Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Mar 18, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

CUSTOM COMPOUNDING LLC

d/b/a PLYMOUTH MEDICAL, a

New York limited liability

company,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:26-cv-727-SPC-NPM

EMCYTE CORPORATION, a

Florida corporation,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Plaintiff Custom Compounding Medical LLC

d/b/a Plymouth Medical’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 10). Plymouth Medical has moved, under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and Local Rule 6.01 of the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida, for an emergency temporary

restraining order and a preliminary injunction against Defendant EmCyte

Corporation, enjoining EmCyte and all persons in active concert or

participation with them, from using, disclosing, disseminating, or otherwise

continuing to exploit Plymouth Medical’s trade secrets and proprietary

confidential business information (“Trade Secret Information”). For the

following reasons, the Court grants that portion of the motion requesting a

temporary restraining order and defers ruling on the request for a preliminary

injunction.

Background

Plymouth Medical’s motion is supported by the Declaration of its

Principal, Jo-An Tremblay, who founded Plymouth Medical in 2011. (Doc. 12).

Tremblay also verified the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 9). Based on the

Declaration, Plymouth Medical is a distributor of products manufactured by

EmCyte. (Doc. 12 ¶ 10). From approximately July 2022 through about March

10, 2026, Arianne Pinacate served as a contractor for Plymouth Medical. (Id. ¶

17).

On March 9, 2026, Plymouth Medical’s server logs show that Pinacate’s

password-protected email account was used to download Plymouth Medical’s

Trade Secret Information, including its client lists. (Id. ¶ 23). Plymouth

Medical takes reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of this Trade Secret

Information, including its client lists. (Id. ¶ 14). At 1:00 a.m. on March 10,

2026, Pinacate emailed Tremblay and another representative of Plymouth

Medical to resign effective immediately, stating, “I have accepted a new

opportunity that allows me to grow both financially and professionally.” (Id. ¶

26).

Seven hours later, at approximately 10:00 a.m. on March 10, 2026,

Plymouth Medical received a Cease and Desist Notice from EmCyte asserting

that Plymouth Medical was prohibited from continuing to distribute EmCyte

products. (Id. ¶ 33). Within hours of sending the Cease and Desist Notice,

EmCyte sent an unsolicited email blast to what appeared to be Plymouth

Medical’s entire master client list. (Id. ¶ 36). The email blast w ent to clients

whose contact information is not publicly available and to numerous clients

with whom EmCyte had never previously done business. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37). The

email blast included clients located outside the United States, including clients

in Europe who had never purchased EmCyte products. (Id. ¶ 38). EmCyte’s

email invited Plymouth Medical’s clients to purchase products directly from

EmCyte and promised “discounted rates for customers previously purchasing

through Plymouth Medical.” (Id. ¶ 39). Several Plymouth Medical clients

forwarded the email to Tremblay shortly after receiving it. (Id. ¶ 40).

Based on Tremblay’s knowledge of Plymouth Medical’s business and

client data, EmCyte could not have obtained this client list through legitimate

or independent means. (Id. ¶ 41). As a result of EmCyte’s email blast,

Plymouth Medical has already lost clients and continues to lose customer

relationships and goodwill. (Id. ¶ 42). Some clients accepted EmCyte’s

misrepresentations as true and immediately severed their relationships with

Plymouth Medical. (Id. ¶ 43). EmCyte has also disseminated the Trade Secret

Information to other distributors—i.e., Plymouth Medical’s direct

competitors—and invited them to directly solicit Plymouth Medical’s clients

(Id. ¶ 44). For example, Marissa Guyan of EmCyte has invited Steve Whyte of

Accelerated Biologics to market to Plymouth Medical’s clients. (Id.). Each

additional dissemination or solicitation compounds the harm and erodes

Plymouth Medical’s client base. (Id. ¶ 45). The loss of customer relationships,

goodwill, and competitive position threatens Plymouth Medical’s continued

viability as a business. (Id. ¶ 47).

Legal Standard

To obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the

movant must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) the

threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the

nonmovant; and (4) entry of this relief would serve the public interest.”

Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005).

Immediate injunctive relief is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy, and [the

movant] bears the burden of persuasion to clearly establish all four of these

prerequisites.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th

Cir. 2016).

In addition to the usual requirements for injunctive relief, a district court

may issue an ex parte temporary restraining order only if “(A) specific facts in

an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse

party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in

writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be

required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

Analysis

The Court finds that Plymouth Medical has satisfied the requirements

for purposes of obtaining narrow temporary protective relief to preserve the

status quo until such time as a preliminary injunction hearing can be held.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

For purposes of temporary protective relief, Plymouth Medical has

shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits through its submission

of evidence that its contractor illicitly obtained Trade Secret Information,

including a master client list, immediately before resigning. The next day,

EmCyte used the information to solicit Plymouth Medical’s clients, including

numerous clients with whom EmCyte had no prior relationship. Plymouth

Medical has established that it takes reasonable measures to protect the

secrecy of this Trade Secret Information, including its client lists. As it relates

to counts in Plymouth Medical’s First Amended Verified Complaint, Plymouth

Medical satisfies the requirements for its claims under misappropriation of

trade secrets under the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“FUTSA”) (count

II); misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act

(“DTSA”) (count III); and civil conspiracy (count IV).

1. FUTSA

To prevail on a FUTSA claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) it possessed

a trade secret and took reasonable steps to protect its secrecy, and (2) the trade

secret was misappropriated by one who knew or had reason to know it was

improperly obtained or who used improper means to obtain it. See Fla. Stat.

§§ 688.002 and .003; Mapei Corp. v. J.M. Field Mktg., Inc., 295 So. 3d 1193

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020); Del Monte Fresh Prod. Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F.

Supp. 2d 1271, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Plymouth Medical meets both

requirements.

Under the FUTSA, a trade secret is defined as information that

“[d]erives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being

generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,

other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,” and

“[i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to

maintain its secrecy.” Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4). The Trade Secret Information—

including Plymouth Medical’s master client list with private contact

information, historical pricing, sales-pipeline data, consignment-account

details, and a strictly confidential Order Log—has independent economic

value, given it is not generally known, reflects more than a decade of business-

development effort, and gives Plymouth Medical a competitive advantage. The

Trade Secret Information, therefore, constitutes a trade secret under the

FUTSA.

Plymouth Medical also took reasonable measures to protect this

information: it used password-protected systems, restricted access on a need-

to-know basis, implemented a written “Trade Secrets and Inventions” policy,

and marked key documents as “Strictly Confidential.”

At this early stage, the record of EmCyte’s knowing misappropriation is

strong. The timeline speaks for itself. EmCyte called another one of Plymouth

Medical’s employees, asking about the employee’s status with Plymouth

Medical less than two weeks prior to Pinacate downloading the Trade Secret

Information and then resigning immediately thereafter. Mere hours after

Pinacate’s resignation, EmCyte sent an unsolicited email blast to Plymouth

Medical’s clients—including clients EmCyte had never previously contacted,

clients outside the United States who have never purchased EmCyte’s

products, and clients with otherwise private email addresses that cannot be

found online.

The timing and scope of this solicitation leaves no plausible explanation

other than that EmCyte used Plymouth Medical’s misappropriated Trade

Secret Information, smuggled by Pinacate, to execute the campaign. See

Forbes v. Millionaire Gallery, Inc., 335 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)

(affirming trade secret misappropriation verdict where defendants solicited

clients from former employer’s confidential list); see also Mapei, 295 So. 3d at

1200–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (finding that competitor “knew or should

have known” it was accessing trade secrets based on circumstantial evidence

of access to password-protected systems and confidentiality requirements).

This second element is, therefore, also satisfied. Accordingly, Plymouth

Medical has shown a substantial likelihood of success with respect to its

FUTSA claim.

2. DTSA

Under the DTSA, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the

plaintiff owned a qualifying trade secret; (2) the defendant misappropriated

that trade secret; and (3) the misappropriated trade secret is related to a

product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign

commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1); WWMAP, LLC v. Birth Your Way

Midwifery, 711 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1318–19 (N.D. Fla. 2024). The Eleventh

Circuit has confirmed that the DTSA “creates a federal cause of action that

largely mirrors FUTSA” and that “the substantive standard for

misappropriation is identical under FUTSA and DTSA.” Compulife Software

Inc. v. Newman, 959 F.3d 1288, 1311 n.13 (11th Cir. 2020).

As set forth above in connection with the FUTSA claim, Plymouth

Medical satisfies the first two elements. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (defining

“improper means” to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or

inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through

electronic or other means”). Plymouth Medical also satisfies the third element,

the interstate commerce nexus, which courts have broadly interpreted as

presenting “a relatively low threshold for federal jurisdiction.” Plymouth

Medical distributes medical devices throughout the United States and Canada,

using interstate wire communications, electronic purchase orders, invoices,

and shipping confirmations transmitted between New York, Florida, and other

states and countries, and the Trade Secret Information relates directly to those

distribution activities. Besides, EmCyte’s email blast went to all of these

clients throughout both the country and beyond. Accordingly, having

established all three elements, Plymouth Medical has demonstrated a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its DTSA claim.

3. Civil Conspiracy

Under Florida law, a civil conspiracy requires proof of: (1) an agreement

between two or more parties, (2) to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by

unlawful means, (3) the doing of some overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy,

and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result. See Raimi v. Furlong, 702 So. 2d

1273, 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).

As stated, the timeline speaks for itself and provides proof of the

agreement between EmCyte and Pinacate to misappropriate Plymouth

Medical’s Trade Secret Information, which Pinacate downloaded just hours

before she abruptly resigned. The evidence of these acts and their timing

satisfies the first three elements. And the fourth element is satisfied because

Plymouth Medical has already lost clients and revenue therefrom as a result

of the unsolicited email blast EmCyte sent just hours after Pinacate’s theft and

resignation. As such, Plymouth Medical has demonstrated a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits of its civil conspiracy claim.

In sum, Plymouth Medical has shown a substantial likelihood of success

with respect to each of the three claims that relate to the motion.

B. Irreparable Injury

For purposes of temporary protective and injunctive relief, Plymouth

Medical has also sufficiently established that it will suffer irreparable injury if

the requested relief is not granted. According to Plymouth Medical’s verified

statements, EmCyte’s exploitation of the Trade Secret Information—namely,

its unsolicited email blast—has already resulted in some clients severing their

relationship with Plymouth Medical. EmCyte’s dissemination of the Trade

Secret Information to Plymouth Medical’s competitors, and its invitation for

those distributors to directly solicit Plymouth Medical’s clients, constitutes an

imminent threat of additional harm. See Freedom Med., Inc. v. Sewpersaud,

469 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1278–79 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (finding irreparable harm

where former employee was “privy to [plaintiff’s] most sensitive information

about its clients, business strategies, territory plans, financial performance,

pricing, costs, and other business metrics” and plaintiff risked “losing

customers, goodwill, and market competitiveness”); see also Merrill Lynch,

Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hagerty, 808 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 (S.D. Fla.

1992), aff’d sub nom., 2 F.3d 405 (11th Cir. 1993).

C. Balance of Harms

For purposes of temporary protective and injunctive relief, Plymouth

Medical has sufficiently established that the threatened injury outweighs the

harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant because EmCyte is merely

being required to return property to which it has no legitimate possessory

right. See Sewpersaud, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 1279; Autonation, Inc. v. O’Brien,

347 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1308 (S.D. Fla. 2004).

D. Public Interest

Finally, entry of this temporary protective and injunctive relief serves

the public interest in protecting trade secrets and enforcing confidentiality

obligations, as such protections encourage business investment, innovation,

and fair competition. See, e.g., Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 908

F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Trade secret law provides protection for

commercial intangibles, seeking to prevent exploitation of those intangibles, to

encourage innovation, and to maintain standards of commercial ethics.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Nat’l Staffing Sols., Inc. v.

Sanchez, 626 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 255 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (“the public interest is

also served by protecting confidential information”); Sewpersaud, 469 F. Supp.

3d at 1279 (“the public interest is served by protecting trade secrets and

enforcing confidentiality agreements” and by “enforcing reasonable, freely-

entered covenants not to compete, which are necessary to encourage business

expansion and growth”); Truepenny People LLC v. Cota, 2016 WL 9308534, *2

(N.D. Fla. 2016) (finding “that the preliminary injunctive relief requested will

serve the public interest by protecting trade secrets, consistent with federal

and state law.”).

E. Security

Whether a bond should be posted and the amount of security is a matter

within the discretion of the trial court. See Carillon Imps., Ltd. v. Frank Pesce

Int’l Grp. Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court finds, in its

discretion, that Plymouth Medical should be required to post a bond of

$1,000.00 as security. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

F. Notice

Plymouth Medical’s counsel certifies in the motion that the original

Verified Complaint was sent to counsel for EmCyte immediately after filing,

and that the First Amended Verified Complaint and the motion and supporting

materials would be sent immediately after filing on March 17, 2026, and that

a process server would be directed to expedite service to EmCyte. The Court

finds that because the temporary relief requested is narrowly drawn to protect

against use of information obtained from Pinacate and to require it be returned

to Plymouth Medical until such time as a hearing can be conducted, it is

appropriate to issue a temporary restraining order in the terms set forth below

to preserve the status quo.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff Custom Compounding Medical LLC d/b/a Plymouth

Medical’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

(Doc. 10) is hereby GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff seeks a temporary

restraining order.

2. This Court hereby TEMPORARILY ENJOINS AND

RESTRAINS EmCyte and all persons acting in concert with EmCyte from:

a) Using, disclosing, disseminating, or otherwise exploiting

Plymouth Medical’s Trade Secret Information in any way, including but

not limited to its client lists, pricing information, sales pipeline data, and

order history;

b) Further contacting, soliciting, or communicating with any

Plymouth Medical client by using or relying on the Trade Secret

Information;

c) Retaining, copying, or failing immediately to return all of

Plymouth Medical’s Trade Secret Information in any form or medium;

d) Destroying, altering, or concealing any evidence related to the

acquisition, misappropriation, or use of the Trade Secret Information;

and

e) Engaging in any other conduct that constitutes or facilitates the

misappropriation of Plymouth Medical’s trade secrets.

3. The Court further ORDERS EmCyte and all persons acting in

concert with EmCyte to immediately return to Plymouth Medical all originals

and copies of documents and data containing Plymouth Medical’s Trade Secret

Information.

4. The Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect for two

weeks from the date of entry of this Order and expires on April 1, 2026, or

until such further dates as set by the Court or stipulated to by the parties.

5. Pursuant to Rule 65(c), Plymouth Medical shall post a bond in the

amount of $1,000.00 on or before March 20, 2026, as security for payment of

damages to which EmCyte may be entitled for a wrongful injunction or

restraint.

6. Immediately upon the entry of the temporary restraining order,

Plymouth Medical is DIRECTED to serve on EmCyte a copy of the summons,

the operative complaint, the motion, a copy of any affidavit and other paper

submitted in support of the motion, and a copy of this Order. See Local Rules

6.01; 6.02. Plymouth Medical is DIRECTED to file proof of service promptly

after service is effected.

7. EmCyte is DIRECTED to file a response to that portion of

Plymouth Medical’s motion requesting a preliminary injunction (Doc. 10)

within seven days after service of the above-referenced documents.

8. The Court DEFERS IN PART the motion to the extent it seeks a

preliminary injunction.

9. A hearing on Plaintiff's motion to the extent it seeks a preliminary

injunction is SET for March 31, 2026, at 9:30 am.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 18, 2026, at

3:00 pm.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

15

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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