Douglas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Kareem Douglas,

Plaintiff,

-v- 2:25-cv-6529

(NJC) (LGD)

Rossana Rosado, DCJS Commissioner; Daniel F.

Martuscello III, DOCCS Commissioner; Raymond A.

Tierney, Suffolk DA; and Dr. Errol D. Toulon, Jr., Suffolk

Sheriff,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is the renewed motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) filed by

Kareem Douglas in relation to a pro se Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Section 1983”) against the following individuals: Commissioner Rossana Rosado (“Rosado”)

of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (“CJS”); Commissioner Daniel F.

Martuscello, III (“Martuscello”) of the New York State Department of Corrections and

Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); Suffolk County District Attorney Raymond A. Tierney

(“Tierney”); and Suffolk County Sheriff Errol D. Toulon, Jr. (“Toulon” and collectively,

“Defendants”). (See Compl., ECF No. 1; Renewed IFP Mot., ECF No. 6.) For the reasons that

follow, the renewed motion to proceed IFP is granted.

Having granted IFP status to Mr. Douglas, the Court has screened the Complaint in

accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon such screening, the Complaint is

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On November 24, 2025, Mr. Douglas filed a Complaint pursuant to Section 1983

together with an IFP Motion and a motion seeking entry of a temporary restraining order and a

preliminary injunction (“Injunctive Relief Motion”). (Compl., ECF No. 1; IFP Mot., ECF No. 2;

Inj. Rel. Mot., ECF No. 3.) By Order dated December 4, 2025 (the “Order”), the Court denied

Mr. Douglas’s IFP Motion and Injunctive Relief Motion without prejudice and with leave to

renew. (Order, ECF No. 5.)

On December 12, 2025, Mr. Douglas timely filed a renewed IFP motion using the Long

Form as the Court directed. (Renewed IFP Mot., ECF No. 6.) Mr. Douglas has not renewed the

Injunctive Relief Motion.

I. The Complaint1

The three-page Complaint was filed with an additional 83 pages of exhibits.2 (Compl. at 1–3;

Exhibits, ECF No. 1 at 4–86.) The Complaint alleges:

Plaintiff was convicted of non-sexually motivated felonies (See Exhibits D and

E). The Appellate Division reviewed the designation in 2020 and made a binding

judicial determination that the Plaintiff’s criminal culpability was non-sexual (See

Exhibit F).

The Defendants had explicit, decade-long notice of the error, reinforced by formal

communications in 2008 (Ex. B), 2010 (Ex. C), and judicial orders in 2011 (Ex.

G).

1 Excerpts from the Complaint have been reproduced here exactly as they appear in the original.

Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected or noted.

2 In assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim, this Court may consider “facts stated

on the face of the complaint, documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the

complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be taken,” and documents “integral

to the complaint.” Clark v. Hanley, 89 F.4th 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2023).

2

The unlawful Level 3 designation resulted in the legal deprivation of protected

property and liberty interests . . . proven by unlawful incarceration (Exhibits K

and L) and multiple housing denials (Exhibits M, N, O, P).

The unlawful Level 3 designation and the deliberate public shaming have resulted

in direct and continuous physical danger to Plaintiff . . . suffering a medically

documented seizure (See Exhibit H).

The malicious maintenance of the Level 3 registration has caused the

unconstitutional dissolution of the Plaintiff’s family unit . . . Specifically, the

Plaintiff is legally prevented from residing with his wife (Exhibit I). The

systematic harassment endured by his wife is documented in official police

reports (Exhibit J) and public shaming (Exhibit Q).

(Compl. at 2, ¶ IV.) The Complaint names Defendants “in their official capacities for Injunctive

Relief and in their individual capacities for Money Damages.” (Id. at 2, ¶ III.)3 With respect to

“Agency Liability,” the Complaint alleges that “[t]he constitutional deprivation was caused by

the unconstitutional policy, custom, and practice of the Defendant agencies . . . Specifically, the

Defendants engaged in a Custom of Malicious Maintenance by ignoring judicial guidance

regarding SORA.” (Id. at ¶ V.) Whereas

[t]he individual Defendants . . . are sued in their individual capacities for acting

with willful, malicious, and deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff’s clearly

established constitutional rights. The combined malicious conduct of these

individual Defendants . . . strips them of the defense of Qualified Immunity.

(Id.)

3 The Complaint alleges official capacities claims pursuant to “Mondell” (id. at 2, ¶ V) which

the Court understands to reference a Monell claim. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690–91 (1978). However, “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that ‘a municipality cannot

be made liable’ under § 1983 for acts of its employees ‘by application of the doctrine of

respondeat superior.’” Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986)).

3

Based on the foregoing allegations, the Complaint alleges that Mr. Douglas suffered

“[p]hysical [h]arm” including “trauma resulting in a medically documented seizure event (See

Exhibit H)” as well as a “[l]oss of [l]iberty/[p]roperty” including “unlawful incarceration (Ex. K

and L), housing denial (Ex. M-P), and the unconstitutional loss of marital and familial

association (Ex. I and J). (Compl. at 3, ¶ VII.) For relief, the Complaint seeks: (1) “judgment

against the Defendants, jointly and severally” for “Declaratory Relief . . . ruling . . . that the

Defendants’ conduct in maintaining the Plaintiff’s Level 3 registration status post-October 2023

was unconstitutional[]”; (2) “a permanent injunction ordering the immediate removal of

Plaintiff’s Level 3 Sex Offender Registration status and requiring a public retraction and

correction”; (3) “compensatory damages in the amount of $6,000,000; and (4) punitive damages

in the amount of $10,000,000.” (Id. ¶ VII.)

II. The Relevant State Court Proceedings

The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department denied Mr. Douglas’s

appeal of his sentence insofar as it designated him as a level three sex offender, and recited the

following facts:

In 2003, the defendant [Mr. Douglas] was convicted, upon a plea of guilty, of,

inter alia, kidnapping in the second degree and unlawful imprisonment in the first

degree in connection with an armed robbery/burglary of a home. During the home

invasion, a father, mother, and 14-year-old boy were tied up, the mother was

sexually assaulted by a codefendant in the defendant’s presence, and a gun was

discharged, with the bullet narrowly missing a 3-year-old child. At one point, the

defendant held a gun to the father’s head while items were stolen. The defendant

was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 8½ to 10 years followed by a period

of post release supervision of 5 years. Upon his release, the defendant was

required to register as a sex offender due to his conviction of kidnapping and

unlawful imprisonment of children less than 17 years old where he was not their

parent, even though he did not commit a sexual act. The Board of Examiners of

Sex Offenders assessed the defendant a total of 195 points, which would make

him a presumptive level three sex offender.

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At a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law

art 6–C [hereinafter SORA] ), the People requested that the defendant be

designated a level three sex offender. The defendant disputed the assessment of

points under risk factors 2 and 13, and sought a downward departure based on the

mitigating factor that he did not have sexual contact with the female victim. By

order dated August 13, 2018, the County Court denied the defendant’s request for

a downward departure and designated the defendant a level three sex offender.

The defendant appeals.

People v. Douglas, 189 A.D.3d 1276, 1277 (2020), leave to appeal denied, 36 N.Y.3d 910

(2021); (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 54.) In denying Mr. Douglas’s appeal, the Appellate Division

explained the following:

The defendant’s claim that his risk level designation should be vacated because

the Judge who presided over the SORA hearing was not the same Judge who

accepted his plea of guilty and sentenced him, was not raised at any time before

the SORA court and is unpreserved for appellate review (see e.g. People v.

Worrell, 183 A.D.3d 602, 122 N.Y.S.3d 356; People v. Dipilato, 155 A.D.3d 792,

63 N.Y.S.3d 525).

The defendant’s contention that the Sex Offender Registration Act is

unconstitutional as applied to him is unpreserved for appellate review (see People

v. Howard, 27 N.Y.3d 337, 342, 33 N.Y.S.3d 132, 52 N.E.3d 1158), and, in any

event, is without merit (see People v. Knox, 12 N.Y.3d 60, 875 N.Y.S.2d 828, 903

N.E.2d 1149; People v. Suarez, 147 A.D.3d 802, 45 N.Y.S.3d 801; People v.

Edney, 143 A.D.3d 793, 38 N.Y.S.3d 817; People v. Taylor, 42 A.D.3d 13, 835

N.Y.S.2d 241).

Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the County Court did not

improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his request for a downward

departure. A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk

level has the initial burden of “(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate

mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of

reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is

otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2)

establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the

evidence” (People v. Wyatt, 89 A.D.3d 112, 128, 931 N.Y.S.2d 85; see People v.

Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701; see also Sex

Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4

[2006] ). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its

5

discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of

the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the

defendant’s dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v. Gillotti,

23 N.Y.3d at 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701; People v. Champagne, 140

A.D.3d 719, 720, 31 N.Y.S.3d 218). Here, while the defendant identified an

appropriate mitigating factor, under the totality of the circumstances, including

the violent nature of the home invasion, the level three designation best assesses

the risk of reoffense by the defendant and the threat posed to the public safety (see

People v. Gillotti, 23 N.Y.3d 841, 861, 994 N.Y.S.2d 1, 18 N.E.3d 701; People v.

Marquez, 165 A.D.3d 986, 987, 84 N.Y.S.3d 572; People v. Gordon, 133 A.D.3d

835, 837, 20 N.Y.S.3d 165; Correction Law § 168–l[5]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, we agree with the County Court’s determination designating the

defendant a level three sex offender.

People v. Douglas, 189 A.D.3d 1276, 1277–78; Compl., ECF No. 1 at 54–55. Mr. Douglas has

also annexed the Suffolk County Court’s Order, dated September 30, 2011, from which Mr.

Douglas appealed. (ECF No. 1 at 57-58.) There, the County Court recited that “one of the

assailants, not Mr. Douglas, decided to sexually molest and assault the wife and mother of the

family” and consequently “the Department of Correctional Services has decided to impose sex

offender conditions upon the incarceration of [Douglas], based on his liability as an accomplice.”

(Id. at 57 (emphasis added).) In rejecting Mr. Douglas’s challenge to his “treat[ment] as a sex

offender based upon the actions of his accomplices,” the County Court stated it could “only offer

the following admonition: Consortio Malorum Me Quoque Malum Facit* *‘The company of

wicked men makes me also wicked.’” (Id. at 58 (quoting Moore’s English King’s Bench

Reports, p. 817).)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Where a plaintiff is proceeding IFP, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 instructs that “the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or

6

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). At the pleading

stage, the court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in

the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009)), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).4

This Court is required to construe pleadings “filed by pro se litigants liberally and

interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th

62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208,

213 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

Nevertheless, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2022)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In determining whether a claim is

sufficiently plausible, a court “accept[s] all factual allegations as true” and “draw[s] all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Herrera v. Comme des Garcons, Ltd., 84 F.4th

110, 113 (2d Cir. 2023). Nevertheless, a court is “not required to credit conclusory allegations or

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Melendez v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 50 F.4th

294, 307 (2d Cir. 2022). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard requires “more than a

4 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks, alterations,

brackets, and citations.

7

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; accord Schiebel v. Schoharie Cent.

Sch. Dist., 120 F.4th 1082, 1106 (2d Cir. 2024). While “detailed factual allegations” are not

required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint fails to state a

claim “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Claims

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides redress for constitutional deprivations and provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure

for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519

(2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)); accord Jean-

Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-441, 2024 WL 1193062, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2024)

(recognizing that Section 1983 does not provide an independent source of substantive rights). To

maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) acted under color of

state law (2) to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or federal law. See

Sykes, 13 F.3d at 519.

8

Here, the Complaint alleges a deprivation of Mr. Douglas’s Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. More specifically, the Complaint alleges that the maintenance of the Level 3

designation to Mr. Douglas deprives him of “constitutional rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause

(Article I, Section 9), the Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment), and the Due

Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution.” (Compl. 1 at ¶ 1.)

i. Heck’s Delayed Accrual Rule

Insofar as Mr. Douglas’s constitutional claims challenge the execution of his sentence,

success on these claims would impugn the validity of a sentence imposed by the state court. In

Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks

damages in a § 1983 suit,” the district court must dismiss the complaint if “a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” and the

“conviction or sentence has [not] already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). In other

words, “a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or

sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at 480–90.

Here, success on Mr. Douglas’s claims would impugn the validity of his sentence and are

therefore not cognizable under Section 1983. Mr. Douglas does not allege that his conviction or

sentence has been overturned, nor does he claim that his conviction was unconstitutional. Rather,

he asserts that the sentencing court erred in designating him as a sex offender. (Compl. at 2,

¶ IV.) To be sure, in addition to monetary damages, Mr. Douglas seeks an order from this Court

“declaring that the Defendants’ conduct in maintaining [his] Level 3 registration status post-

October 2023 was unconstitutional” and a “permanent injunction ordering the immediate

9

removal of [Mr. Douglas’s] Level 3 Sex Offender Registration status and requiring a public

retraction and correction.” (Id. at 3 ¶ VII.A-B.) But the requirement that Mr. Douglas register as

a sex offender comes from his 2003 conviction and is therefore barred under Heck. See Compl.,

Ex. F at 54 (quoting the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department opinion finding

that “[u]pon his release, [Mr. Douglas] was required to register as a sex offender due to his

conviction of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment of children less than 17 years old where he

was not their parent, even though he did not commit a sexual act”); Harris v. New York State

Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Servs., No. 20-cv-1028, 2020 WL 5653282, at *2 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept.

23, 2020) (holding that where the requirement to register as a sex offender resulted from a state

conviction, “which [plaintiff] does not dispute remains valid, any consequences apparently

flowing from it—including the 1999 and 2013 sex offender sentencings, and the alleged sentence

extension by [DOCCS]—are barred under Heck.”) Mr. Douglas must seek habeas relief instead

of bringing a Section 1983 claim because “success in [the] action would necessarily demonstrate

the invalidity of confinement [pursuant to state law] or its duration” unless the “conviction or

sentence has already been invalidated.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 80, 82 (2005)

(citations omitted).

Accordingly, the constitutional claims seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive

relief are barred by Heck and its progeny and are thus not plausible. See, e.g., Wynder v. Linn,

No. 25-cv-2961, 2025 WL 2926543, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2025) (concluding that Heck bars

claims for money damages and declaratory relief where a plaintiff’s conviction was been upheld

on appeal and was not otherwise invalidated); Murphy v. Travis, 36 F. App'x 679 (2d Cir. 2002)

(applying Heck to claims for declaratory relief) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648

10

(1997)) (summary order); Bodie v. Morgenthau, 342 F. Supp. 2d 193, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

(finding that Heck bars injunctive relief when it “directly relates to” the plaintiff’s sentence and

“seeks to compel specific action pertaining to” the sentence.)

These claims are therefore dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)

without prejudice to Mr. Douglas pursuing appropriate appellate relief.

ii. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The reach of the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to extend

beyond the terms of its text to bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own citizens or

by foreign sovereigns.” State Emps.’ Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d

Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Eleventh Amendment immunity also

extends to suits for money damages against state officials in their official capacities. See Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.

As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”). District courts may raise the issue

of sovereign immunity “sua sponte because it affects . . . subject matter jurisdiction.” Atl.

Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993).

Here, Mr. Douglas’s official capacity damages claims against Rosado, Martuscello and

Tierney are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). See Darcy v.

11

Lippman, 356 F. App'x 434, 436–37 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars

“claim[s] for damages against the individual defendants in their official capacities” as state

officials); Torres v. Spota, No. 19-cv00296, 2019 WL 3035522, at *3 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. July 10,

2019) (applying Eleventh Amendment immunity to a district attorney) (citing Ying Jing Gan v.

City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993)); Griffith v. New York State, No. 5:23-cv-

1266, 2024 WL 16341587, at *5 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2024) (“A dismissal based on the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, is consequently a dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Wang v. Delphin-Rittmon, 664 F. Supp. 3d 205, 217 (D. Conn.

2023) (“sovereign immunity strips the court of jurisdiction”) (citation omitted); see also Montero

v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“A complaint will be dismissed as

frivolous when it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.”).

iii. Prosecutorial Immunity

Prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil suits for acts committed within the scope

of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but rather

are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Bouchard v. Olmsted, 775 F. App’x 701, 703 (2d Cir. 2019)

(summary order) (“Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to their

‘prosecutorial functions,’ which include their actions ‘as advocates and when their conduct

involves the exercise of discretion.’” (quoting Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir.

2011) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)). “[A]dvocacy during sentencing

proceedings—both in the courtroom and in communications with the Probation Office—falls

within the ‘traditional functions of an advocate’ subject to absolute immunity.” Bouchard, 775 F.

12

App’x at 703 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131). Thus, insofar as Mr. Douglas seeks to impose

liability on Tierney for the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office’s advocacy during

sentencing, such a claim is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity and is dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

iv. Personal Involvement

Although Mr. Douglas has named Tierney and Toulon as defendants, he has not alleged

any conduct or inaction attributable to either individual. (Compl., in toto). The Supreme Court

held in Ashcroft that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... [Section] 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own actions,

has violated the Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676; see also Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609,

618–19 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining the standard for supervisory liability). Thus, a complaint

based upon a violation of Section 1983 that does not allege the personal involvement of a

defendant fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed as to that defendant. Johnson v.

Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).

To the extent that Mr. Douglas seeks to impose liability on Tierney and Toulon given the

supervisory positions they hold as Suffolk County District Attorney and Suffolk County Sheriff,

respectively, he has not sufficiently alleged their personal involvement. The Second Circuit

Court of Appeals has made clear that there is no “special test for supervisory liability” and, in

order “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements

of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official. . . .” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at

620. Accordingly, Mr. Douglas has not alleged a plausible claim against Tierney and Toulon and

such claims are thus dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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v. Rooker-Feldman Precludes Adjudication of Mr. Douglas’s Claims in this

Court

Finally, to the extent Mr. Douglas is attempting to challenge the risk level assigned to

him as a result of the state court’s proceedings, such a challenge is precluded by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine—established by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923), and Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983)—federal district courts lack authority to review final

state court orders and judgments where the federal court plaintiff seeks relief that invites the

federal court to reject or overturn the state court judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005); see also Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101

(2d Cir. 2021) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “bars federal district courts from hearing

cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court [of the

United States] is the only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.”) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257); see also McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Rooker–

Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to consider a plaintiff’s claim which

applies to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review of those judgments.”).

There are four requirements for application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) the

plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court

judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites district court review and rejection of the state court judgment;

and (4) the state court judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.

Dorce, 2 F.4th at 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Here, to the extent Mr. Douglas is seeking reversal of the state court’s determination of

his risk level assessment, the claim is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mr. Douglas

lost in the state court proceeding well before the filing of this action. The injury of which he

complains, the determination that he is a level 3 offender, was the result of the state court

proceeding. Mr. Douglas seeks reversal of that determination in federal court, but such a

challenge is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Zuneska v. Cuomo, No. 12-cv-949,

2013 WL 431826, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2013) (holding that plaintiff’s challenge to his SORA

designation was precluded by Rooker-Feldman); Myers v. Sperazza, No. 11-cv-292, 2012 WL

6690303, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (challenge to state court’s determination that plaintiff

is a level 3 offender precluded under Rooker-Feldman).

Since all four elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are met, this Court has no

jurisdiction over Mr. Douglas’s claims concerning the propriety of his designation as a level 3

sex offender. Galtieri v. Kelly, 441 F.Supp.2d 447, 453 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (“federal district courts

lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments”).

Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims set forth in the Complaint and

they are thus dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

II. State Law Claims

A district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

[where it] has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-

law claims.” Chinniah v. FERC, 62 F.4th 700, 703 (2d Cir. 2023). Having dismissed the federal

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claims alleged in the Amended Complaint for the reasons set forth above, the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Cohen v. Postal Holdings, LLC, 873 F.3d 394, 405 (2d Cir. 2017) (Calabresi, J.,

concurring) (the Second Circuit “takes a very strong position that state issues should be decided

by state courts”).

Thus, any state law claims that may be liberally construed from the allegations in the

Complaint are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to replead in state court.

III. Leave to Amend

A pro se plaintiff should ordinarily be given the opportunity “to amend at least once

when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”

Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009). However, leave to amend is

properly denied where amendment would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d

Cir. 2000) (where amendment would be “futile,” leave to amend the complaint should be

denied). Here, the deficiencies in the claims presented are substantive and cannot be cured with

better pleading. As stated above, however, if Mr. Douglas seeks to challenge the constitutionality

of his underlying sentence, he must seek relief through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 78–83.

Accordingly, leave to amend would be futile and is thus denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Mr. Douglas’s renewed IFP Motion (ECF

No. 6) and dismisses the Complaint (ECF No. 1) as set forth above pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).

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The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to Mr. Douglas

at his address of record and shall note such mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of any appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

May 22, 2026

Nusrat J. Choudhury

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY

United States District Judge

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