Frink

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT June 23, 2026

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

Benilde Campos Bernal, §

§

Petitioner, §

§

v. § Civil No. 4:26-cv-2239

§

Martin Frink, et al., §

§

Respondents. §

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Benilde Campos Bernal is a native and citizen of Cuba who concedes that

she unlawfully entered the United States in September 2022. Docs. 1 ¶ 1, 7-1. On February

3, 2026, she was detained by the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b), and she remains in the custody of Respondent, Warden of the Houston Contract

Detention Facility. Docs. 1 at 1, 8 at 1. Petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241 on the grounds that her present detention without a bond hearing violates

(1) the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) substantive due process; (3) procedural due

process; (4) equal protection; (5) the Administrative Procedures Act; (6) the Suspension

Clause; and (7) the Accardi Doctrine.

Now before the Court is Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 8. For

the reasons set forth below, Respondent’s Motion is GRANTED, and the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED.

The Court addresses each of Petitioner’s challenges to her detention in turn.

A. Immigration and Naturalization Act

Petitioner first argues that her detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)

violates the plain language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and its

implementing regulations. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 74–85. The Fifth Circuit has issued a controlling

decision foreclosing this statutory argument in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494

(5th Cir. 2026), which held that anyone present in the United States without legal admission

is “seeking admission” into the country and thus subject to mandatory detention under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).1 Petitioner concedes that she is unlawfully present in the United

States. See Doc. 1 ¶ 1. She is therefore an “applicant for admission” to the country, and

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) statutorily mandates her detention.

B. Due Process

Petitioner next argues that her pre-removal-order detention without an

individualized assessment violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Many alien

petitioners have framed this as a procedural due process claim, others as a substantive

violation. Most allege both.

1 Petitioner further contends that Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi is inconsistent with Loper

Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), in that the Fifth Circuit failed to exercise

its independent judgment when reviewing the INA and associated DHS actions. See Doc. 1 ¶¶

67–73. As Petitioner evidently acknowledges by merely raising this argument “[t]o further

preserve the statutory issue for potential en banc review by the Fifth Circuit or certiorari to the

Supreme Court,” this Court is bound by controlling Fifth Circuit precedent and therefore does

not entertain grounds for that precedent to be overturned.

2

This is an unhelpful distinction. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” Traditionally, “[a] substantive due process violation is an action

government officials may not take no matter what procedural protections accompany

them.” SO Apts., L.L.C. v. City of San Antonio, 109 F.4th 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). In other words, the Court has recognized that some

rights—those “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition” and “implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty”—are so substantive that no amount of “due process” can justify

their deprivation. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997).

In contrast, “[p]rocedural due process imposes constraints on governmental

decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests.” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (emphasis added). The government must “adhere[] to

the minimum procedures required by t[he] [Due Process] Clause” before abridging these

protected interests. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). Thus, procedural due process

does not prevent the deprivation of life, liberty, or property itself. Instead, by enabling

persons to contest the basis upon which the government has proposed to deprive them of a

protected interest, procedural due process rules minimize the risk of “mistaken or

unjustified deprivation.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259–60 (1978).

Alien detention challenges, however, have proven not so easily separated. In 1976,

Mathews v. Eldridge articulated the three distinct factors that guide procedural due process

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analysis.2 See 424 U.S. 319. Since then, the Supreme Court has thrice addressed whether

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits the detention of deportable aliens

pending their removal. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678 (2001); Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). None of these opinions

cite Mathews, let alone applies its three factors. See generally Reno, 507 U.S. 292;

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678; Demore, 538 U.S. 510.

These conspicuous omissions compel a conclusion. Aliens are indeed persons

entitled to due process. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). But when aliens

challenge pre-deportation detention, the protections afforded by the traditional procedural

due process framework prove an imperfect fit. The rationale is straightforward: the

admission of aliens implicates a distinct sovereign interest grounded in the Founders’

understanding that “the right of remaining in our country is vested in no alien; he enters

and remains by the courtesy of the sovereign power, and that courtesy may at pleasure be

withdrawn.” Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1216 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bumatay, J.,

concurring) (quoting The Address of the Minority in the Virginia Legislature to the People

of that State; containing a Vindication of the Constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition

2 The three distinct factors are (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2)

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the

government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal administrative burdens that

the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 at

335. If Mathews applied to pre-deportation detention, the Supreme Court would have reviewed

removal proceedings’ sufficiency in light of these three countervailing factors. But as noted in-

text, the Court has not done so.

4

Laws 9-10 (1799)). Because “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a

fundamental sovereign attribute,” it is “largely immune from judicial control.” Trump v.

Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018). Therefore, when a detained alien challenges the United

States’ exercise of that attribute, Mathews does not control the analysis. See Diaz, 53 F.4th

at 1214 (Bumatay, J., concurring) (“In resolving similar immigration-detention challenges,

the Supreme Court has not relied on the Mathews framework.”) (citing Demore, 538 U.S.

at 521–31 and Reno, 507 U.S. at 299–315).

Instead, to the extent the INA implicates a cognizable liberty interest held by

Petitioner, “the categorical abrogation of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute

suffices to provide all the process that is ‘due.’” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538

U.S. 1, 8 (Scalia, J., concurring). Congress has decided that all aliens shall be mandatorily

detained pending their deportation proceedings, irrespective of their individualized flight

risk or danger to the community. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Buenrostro-Mendez v.

Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Thus, unless Petitioner can show that the “substantive

rule of law is defective”—that her asserted liberty interest is so fundamental as to render

its deprivation patently unconstitutional—the INA affords her all the process that she is

due. Conn. Dep’t, 538 U.S. at 7. A request for process beyond what has been statutorily

provided is merely a substantive due process argument “recast in procedural due process

terms.” Reno, 507 U.S at 308 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court therefore turns to Petitioner’s substantive due process claim. It, too, turns

on an immigration-specific subset of due process jurisprudence. Washington v. Glucksberg

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was decided twenty-one years after Mathews v. Eldridge, but neither of the two alien

detention cases decided thereafter cited Glucksberg to frame the asserted liberty interest.

See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678; Demore, 538 U.S. 510. Instead, both the Zadvydas Court and

the Demore Court adopted their predecessors’ practice of framing the Fifth Amendment’s

limitations on alien detention without distinguishing between procedural and substantive

protections. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Reno, 507 U.S. 292; Zadvydas,

533 U.S. 678; Demore, 538 U.S. 510. Among these seminal decisions,3 only the Zadvydas

Court found the challenged detention unconstitutional, and its holding was limited to

recognizing a constitutional limit to indefinite post-removal-order detention. See 533 U.S.

at 682. And rather than identifying a fundamental substantive right, all four “recognized

detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the

deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523.

First, in Carlson v. Landon, the Court examined the Immigration and Naturalization

Service’s process of detaining alien members of the Communist Party pending their

deportability determinations. See 342 U.S. at 526–29. Explaining that “detention is

necessarily a part of [the] deportation procedure,” the Carlson Court “rejected the aliens’

3 The Zadvydas Court’s invocation of the constitutional avoidance canon to read in a

limitation to post-removal-order detention was later extended to all detained aliens referenced by

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), regardless of whether those aliens had or had not been previously

admitted to the country. See Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375 (2005). Because the

Clark Court simply extended the Zadvydas interpretation of the statute, it refrained from

substantively examining the alien petitioners’ due process rights as the four opinions addressed

in-text did. See generally id.

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claims that they were entitled to be released . . . if they did not pose a flight risk.” Demore,

538 U.S. at 524 (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538). At least one of the petitioners was

deemed “not likely to engage in any subversive activities” himself. Carlson, 342 U.S. at

549 (Black, J., dissenting). But the Carlson Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not

mandate an individualized finding of dangerousness as to each petitioner before detaining

them; instead, the Court deferred “to the legislative scheme.” See Demore, 538 U.S. at 525

(citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541).

In Reno v. Flores, the Immigration and Naturalization Service maintained a policy

to only release detained alien juveniles to parents, legal guardians, or other adult relatives.

507 U.S. at 297–98. A class of juveniles without a qualifying guardian or relative

challenged their continued detention as violative of due process. Id. at 299–300. The Flores

Court again upheld the INS policy, noting that “reasonable presumptions and generic rules

. . . are not necessarily impermissible exercises of . . . power . . . with respect to aliens.”

Demore, 538 U.S. at 526 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 313).

In Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, the Court went even further. 538 U.S. 510. There,

the petitioners raised a due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which mandates pre-

removal-order detention for a limited class of deportable aliens, including those convicted

of an aggravated felony. Id. at 516. Noting Congressional findings that “one out of four

criminal aliens released on bond abscond[] prior to the completion of his removal

proceedings” and that “the INS could not even identify most deportable aliens, much less

locate . . . and remove them,” the Demore Court held that the detention of criminal aliens

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pending their removal proceedings is “a constitutionally permissible part of th[e] [removal]

process.” Id. at 518, 531.

Zadvydas v. Davis is the lone outlier. There, aliens challenged their continued

detention after the issuance of a final order of removal. The Zadvydas Court held that post-

removal-order detention becomes unconstitutional when removal is “no longer practically

attainable.” 533 U.S. at 690. Thus, after a removal order is issued, it is presumptively

reasonable for the government to continue to detain an alien for six months, but thereafter,

detention violates due process if there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. However, even the

Zadvydas Court acknowledged the legitimacy of pre-removal-order detention,

distinguishing that “post-removal period detention, unlike detention pending a

determination of removability . . ., has no obvious termination point.” See Demore, 538

U.S. at 529 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697) (emphasis in original).

It is against this backdrop that the Court must answer the question as to whether pre-

removal-order detention of an alien without an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Some district

courts have answered in the affirmative, holding “that the Due Process Clause requires an

individualized assessment of flight risk and danger when detention becomes unreasonable

in relation to the statute’s purpose of facilitating lawful removal.” See Banegas Avile v.

Frink, No. CV H-26-916, 2026 WL 976144, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2026) (Rosenthal,

J.) (collecting cases). Others have disagreed and flatly held that due process does not

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mandate a “bond hearing at odds with the terms of § 1225(b)(2)(A).” See Clavijo v.

Thompson, No. 4:26-CV-01454, 2026 WL 923310, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026)

(Eskridge, J.) (citing Diaz Patino v. Villegas, 822 F. Supp. 3d 718, 721 (N.D. Tex. 2026));

Salazar- Gonzalez v. Noem, 4:25-cv-04662 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 12, 2026) (Hanen, J.); Jimenez

v. Bradford, 4:25-cv-05853 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 10, 2026) (Lake, J.).

This Court joins the latter group. Collectively, Carlson, Reno, Zadvydas, and

Demore stand for a common principle: It is not membership in the Communist Party,

juvenile status, or criminal history that subjects aliens to “rules that could be unacceptable

if applied to citizens,” Matthews v. Diza, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80, rather, it is their alien status.

As such, the Court’s due process jurisprudence establishes a brightline rule: an alien

unlawfully present in the country awaiting a removal order—a defined termination point—

can be detained as “a constitutionally permissible part of th[e] [removal] process.” See

Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896)

(“We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary

to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would be valid”));

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697 (distinguishing post-removal-period detention from pre-removal

period detention).

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner has been detained pending the issuance of a

final removal order. See Doc. 8 at 1. Her pre-removal-order detention does not violate the

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Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.4 Pursuant to Zadvydas, due process would limit

the duration of Petitioner’s detention after a removal order has been issued. See Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 697. But until then, Petitioner’s detention remains a constitutionally

permissible part of her removal from the country.

C. Equal Protection

Petitioner next challenges her detention on equal protection grounds. This claim

likewise lacks merit.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o

State . . . shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment “reverse incorporates” this guarantee of equal protection,

thereby binding the federal government to the same constitutional limitations. Bolling v.

Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). Accordingly, “Fifth Amendment equal protection

claims against federal actors are analyzed under the same standards as Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claims against state actors.” Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571,

590 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).

4 To the extent Petitioner argues that her present detention constitutes “arbitrary and

capricious” government action violative of the Due Process Clause, see Doc. 1 ¶ 64, this theory

fails on identical grounds as her primary substantive due process challenge: it still depends on

the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. Moreover, Petitioner’s allegation of

selective enforcement is belied by the fact that she is among the tens of thousands of aliens that

the Department of Homeland Security has mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

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For both state and federal claims, the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Said differently, the “clause’s

protection reaches only dissimilar treatment among similar people.” Mahone v. Addicks

Utility Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 932 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, at the outset, a court must

determine whether members of a subject classification are indeed “in all relevant respects

alike” to persons or groups allegedly subjected to differential treatment. See Tex. Entm’t

Ass’n v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 513 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S.

1, 10 (1992)).

Petitioner’s equal protection claim fails this threshold inquiry. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) indeed subjects aliens seeking admission to the United States to

mandatory detention, whereas certain aliens in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226

are entitled to individualized bond hearings. The distinction between these respective

classifications, however, is non-trivial. Aliens mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) have committed a criminal offense by unlawfully crossing American

borders and have not yet been admitted to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326;

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2026). In contrast, those aliens

entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 have merely committed a civil infraction—

such as overstaying a visa—and were at one point lawfully admitted into the United States.

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i).

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As such, Petitioner has not shown that Respondent is treating “similarly situated”

people differently. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. Quite to the contrary, Respondent

subjects two distinct categories of deportable aliens to correspondingly distinct removal

procedures. This alone renders Petitioner’s equal protection challenge meritless.

However, even if the Court were inclined to subject 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s

mandatory detention provision to judicial scrutiny, the statute would survive rational basis

review. “[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along

suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational

relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental

purpose.” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 680 (2012). In other words, where

neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is implicated, differential treatment

survives judicial review if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis” for the disparate treatment. See Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886,

894 (5th Cir 2011). And “[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class

because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional

irrelevancy.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).

Respondent’s refusal to grant aliens who were never lawfully admitted to the United

States (a subset of a decidedly non-suspect class) an individualized pre-detention bond

hearing (a non-fundamental right) triggers mere rational basis review. See Carnesolta v.

Tate, No. 4:26-cv-1006, 2026 WL 948727, *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026) (Eskridge, J.). And

the Court finds that a rational explanation exists as to why Congress would subject aliens

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detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and § 1226 differently. As civil offenders

previously admitted to the country, the latter group may well deserve pre-detention

processes that not-yet-admitted aliens do not. Said differently, a conceivable government

interest—subjecting aliens who unlawfully entered, and are still seeking admission to, the

country to more exacting detention policies—exists for the statutes’ disparate standards.

Seeing as the Supreme Court has stressed “the limited scope of judicial inquiry into

immigration legislation,” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), this Court declines to

delve further. Petitioner’s mandatory detention therefore survives rational basis review.

In sum, Petitioner has neither identified a similarly situated class of persons subject

to disparate treatment nor established that the relevant Immigration and Naturalization Act

provisions fail rational basis review. Therefore, Petitioner has not been denied equal

protection of the law.

D. Administrative Procedure Act

Petitioner’s Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) claim also fails, as the APA is

not the proper claim to challenge her detention. The APA subjects agency action to judicial

review only when “there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. However,

28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides district courts with jurisdiction over petitions for habeas relief

where a petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treatises of the

United States.” Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). Accordingly, when detainees challenge “the invalidity of their

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confinement . . . their claims must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670,

672 (2025).

Petitioner challenges her continued custody. See Doc. 1. She has thus rightly filed a

habeas petition to seek judicial relief from her detention—an adequate remedy in court.

See id. Therefore, “habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle” for Petitioner’s

claim. See Trump, 604 U.S. at 674 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

E. Suspension Clause

Petitioner next claims that her detention violates the Suspension Clause. It does not.

The Court begins with the Constitution’s text: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas

Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public

Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The clause specifies the two scenarios in

which the writ can be suspended, but it also generally enshrines the Founders’

understanding of the writ as a privilege “guarantee[ing] freedom from discretionary

detention.” See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 149 (2020)

(Thomas, J., concurring). That freedom is not only abridged by executive decree. See, e.g.,

Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. Rather, if “a statute grant[s] the executive

the power to detain without bail or trial based on mere suspicion of a crime or

dangerousness,” the writ is de facto suspended for those detained. See Thuraissigiam, 591

U.S. at 149 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771

(2008) (noting that judicial abstention from reviewing writs of habeas corpus may be a de

facto suspension of the privilege of the writ).

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Here, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act does not

suspend the writ because it does not grant the executive unfettered discretion. Instead, it

requires that the examining immigration officer determine that the alien “is not clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” to the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Only

then is the alien temporarily detained pending a removal proceeding, at which the alien

may adduce evidence refuting her removability. Thus, as with Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize detention based on mere suspicion, and it “bears

little resemblance to a suspension as that term was understood at the founding.” See

Thuraissigiam 591 U.S. at 149 (Thomas, J., concurring). And whereas aliens subjected to

expedited removal under Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) can only seek judicial review of three

distinct determinations, aliens detained under section 1225(b)(2)(A) are free to petition for

habeas relief on any grounds. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(e)(2).

Accordingly, several district courts have flatly rejected these “Suspension Clause

habeas petitions” as self-contradictory. See, e.g., Carnesolta v. Tate, No. 4:26-cv-01006,

2026 WL 948727, *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026); Chi v. Warden, Bluebonnet Detention

Facility, No. 1:26-CV-067-H, 2026 WL 1062625, *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2026); Delgado-

Paz v. Olson, No. 2:26-cv-00193-JRO-MJD, 2026 WL 1122637, *8–*9 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24,

2026). Put simply, how can the writ be suspended if thousands of similarly situated aliens

are filing habeas petitions to challenge their detention?

In light of the Founders’ understanding of the Suspension Clause, the Court adopts

this approach. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize the executive branch to wield

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unfettered discretion when mandating pre-removal-order detention. Instead, it prescribes

determination by an appropriate officer, and any detention resulting from that

determination is subject to habeas review. As such, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot violate

the Suspension Clause.

F. Accardi Doctrine

Finally, Petitioner’s Accardi Doctrine claim fails because the writ of habeas corpus

affords relief from unlawful detention, not from unlawful arrests. Thus, even if the

Department of Homeland Security violated its rules and procedures when arresting

Petitioner, the petition would not justify Petitioner’s release from custody.

The Accardi Doctrine requires agencies to follow their own rules and procedures.

See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Morton v. Ruiz,

415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent

upon agencies to follow their own procedures.”). 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c) establishes the DHS’s

procedures for alien arrests. The regulation provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n arrest shall

be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person

to be arrested . . . is an alien illegally in the United States,” and “[a] warrant of arrest shall

be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the

person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i–ii).

Here, Petitioner alleges that her arrest violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c). Doc. 1 ¶¶ 138–

148. She contends that because her ongoing detention flows directly from—and is

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predicated upon—the arrest, the Court must remedy the violation by ordering her release.

Id.

The Supreme Court has affirmed that “an illegal arrest has no bearing on a

subsequent deportation proceeding” because the “body or identity of [the arrestee] is never

itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest.” Immigration and Naturalization Service

v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039–40 (1984). It logically follows that if an alien is

detained pursuant to a deportation proceeding, a habeas petition cannot secure the alien’s

release from custody by challenging the lawfulness of the underlying arrest. Therefore, the

Court joins several courts in this and neighboring federal districts in holding that “an

illegal arrest has no bearing on the legality of detention following that arrest.” See

Carnesolta v. Tate, No. 4:26-CV-01006, 2026 WL 948727, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026)

(Eskridge, J.); see also Hechavarria-Vasquez v. Tate, No. CV H-26-1266, 2026 WL

1427003, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2026) (Lake, J.); Navdeep v. Warden Ero El Paso Camp

E. Montana Det. Ctr., No. EP-26-CV-829-KC, 2026 WL 1179624, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr.

23, 2026) (Cardone, J.).

Thus, even if Petitioner’s arrest violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c), the Court cannot

remedy the violation by ordering her release. Consequently, her Accardi Doctrine claim

must be dismissed.

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KKK

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and

the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. A final judgment will be entered separately.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on the 23rd of June, 2026.

Nicholas J. Ganjei

United States District Judge

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