Opinion

Webb

Court
District Court, E.D. Arkansas
Filed
May 20, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

PAMELA WEBB PLAINTIFF

v. CASE NO. 2:25-CV-00259-BSM

LEE COUNTY ARKANSAS, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 4] Pamela Webb’s official capacity claims

against them is granted; the motion to dismiss her individual capacity claims against the Lee

County Quorum Court members is denied; and the motion to dismiss the individual capacity

claims against the County Judge of Lee County is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Pamela Webb is the present County Clerk of Lee County. She is suing Lee County’s

County Judge ,Terry Sandefer, and its Quorum Court members, Rusty Crump, Junious Pruett,

Lydia Lewis, Jed Anderson, Ronni Schwantz, Tracia Tinzie, West Higginbothom, Bill

Gerrard, and Jesse Garrett. She is suing defendants in their individual and official capacities

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA); for violating the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment; and for

violating the federal Equal Pay Act and the Arkansas Equal Pay Act.

Webb alleges that she was elected county clerk in July 2018. Compl. ¶ 17, Doc. No.

1. In November 2018, the Lee County Quorum Court determined that it had mistakenly

approved a salary for the clerk who was scheduled to leave office on January 1, 2019, that

was $10,000 more than she should have been paid. Id. ¶ 18. The quorum court required the

existing clerk to pay back the money she was overpaid. Id. ¶ 19. Webb alleges that similarly

situated male county employees were also overpaid but were not required to pay back the

money and benefits they were improperly paid. Id. ¶ 20. For example, she alleges that

County Judge Terry Sandefer and Sheriff Ocie Banks were overpaid for their truck

allowances but were not asked to pay back the overpayments; Coroner Robert Kennedy

improperly received a pay raise and was paid as a full time employee, despite the fact that

the coroner’s position was a part time position; County Judge Sandefer received a pay raise

and improperly used the county’s diesel fuel for his personal vehicle; and male road

department workers received higher pay and benefits than similarly situated female

employees. Id. ¶ 20a–d. Webb alleges that when she raised concerns about these disparities,

defendants hostily refused to raise her salary and continued to maintain a compensation

structure that favors men. Id. ¶¶ 24 & 26.

Defendants are moving to dismiss all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when the plaintiff fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To meet the 12(b)(6) standard, the facts

alleged in the complaint must create a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although detailed

factual allegations are not required, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, are insufficient. Id. All allegations contained in

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the complaint are considered true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s

favor. Rydholm v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 44 F.4th 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2022). At this

stage, materials embraced by the pleadings as well as exhibits attached to the pleadings and

matters of public record may all be considered. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs.. 858 F.3d

520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION

Webb’s official capacity claims against the county judge and the quorum court

members are dismissed because Webb does not contest dismissal. See Pl.’s Resp. Mot.

Dismiss ¶ 1, Doc. No. 8. The motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims against the

quorum court members is denied. The motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims

against Judge Sandefer is granted.

A. Quorum Court

The motion to dismiss Webb’s individual capacity claims against the members of the

quorum court is denied.

1. Qualified Immunity

The motion to dismiss Webb’s claims against the quorum court members based on

qualified immunity is denied. To overcome qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss

stage, Webb must allege (1) that the defendants violated a statutory or constitutional right,

and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Watkins

v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 102 F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024). Webb has alleged enough

to show that defendants are not immune because she has alleged that defendants

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discriminated against her and retaliated against her based on her sex, and the rights to be free

from sex discrimination and retaliation are clearly established. Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d

959, 963 (8th Cir. 2009) (right to be free from sex discrimination clearly established);

Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 481 (8th Cir. 2010 )(right to exercise First

Amendment freedoms without retaliation is clearly established).

2. Sex Discrimination

To state a sex discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Webb must allege

that (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances permit an inference of

discrimination. Tyler v. Univ. of Arkansas Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 990 (8th Cir. 2011).

Webb is a member of a protected group who alleges that she is qualified for her position.

She also alleges that she suffered adverse employment action when the Lee County Quorum

Court reduced the pay for her position and continues to improperly underpay her despite

giving raises to men and not requiring men to pay back overpayments. Compl. ¶¶ 18 & 20.

While the allegations against the quorum court members are somewhat thin, Webb has

alleged enough to survive dismissal.

3. Retaliation

To state a retaliation claim, Webb must allege that (1) she engaged in protected

activity; (2) defendants took adverse action against her; (3) the adverse action was motivated

at least in part by the protected activity. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir.

2004). Webb alleges that she has repeatedly raised concerns about compensation disparities

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and misuse of county funds to the quorum court members. Compl. ¶¶ 24 & 68. Webb alleges

that defendants refused to raise her compensation and benefits to match those of similarly

situated men due to her efforts to expose the improper practices. Id. ¶¶ 71–72. Again, this

claim is thin, but Webb has alleged enough to overcome dismissal. Fender v. Delaware Div.

of Revenue, 628 F. App’x 95, 98 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43

F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir.1994) (speech that is motivated by a private concern can address

matters that concern the public as well).

4. ACRA

The motion to dismiss Webb’s sex discrimination and retaliation claims under the

Arkansas Civil Rights Act is denied for the same reasons provided in sections A2–A3.

Muntaqim v. Payne, 2021 Ark. 162, 628 S.W.3d 629, 635 (2021) (courts may look for

guidance to state and federal decisions interpreting the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 when construing the ACRA); Benton Sch. Dist. v. Greer, 730 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ark.

2026) (ACRA retaliation claim elements); DePriest v. Milligan, 823 F.3d 1179, 1185 (8th

Cir. 2016) (section 1983 sex discrimination and ACRA claims use same standard).

B. Judge Sandefer

The motion to dismiss Webb’s individual capacity claims against Judge Sandefer is

granted because Webb has not alleged that Sandefer engaged in discriminatory or retaliatory

conduct. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (plaintiffs’ obligation to

provide grounds for relief requires more than conclusions). Webb is suing Sandefer in his

“individual capacity for his personal involvement in and deliberate indifference to the

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discrimination complained. ...”. Compl. 46. Webb alleges that she complained about

misuse of funds, improper compensation practices, pay disparities, and violations of law to

the county judge and the quorum court and all adverse actions were decided by the county

judge and quorum court. Jd. J] 12 & 80. The problem for Webb is that, while county judges

preside over the quorum court, they do not havea vote. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-14-1102(b)(6).

Even if everything Webb alleges is true, Sandefer could not have participated in the votes

that Webb alleges discriminated and retaliated against her.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to the claims made

against all defendants in their official capacities and to Judge Sandefer in his individual

capacity and denied as to the other individual defendants in their individual capacities.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of May, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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