Gonzalez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUAN GONZALEZ, : Civ. No. 3:18-CV-2254

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley)

:

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

:

JOHN P. CHULOCK and :

DAVID HUDZINSKI, :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

This case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment by

the defendants, John Chulock and David Hudzinski. The plaintiff, Juan

Gonzalez, sued these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging certain

actions during an arrest violated his constitutional rights.

The defendants submit that the undisputed facts show they are

entitled to immunity against the bulk of these claims and to judgment as

a matter of law on others.1 Gonzalez argues there are genuine issues of

material fact that should prevent summary judgment at this time.2

1 Docs. 131-133.

2 Doc. 134.

The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.3 After careful

consideration, we conclude that the defendants have shown the

undisputed facts entitle them to qualified immunity against most of the

federal claims and that sovereign immunity shields them from liability

on the state law claims. Ultimately, we conclude that only one claim,

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, should survive the

motion. Accordingly, we will recommend that the motion be granted in

part and denied in part.

II. Background4

Plaintiff Juan Gonzalez is a resident of Brooklyn, New York, who

owns property at 317 Anchor Street in West Hazleton, Pennsylvania. On

July 13, 2018, Gonzalez traveled from New York to visit the Anchor

Street property. While driving onto the property with his uncle, Gonzalez

was approached by law enforcement officers from both the Pennsylvania

State Police (“PSP”) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).

The officers were wearing ski-masks that obscured their faces. The

agents informed Gonzalez that he was under arrest and facing

3 Docs. 133, 134, 138.

4 The facts herein are derived from defendant’s statement of facts (Doc.

132) and plaintiff’s counterstatement of facts (Doc. 134 at 1-6).

deportation for being an illegal alien. Gonzalez stated that he was a

citizen, and that he could produce a copy of his passport on his mobile

phone. The agents physically restrained him to effectuate his arrest on

an immigration detainer. Gonzalez alleges that during that restraint, he

was violently and unnecessarily slammed against a vehicle, causing

injuries to his right arm, wrist, and shoulder.

Once arrested, Gonzalez was brought to PSP’s Hazleton barracks,

where he spent roughly 30 minutes being processed by ICE. After

fingerprinting Gonzalez, law enforcement realized that he was not a

deportable alien, but a citizen. Apparently, ICE had believed Gonzalez

to be his brother, Pedro Gonzalez, who deportable and had been

using Juan’s name as an alias. Because Juan Gonzalez was also the

subject of a PSP drug investigation, PSP performed a K-9 search on the

exterior of his vehicle. That search produced no results, and Gonzalez

was released.5

5 On May 25, 2019, the same PSP officers involved in the July 13 incident

and the instant defendants, Chulock and Hudzinski, facilitated a

controlled drug buy from Juan Gonzalez. That ultimately resulted in

Gonzalez pleading guilty to one count of manufacture, delivery, or

possession with intent to deliver. He was sentenced to 36-72 months

incarceration in a state correctional institution.

Gonzalez commenced this action in November of 2018.6 Several

other defendants were dismissed in 2019 and 2020,7 and then Gonzalez

amended his complaint.8 In 2022, the claims against institutional

defendant ICE were dismissed,9 and in 2023 the individual federal

defendants were dismissed.10 The case was delayed for a time pursuant

to Gonzalez’s criminal case.11 Discovery closed in this matter in August

of 2025.12 The remaining defendants have moved for summary judgment

on all claims against them: assault and battery, and violation of

Gonzalez’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.13 That motion is

fully briefed and ripe for resolution.14 After consideration, we will

recommend that the court grant the motion in part and deny the motion

in part, permitting only the excessive force claim to proceed against these

defendants.

6 Doc. 1.

7 Docs. 12, 32

8 Doc. 37.

9 Doc. 70.

10 Doc. 99.

11 Doc. 112.

12 Doc. 130.

13 Doc. 131.

14 Docs. 133, 134, 138.

III. Discussion

A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Standard of Review

The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(a)

provides that a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”15 The materiality of

the facts will depend on the substantive law.16 Thus, “[o]nly disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law”

will preclude summary judgment.17 A dispute is only genuine if a

reasonable juror could find in favor of the nonmoving party.18

The moving party bears the initial burden to “demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” relying on pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, and other evidence in the record.19 If the movant

“successfully points to evidence of all of the facts needed to decide the

case on the law,” the nonmovant can still defeat summary judgment by

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

16 , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

17 .

18

19 , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

pointing to evidence in the record which creates a genuine dispute of

material fact and from which a jury could find in its favor.20 However,

“[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted.”21 A court may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence, but “must view the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.”22

B. The Motion for Summary Judgment Should be Granted In Part and

Denied in Part.

In his amended complaint, Gonzalez brings three counts against

the remaining defendants.23 Count one alleges assault and battery, count

two alleges violation of Gonzalez’s Due Process rights, and count three

alleges a violation of Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment rights to security

and privacy in his home.24 Notably, count two is, in our view,

substantively alleging three different Fourth Amendment violations as

opposed to violations of Gonzalez’s due process rights, as discussed in

20 , 479 F.3d 232,

238 (3d Cir. 2007).

21 , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

22 , 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

23 A fourth count alleging inadequate supervision and training is not

analyzed here as it was brought only against the institutional defendant

ICE, who has since been dismissed from the case. (Doc. 70).

24 Doc. 37 ¶¶ 21-49.

detail below. After consideration, we conclude that the state law claims

are barred by sovereign immunity and that all other claims are barred

by qualified immunity—except for the claim of excessive force in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, which we conclude should survive this motion.

1. Count One – Assault and Battery

Gonzalez claims the defendants are liable to him for assault and

battery, presumably under Pennsylvania law.25 The defendants argue

that any state law claim is barred by sovereign immunity, and we agree.

Pennsylvania law is clear that “the Commonwealth, and its officials and

employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy

sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit

except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.”26

Pennsylvania law has codified ten such waivers, none of which apply

here.27 There has been no suggestion that these defendants were not

Commonwealth employees acting within the scope of their duties, and we

therefore have no difficulty in concluding the state law claims of assault

25 Doc. 37 ¶¶ 22-37.

26 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310.

27 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)(1)-(10).

and battery are barred by sovereign immunity. We recommend the court

dismiss these claims.

2. Count Three – Security and Privacy in the Home

Gonzalez further claims his arrest was a violation of his Fourth

Amendment right to security and privacy in his home.28 The defendants

argue their actions were protected by qualified immunity.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.”29 This doctrine “provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.”30 While generally a question of law to be decided at the

earliest possible stage, “a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of

qualified immunity may preclude summary judgment.”31

28 Doc. 37 ¶¶ 43-49.

29 , 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

30 , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

31 , 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be

established by the official seeking immunity.32 To determine whether an

official is entitled qualified immunity, a court must determine (1)

whether the official violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that

right was clearly established.33

A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”34 To be clearly

established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.”35 Courts must not define the

right “at a high level of generality.”36 Rather, the inquiry should focus on

“whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established.”37 Ultimately, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

32 , 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (

, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)).

33 , 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); , 555 U.S. at 236

(permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs should be addressed first).

34 , 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015).

35 . ( , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

36 . ( , 563 U.S. at 742).

37 . ( , 563 U.S. at 742).

situation he confronted.”38 The plaintiff bears an initial burden of

demonstrating that the constitutional right at issue was clearly

established at the time of the claimed violation.39

To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may

look to cases from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit

courts.40 Unpublished cases cannot establish a right because they do not

constitute binding authority.41 In rare cases, the conduct may be clearly

established from the obviously unlawful nature of the conduct “even

though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.”42

Here, Gonzalez appears to acquiesce to the affirmative defense, as

his brief in opposition makes no effort to identify caselaw showing his

right to security and privacy in his home was clearly established. While

the complaint alleges a general violation of Gonzalez’s Fourth

38 , 533 U.S. at 202.

39 , 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984); ,

113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997).

40 ., 974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020) (

., 877 F.3d 136, 142

(3d Cir. 2017)).

41 , 975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020).

42 , 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (

, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).

Amendment rights, in the context of qualified immunity the relevant

inquiry is “whether the violative nature of is clearly

established.”43 The particular conduct in this matter relates to law

enforcement arresting Gonzalez on a valid administrative warrant that

was ultimately for another person, his brother, but which the facts

suggest the officers legitimately believed to be for Juan. Gonzalez needed

to show that a reasonable officer would have understood, based on legal

precedent or something obviously unlawful about the situation, that they

could not execute that warrant on that individual. Nothing in Gonzalez’s

filings can be said to reach this standard, particularly given that this

burden can typically only be satisfied by citation to specific Supreme

Court caselaw on a robust consensus of Circuit level caselaw.44 We

conclude Gonzalez has not carried his burden to show the right in

question was clearly established, and so qualified immunity shields the

defendants from this claim.

43 , 577 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added).

44 , 974 F.3d at 449.

3. Count Two – Fourth Amendment Violations

In count two of his amended complaint, Gonzalez makes a host of

claims and accusations against these defendants. First, he argues that

the defendants used excessive force in violation of his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.45 Next, he alleges that his detention for

processing was an unlawful deprivation of liberty without due process in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.46 Third, he alleges

that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him in violation of the Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.47 We construe these as three

distinct claims under the Fourth Amendment: (1) excessive force; (2) false

arrest and false imprisonment, and; (3) malicious prosecution.48 The

defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity against

these claims. Below, we consider each of these claims independently and

45 Doc. 37 ¶ 34.

46 ¶ 35.

47 ¶ 36.

48 While Gonzalez asserts these claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment, these claims clearly fall within the ambit of the Fourth

Amendment, and the more-specific provision rule bars consideration of

the claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. ,

520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a

specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the

standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process.”).

conclude that only the claim of excessive force should survive the instant

motion.

a. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

As explained, we interpret Gonzalez’s claim of unlawful deprivation

of liberty in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as

alleging false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

In order to “bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish

(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without

probable cause.”49 A plaintiff alleging false imprisonment “must

establish: (1) that he was detained; and (2) that the detention was

unlawful.”50 Thus, for both claims, Gonzalez must establish that the

arrest was made without probable cause.51

Probable cause to arrest exists when facts known to the officer “are

sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that

49 , 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020).

50 at 202.

51 , Civ. No. 1:23-431, 2025 WL 1827896 at *6

(July 2, 2025, M.D. Pa) (finding that a showing of probable cause by the

arresting officer defeats both false arrest and false imprisonment).

an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”52

Probable cause “requires more than mere suspicion” that a crime has

occurred but “does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to

prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”53 While it “is well established in

the Third Circuit that ‘the existence of probable cause in a Section 1983

action is a question of fact’ and therefore must be decided by the jury [,]”54

a court may consider probable cause where that determination is

necessary to answer the question of qualified immunity.55 Courts can

raise the issue of qualified immunity where appropriate.56 We

conclude it is appropriate to raise it here, where the exact nature of the

claim raised in the complaint is vague and the defendants have raised

qualified immunity as a general defense in this matter.57

52 , 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).

53 , 71 F.3d at 482-83.

54 , 126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 840 (E.D. Pa. 2000)

(quoting , 113 F.3d at 401).

55 , 113 F.3d at 401 n.4 (explaining there is a tension in

holding probable cause to be a question of fact, but qualified immunity a

question of law, and implying that a court may consider the existence of

probable cause where it is necessary to do so to determine the application

of qualified immunity).

56 , 638 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427 n.3 (M.D. Pa.

2022) (citing , 257 F.3d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 2001)).

57 There is no prejudice to Gonzalez in our raising this defense here.

While it deprives Gonzalez of his opportunity to argue these rights were

The government attached several exhibits to the instant motion,

including a general investigation report by Hudzinski, which explains

that PSP had received intelligence that, , Gonzalez was

distributing cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, and heroin out of the

home in question.58 Additionally, a sworn affidavit from Hudzinski

explains that in the course of investigating, he learned that a Pedro

Gonzalez was operating under the alias of Juan Gonzalez and was a

deportable felon, a fact he confirmed with the Department of Homeland

Security.59 Hudzinski’s affidavit further explains that confirmation of

that status with DHS indicated to him that there was probable cause for

a final order of removal of Pedro Gonazlez.60 These facts are undisputed.

We have no difficulty concluding that these facts created probable

cause to arrest Pedro Gonzalez, and that Juan Gonzalez was arrested

based on Pedro’s use of Juan’s name as an alias. Juan was released from

clearly established, we are permitted to consider either prong

first, and given that we conclude the uncontested facts show no violation

of a constitutional right, showing these rights are clearly established

would not change the result. ( , 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting

federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two

prongs should be addressed first)).

58 Doc. 132-1 at 1.

59 Doc. 132-2 at 1-2.

60

ICE custody once ICE determined that he was a separate person from

Pedro.61 His detention was extended briefly by PSP for the K9 search,

but we conclude that the investigation into drug trade at Gonzalez’s home

provided probable cause for that search. We therefore conclude that the

arrest and brief detention of Gonzalez were based on probable cause, and

there was no constitutional violation. For those reasons, we conclude the

defendants are shielded from liability for these actions by qualified

immunity, and we recommend granting the motion for summary

judgment as it pertains to these claims.

b. Malicious Prosecution

Gonzalez also alleges that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights by maliciously prosecuting him,62 which we construe

as alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The elements of

malicious prosecution are:

(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the

criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff’s] favor; (3) the

defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4)

the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than

bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered

61 Doc. 132-2 at 1-2

62 Doc. 37 ¶ 36.

deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as

a consequence of a legal proceeding.63

Given that an absence of probable cause is an essential element of

malicious prosecution, we conclude that the defendants’ qualified

immunity extends to this claim as well, and this claim should be

dismissed.

c. Excessive Force

Finally, Gonzalez alleges a claim of excessive force. While the

defendants concede that Chulock and Hudzinski are specifically

identified as the alleged perpetrators in the amended complaint, they

argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Gonzalez has

failed to produce evidence past the pleading, that he can accurately

identify who used force against him. They argue that Gonzalez made

certain statements in his deposition64 that demonstrate a failure to allege

63 , 750 F.3d 273, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2014).

64 Among other statements, the defendants cite the follow quotes from

Gonzalez’s deposition to show he cannot identify his assailants: “They

didn’t identify s***. They just came –I knew they were supposed –how

the f*** you supposed to know somebody with a ski mask.”; “They had a

ski mask. And they was with the state trooper also. The only person that

you could see their face was the state trooper. And one of the f***ing state

troopers named Kosinki, he’s the mother***er that dragged me out of the

f***ing - and the other one, this - the whatchamacallit, the ICE, one of

the guys, the skinny guy though, I have the f***ing video.” ; “[T]here was

“direct and personal involvement” by these defendants, an essential

element of a Section 1983 claim.65

The defendants are correct that individual liability under Section

1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant had personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.66 Personal

involvement may be shown through allegations regarding the

defendant’s own conduct, or that the defendant had knowledge of the

unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the behavior.67

Here, we conclude that Gonzalez has provided evidence from which

a jury could conclude the defendants were personally involved in the

alleged use of excessive force. At the outset, Gonzalez’s statements

identified by the defendants are too ambiguous to conclude as a matter

of law that Gonzalez failed to identify them. While it appears from these

statements that Gonzalez may not have known exactly who used what

force against him, other statements from his deposition arguably identify

another big guy that I told you, there was like f***ing five people on top

of me. Between ICE and the state trooper both.” (Doc 132-2 at 105-09).

65 , 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018).

66 , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988).

67

the defendants as having used the alleged force against him.68

Additionally, the ambiguity in Gonzalez’s deposition is distinguishable

from other Third Circuit cases analyzing personal involvement, in that

Gonzalez has, in his amended complaint, narrowed his list of potentially

liable actors down to the defendants.69

Moreover, Gonzalez has submitted a sworn affidavit in which he

identifies the instant defendants as his assailants,70 as well as a sworn

affidavit from his uncle, Felix Colon, who was in Gonzalez’s car when the

arrest began, identifying these defendants as the assailants.71

Accordingly, given that we must view the evidence in a light favorable to

68 Gonzalez testified that he could see the face of at least one state

trooper; an officer “Kosinki” was the one who dragged him out of his car;

“Officer Shula” was the one that “f***ed him up”; and that his recording

of portions of the events helped him adduce that “Kosinski” and “Shula”

were the ones he intended to sue from the outset. (Doc 132-2 at 106-09.)

69 In contrast, summary judgment was affirmed by the Third Circuit

where plaintiffs conceded they could only narrow down the possible

offenders to one of two persons, 464 F.2d 272 (3d

Cir. 1972); or one of twenty persons, , 128 F.3d 810 (3d

Cir. 1997). Notably, in , the Third

Circuit stated that in some circumstances it “may be problematic to

require plaintiffs to specifically identify which officers” committed a

violation. 904 F.3d at 289. In our view, the officers all being

masked may present such a circumstance.

70 Doc. 132-2.

71 Doc. 132-3.

the non-movant, we conclude that a jury could find the defendants were

personally involved in the alleged use of excessive force, and summary

judgment should be denied as to this claim.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED

that the defendants’ motion for summary judgement72 be GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. The motion should be DENIED as to the excessive force claim;

and

2. The motion should be GRANTED in all other respects.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule

72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed

findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or

matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a

recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a

habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk

of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,

written objections which shall specifically identify the

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report

to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.

The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall

apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

72 Doc. 131.

recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her

discretion or where required by law, and may consider the

record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or

her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge

may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or

recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 11th day of May 2025.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge