Murzike

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JAMES T. MURZIKE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-98-WWB-PDB

RONNIE WEEMS, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the following motions: the Nurse Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 141), with exhibits (Doc. Nos. 141-2 to 141-15, 143);

the Officer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142), with exhibits (Doc.

Nos. 142-1 to 142-3, 143);1 and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 144),

without exhibits. Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff has

responded only to the Officer Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 161), but he filed it late without

seeking leave of Court. As such, the Court will strike it.2

1 The Officer Defendants submitted video evidence under seal in support of their

Motion (Doc. 143). The Nurse Defendants rely on the same video evidence. (See Doc.

141 at 3). Except for the video evidence, all exhibits will be cited by document and page

number as assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system. The video evidence,

which consists of three separate clips on one thumb drive, will be cited according to the

Officer Defendants’ exhibit designation (D, E, or F) followed by the time stamp.

2 Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s late response, it would not help him.

He adds new allegations or attempts to revive claims previously dismissed or not pursued

in his Amended Complaint, some of his writing is indecipherable, and he filed no exhibits

with it. Rather, he relies on the evidence Defendants filed with their Motions, and that

evidence contradicts his claims. In a separate filing, which Plaintiff mailed four days after

he mailed the response, Plaintiff contends that he “had medical documents” to support

his alleged injuries, but security officials destroyed them (Doc. 162). As with most of

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections, is proceeding pro so

on an Amended Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 20)

on the following claims arising out of an organized use of force that occurred on December

22, 2022: excessive force or failure to intervene against Officer Defendants Weems, Bias,

Taylor, Green, and Mattox; retaliation against Defendant Weems; deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs against Nurse Defendants Cummings and Putney; and failure

to intervene against Nurse Defendants Cummings, Putney, Allen, and Kushner. The

allegations supporting these claims are fully set forth in this Court’s August 18, 2025 Order

on Defendants’ separate Motions to Dismiss:3

[As to the Officer Defendants, Plaintiff] . . . alleges Defendants Weems,

Bias, and Talyor hit him, grabbed him, cut him, or unnecessarily sprayed

him with chemical agents “maliciously [and] sadistically to cause [him] harm

when [he] was not violating any prison rule []or . . . acting disruptively.”

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor unnecessarily sprayed

him with chemical agents twice, including one time “continuously,” causing

second or third degree burns, while Defendant Weems “repeatedly

slammed [and] smash[ed his] arm [and] shoulder into [the] cell door”;

Defendant Bias stabbed him with a “switch blade”; and Defendants Bryan,

Green, and Mattox (along with the Nurse Defendants) “stood by [and]

watched.” Additionally, he alleges that when he was in the medical exam

room, Defendants Green and Bias “repeatedly punch[ed him] in [his] side,

ribs, [and] stomach,” while Defendant Cummings watched.

* * *

[As to the Nurse Defendants, Plaintiff] asserts his arm was cut so badly that

he had “tissues [and] meat . . . hang[ing] out while gushing out blood,” and

Plaintiff’ filings, this notice is not a proper motion, it is largely illegible, it contains

conclusory, unsupported allegations, and in it, Plaintiff complains about other conduct

unrelated to the issues in this case.

3 In that Order, the Court dismissed numerous claims, substantially narrowing the

issues before the Court now. (See Doc. 103 at 19).

even after having had a decontamination shower, he had second- or third-

degree burns that were not treated [by Defendants Cummings and Putney].

(Doc. 103 at 8–9, 12).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates “that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it may “affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law.” Id. “The moving party bears the initial burden of

showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of

material fact that should be decided at trial.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306,

1313–14 (11th Cir. 2007). Stated differently, the moving party discharges its burden by

showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

However, once the moving party has discharged its burden, “Rule 56(e) … requires

the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (quotation omitted). The

nonmoving party may not rely solely on “conclusory allegations without specific

supporting facts.” Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985).

Nevertheless, “[i]f there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations or evidence, the

[nonmoving] party’s evidence is presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must

be drawn in the [nonmoving] party’s favor.” Allen, 495 F.3d at 1314.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff’s Motion is not proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. It reads

like both a response to a motion to dismiss (referencing Rule 8(a)(2) and using the failure-

to-state-a-claim language) and a motion to compel (including a list of discovery requests

to which Defendants “fail[ed] to act or respond”).4 (See Doc. 144 at 3–4). More

importantly, however, Plaintiff does not demonstrate by reference to “particular parts of

materials in the record” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(A). Indeed, he provides no evidence supporting his Motion but rather relies on

Defendants’ evidence, which justifies summary judgment in their favor, as explained

below. (See Doc. 144 at 7). To the extent Plaintiff intended his Motion to be one for

summary judgment under Rule 56, he has not carried his burden. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(A). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion will be denied.

B. Nurse Defendants’ Motion

First, for reasons explained later in this Order, the Court concludes the

uncontroverted video evidence shows that no Officer Defendant used excessive force

against Plaintiff. As such, any claim that the Nurse Defendants failed to intervene

necessarily fails. Second, the Court concluded at the motion-to-dismiss stage that

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against the Nurse Defendants could proceed only

4 Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to engage in discovery, and the Court

provided him with citations to relevant Rules and resources for doing so. (See Doc. 108).

Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a pro se IFP litigant

is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.”).

because the Court had to accept as true Plaintiff’s hyperbolic allegations that he had

serious medical needs that were not treated (i.e., “tissues [and] meat . . . hang[ing] out

while gushing out blood,” and second- or third-degree burns from the chemical agents).

(See Doc. 103 at 12). At this juncture, the Court no longer must accept these allegations

as true, and the clear, reliable video evidence shows Plaintiff sustained no such injuries.

(See Def. Ex. D, 42:15–42:49, 12:30–12:45; see also generally Def. Ex. E). The

contemporaneous medical records align with the video evidence. Defendant Cummings

conducted the post-use-of-force exam and noted Plaintiff presented with only two

scratches to his left forearm, which Defendant Cummings cleansed with Hydrogen

Peroxide. (See Doc. 141-2 at 2–3).5 Plaintiff had a mental health screening five days

after the incident at which he asked the provider (Defendant Kushner) to “document”

marks on his left arm that Plaintiff claimed were burns from the chemical agents. (See

Doc. 141-4 at 1). No burns were diagnosed by any medical provider.

Plaintiff’s minor scratches, which did not require stitches, do not constitute a

serious medical need. See Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 565–66 (11th Cir. 2010);

see also Arce v. Okaloosa Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:24CV304, 2024 WL 5359938, at *2

(N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2024) (“It is well settled that ‘[c]uts and bruises that require only minor

treatment are not a serious medical need for purposes of [deliberate indifference] claims.’”

(alterations in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 308106 (Jan. 27,

2025). Regardless, Defendant Cummings—the only Nurse Defendant who examined

Plaintiff that day—treated Plaintiff’s injuries. (See Doc. 141-2 at 3). Defendant Cummings

5 Defendant Putney was not involved in the treatment of Plaintiff’s scratches but

merely reviewed and signed off on Defendant Cummings’s medical note. (See Doc. 141-

2 at 4).

noted that Plaintiff “[t]olerated [the treatment] [w]ell,” (id.), and Plaintiff offers no evidence

showing that his scratches required additional treatment that was not provided, such as

stitches. See Fernandez v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t, 397 F. App’x 507, 513 (11th Cir.

2010)6 (holding the plaintiff failed to allege he had a serious medical need where he bled

for only five minutes and had no open wounds that required stitches).

Plaintiff provides no documentation contradicting Defendants’ evidence, and he

may not rely on the allegations in his Amended Complaint to overcome summary

judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (“Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving

party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’”); see also Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus.,

Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 658 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The party [opposing a motion] for summary

judgment cannot rest on his pleadings to present an issue of fact . . . .”).

The Nurse Defendants carry their burden demonstrating there is no genuine issue

of material fact for trial, and Plaintiff does not go beyond the pleadings to show the

opposite, nor does he “show[] that the materials cited [by the Nurse Defendants] do not

establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). As such,

the Nurse Defendants’ Motion will be granted.

6 Any unpublished decisions cited in this Order are deemed persuasive authority

on the relevant point of law. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1061 (11th Cir.

2022).

C. Officer Defendants’ Motion

The Officer Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to demonstrate Defendant Weems

retaliated against him, and they invoke qualified immunity on the excessive-force and

failure-to-intervene claims.

i. Retaliation

A successful retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) he engaged in

“constitutionally protected” speech, (2) he “suffered adverse action” because of that

speech, and (3) a causal connection between the speech and the adverse action.

O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). The “adverse action” element

hinges not on whether the plaintiff’s own First Amendment rights were “chilled,” but rather

whether the “allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness”

from exercising his First Amendment speech rights. Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F. App’x 867,

870 (11th Cir. 2007). The “causation” element requires a showing that “the defendants

were subjectively motivated to discipline” the plaintiff because of the protected activity.

Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008). The “motive” inquiry is subject to

a “burden-shifting framework.” Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1193 (11th Cir. 2023)

(citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). Under that

framework, the plaintiff first “must show that his constitutionally-protected speech was a

‘motivating factor’ in [the defendant’s] decisions to carry out the adverse actions.” Id. The

burden then shifts to the defendant who “must show that he would have implemented

those adverse actions irrespective of [the plaintiff’s] complaints.” Id.

As mentioned, Plaintiff provides no evidence supporting his claims. For instance,

he does not provide any grievances in which he complained about Defendant Weems

near the time of the incident, and he may not rely solely on the vague allegations in his

Amended Complaint. Not only does Plaintiff not demonstrate he engaged in

constitutionally protected speech, but even if he had, he offers no evidence showing that

his constitutionally protected speech was a motivating factor in the decision to carry out

the use of force. On the other hand, Defendants demonstrate they would have taken the

same adverse action in the absence of Plaintiff having written grievances. According to

use-of-force reports, Defendant Weems requested an organized force response to gain

Plaintiff’s compliance when Plaintiff refused to submit to restraint procedures for a cell

search. (See Doc. 142-3 at 8). That request was approved by Colonel Jeffery Lindsey

and carried out by Defendant Taylor. (Id. at 8, 11–12, 20).

Finally, assuming arguendo that Defendant Weems may have subjectively been

motivated to discipline Plaintiff for writing grievances, Defendant Weems was not the

officer who approved or carried out the use of force. Thus, any causal connection

between Defendant Weems’s allegedly retaliatory motive and the adverse action was

broken. See Thomas v. Lawrence, 421 F. App’x 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the

plaintiff failed to state a plausible retaliation claim because a prison official other than one

with the alleged retaliatory motive “determined or confirmed” that the plaintiff should incur

a disciplinary report).7 Thus, Defendant Weems is entitled to summary judgment on the

retaliation claim.

7 Also of note, Plaintiff did not respond to the Officer Defendants’ Requests for

Admissions, which asked Plaintiff in relevant part the following: “Admit that as a result [of

you failing to comply with orders to submit to handcuffs,] Defendant Taylor administered

the authorized chemical spray to bring you into compliance”; and “Admit that none of the

Defendants threatened you on December 22, 2022.” (See Doc. 142-1 at 2, 4). Plaintiff’s

failure to respond to Defendants’ properly served Requests for Admissions results in the

requests being admitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (“A matter is admitted unless, within

ii. Excessive Force & Failure to Intervene

“In order to receive qualified immunity, [a] public official must first prove that he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).

There is no dispute that the Officer Defendants were acting within their discretionary

duties at the time of the incident. Where, as here, it is undisputed that Defendants were

acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to

prove that Defendants “(1) violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff must satisfy both prongs to survive a

qualified-immunity defense. Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019).

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,

or the infliction of pain totally without penological justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d

318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). And the Eleventh Circuit has “long recognized that ‘an officer

who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim

of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.’” Nute

v. White, 152 F.4th 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 2025). At the same time, it is well understood

that prison guards, who are charged with maintaining order and protecting inmates and

30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the

requesting party a written answer or objection.”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s suggestion that

Defendant Weems orchestrated the incident specifically to justify spraying him with

chemical agents to discipline him strains credulity since the chemical agents caused the

nearby officers—including Weems—to suffer the side effects as well. (See, e.g., Def. Ex.

D, 21:00, 24:00–25:35).

staff, may use force when necessary. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986);

Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991).

For instance, officers may use chemical agents to quell a disturbance so long as

a valid penological reason supports its use and it is not used in “quantities greater than

necessary or for the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain.” Thomas v.

Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1310 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he use of chemical agents on

recalcitrant prisoners is not per se unconstitutional.” (quoting in part Soto v. Dickey, 744

F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984))); see also Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1264

(11th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging “pepper-spray” may be used to subdue an inmate when

penologically necessary); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008),

overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th

Cir. 2010) (“Pepper spray is an accepted non-lethal means of controlling unruly

inmates.”).

Regardless of the type of force employed, whether an officer used more force than

necessary to quell a disturbance or regain control of a prisoner requires courts to consider

various factors, including the need for force, the extent of force used in relation to the

prisoner’s conduct, the threat of harm the prisoner posed to others, whether the officer

tried to “temper the severity of a forceful response,” and the injuries inflicted. See

Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295,

1300 (11th Cir. 2002). A prisoner’s lack of an injury is not dispositive but can be “evidence

of the kind or degree of force that was used by [an] officer.” Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th

686, 700 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021)).

In applying the Whitley factors, courts should “give a wide range of deference to

prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). A prisoner against whom force is used to restore order

demonstrates an Eighth Amendment violation “only if the measure taken ‘inflicted

unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering’ caused by force used ‘maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575.

Corrections officials are not required to “convince every inmate that their orders are

reasonable and well-thought out,” and “[c]ertainly . . . are not required to do so where an

inmate repeatedly fails to follow those orders.” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307. As such,

“courts must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute over the

reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior

alternatives.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. A case should not go to the jury “[u]nless it

appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support

a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” Id.

Upon review of the evidence and affording Defendants “a wide range of deference”

in maintaining prison security, the Court concludes the Whitley factors balance in their

favor. See Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1311. First, there was a documented need to use force

because Plaintiff disobeyed orders to submit to restraints for a cell search. (See Doc.

142-3 at 8, 11, 20). Before administering the first round of chemical agents, Defendant

Weems gave Plaintiff two opportunities to submit to restraint procedures, and he refused.

(See Def. Ex. D, 2:07–2:30, 6:14–6:32). Defendant Weems attempted to gain Plaintiff’s

compliance again before administering the second round of chemical agents, and Plaintiff

again refused. (Id., 15:08–15:20). Second, the type and amount of force used was

minimal, consisting of two rounds of chemical agents, which Plaintiff attempted to block

with his food tray. (See Doc. 142-3 at 11, 13; see also Def. Ex. D, 7:43–7:58, 15:30–

15:39). Third, the Court accepts that Plaintiff presented a threat of harm to others through

his “disruptive behavior.” (See Doc. 142-3 at 8, 11). Indeed, he used his food tray not

only to block the chemical agents from entering his cell but also to prevent officers from

closing his cell door, which could have created additional security concerns and shows

his noncompliance. (See id. at 11, 13; see also Def. Ex. D, 8:00–8:10, 15:34–15:49).

Fourth, Defendants tried to temper the severity of a forceful response in the

following ways: giving Plaintiff multiple warnings; attempting to “deescalate the situation”

by using CIT (“crisis intervention techniques”) to counsel Plaintiff beforehand; checking

with medical personnel to ensure chemical agents could safely be utilized; giving Plaintiff

plenty of time and multiple opportunities to comply; allowing Plaintiff to wash the chemical

agents off his body immediately after he exited his cell; and having a nurse assess and

treat any injuries. (See Doc. 142-3 at 11–12; see also Def. Ex. D, 0:20–1:05, 30:25–

35:09; Def. Ex. E, 2:10–12:25).

Finally, as previously discussed, Plaintiff sustained only minor injuries, which likely

were due to his own actions. (See Doc. 142-3 at 22; see also Def. Ex. D, 42:15–42:49,

12:30–12:45). There is no evidence whatsoever that Plaintiff sustained any of the serious

injuries he claimed in his Amended Complaint to have sustained: “deep gashes in left

arm”; severe burns; cuts and scratches on his back; lower back pain; swelling; blurry

vision; large lump on the head; etc. (See Doc. 20 at 12). Moreover, the evidence blatantly

contradicts his allegation that he was “denied all medical care.” (See id.). “When

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

The video evidence also blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations that the Officer

Defendants sprayed him so excessively that he sustained chemical burns, repeatedly

slammed or smashed his arm or shoulder, stabbed him with a switchblade, or repeatedly

punched him inside the medical exam room.8 (See generally Def. Exs. D; E). Indeed,

based on where inside the cell Defendant Taylor sprayed the chemical agents combined

with Plaintiff’s use of his food tray to block the spray, it does not appear the spray even

made direct contact with his skin, and once Plaintiff exited his cell, no further force was

used against him. (See Def. Ex. D, 7:43–7:58, 15:30–15:39, 26:43–44:03; see also

generally Def. Ex. E). On the contrary, Defendants Green and Bias, who shackled and

escorted Plaintiff, engaged with him calmly, gently, and respectfully.9 (See Def. Ex. D,

8 Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has filed numerous motions and notices that

have bordered on frivolous and have wasted scarce judicial resources. Upon review of

the video evidence, it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff’s allegations in his Amended

Complaint were either completely contrived—either intentionally or due to his mental

illness—or exceedingly exaggerated. In either case, Plaintiff has engaged this Court and

Defendants unnecessarily in protracted litigation for more than three years. As a prolific

filer in this Court, Plaintiff is reminded that sanctions may be imposed for knowingly

making false material declarations that have no “evidentiary support.” See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 11(b), (c) (providing for sanctions against a party who violates subsection (b)); see also

18 U.S.C. § 1623 (providing that a person who knowingly makes a false material

declaration to the Court is subject to fine, imprisonment, or both).

9 After Plaintiff was removed from the shower cell and being escorted to the

medical exam room, the camera operator had to make a camera swap because the

battery died. Based on Defendants’ reports and where Plaintiff and the escorting officers

were standing when the first video ends and the second begins, there was no significant

lapse in coverage. (See Doc. 142-3 at 12–13; Def. Ex. D, 44:03; Def. Ex. E, 0:00–0:05).

Regardless, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the offending conduct took place

26:43-29:24, 41:03-44:03; see also generally Def. Ex. E). Because no Officer Defendant

used excessive force against Plaintiff, and because the viability of a failure-to-intervene

claim depends on the existence of an underlying excessive force claim, the Officer

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims.

In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Medical Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 141) is

GRANTED.

2. The Officer Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142) is

GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 144) is DENIED.

4. Plaintiffs late Response to the Officer Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 161), and his emergency notices (Doc. Nos. 160, 162) are

STRICKEN.

5. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants, terminate

any pending motions as moot, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 19, 2026.

vs

\

UNITED STATES T T JUDG

at his cell or inside the medical exam room. (See Doc. 20 at 13-14). There was no break

in the recording during those times. (See generally Def. Exs. D, E).

14

Jax-6 3/18

c:

James T. Murzike

Counsel of Record