The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WENDELL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-11535 (RMB)
(SAK)
v.
OPINION
OFFICER A. EME,
Defendant.
BUMB, Chief District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the motion of Defendant Aloysius
Eme ("Officer Eme") to dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”)) of pro se
Plaintiff Wendell Johnson ("Johnson" or “Plaintiff”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 9.) Johnson is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner
housed at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey. He brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Eme in his personal capacity,1 alleging that Officer
Eme violated his First Amendment rights by returning two items of Johnson's
outgoing mail — a supplemental legal brief and a vote-by-mail application — rather
1Johnson's Complaint names "Officer A. Eme" without specifying whether the suit is
brought against Officer Eme in his personal or official capacity. A § 1983 suit against
a state employee in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the State itself and
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver or congressional abrogation,
neither of which applies here. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). Accordingly, the Court
construes the complaint as asserting a personal-capacity claim only, which is the sole
viable reading consistent with the damages Johnson seeks.
than mailing them to their intended recipients. Officer Eme moves to dismiss on the
grounds that Johnson has failed to plead a "pattern and practice" or "explicit policy"
of mail interference as required by Third Circuit precedent, and that Johnson's
complaint, liberally construed to encompass a First Amendment right-of-access-to-
courts theory, also fails to allege the actual injury that such a claim demands. Johnson
opposes. (ECF No. 10.) Officer Eme replied. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth
below, Officer Eme's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Johnson's First Amendment
mail interference claim is dismissed without prejudice. Johnson's First Amendment
right-of-access-to-courts claim is dismissed with prejudice. The Court separately
addresses the pending temporary restraining order (“TRO”) request.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
Johnson is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner serving a sentence at
Northern State Prison for aggravated arson and related offenses, following a jury trial
in which he represented himself. See State v. Wendell Johnson, a/k/a Lamar Hill, No. A-
2503-21, 2024 WL 134523, at *1, *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2024). His
projected parole eligibility date is April 5, 2027. (ECF No. 1-2, at 4.) Johnson filed this
action on December 31, 2024, alleging a single incident of mail interference by Officer
Eme, a corrections officer employed by the New Jersey Department of Corrections at
2 The Court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in Johnson's complaint
for purposes of this motion. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir.
Northern State Prison. (ECF No. 1.) Johnson discloses one prior federal civil rights
action that was dismissed for failure to state a claim.3
On October 29, 2024, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Officer Eme signed a legal
mail receipt acknowledging that he had returned two items of Johnson's outgoing mail
to Johnson rather than mailing them to their intended recipients. (ECF No. 1, at 5.)
Johnson asserts Officer Eme lacked any good cause for doing so. (Id.) The first
returned item was a vote-by-mail application addressed to the government. (Id.) The
second was a supplemental brief that Johnson intended to send to his criminal defense
attorney for filing with the courts. (Id.) Johnson does not identify in his complaint
which criminal proceeding the brief concerned, what legal argument or relief it
advanced, or what consequence flowed from its non-delivery. (Id., at 1–7.)
3 Plaintiff discloses one prior federal civil rights action, Johnson v. McGill, No. 2:24-cv-
06910 (D.N.J.), which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
Court’s independent review further reflects additional prior actions, including Johnson
v. Kuhn, No. 2:22-cv-04453 (D.N.J.), and Johnson v. State of New Jersey, No. 3:20-cv-
12726 (D.N.J.), both of which appear to have been dismissed in their entirety at
screening for failure to state a claim and thus may qualify as “strikes” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), notwithstanding any without-prejudice designation. See Lomax v. Ortiz-
Marquez, 590 U.S. 595, 597 (2020). By contrast, other matters identified by the Court—
including Johnson v. United States, No. 3:21-cv-12013 (D.N.J.), and Johnson v. Ellis, No.
3:20-cv-11472 (D.N.J.)—appear to involve mixed dispositions and therefore may not
satisfy the “entire action” requirement for a strike. See Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275,
280–81 (3d Cir. 2021). The Court’s review also identifies additional actions, including
Johnson v. New Jersey State Parole Board, No. 3:22-cv-02530 (D.N.J.), whose procedural
posture is not readily classifiable on the present record. The Court expresses no
definitive view at this juncture as to whether any of these matters qualify as strikes but
identifies them to ensure an accurate and complete record for any subsequent § 1915(g)
analysis.
On the complaint form's defendant-description page, Johnson writes that "[t]his
officer keep[s] returning [Johnson's] mail to his criminal attorney for filing with the
courts, [Johnson's] application to vote by mail." (Id., at 4.) He provides no dates,
frequency, or supporting details beyond the single October 29, 2024 incident. (Id., at
1–7.) Johnson also alleges that he filed nine grievances with prison officials regarding
his complaints and that those officials either failed or refused to respond, which he
contends satisfies his duty to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Id., at 5–6.) As relief,
Johnson seeks $500 billion in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., at 6.)
On July 11, 2025, following screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court
granted Johnson's application to proceed in forma pauperis and permitted the complaint
to proceed solely on a Section 1983 First Amendment "interference with personal and
legal mail" claim against Officer Eme. (ECF No. 3, at 2.) No other claim was
authorized. (Id.)
On October 28, 2025, Officer Eme moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
arguing in the alternative that the complaint should be dismissed even if liberally
construed to raise a First Amendment right-of-access-to-courts claim. (ECF No. 9;
ECF No. 9-1, at 9–11.) Johnson filed a handwritten opposition on December 1, 2025,
raising several new factual allegations and legal theories not in the complaint. (ECF
No. 10.) Officer Eme replied on December 18, 2025. (ECF No. 13.) Separately, on
April 7, 2026, Johnson filed a letter this Court construed as a motion for a TRO. (ECF
No. 15; ECF No. 16.) Defendant's deadline to respond to that request has been
extended to May 7, 2026. (ECF Nos. 18, 20.) The motion to dismiss is now ripe.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The standard "is not akin to a
'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Where the well-pleaded
facts "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged — but it has not shown — that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court conducts a two-step inquiry.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–11. The Court first separates the factual and legal elements of
the claim, accepting well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff's favor, while disregarding bare legal conclusions and formulaic
recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It then
determines whether the surviving factual allegations state a plausible — not merely
conceivable — claim for relief. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. The Court may consider "the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these
documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).
Because Johnson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally
and holds them to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by counsel.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). That obligation does not, however, require the Court to supply missing factual
allegations, manufacture legal theories the plaintiff has not advanced, or credit
conclusory assertions untethered to any factual support. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir.
1999). Nor may a pro se plaintiff cure pleading deficiencies by raising new factual
allegations for the first time in an opposition brief. See Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. Pepsico,
Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not
be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.").
III. DISCUSSION
Officer Eme raises two grounds for dismissal. First, he argues that Johnson has
failed to allege the "pattern and practice" or "explicit policy" of mail interference that
Third Circuit precedent requires to state a plausible First Amendment mail
interference claim. Second, he argues in the alternative that, even if the complaint is
liberally construed to raise a First Amendment right-of-access-to-courts theory, that
claim fails for want of a cognizable actual injury. The Court also addresses exhaustion,
the damages demand, and the pending TRO.4
A. First Amendment Mail Interference Claim
The First Amendment protects the right of prisoners to send and receive mail
free from unwarranted governmental interference. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358
(3d Cir. 2006). That right operates within the legitimate penological constraints of
prison administration. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Third Circuit has
imposed a threshold pleading requirement: to state a plausible First Amendment mail
interference claim, a prisoner must allege either a "pattern and practice" of mail
interference or an "explicit policy" directing such interference. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d
at 359; see also Muir v. Wetzel, No. 20-4459, 2020 WL 6799250, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
19, 2020). This requirement applies equally to legal mail and personal mail; courts in
this circuit draw no material First Amendment distinction between the two categories
at the pleading stage. See Barrett v. Matters, No. 14-1250, 2015 WL 5881602, at *5–6
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015).
The rationale for this threshold requirement is grounded in the distinction
between individual misconduct and systemic constitutional harm. An isolated act of
mail interference — whether the product of negligence, administrative error, or a single
officer's momentary lapse — does not implicate the constitutional values the First
4 Officer Eme does not move to dismiss the underlying complaint on exhaustion
grounds, and the Court does not reach that question as to the claims addressed in
this Opinion. The Court separately addresses exhaustion in connection with
Amendment protects in the prison mail context. It is the systemic, repeated, or policy-
driven suppression of an inmate's correspondence that rises to constitutional
dimension. Accordingly, the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that "a single, isolated
interference" with inmate mail is "insufficient to constitute a First Amendment
violation." Nixon v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 501 F. App'x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted); accord Iwanicki v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 582 F. App'x 75, 79 (3d Cir.
2014). Johnson's complaint fails both available pleading paths.
As to pattern and practice: Johnson's complaint describes a single, isolated act
— on October 29, 2024, Officer Eme returned two items of Johnson's outgoing mail.
That is the entirety of the alleged misconduct in the statement of claims. (ECF No. 1,
at 5.) Under controlling Third Circuit authority, a single incident is categorically
insufficient. Nixon, 501 F. App'x at 178. The only potential hook for a pattern theory
in the complaint is Johnson's assertion on the defendant-description page that Officer
Eme "keep[s] returning" his mail. (ECF No. 1, at 4.) The Court has carefully
considered whether this phrase, even under the liberal construction owed to pro se
pleadings, can support a pattern allegation. It cannot, for two independent reasons.
First, read in context, the phrase does not function as a freestanding allegation
of recurrent misconduct. It appears in the section where Johnson is asked to describe
how Officer Eme was "involved in the case," immediately before Johnson details the
October 29, 2024 incident. The phrase reads as a characterization of that specific
incident — an officer who, on that occasion, returned Johnson's mail — not as an
independent allegation that the same conduct occurred on other unspecified occasions.
Second, even if the phrase were read as a standalone recurrence allegation, it is
entirely devoid of factual content. It identifies no other dates, no frequency, no
additional items of mail, and no other circumstances from which the Court could
assess whether a plausible pattern exists. A bare assertion of recurrence, untethered to
any supporting facts, is precisely the kind of conclusory allegation the Court need not
credit on a motion to dismiss. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1429 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204 (3d Cir.
1980). The contrast with cases sustaining a pattern allegation is telling: in Taylor v.
Oney, the Third Circuit sustained a mail interference claim where the prisoner
specifically alleged that his legal mail was opened outside his presence on eight distinct
occasions over a four-year period, providing a concrete temporal and numerical
foundation from which to infer a pattern. 196 F. App'x 126, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).
Johnson's complaint provides nothing of the kind.
As to explicit policy: Johnson argues in his opposition brief that Officer Eme
interfered with his mail "due to an explicit policy." (ECF No. 10, at 5.) Even setting
aside that this argument appears for the first time in Johnson's opposition and cannot
amend the complaint, Zimmerman, 836 F.2d at 181, it fails on the merits. In the
analogous context of § 1983 municipal liability, the Third Circuit has held that a
"policy" within the meaning of the statute is made when "a decisionmaker possess[ing]
final authority to establish [the relevant] policy . . . issues an official proclamation,
policy, or edict." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss on an explicit-policy theory, a
plaintiff must identify the specific policy — not merely assert in conclusory terms that
one exists. See Hill v. City of Philadelphia, No. 16-3868, 2017 WL 3263786, at *5-8 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 1, 2017) ("[T]he plaintiff must 'identify a custom or policy, and specify what
exactly that custom or policy was.'") (citing McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636,
658 (3d Cir. 2009)). Johnson identifies no specific policy anywhere in his complaint
or, tellingly, his opposition brief. His assertion of an explicit policy is unsupported and
conclusory and cannot sustain his claim under either the complaint or the opposition.
Johnson's opposition brief also attempts to supplement the complaint with new
factual allegations — including a claim that Officer Eme interfered with his legal mail
on "at least 10 different dates" before October 29, 2024, (ECF No. 10, at 5), and a
February 3, 2023 New Jersey Department of Corrections contraband seizure report as
purported evidence of a broader pattern. (ECF No. 10, at 9.) The Court may not
consider either on this motion. Zimmerman, 836 F.2d at 181; Frederico v. Home Depot,
507 F.3d 188, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2007); Mayer, 605 F.3d at 230.
The contraband seizure report presents an additional, independent deficiency:
it is simply not probative of any claim against Officer Eme. The report — dated
February 3, 2023, more than nineteen months before the conduct alleged in the
complaint — identifies the seizing officer as "Ofc. P. Rex," not Aloysius Eme. (ECF
No. 10, at 11.) A document recording the conduct of a different officer at a different
time establishes nothing about Officer Eme's conduct. Whatever relevance the report
might have to a claim against Officer Rex, it cannot substitute for factual allegations
concerning the defendant actually named in this action. Even if the Court were to
consider the report — which it does not — it would be of no assistance to Johnson in
this case.
Accordingly, Johnson's First Amendment mail interference claim is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to allege either a pattern and practice or an explicit policy
of mail interference.5.
B. First Amendment Right-of-Access-to-Courts Claim
Although the Court's July 11, 2025 screening order authorized only a mail
interference claim (ECF No. 3, at 2), Officer Eme's moving brief argued in the
alternative that dismissal is also warranted if the complaint is liberally construed to
raise a First Amendment right-of-access-to-courts theory. (ECF No. 9-1, at 9–11.)
Johnson addressed this theory in his opposition. (ECF No. 10, at 7–9.) Because Officer
Eme placed the access-to-courts theory squarely before the Court, both parties have
5 The Court notes an additional, independent deficiency as to the vote-by-mail sub-
claim specifically. Even if Johnson had adequately alleged a pattern and practice of
interference, the return of a vote-by-mail application cannot have caused him a
cognizable First Amendment injury because, as a convicted prisoner serving a sentence
of incarceration in a New Jersey state facility, he has no right to vote under New Jersey
law. See N.J. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 7 ("The Legislature may pass laws to deprive persons
of the right of suffrage who shall be convicted of such crimes as it may designate.");
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:4-1(8) (disqualifying from suffrage "[a]ny person . . . serving a
sentence of incarceration as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense"). A
First Amendment mail interference claim requires a showing that the interference
harmed a constitutionally protected interest. Where the underlying activity is itself
foreclosed by law, no such interest exists and the sub-claim fails irrespective of the
defendant's conduct. This point is raised in a footnote because the pattern-and-practice
and explicit-policy deficiencies independently dispose of the mail interference claim in
its entirety; this provides only an additional, independent basis for dismissal of the
vote-by-mail sub-claim.
briefed it, and resolving it now provides Johnson fair notice of what he may and may
not replead, the Court addresses it here in the interest of judicial economy.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee prisoners a right of
meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Monroe v.
Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). To state a plausible access-to-courts claim
under § 1983, a prisoner must satisfy three requirements. First, the underlying
proceeding must fall within one of two categories recognized by the Supreme Court: a
direct or collateral challenge to the prisoner's sentence, or a challenge to the conditions
of confinement. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205 (citation omitted); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 355–56 (1996) (declining to extend the access-to-courts right beyond these
categories). Second, the prisoner must allege an "actual injury" — that is, that he "lost
a chance to pursue a 'nonfrivolous' or 'arguable' underlying claim." Monroe, 536 F.3d
at 205; Caldwell v. Beard, 305 F. App'x 1, 3 (3d Cir. 2008) ("An actual injury is shown
only where a nonfrivolous, arguable claim is lost."). Third, the prisoner must show
that no other remedy could provide recompense for the lost claim. Monroe, 536 F.3d
at 205.
Johnson's access-to-courts claim — to the extent one can be construed from his
complaint — fails at the threshold. The Complaint alleges only that the returned
supplemental brief was intended for Johnson's "criminal attorney for filing with the
courts." (ECF No. 1, at 5.) It does not allege the nature of the proceeding, whether it
constituted a challenge to Johnson's sentence or conditions of confinement, or any
other facts that would bring it within the recognized categories. Monroe, 536 F.3d at
205.
Johnson's opposition brief attempts to fill this gap by alleging for the first time
that the supplemental brief concerned his direct criminal appeal and specifically
challenged whether the trial court improperly eliminated the degree of crime from the
verdict sheet. (ECF No. 10, at 8.) The Court may not consider this after-the-fact
allegation. Zimmerman, 836 F.2d at 181. However, the Court addresses the claim as if
Johnson had so alleged — both as an exercise of liberal construction and because it
affords the clearest path to a final disposition that serves the parties' interests — and
finds that even accepting the opposition brief's characterization arguendo, the claim
fails on the actual-injury requirement and is not susceptible to amendment.
The actual-injury requirement demands more than an allegation that outgoing
mail was returned. A prisoner must allege that the interference caused the loss of a
specific, nonfrivolous, arguable legal claim — not merely that a filing was impeded.
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d at 359. The Third Circuit has been precise about this standard:
the question is not whether the underlying claim ultimately succeeded on the merits,
but whether it was "arguable" — that is, whether it had some colorable legal basis at
the time it was allegedly lost. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205; Caldwell, 305 F. App'x at 3.
Johnson's Complaint alleges no such arguable claim — it identifies no proceeding, no
argument, and no lost opportunity — and his opposition brief, while more specific,
cannot cure the Complaint's deficiency.
Moreover, the Court may take judicial notice of the published record of
Johnson's direct criminal appeal — State v. Wendell Johnson, a/k/a Lamar Hill, No. A-
2503-21, 2024 WL 134523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2024) — for the
existence and legal effect of that adjudication, not for the truth of any facts recited
therein. S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410,
426 (3d Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). That record is dispositive as to whether any
arguable claim was lost.
The Appellate Division found that Johnson had represented himself at trial and
raised no objection to either the jury charge or the verdict sheet when they were
reviewed with the parties. Johnson, 2024 WL 134523, at *4, *6. That failure to object
at trial confined any verdict-sheet argument on direct appeal to plain-error review —
the most demanding standard of appellate review in New Jersey, requiring a showing
that the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." State v. Cuff, 217 A.3d
129, 140 (N.J. 2019) (citation omitted); N.J. Court Rules, R. 2:10-2. An argument
subject to plain-error review — as opposed to the ordinary harmless-error standard —
is one that has been substantially narrowed by the defendant's own trial-level waiver.
Its viability as an "arguable" claim for purposes of the access-to-courts analysis is
materially diminished by that waiver from the outset.
More fundamentally, the Appellate Division reached the merits and found that
the "compelling nature" of the incriminating evidence against Johnson rendered any
trial-level errors harmless. Johnson, 2024 WL 134523, at *23. It further stated that it
had "duly considered all other points and sub-points raised by defendant" and
concluded they "lack[ed] sufficient merit to warrant discussion" because the record
either lacked factual support for or "blatantly contradict[ed]" Johnson's assertions. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Johnson, 256 N.J. 534
(2024). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Johnson v. New Jersey, 145
S. Ct. 233 (2024).
The significance of this record for the arguability analysis is direct. The
arguable-claim standard under Monroe and Jones v. Brown asks whether the claim the
prisoner was allegedly impeded from pursuing had some colorable legal basis — not a
guaranteed path to victory, but a nonfrivolous argument. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353
n.3. Here, the Appellate Division did not merely rule against Johnson on a close
question; it found that his arguments either lacked factual support in the record or were
"blatantly contradict[ed]" by it. Johnson, 2024 WL 134523, at *8. An argument that is
blatantly contradicted by the record — the court's own characterization — is not an
arguable claim in any meaningful sense. Combined with Johnson's trial-level waiver
of the verdict-sheet objection, which constrained the argument to plain-error review,
the appellate record forecloses any plausible allegation that Officer Eme's return of the
supplemental brief caused the loss of a nonfrivolous, arguable claim. See Jones v. Brown,
461 F.3d at 359. There is accordingly no actual injury, and the claim fails on that
independent ground as well.
Because the access-to-courts claim fails at the threshold for want of an
adequately alleged qualifying proceeding, and on the actual-injury requirement as
confirmed by the judicially noticeable appellate record, and because the appellate
record establishes that amendment would be futile, this claim is dismissed with
prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).67
C. Damages Demand
Johnson seeks $500 billion in compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No.
1, at 6.) Because the Court is dismissing the complaint, it need not resolve the damages
question at this stage. The Court notes, however, for Johnson's guidance should he
elect to replead, that compensatory damages under § 1983 require proof of actual
injury causally connected to the constitutional violation. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986). Punitive damages are available under § 1983 only
upon a showing that the defendant's conduct was motivated by evil motive or intent,
or involved reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights.
6 The Court also notes that Johnson argues in his opposition brief that Officer Eme's
acceptance of his well-pleaded factual allegations as true constitutes a "waiver" of
defenses entitling Johnson to summary judgment. (ECF No. 10, at 4.) This
fundamentally misreads the applicable standard. Officer Eme's acknowledgment of the
well-pleaded facts restated the governing Rule 12(b)(6) framework. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). It is neither an admission for any other
purpose nor a waiver of any defense. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment are governed by entirely distinct procedural rules and
evidentiary standards. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This
argument is without merit.
7 The Court's with-prejudice dismissal of the access-to-courts claim is expressly limited
to the specific claim arising from the October 29, 2024 incident and Officer Eme's
alleged interference with Johnson's supplemental brief in connection with the direct
criminal appeal that has since been fully adjudicated. It does not foreclose Johnson
from bringing a future access-to-courts claim against Officer Eme or any other
defendant premised on different facts — for example, interference with mail in
connection with a distinct, pending, nonfrivolous legal proceeding not yet litigated to
final judgment. The with-prejudice disposition reflects solely that amendment of this
access-to-courts claim, premised on these facts, would be futile.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). An amended complaint that fails to allege facts
plausibly supporting either category of damages will be subject to dismissal on that
ground as well.
D. Plaintiff’s TRO Request
On April 7, 2026, Johnson filed a letter this Court construed as a motion for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 15; ECF No. 16.)
Defendant filed his opposition on May 7, 2026. (ECF No. 21.) The motion is now ripe
and is DENIED for two independent reasons.
First, Johnson’s motion is procedurally defective because the injuries it alleges
bear no plausible relationship to the conduct asserted in the complaint. The Third
Circuit has instructed that “there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed
in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.’” Ball v. Famiglio, 396
F. App’x 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); accord James v. Varano, No. 14-cv-
01951, 2017 WL 895569, at *6–8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017). Johnson’s complaint, as
authorized to proceed by this Court’s July 11, 2025 screening order, concerns a single
First Amendment mail interference claim arising from Officer Eme’s return of two
items of outgoing mail on October 29, 2024. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 3.) Johnson’s TRO
motion alleges an entirely different set of injuries: ongoing verbal intimidation and
threats on his life by NJDOC employees in retaliation for filing this and other civil
complaints; the destruction of his legal books, Bible, and transcripts; and sexual
harassment. (ECF No. 15, at 1–5.) The motion further seeks relief — an immediate
institutional transfer to New Jersey State Prison or South Woods State Prison — that
is wholly untethered to the $500 billion in damages sought in the complaint. (Compare
ECF No. 15, at 3, with ECF No. 1, at 6.) The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief
is to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the underlying claims on the merits,
not to obtain relief on wholly unrelated claims that have never been pleaded, screened,
or authorized to proceed. Because Johnson’s motion bears no plausible relationship to
the conduct alleged in his complaint, it is denied on that threshold basis.
Second, and independently, Johnson’s motion must be denied because he has
not alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to the new claims it
raises. The PLRA mandates that a prisoner exhaust all available administrative
remedies before seeking relief in federal court with respect to prison conditions. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). That requirement “applies
to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Id.
(citation omitted). Johnson’s motion alleges that he was threatened on February 17,
2026, yet he nowhere alleges that he sought any administrative relief through the
NJDOC’s grievance process in the two months before filing his motion, or that he
notified prison officials of any of the incidents described. (ECF No. 15, at 1–9.) Courts
in this circuit are precluded from considering unexhausted claims. Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2004). The motion is accordingly denied on this ground as well.
Because the motion is denied on two independent threshold grounds, the Court does
not reach the Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) four-factor
analysis. The Court further notes that, even were it to reach the merits, Johnson could
not satisfy the threshold gateway requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. A
movant must first demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and a likelihood
of irreparable harm. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing
Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20). Given that Johnson’s underlying complaint is dismissed by
this Opinion, he cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of any
currently pending claim. The Winter analysis need not be reached.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit instructs that district courts should generally extend a pro se
plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend before dismissing a civil rights complaint
with prejudice. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251
(3d Cir. 2007); Grayson, 293 F.3d 103, 108. Leave to amend is properly denied only
where amendment would be inequitable or futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962).
As to the mail interference claim, the Court cannot conclude at this stage that
amendment would be futile. Johnson may possess good-faith factual bases — specific
dates, descriptions of additional incidents, and contextual details about a pattern or
explicit policy — that he omitted from his initial complaint. He is granted leave to file
an amended complaint as to this claim within thirty (30) days of the accompanying
Order.
As to the access-to-courts claim, amendment would be futile for the reasons
explained in Section IV.C above. The judicially noticeable appellate record establishes
that Johnson cannot plausibly allege the loss of a nonfrivolous, arguable claim arising
from the October 29, 2024 incident. Leave to amend the access-to-courts claim is
denied. For the avoidance of doubt, any amended complaint Johnson chooses to file
may not reassert an access-to-courts claim premised on Officer Eme's interference with
the supplemental brief on October 29, 2024, or on the direct criminal appeal
proceedings addressed in Section IV.C.
Should Johnson file an amended complaint, it must be a complete and self-
contained pleading superseding the original in all respects. As to any mail interference
claim, it must set forth: the date of each alleged incident of interference; the identity of
the officer responsible; the nature of the mail affected; and any factual basis from which
the Court could infer that the conduct formed part of a pattern and practice or was
carried out pursuant to an identifiable explicit policy. Vague or conclusory assertions
of recurrence, unmoored from specific facts, will not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 204.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Officer Eme's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) is
GRANTED. Johnson's First Amendment mail interference claim is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Johnson's First Amendment right-of-access-to-courts
claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Johnson shall have thirty (30) days from
the date of the accompanying Order to file an amended complaint limited to the mail
interference claim. Johnson’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 15)
is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
s/ Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
Chief United States
District Judge
Dated: May 18, 2026