The opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 Behruzjon Sherzod UGLI OKBUTAEV, Case No.: 26-cv-1163-AGS-BLM
4 Petitioner,
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN
5 v.
6 Jeremy CASEY, et al.,
7 Respondents.
8
9
10 Petitioner Behruzjon Ugli Okbutaev seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
11 § 2241 to free him from immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a
12 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing
13 Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary
14 dismissal “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner
15 is not entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section
16 2254 Cases to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules
17 permit “summary dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth,
18 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any
19 potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
20 In “2023,” Ugli Okbutaev, an “Uzbekistan” “native,” “entered the United States.”
21 (ECF 1, at 2.) Years later, on “February 8, 2026,” he “was re-detained by Respondents.”
22 (Id.) He is still in custody and challenges the government’s decision to subject him to
23 “mandatory detention” under “8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)[]” as an “arriving alien.” (Id. at 11.) He
24 asserts that his case is instead governed by “[8 U.S.C.] § 1226”—which authorizes release
25 on bond or conditional parole. (Id. at 5.)
26 This challenge merits a response. The two Courts of Appeals to address this question
27 disagreed about how to interpret the issue. Compare Castañon-Nava v. United States Dep’t
28 of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025) (concluding “on this
| preliminary [motion-to-stay] record” that plaintiffs who are “unlawfully already in the
2 || United States” are not “subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”’), with
3 || Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, — F.4th _, 2026 WL 323330, at *1
4 Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (holding that, under § 1225(b)(2)(A), petitioners who entered the
5 || United States “illegally many years ago” must “be detained” without a bond hearing). But
6 petitioners have nonetheless obtained habeas relief in functionally identical cases.
7 || See, e.g., Barco Mercado vy. Francis, ___F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK),
8 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362”
9 || opinions to address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final
10 || basis,” and these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty
11 different courts”). And a district court recently “vacate[d]” the Board of Immigration
12 || Appeals decision that respondents have regularly relied on to mandatorily detain those in
13 |/petitioner’s position, holding that the BIA decision was “contrary to law” under the
14 || Administrative Procedure Act. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM,
15 F. Supp. 3d__, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026).
16 In addition, respondents have routinely conceded these claims when brought by
17 those—like petitioner—who seem to be members of the Bond Eligible Class certified in
18 ||that same case. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL
19 ||3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). So, by Friday, February 27, 2026, the
20 || government is ordered to file a brief stating whether it: (1) agrees petitioner is detained
21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and (2) intends to concede petitioner’s right to a bond hearing under
22 || that authority.
23 || Dated: February 25, 2026
25 Hon. rew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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