not support a finding of

“ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of

imminent serious physical injury.” Martin, 319 F.3d at 1050. As such, Plaintiffs Complaint

should be dismissed without prejudice pending payment of the $405.00 filing and administrative

fee.

I. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. If Plaintiff wishes to continue this case, he be required to submit the statutory filing

and administrative fee of $405.00 to the Clerk, noting the above case style and number, within

fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, together with a motion to reopen the case. Upon receipt

of the motion and full payment, the case will be reopened.

3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis

appeal from any Order adopting these recommendations and the accompanying Judgment would

not be taken in good faith.

Dated this 21% day of April, 2026.

JEROME T. KEARNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE