Forshey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

ANTHONY KENNEDY, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1436

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

vs. :

:

Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K.

JAMES FORSHEY, et al., :

: Bowman

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Warren Correctional Institution (“WCI”), proceeding

without the assistance of counsel, has filed a civil rights complaint challenging actions by

Defendants stemming from Plaintiff’s incarceration at Noble Correctional Institution

(“NCI”) that subsequently led to Plaintiff’s transfer to WCI. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff states that,

at WCI, he has been assaulted, extorted, and raped, and that the faulty conduct report

stemming from Defendants’ actions has deprived Plaintiff of access to meaningful

programs and will adversely affect his clemency and parole applications. By separate

Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 3).

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to

determine whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.C.S. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b).

For the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMEDS that Plaintiff be

permitted to proceed with his due process privacy claim against Defendant Cobb and that

Plaintiff be permitted to amend his claims challenging the conduct report and the Rules

Infraction Board (“RIB”) proceedings to provide more details as described more fully

below. But it is further RECOMMENDED that all claims against Defendants in their

official capacities for monetary damages be DISMISSED with prejudice and that all

other remaining claims be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking

to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fee and

court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic

incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31

(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern,

Congress included subsection (e)(1) as part of the statute, which provides in relevant part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

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been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that—

***

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e)

requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action

is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy

the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C §§ 1915A and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands of the authors of

complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503

(6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations’ …

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[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter … to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations,

including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s

conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro

se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”

Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th

Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits, “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the

claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff states that, while he was incarcerated at NCI, he attended therapy sessions

with Defendant Mental Health liaison Ms. Cobb twice a week for a period of six months

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because he was experiencing depression. He states that on July 12, 2024, Ms. Cobb

revealed sensitive, confidential information about his criminal case to NCI staff in

violation of his right to confidentiality and privacy, as well as the national H.I.P.P.A. law.

(Doc. 4, at 32). Plaintiff was interrogated by the unit manager and deputy warden (who

are not named as Defendants), during which sensitive information about his criminal case

not publicly known was referenced, and after which Plaintiff was sent to TPU (restrictive

confinement) pending investigation of the sensitive statements he had made during his

therapy sessions.

On July 17, 2024, the NCI RIB found Plaintiff guilty of Conduct Report NCI-24-

003733, which Plaintiff contends “was a faulty report because the offense did not

coincide with actual events.” Plaintiff notes that Defendant Aufdenkampe is the RIB

charging officer, that Defendant Harper is the RIB chairman, and that Defendant

Chapman is the RIB second officer. Plaintiff goes on to explain that he asked Defendants

Aufdenkampe, Harper, and Chapman if they knew the definition of “stalking.” When

they answered that they did not, Plaintiff asked them how they could find him guilty of

“stalking” if they did not know the definition of “stalking.” (Id.). Plaintiff states that the

RIB Board recommended a Security Classification Review to increase Plaintiff’s security

level. He further states that although the security review’s mandatory appeal was never

conducted, his security level was still increased. He contends that this was defamation of

his character, slander, a violation of his right to due process, and a denial of his right to

access to the courts.

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Next, Plaintiff states that Defendant TPU Officer John Doe, or Dow1, disposed of

and/or never filed Plaintiff’s appeal of the RIB Board’s July 17, 2024 verdict. This,

Plaintiff contends, was another violation of his due process rights and denial of his access

to the courts through the mishandling of Plaintiff’s legal mail (his appeal).

Plaintiff asserts that James Forshey, as the NCI Warden, “is directly responsible

for all the actions of his employees.” (Id.).

Plaintiff states that he was transferred “to a very dangerous, higher security level 3

prison,” WCI, where he has been assaulted, extorted, and raped. He further states that the

faulty conduct report has prevented him from getting into meaningful education, job, and

other programs, and also will adversely affect his clemency and parole applications. (Id.

at 32-33). He concludes:

Ms. Cobb violated privilege communication and H.I.P.P.A. laws. RIB

charging Officer C. Aufdenkampe, RIB Chairman J. Harper and RIB

Officer C. Chapman is guilty of slander, defamation of character and has

violated my due process rights. TPU Officer John Dow has denied me

access to the courts, mishandled my legal mail (my appeal) and has violated

my due process rights. Finally James Forshey is the ringleader of this

conspiracy and is in complicity of such corruption. The actions exhibited by

the Warden of NCI and his employees show malice, wanton corruption and

reckless disregard to ODRC policy and Ohio Administrative Codes.

All of the defendants of NCI did, purposely, with prior calculation and

design, restrained my liberty through force, threat and deception by

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity that is contrary to the dignity of the

state of Ohio. They have not only lost their way and created a miscarriage

1 It is unclear whether Plaintiff uses the name “John Doe” or “John Dow” to refer

to an actual individual with that name or whether Plaintiff uses the name “John Doe or

“John Dow” as a placeholder to refer to a TPU officer whose name is unknown to

Plaintiff.

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of justice, but they have purposely abandoned their oath and created an

abortion of justice. Because such corruption is so erroneous and gross that

it was done with malice, wanton and reckless disregard.

(Id. at 32).

Plaintiff names as Defendants: James Forshey (NCI Warden); Ms. Cobb (NCI

Mental Health Liaison); NCI Officer C. Aufdenkampe, (RIB charging officer); NCI

Officer J. Harper (RIB Chairman); NCI Officer C. Chapman (2nd RIB Officer); and NCI

Officer John Doe, or Dow (TPU Officer). (Id. at 31).

In relief, Plaintiff asks for the RIB Conduct Report NCI-24-0037733 to be vacated

and to be awarded damages in the amount of $3,000,000. (Id. at 34).

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the above allegations, the Undersigned understands Plaintiff to be

raising, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims under the First, and/or Eighth, and/or

Fourteenth Amendments alleging: violation of his right to privacy; the filing of a false or

faulty conduct report; defamation of character and slander; improper security

reclassification and transfer; denial of access to institution programs and adverse impact

on clemency and parole applications; denial of access to courts through mishandling of

legal mail (RIB appeal); violations of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

(“ODRC”) and Ohio Administrative Code (“OAC”) provisions; and conspiracy and/or a

pattern of corrupt activity.

For the following reasons, the Undersigned is persuaded that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment privacy claim may PROCEED against Defendant Cobb. It is also

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RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted to amend his claims to provide the Court

with additional details about his due process challenge that Defendants Aufdenkampe,

Harper, Chapman, and Doe (or Dow) were responsible for a faulty conduct report against

him that was resolved without the benefit of due process at the RIB hearing. It is further

RECOMMENDED that the Court decide at a later date whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims of defamation and slander.

But the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS with prejudice

all claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages and all

other remaining claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

A. Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cobb, NCI’s Mental Health Liaison, violated his

right to privacy when she disclosed to NCI staff sensitive information about his criminal

case that Plaintiff shared with her during therapy sessions. (Doc. 4, at 32). Plaintiff does

not explicitly state, and this Court makes no finding at this time about, what that

information was disclosed. Plaintiff’s claim arguably implicates an interest in avoiding

disclosure of personal matters rooted in the substantive due process protections of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008)

(discussing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 603-04 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.

Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977); and Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998)).

In Moore v. Prevo, 379 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit determined

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that inmates have no constitutional right to privacy barring disclosure of an inmate’s

sensitive medical information to corrections officers. But as a sister court recently

observed, “Moore did not address whether disclosure of other sensitive information,

including the fact that Plaintiff had been raped, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Gardner v. Burgess, No. 1:25-cv-1191, 2025 WL 3181603, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 14,

2025) (emphasis added). The court in Gardner permitted the plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment privacy claim to proceed at the screening stage because “taking Plaintiff’s

allegations as true, Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest any legitimate penological

purpose underlying [the defendant corrections officer]’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s history

of having been raped.” Id.

At this early stage in these proceedings, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true,

and without knowing what sensitive information Defendant Cobb disclosed or whether

the disclosure was in furtherance of a legitimate penological interest, the Undersigned

concludes that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim against Defendant Cobb

may PROCEED to further development.2 The Undersigned expresses no opinion at this

time on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims or whether there may be defenses or procedural

bars that will prevent him from ultimately obtaining relief.

2 To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cobb violated the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”), that allegation fails to state a §

1983 claim, which Plaintiff even acknowledges. (Doc. 5, at 39). “HIPPA regulations do

not confer a private right of act on an individual.” Burley v. Rider, No. 1:17-cv-88, 2018

WL 6033531, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 1:17-cv-88, 2018 WL 4443071 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2018).

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B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains allegations which, construed liberally, suggest a

Fourteenth Amendment claim that Defendants Aufdenkampe, Harper, and Chapman

promulgated a faulty conduct report against Plaintiff and/or litigated that report at a RIB

hearing that did not comply with due process. Additionally, Plaintiff states that Defendant

John Doe, or Dow (TPU Officer) did not process or file Plaintiff’s appeal of the RIB

verdict. Generally, an allegation of a false conduct report standing alone does not state a

claim under 1983. See, e.g., Johnson v. Osborne, No. 1:21-cv-3, 2021 WL 2077908, at *3

(S.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2093258

(S.D. Ohio May 24, 2021) (“Erroneous or even fabricated allegations of misconduct by

an inmate, standing alone, do not constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right.”). And

to the extent that false accusations of misconduct do raise due process concerns, such

charges do not constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights if the charges subsequently

are adjudicated in a fair hearing. See, e.g., Brown v. McCullick, No. 18-2226, 2019 WL

5436159, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2019) (cleaned up). It is at this latter point where

Plaintiff’s allegations might implicate a constitutionally protected right.

The “minimum due process requirements for such a disciplinary hearing are: (1)

written notice of the charges before the hearing, (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and

present evidence, and (3) a written statement of the evidence relied upon and reason for

the action taken.” Roundtree v. Dunlap, No. 3:18-cv-1198, 2019 WL 3252912, at *5, n.7

(N.D. Ohio July 19, 2019) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)). The Court

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is without sufficient details to determine whether Plaintiff can satisfy these prerequisites

to state a due process claim stemming from the alleged faulty conduct report and RIB

process by which it was adjudicated. But Plaintiff has stated enough to warrant an

opportunity to amend his claims to provide additional details about the conduct of

Defendants Aufdenkampe, Harper, Chapman, and Doe/Dow in the issuance of the

challenged conduct report against Plaintiff and, more specifically, the manner in which

the report was presented and resolved at the RIB proceeding. Plaintiff should be given

thirty (30) days from the date of this Report to amend his claims to provide additional

details about the faulty conduct report and RIB hearing process.

C. Defamation of Character and Slander

Relatedly, any claims against Defendants Aufdenkampe, Harper, Chapman, and

Doe/Dow for defamation of character or slander would lie under state law and do not

state a federal claim. Cottman v. Horizon Healcare, No. 1:15-cv-68, 2015 WL 959913, at

*3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2015). The Court should determine at a later stage in the

proceedings whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is

appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

The Undersigned turns now to the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims, which should be

dismissed.

D. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff states that he is suing each Defendant in their

individual and official capacities. (Doc. 5, at 38). But his claims against Defendants in

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their official capacities are subject to dismissal to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages. Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damages suits under the

Eleventh Amendment. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506

U.S. 139 (1993); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The State of Ohio has neither

constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal

courts. See Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524 (6 h Cir. 1985); State of Ohio

v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes No. 1 and No. 2, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982).

The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party but

where the action is essentially one for the recovery of money from the state. Edelman,

415 U.S. at 663 (citations omitted); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of State of

Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). A suit against Defendants in their official capacities

would, in reality, be a way of pleading the action against the entity of which Defendants

are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus,

actions against state officials in their official capacities are included in this bar. Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232

(1974); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n official-capacity suit

against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is thus barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis omitted)). Because the

named Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities to the extent that

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their

official capacities should be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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E. Respondeat Superior Claims

Next, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Warden Jay Forshey should be

dismissed. Plaintiff names Forshey as a Defendant because he “is the warden of NCI and

oversees all the operations of the prison, as is directly responsible for all the actions of his

employees.”3 (Doc. 4, at 32). But this respondeat superior theory does not apply to §

1983 claims and may not serve as a basis for liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209,

1213 (6th Cir. 1992) “[Section] 1983 liability of supervisory personnel must be based on

more than the right to control employees.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th

Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). A supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train

an offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor “either encouraged the

specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a

minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved,

or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s

allegations do not plausibly establish a nexus between any decision, action, or inaction by

Warden Forshey and Defendant Cobb’s disclosure of sensitive information about Plaintiff

to NCI staff; or Defendants Aufdenkampe’s, Harper’s, Chapman’s, and Doe/Dow’s roles

3 In his “Merit Brief,” Plaintiff additionally states, “James Forshey, Warden, who is the

ringleader of this conspiracy and oversees all the operations of NCI including the appeal process

of the RIB decisions, security level reviews, and prison to prison transfers. He ignored the

malicious actions of his staff consequently condoning such behavior.” (Doc. 5, at 37).

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in the issuing of the challenged conduct report and/or RIB hearing due process claim; or

state-law claims of defamation of character and slander—the only claims not subject to

dismissal at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Warden

Forshey should be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.4

F. Remaining Claims

1. Access to courts and interference with legal mail (RIB appeal)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Doe/Dow’s failure to submit Plaintiff’s appeal of

the RIB verdict constituted interference with legal mail in violation of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment right to access to the courts. This claim should be dismissed. As a

preliminary matter, the Undersigned rejects as specious Plaintiff’s conflation of

Defendant Doe/Dow’s alleged act of failing to file Plaintiff’s RIB appeal with the act of

interfering with legal mail. But even accepting Plaintiff’s flawed factual premise, he fails

to state a claim for denial of access to the courts because he alleges no actual injury to

any pending litigation. See Lewis v. Grider, 27 F. App’x 282, 283 (6th Cir. 2001)

(prisoner’s claim for interference with access to the courts through opening legal mail

failed “as he alleged no prejudice to any pending litigation”); Lewis v. Cook County Bd.

of Com’rs, 6 F. App’x 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff could not prevail when he did

“not describe a single legal case or claim that was in any way thwarted because the mail

room staff opened his legal mail.”). Irrespective of the manner in which Doe/Dow’s

handling of Plaintiff’s RIB appeal may affect Plaintiff’s due process claim discussed

4 Plaintiff may further amend his complaint to include facts to support these claims.

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above, here, the failure or refusal to file an appeal does not equate to an interference with

legal mail or a denial of access to the courts. And the inability to challenge an RIB

verdict does not constitute prejudice to any pending litigation or claims. Plaintiff’s

allegation should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

2. Security level and transfer

Plaintiff’s allegation that the faulty conduct report and RIB verdict impacted his

security level and resulted in his transfer to a more dangerous facility does not implicate a

liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571,

577 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n increase in security classification … does not constitute an

‘atypical and significant’ hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life

because a prisoner has no constitutional right to remain incarcerated in a particular prison

or to be held in a specific security classification.” (internal question marks and citation

omitted)); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (“[T]he Constitution itself

does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of

confinement.”) (citations omitted); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (no due

process violation arising from transfer to maximum-security prison because

“[c]onfinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of

custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”). The Undersigned

cannot construe from Plaintiff’s allegations that the increase in his security level or

transfer to WCI amounted to an ‘atypical and significant’ hardship in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life. Plaintiff’s claim should be DISMISSED for failure to

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state a claim.

3. Clemency and parole applications

Plaintiff’s allegation that the conduct report and RIB verdict will adversely affect

his clemency and parole applications also fails to establish a liberty interest sufficient to

implicate the Due Process Clause. “A liberty interest in parole eligibility derives only

from state law.” Settle v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs., 487 F. App’x 290, 291 (6th Cir. 2012)

(cleaned up); see also Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is

no fundamental right to parole under the federal constitution.”) (citations omitted). “[I]t is

well established that Ohio law does not create a protected liberty interest in release from

parole.” Jergens v. State of Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corrs. Adult Parole Auth., 492 F.

App’x 567, 570 (6th Cir. 2012). Because Ohio law does not create a liberty interest in

parole or clemency, Plaintiff is not able to state a viable § 1983 claim premised on his

allegation that the conduct report and RIB verdict might adversely impact his parole and

clemency applications. It is RECOMMENDED that this claim be dismissed for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

4. Access to institution programs and jobs

Relatedly, Plaintiff’s allegations that the faulty conduct report and the elevation of

his security level resulted in him being denied access to education, job, and other

programs offered at WCI fail to implicate any constitutionally protected interest. See

Lane v. Love, No. 3:21-cv-346-RLJ-DCP, 2021 WL 5710086, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 1,

2021) (an inmate “does not have a constitutional right to jail educational programs.”)

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(citing Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2010) (holding

that “[p]risoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs”)). See

also Parr v. Caruso, No. 1:10-cv-109, 2010 WL 727106, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 25,

2010) (collecting cases) (explaining that “[f]ederal courts consistently have found that

prisoners have no constitutionally protected interest in vocational, rehabilitation, and

education programs based on the Fourteenth Amendment” and that “prisoners do not

have a fundamental right to prisoner reentry services under the Constitution.”). Plaintiff’s

claim alleging constitutional deprivation from his denial of access to education, job, or

other programs at WCI should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

5. Violations of ODRC or OAC provisions

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants violated ODRC and OAC provisions

likewise fail to state a claim under § 1983. (Doc. 4, at 33). Prisoners do not have federal

statutory or constitutional right to enforce prison officials’ compliance with prison

policies. Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1996). That is, § 1983 does

not provide a remedy for violations of state laws or regulations. Williams v. Burgess, No.

5:21-cv-99, 2021 WL 5816830, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing Laney v. Farley,

501 F.3d 577, 580 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)). Since Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with

a state administrative rule or prison policy does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation, Plaintiff’s allegation should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

6. Pattern of corrupt activity

To the extent that Plaintiff’s allegations accuse Defendants of a conspiracy and/or

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of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity (Doc. 4, at 33), his Complaint fails to state a §

1983 claim.

“A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is an agreement between two or more persons to

injure another by unlawful action.” Crowley v. Anderson Cnty. Tenn., 783 F. App’x 556,

560 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

To prevail on a civil conspiracy claim, [a plaintiff] must show that (1) a

“single plan” existed, (2) [the defendant] “shared the general conspiratorial

objective” to deprive [the plaintiff] of his constitutional (or federal

statutory) rights, and (3) “an overt act was committed in furtherance of the

conspiracy that caused the injury” to [the plaintiff].

Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). In the Sixth

Circuit, “conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and [] vague

and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state

such a claim under § 1983.” Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008) (cleaned

up).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet this requirement. He alleges that Warden

Forshey “is the ringleader of this conspiracy,” (Doc. 4, at 33); that the Defendants all

engaged in a conspiracy that violated his Due Process rights, (Doc. 5, at 38); and that Ms.

Cobb’s violation of HIPPA constituted an element of this overarching conspiracy (id. at

39). These “conclusory assertions that defendants were acting in concert do not meet the

requirement that allegations of a conspiracy be pled with some degree of specificity.”

Ashenhurst v. 27th District Court, No. CIV. 07-10082, 2007 WL 1119883, *2 (E.D.

Mich. Apr. 16, 2007) (citing Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) and

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Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 1984)). At base, Plaintiff’s conclusory

assertion that his allegations demonstrate a “pattern of corrupt activity” does not identify

or invoke any federal rights that may have been violated sufficient to state a § 1983

claim. Accordingly, any such claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Undersigned has screened the Complaint (Doc. 4) as required under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915 and 1915A and finds that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim may

PROCEED against Defendant Cobb.

It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be given thirty (30) days from the date of

this Report to file a complete amended complaint for the sole purpose of providing

additional details about the faulty conduct report and RIB hearing due process claim

against Defendants Aufdenkampe, Harper, Chapman, and Doe/Dow.

It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court decide at a later date whether to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims of defamation and

slander.

It is further RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS with prejudice all

claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages and all other

remaining claims without prejudice.

Insofar as the Court has conducted its initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint and

determined that his Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim may proceed, that he should be

permitted to file an Amended Complaint addressing his faulty conduct report/RIB due

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process claim, and that the Court should decide at a later stage whether to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed with

1983 Civil Suit (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.

One of the next steps in this case is for Defendant Cobb (and Defendants

Aufdenkampe, Harper, Chapman, and Doe/Dow, if later determined to be warranted) to

be served with the Summons and Complaint, and then for the Defendant(s) to file a

response to the Complaint. Once the Court screens any amended complaint (with

additional details about the faulty conduct report and RIB proceed), the Court will direct

the United States Marshal Service to serve a copy of the Summons, the Complaint, and

this Report and Recommendation on the specified Defendant(s) as directed by Plaintiff.

To this last point, as noted above, it is not clear whether Plaintiff refers to the TPU officer

who failed to file Plaintiff’s RIB appeal as “John Doe” or “John Dow” because that is the

officer’s name or because Plaintiff does not know the officer’s name. Plaintiff is advised

that, should he be permitted to proceed with any claims against this officer, Plaintiff will

be responsible for identifying the officer through discovery.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a

copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended

further by the Court on timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the

portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in

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support of these objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in

part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall

promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties

may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District

Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14

DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance

with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520,

530 (6th Cir. 2019). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); U.S. v. Walters, 638

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

May 13, 2026 s/Stephanie K. Bowman

STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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