The opinion
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
WILD CARD, INC., §
§
Plaintiff, §
v. § Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-1216
§ Judge Mazzant
PANINI AMERICA, INC., §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Panini America’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the
Northern District of Texas (the “Motion”) (Dkt. #11). Having considered the Motion, the relevant
pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is an antitrust case involving allegations that Panini America, Inc. (“Defendant”)
sought to exclude Wild Card, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) from the premium sports trading card market by
leveraging its market power and pressuring distributors not to carry Plaintiff’s products
(Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 1, 22). Plaintiff is a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of business in
Nolensville, Tennessee, while Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Irving, Texas (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 4–5). The market at issue primarily operates through
hobby-channel distributors, which distribute trading cards, while dominant suppliers control
product allocation and, in turn, distributors’ inventory (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 11).
On October 21, 2021, Defendant convened a closed-door annual meeting with its national
hobby-channel distributors at its headquarters in Irving, Texas (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges
that, during this meeting, Defendant warned distributors that carrying Plaintiff’s cards would
result in consequences relating to allocations, programs, and access (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 22). Following the
meeting, four major premium card distributors—including, Southern Hobby, Magazine Exchange,
Hamps Supply, and Steel City (collectively, the “Named Distributors”)—refused Plaintiff’s
allocations and previously committed shipments (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 24).
On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant alleging: (1) violations
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2; (2) violation of Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14; and (3) violation of Chapter 15 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code,
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (See Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 46–86).
On January 23, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion seeking to transfer this action to
the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Dkt. #11). On
February 20, 2026, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s Motion (Dkt. #17). On March 13, 2026,
Defendant filed its Reply in Support of its Motion (Dkt. #18). On April 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a
Sur-Reply (Dkt. #28).1 On April 13, 2026, at Defendant’s request, the Court held a hearing on the
Motion pursuant to the Court’s Standing Order Regarding Courtroom Opportunities for Younger
Attorneys. The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 1404 provides the following: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all the parties consented.”
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to
1 Local Rule CV-7(f) provides that sur-replies must be “filed within seven days from the date the reply is served,”
and that “(a)bsent leave of court, no further submissions on the motion are allowed.” LOCAL RULE CV-7(f). Here,
Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply was filed more than seven days from the date the reply was filed. Despite it being untimely, the
Court considered Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply.
adjudicate motions for transfer according to ‘an individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). “The purpose of section 1404 is to prevent the waste
‘of time, energy and money’ and ‘to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary
inconvenience and expense.’” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-5 85,
364 U.S. 19, 26, 27 (1960)).
The threshold inquiry when determining eligibility for transfer is “whether the judicial
district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have been
filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Volkswagen I]. Once that
threshold inquiry is met, the Fifth Circuit has held the determination of convenience turns on eight
private and public interest factors, where “[n]o factor is of dispositive weight.” In re TikTok, Inc.,
85 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2023).
The private interest factors include: (1) relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) cost of attendance
for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter
Volkswagen II] (en banc). The public interest factors include: (1) administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; (2) local interest in having localized interests decided at home;
(3) familiarity of the forum with the governing law; and (4) avoidance of unnecessary problems of
conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id. These factors are neither exhaustive nor
exclusive. Id.
The party seeking transfer of venue must show good cause for the transfer. Id. The moving
party must show that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient” than the transferor venue.
Id. The plaintiff’s choice of venue is not a factor in this analysis, but, rather contributes to the
defendant’s burden to show good cause for the transfer. Id. at 313, 314 n.10 (“[W]hile a plaintiff
has the privilege of filing his claims in any judicial division appropriate under the general venue
statute, § 1404(a) tempers the effects of the exercise of this privilege.”). However, “when the
transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s choice should be respected.” Id. at 315. And while the multi-factor analysis is
informative, ultimately, “the district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to order a
transfer.” Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank of S.C., 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam)).
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that this case should be transferred to the Dallas Division of the Northern
District of Texas under § 1404(a) (Dkt. #11). Neither party disputes that this case could have been
filed there. The Court therefore turns to the second part of the transfer inquiry: whether transfer
is appropriate under the private and public interest factors. As explained below, the Court finds
that the factors weigh in favor of transferring the case.
I. Private Interest Factors
The Court begins by addressing the private interest factors: (1) the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. The Court will consider
each factor in turn.
A. The Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
This first private interest factor “focuses on the location of ‘documents and physical
evidence relating to the [case].’” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316).
This relative ease of access to sources of proof is still a relevant part of the transfer analysis despite
technological advances that have made transporting large volumes of documents across the country
more convenient. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316. “That means this factor weighs in favor of transfer
where the current district lacks any evidence relating to the case.” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358. “But
when ‘the vast majority of the evidence [is] electronic, and therefore equally accessible in either
forum[,]’ this factor bears less strongly on the transfer analysis.” Id. (quoting In re Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2022)).
In this case, Plaintiff complains of Defendant’s alleged anti-competitive scheme and
exclusionary tactics to manipulate the sports trading card market in its favor (See Dkt. #1). Plaintiff
contends that Defendant’s wrongful conduct culminated at a closed-door meeting between
Defendant and various distributors carrying Plaintiff’s product (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 22). Defendant argues
that “any documents, presentation decks, or physical evidence” related to this distributor meeting,
along with any relevant evidence regarding its program access or allocation policies, would be
located at its headquarters in Irving, Texas, which is in the Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #11 at
p. 11; Dkt. #11-1 at ¶¶ 5–6; Dkt. #18 at p. 11). Notably, Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in
the Eastern District of Texas, which would seem to weigh in favor of transfer (See Dkt. #11 at p. 11).
See TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (“[T]his factor weighs in favor of transfer where the current district
lacks any evidence relating to the case.” (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316)).
However, Plaintiff asserts that the existence of physical evidence in the Northern District
of Texas “does not mean it is unavailable in readily accessible electronic form in the Eastern District
of Texas” (Dkt. #17 at p. 8). Defendant does not rebut the assertion that electronic documents
would be “equally accessible in either forum.” See TikTok, 85 F.4th at 358 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630). Thus, the Court finds that this factor
weighs only slightly in favor of transfer because some documents are located in the Northern
District of Texas but are equally accessible in either forum.
B. The Availability of Compulsory Process
The second private interest factor considers the availability of compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses. TikTok, 85 F.4th at 360. This factor “receives less weight when it has
not been alleged or shown that any witness would be unwilling to testify.” Id. (internal quotations
marks omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 630–31). Here, Defendant does not allege
or show that any witness would be unwilling to testify. See TikTok, 85 F.4th at 360. In the absence
of such an argument, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
C. The Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
“The third private factor, which considers the conveniences for witnesses who attend
willingly, has been described as the most important factor.” Seagen Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd.,
546 F. Supp. 3d 515, 531 (E.D. Tex. 2021). In considering the availability and convenience of
witnesses, the Court must concentrate primarily upon the availability and convenience of key
witnesses. Shoemake v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 233 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (E.D. Tex. 2002). The
Fifth Circuit uses a 100-mile threshold to assess this factor. TikTok, 85 F.4th at 361 (citing
Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317). “When the distance between an existing venue for trial . . . and a
proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to the
witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” Id. While the
Court can consider costs imposed on witnesses when the proposed transfer is within the 100-mile
threshold, “this factor has greater significance when the distance is greater than 100 miles.” In re
Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Finally, the convenience of party
witnesses is given relatively little weight when compared to non-party witnesses. United States ex
rel. Ferguson v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 4:20-CV-097, 2023 WL 8719443, *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
18, 2023).
The Dallas and Sherman courthouses sit less than 100 miles apart from each other, so this
factor, while relevant, receives less significance. See id. Defendant argues that this factor weighs in
favor of transfer since none of the potential witnesses mentioned in the Complaint live in the
Eastern District of Texas but three of the potential witnesses reside in cities within the Northern
District of Texas (Dkt. #11 at p. 12; Dkt. #18 at p. 12). In response, Plaintiff argues that because
half of the witnesses reside outside of Texas, “there is no meaningful difference in the cost of
attendance for the witnesses between the two districts” (Dkt. #17 at p. 9).
The representatives of the Named Distributors, which allegedly refused Plaintiff’s
allocations and previously committed shipments, are potential non-party witnesses (Dkt. #1 at
¶ 24). Three of the four Named Distributors are located outside of Texas (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 24;
Dkt. #11-1 at ¶¶ 8–12). The fourth Named Distributor is located in Dallas, Texas and its
representative, who attended the distributor meeting, lives in Highland Park, Texas (Dkt. #11-1 at
¶¶ 11). Finally, Defendant’s Vice President of Sales, a party witness whom Plaintiff alleges warned
distributors not to carry its products, resides in Aledo, Texas (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 22; Dkt. #11- 1 at ¶ 7).
With respect to the three Named Distributors located outside Texas, the Court finds that
any difference in the burden of traveling to the Sherman courthouse as opposed to the Dallas
courthouse is negligible (Dkt. #11-1). See, e.g., Vargas v. Seamar Divers Int’l, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-
178-TJW, 2011 WL 1980001, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 20, 2011) (finding the difference in convenience
negligible when witnesses resided over 100 miles from both parties’ preferred venues); Erickson v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:24-CV-363, 2025 WL 1047099, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2025) (finding
that whether in Galveston or Houston, witnesses must travel some distance by car from the airport
and that any difference in burden is negligible).
Next, the Named Distributor and its representative located in Dallas and Highland Park,
Texas respectively, would face slightly less inconvenience traveling to the Dallas courthouse
compared to the Sherman courthouse (Dkt. #11-1 at ¶ 11). Finally, while given less weight as a party
witness, Defendant’s Vice President of Sales would similarly face slightly less inconvenience
traveling to the Dallas courthouse instead of the Sherman courthouse from his residence in Aledo,
Texas (Dkt. #11-1 at ¶ 7). See Holloway v. City of Fort Worth, No. 4:23-CV-487, 2024 WL 96666, at
*6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2024) (“Even [the party witness] would experience a lesser inconvenience
traveling to the Fort Worth courthouse than to the Sherman courthouse because the Fort Worth
courthouse is closer to his residence.”). Accordingly, the Court finds this factor slightly favors
transfer.
D. Other Practical Problems
The fourth private interest factor is a catchall where the Court “considers ‘all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.’” TikTok, 85 F.4th
at 362 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315). In particular, the presence of parallel litigation
involving the same or similar issues may create practical challenges that weigh in favor of or against
transfer. Ferguson, 2023 WL 8719443, at *5. This factor considers whether related cases are
pending and their impact on judicial economy. Id. (citing ACQIS LLC v. EMC Corp., 67 F. Supp.
3d 769, 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2014)).
Plaintiff argues that judicial economy weighs against transfer because of a prior suit before
the Court (the “AAA Sports Lawsuit”) (Dkt. #17 at pp. 4–6).2 Plaintiff contends the AAA Sports
Lawsuit involved the same defendant and similar product markets, giving the Court “substantial
familiar with the issues in this case and the sports trading card industry, generally (Dkt. #17 at
pp. 4–6). Plaintiff goes on to explain that in assessing the copyright infringement claims asserted
in the AAA Sports Lawsuit, the Court developed “institutional knowledge” of this “niche
industry;” namely, “how sports trading card products are developed and commercialized, how
value and demand are created for premium products, and how industry-specific licensing and
authorization relationships shape competition in primary markets” (Dkt. #17 at p. 5; Dkt. #28 at
pp. 3–4). Defendant argues that any familiarity the Court has from presiding over the AAA Sports
Lawsuit is outweighed by the fact that the Eastern District of Texas has “no rational relationship
to the events giving rise to this suit” (Dkt. #18 at pp. 13–14).
The Court agrees with Defendant; specifically, the Court is not convinced that presiding
over the AAA Sports Lawsuit makes trial of the instant case easier, more expeditious, or
inexpensive. TikTok, 85 F.4th at 362. First, the instant action was brought by a different plaintiff
and the wrongful conduct implicates new witnesses, the Named Distributors (Dkt. #1 at ¶ 22;
Dkt. #11-1). Second, in this case, Plaintiff has alleged an antitrust scheme, while the plaintiff in the
2 The AAA Sports Lawsuit refers to E. Hanlin Bavely, Chapter 7 Trustee of AAA Sports, Inc. v. Panini Am., Inc.,
Case No. 4:22-cv-93, filed on Feb. 10, 2022. A week before the Final Pretrial Conference, on August 23, 2023, the
parties filed a Notice of Settlement, and the AAA Sports Lawsuit was closed (AAA Sports Lawsuit, Dkt. #249).
AAA Sports Lawsuit asserted copyright infringement claims (Compare Dkt. #1 with AAA Sports
Lawsuit, Dkt. #1). Third, the AAA Sports Lawsuit was closed two and a half years ago so there is
“little to no impact on the judicial economy because the judicial resources are already expended.”
Ferguson, 2023 WL 8719443, at *5; see also Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. Lattice Semiconductor
Corp., 126 F. Supp. 3d 430, 444 (D. Del. 2015) (finding that actions that were now dismissed should
not be considered when analyzing this fourth private interest factor). Moreover, because of this
lapse in time since the AAA Sports Lawsuit was closed, the Court would have to become familiar
with all matters again, a process that another judge “is equally equipped to manage.” Odom v. BP
Expl. & Prod. Inc., No. CV 16-15974, 2017 WL 11221334, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 2017).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
II. Public Interest Factors
The Court next turns to public interest factors: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. The
Court will consider each factor in turn.
A. The Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion
The first public interest factor concerns “whether there is an appreciable difference in
docket congestion between the two forums.” In re Adobe Inc., 823 F. App’x 929, 932 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (unpublished) (citing Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963)). “One
element to be considered stems from the administrative difficulties that arise when courts become
congested with litigation that should have been handled at its place of origin.” Alaniz v. Liberty Life
Assurance Co. of Bos., No. 1:18-CV-297, 2018 WL 11428242, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018).
Defendant contends that this factor favors transfer because not only is the median time
from filing to resolution shorter in the Northern District of Texas, but the judges in the Eastern
District carry significantly heavier caseloads (Dkt. #11 at p. 13; Dkt. #18 at p. 13). Defendant further
argues that “[t]he Court should not be forced” to keep a case that “the Eastern District has no
stake in adjudicating” (Dkt. #11 at p. 13). Plaintiff responds that although the median time from
filing to disposition was shorter in the Northern District of Texas, transfer is unlikely to expedite
the case (Dkt. #17 at p. 9). Specifically, Plaintiff notes that the Eastern District of Texas has a
shorter time from filing to trial in civil cases, has fewer civil cases older than three years, and has
not experienced vacant judgeship months like the Northern District of Texas (Dkt. #28 at p. 4).
As of December 31, 2025, the median number of months from filing to disposition for civil
cases is 7.2 months in the Eastern District of Texas and 5.8 months in the Northern District of
Texas.3 The median number of months from filing to trial for civil cases is 24.0 months in the
Eastern District of Texas and 24.4 months in the Northern District of Texas.4 Further, in the
Eastern District of Texas, there were 6,895 cases pending, with an average of 862 cases per each
district judge.5 In contrast, in the Northern District of Texas, there were 6,432 cases pending, with
an average of 536 cases per each district judge.6
The Court is not convinced its docket is less congested than the dockets of the courts in
the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, as Plaintiff suggests. While the Eastern
District of Texas reflects a marginally shorter median time from filing to trial, the Court sits in the
3 UNITED STATES COURTS, U.S. District Court — Judicial Caseload Profile, 2020-2025 (April 15, 2026), https://ww
w.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/document/fcms_na_distprofile1231.2025.pd.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
busiest division of the Eastern District of Texas, insomuch that the district is operating under an
adjusted case assignment system that distributes the Sherman Division’s caseload throughout the
entire district. See General Order No. 26-03, General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions,
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Texas (April 1, 2026). Accordingly, this factor favors
transfer.
B. The Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home
The second public interest factor is the local interest in having localized disputes decided
at home. Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315. “Important considerations include the location of the
injury, witnesses, and the [p]laintiff’s residence.” Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414, 435
(5th Cir. 2022). Also, “[j]ury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation.” Volkswagen I, 371 F.3d at 206 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)).
Further, the Court should “look not to ‘the parties’ significant connections to each
forum . . . but rather the significant connections between a particular venue and the events that
gave rise to a suit.’” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 364 (quoting Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 435). “[T]he
place of the alleged wrong is one of the most important factors in venue determinations.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 435). “[T]his factor
weighs heavily in favor of transfer [when] . . . there is no relevant factual connection to the
[transferor district].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at
317–18). “Also, this factor can weigh against transfer when the ‘citizens of [the transferor district]
have a greater stake in the litigation than the citizens of [the transferee district].’” Id. (quoting
Planned Parenthood, 52 F.4th at 632).
Defendant contends that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because the Complaint
alleges no facts tying this case to the Eastern District of Texas, as neither Plaintiff or Defendant are
located here, no party or non-party witnesses are located here, and the purported distributor
meeting at the center of the antitrust scheme did not occur here (See Dkt. #11 at pp. 9–10; Dkt. #18
at pp. 5–9). In response, Plaintiff argues that the alleged anticompetitive tactics that gave rise to
this action have a nationwide scope, and Defendant operates through national distribution
channels, giving the Eastern District a legitimate interest and, at a minimum, rendering this factor
neutral (See Dkt. #17 at pp. 6–8; Dkt. #28 at p. 5).
In support of its position, Plaintiff relies on Rochester Med. Corp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 5:04-
CV-60, 2005 WL 8161204 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2005) (Dkt. #17 at pp. 7– 8). The decision in
Rochester Med. Corp. involved an antitrust medical device sales dispute centered on group
purchasing organization contracts. Id. at *1. The transferee district retained a strong local interest
because, unlike here, there was no centralized location where the conduct giving rise to the suit
occurred. See id. at *4. Further, the plaintiff identified specific acts by both the plaintiff and
defendant in the Eastern District of Texas that were essential to their ordinary business operations.
Id. at *1. The plaintiff also offered evidence that much of the alleged anticompetitive conduct at
issue in the case was directed at consumers in the Eastern District of Texas, which is not the case
here. See id. The Court finds that this case does not stand for Plaintiff’s proposition that the
nationwide effects of an anticompetitive scheme are sufficient to establish a localized interest in
any forum. See id. at *4. Thus, the Court will not adopt that view here.
The Court finds that the second public interest factor, the local interest in having localized
disputes decided at home, weighs heavily in favor of transfer as there is no relevant factual
connection to the Eastern District of Texas. See TikTok, 85 F.4th at 364 (explaining that the second
factor “weighs heavily in favor of transfer when there is no relevant factual connection to the
transferor district.” (citation modified)). Indeed, not only does Plaintiff not reside in the Eastern
District of Texas, but neither party has been able to identify even a single witness that lives within
this district (See Dkt. #1 at ¶ 4; Dkt. #11-1 at ¶¶ 7–12). See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317 (finding
that the second factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer where, as here, all of the plaintiffs and
witnesses in the case reside in districts other than the Eastern District of Texas). Importantly, the
incident giving rise to this action occurred in the Northern District of Texas at Defendant’s
headquarters during a closed-door meeting where Defendant allegedly threatened distributors
carrying Plaintiff’s product (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 22–31).
While Plaintiff argues that the effects of the conduct at the meeting “reach far beyond the
Northern District [of Texas], affecting the sports trading card market across the United States,
including in this District,” the Court finds this argument unavailing (Dkt. #17 at pp. 6–7). Under
that reasoning, at a minimum, the Eastern District’s connection to the controversy is identical to
that of any other jurisdiction. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318 (noting that it “stretches logic” to
conclude that a district has an interest in a case merely because the product is available there, as
that rationale “could apply virtually to any judicial district or division in the United States.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer.
C. The Familiarity of the Forum with Governing Law
This third public interest factor “considers the current district’s ‘familiarity with the law
that will govern the case.’” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 365 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315). “This
factor does not weigh in favor of transfer when both districts are ‘equally capable of applying the
relevant law.’” TikTok, 85 F.4th at 365 (quoting Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289). The Court finds that
both the Eastern and Northern Districts of Texas are equally capable of applying the relevant law
and thus this factor is neutral (Dkt. #11 at p. 8 n.1; Dkt. #17 at p. 6). Accordingly, this factor is
neutral.
D. Avoidance of Conflict of Law
The final public interest factor “seeks to avoid ‘unnecessary problems of conflict of laws
or in the application of foreign law.’” Def. Distributed, 30 F.4th at 436 (quoting Volkswagen II, 545
F.3d at 315). Here, conflict of laws is not in dispute (See Dkt. #11 at p. 8 n.1; Dkt. #17 at p. 6).
Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
* * *
In sum, the Court finds that four factors weigh in favor of transfer, while four factors are
neutral. The Court acknowledges that the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas and
the Sherman Division of the Eastern District of Texas border each other, meaning there is little to
no inconvenience from having to litigate here instead of there. However, the Dallas Division of the
Northern District of Texas is the clearly more convenient forum when considering no party resides
in this district and there is no relevant connection between the events giving rise to this litigation
and this district. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion seeking to transfer the case under § 1404(a)
should be GRANTED.
III. Plaintiff’s Choice of Venue
The final issue for the Court to address is whether the Court should defer to Plaintiff’s
choice of venue. Plaintiff argues that in antitrust cases, a plaintiff’s forum selection should be
afforded significant deference (Dkt. #17 at p. 4). In response, Defendant argues that the nature of
an antitrust lawsuit does not alter the § 1404(a) transfer analysis (Dkt. #18 at p. 10).
Antitrust lawsuits against corporations, like the instant case, “may be brought not only in
the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business.” 15 U.S.C. § 22. The Supreme Court has indicated that § 1404(a) is applicable
to antitrust cases just like any other civil case. United States v. Nat’l City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 84
(1949). Thus, although an antitrust plaintiff may choose from a broad range of venues as to where
to file suit, the convenience of the forum may still be scrutinized under § 1404(a) and transfer may
be permissible. Id.; JM Comput. Servs., Inc. v. Schlumberger Techs., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 358, 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (collecting cases) (“[C]ourts have specifically rejected the argument that a
§ 1404(a) transfer is inappropriate in antitrust cases.”).
In support of its position that an antitrust plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to
heightened deference, Plaintiff directs the Court to four cases (Dkt. #17 at p. 4; Dkt. #28 at p. 3).
First, Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 1392 (S.D. Tex. 1992). In that antitrust
action, the court denied a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a), finding the defendant had not
demonstrated that a change of venue was warranted. Cont’l Airlines, 805 F. Supp. at 1396. The
court also noted that the following factors suggested that “greater deference” should be shown
towards the plaintiffs’ choice of forum: (1) at least one of the plaintiffs resided in that district; and
(2) “at least one court has held that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to particular deference
in antitrust cases.” Id. (citing Expoconsul Int’l, Inc. v. A/E Sys., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 730, 735 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
Plaintiff further relies on the Expoconsul case. In that case, a court in the Southern District
of New York denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss a complaint based on improper venue or
alternatively, to transfer venue to the neighboring District of Connecticut under § 1404(a).
Expoconsul, 711 F. Supp. at 731. The plaintiff’s claims centered around the defendant’s alleged
intent to monopolize the market for building design and construction industry tradeshows held in
New York City. Id. at 732. The defendant argued Connecticut was its primary location. Id. at 735.
The Court found the defendant had not met its burden of showing that the balance of convenience
weighed strongly in favor of the District of Connecticut, considering the defendant traveled to and
transacted a significant amount of business in New York without any burden. Id. at 733–34.
Plaintiff next relies on Lanier Bus. Prods. v. Graymar Co., 355 F. Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1973). In
that case, the defendant asserted counterclaims for violations of antitrust laws. Lanier, 355 F. Supp.
at 525. The court ultimately denied the plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue reasoning that, “[t]his
is not a case presenting a forum totally irrelevant to the subject matter of litigation,” and “[w]here
the balance of convenience and interest of justice are in substantial equilibrium, the Court must
deny the motion to transfer.” Id. at 528–29.
Finally, Plaintiff relies on Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375 (W.D.
La. 1996). In that case, the court noted, “[t]here is authority for the proposition that the defendants’
§ 1404(a) burden is ‘especially heavy’ in antitrust suits because the plaintiff’s choice of forum is
entitled to a particular respect.” Icon, 921 F. Supp. at 385 (quoting Expoconsul, 711 F. Supp. at 735).
However, that court found “it unnecessary to apply that rule,” reasoning that “the defendants still
have not made the ‘clear cut’ showing necessary under § 1404(a).” Id. Thus, because the court
could not find the convenience factors favored transferring, it denied the defendants’ motion to
transfer venue and maintained the plaintiff’s forum selection. Id. at 384.
In each of these four cases referenced in Plaintiff’s Response and Sur-Reply, the courts
considered the convenience of the dueling forums and concluded that the moving party had not
met its burden to show transfer was warranted under § 1404(a). Because inconvenience had not
been demonstrated, those courts found no reason to disturb the antitrust plaintiff’s chosen venue.7
See Cont’l Airlines, 805 F. Supp. at 1396; see Expoconsul, 711 F. Supp. at 733–34; see Lanier, 355 F.
Supp. at 528–29; see Icon, 921 F. Supp. at 384–85.
That is not the case here. The Court has determined that four of the private and public
factors weigh in favor of transfer under § 1404(a) and four were neutral. Of those that tipped in
favor of transferring, the most prominent was that the Eastern District of Texas does not have a
strong local interest in deciding this case. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the conduct giving rise to
this suit occurred at an annual distributor meeting at Defendant’s headquarters in the Northern
District of Texas (Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 22–31). None of the parties or witnesses reside in this district.
Plaintiff did not identify any specific acts essential to the Defendant’s business that occurred in this
district. And none of the alleged anticompetitive conduct at issue was directed at consumers in this
district. As such, the Court is left with “a case presenting a forum totally irrelevant to the subject
matter of litigation.” Lanier Bus. Prods., 355 F. Supp. at 528.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s forum selection need not be afforded greater deference or
supersede the § 1404(a) analysis, and the Court will exercise its discretion to transfer this case to
the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
7 Further, a Fifth Circuit panel recently declined an invitation to adopt the contention that the Clayton Act
“amplifies” the ordinary deference that a plaintiff’s choice of forum ordinarily receives. In re Google, L.L.C., No.
25-40788, 2026 WL 934924, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2026). In its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit stated the following:
“The liberal venue provisions of the Clayton Act allow a plaintiff to select from a broad range of possible forums.
But the appropriateness of their selection is still measured by the standards of § 1404(a).” Id. (citing Ex parte Collett,
337 U.S. 55 (1949)). Notably, the dissent does not address the majority’s position on this issue. Id. (Higginson, J.,
dissenting). As such, to the extent Cont’l Airlines interprets Expoconsul to require courts to extend a heightened
deference to an antitrust plaintiff’s chosen venue, the Court disagrees.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Panini America’s Motion to Transfer Venue
(Dkt. #11) is hereby GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that this case is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division.
IT IS SO ORDERED.