Campbell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

DAVE CAMPBELL and

CATRENIA DAWN CAMPBELL PLAINTIFFS

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-00064-KGB (Lead Case)

Case No. 3:25-cv-00134-KGB

BARRY JOSEPH O’DELL, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the motion to dismiss of defendants Judge Tim Weaver, Judge

Chaney Taylor, Judge Don McSpadden, Prosecutor Drew Smith, Prosecutor Dwayne Plumlee, and

Adult Protective Services (“APS”) (Dkt. No. 49) and the motion to dismiss of Iron Rock Law Firm

PLLC (“Iron Rock”) (Dkt. No. 51). Plaintiffs Dave Campbell and Catrenia Dawn Campbell

(collectively “the Campbells”) have responded to defendants’ motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 58,

59). Also pending before the Court are the motions to sever of defendants Louise Alexander,

Brenda Dunn, Gary Dunn, Randy Dunn, Shayne Peterson, Mr. Frederick Alexander O’Neill, Mr.

Paul David Kauffman, and Peterson Properties LLC (Dkt. Nos. 45, 53, 54). The Campbells have

responded to the motions to sever (Dkt. Nos. 56, 66, 67). Also pending before the Court is the

Campbells’ response and motion to strike the answer of defendants John Allen Barnett, Danny L.

Busch, Hunter Ray Crawford, Barbara Ann Gann, City of Mammoth Spring, Barry Joseph O'Dell,

and James Edward Turnbough (“the City defendants”) (Dkt. No. 55). The City defendants have

responded in opposition to the Campbells’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 68). For the following

reasons, the Court grants the motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 49; 51), the Court denies the motions

to sever (Dkt. Nos. 45, 53, 54), and the Court denies the Campbells’ motion to strike the City

defendants’ answer (Dkt. No. 55).

I. Background

The Campbells are residents of Mammoth Spring, Arkansas. In their consolidated

amended complaint (“the operative complaint”) the Campbells make 42 claims against 28

defendants (Dkt. No. 32). Defendants include: the City of Mammoth Spring, Arkansas (“City”);

Barry Joseph O’Dell, a City Councilman and Church of Christ preacher in the City; Danny L.

Busch, the Mayor of the City; Carl Dwayne Plumlee, City Attorney for the City and former Deputy

Prosecuting Attorney for Fulton County, Arkansas; Barbara Ann Gann, City Clerk and licensed

Notary; James Edward Turnbough, Chief of Police for the City; John Allen Barnett, Assistant

Chief of Police for the City; Hunter Ray Crawford, City police officer; Timothy Weaver, Fulton

County, Arkansas, Circuit Judge; Chaney Taylor, Fulton County, Arkansas, District Judge; Drew

Smith, Prosecuting Attorney for the 16th Judicial District; Donald McSpadden, Circuit Judge for

Fulton County, Arkansas; Gary Dunn; Randall Dunn; Brenda Dunn; Paul Kauffman; Frederick

O’Neill; John T. McGinnes; Jody Shackelford; Shayne Peterson; Lauren Siebert; Louise

Alexander; Bragg Broadcasting, Inc. (“Bragg”), an Arkansas corporation; Hallmark Media, LLC

(“Hallmark”), an Arkansas limited liability company; Peterson Properties & Investments, LLC

(“Properties”), a Missouri limited liability company; Iron Rock; and APS. The Campbells allege

Melissa Rogers, Mammoth Spring’s City Secretary is an indispensable party to this case (Id., ¶

32).

The Campbells’ claims arise from allegations of a border wall dispute between themselves

and a neighbor, an alleged dispute between themselves and Mammoth Spring employees, an

alleged physical altercation that resulted in a criminal conviction, alleged irregularities in various

state court cases, and the denied Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“AFOIA”) request (Id.).

The operative complaint alleges that judges, police officers and prosecutors violated the

Campbells’ rights by prosecuting Dave Campbell for battery and by refusing the Campbells’

participation in a state probate case. Id. Additionally, the Campbells bring an AFOIA claim

against APS. Id. The Campbells bring claims against Judges Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden,

as well as Prosecutors Plumlee and Smith, in their individual capacities. The Campbells also bring

an AFOIA claim against APS for failing to provide requested information. Id.

Additionally, in the operative complaint, the Campbells allege that Iron Rock used an

unauthorized name for its law firm, made false representations in court pleadings, and filed a

fraudulent certificate of service in two defamation cases against them. Id.

Judges Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden contend that they are entitled to judicial immunity.

Prosecutors Plumlee and Smith assert that they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. APS asserts

that the Campbells fail to state a valid AFOIA claim.

Iron Rock maintains that claims against it should be dismissed for failure to state claim

upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. Motions To Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “While a complaint attacked

by a [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “[T]he complaint must contain facts

which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be conclusory.” Briehl v. General Motors

Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671

(8th Cir. 1995)). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept the allegations

contained in the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn

in favor of the nonmoving party.” Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001).

The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, and “‘pro se litigants are held to a

lesser pleading standard than other parties.’” Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 927 (8th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008)). Nonetheless,

pro se complaints “‘still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.’” Stringer v.

St. James R–1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912,

914 (8th Cir. 2004)). “‘Liberal construction’” concerns whether it appears “beyond a doubt that

petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. We do not believe, however, that a

district court must pretend that certain facts exist in order to foresee a theory of recovery not

actually raised or reasonably inferred by the pleader.” Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th

Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). “‘[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner

which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting

Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981)).

B. Analysis

1. Judicial Immunity

The Campbells name three judges in their operative complaint (Dkt. No. 32). Judges

Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden contend that they are entitled to judicial immunity (Dkt. No. 49,

¶ 5).

“Judges performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability.”

Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “The doctrine of judicial immunity is

supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment

vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability.” Antoine v.

Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993). “[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit,

not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he

will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 336 (1871)).

Judges Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden are entitled to absolute immunity because the

operative complaint fails to allege the judges acted in the absence of all jurisdiction.

The Campbells allege a variety of constitutional violations against Judge Taylor centered

on Judge Taylor presiding over Dave Campbell’s criminal case (Dkt. No. 32, at 20-21). The

Campbells allege Judge Taylor violated Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-17-138, which provides

“[a] district court shall hold court in each department of the district court at least one (1) time a

month unless mutually waived by the district court judge and the governing body of the city or

town in which the department is located.” However, the Campbells fail to explain how Dave

Campbell’s criminal court proceedings violated the statute or how this alleged violation eliminated

Judge Taylor’s jurisdiction over the matter. The Court determines that the Campbells have not

established a violation of an Arkansas statute, and the argument simply amounts to a disagreement

with Judge Taylor’s decisions in Dave Campbell’s criminal case.

The Campbells’ primary complaint against Judge Weaver arises from his authorization of

Dave Campbell’s arrest and for his actions in handling a companion civil case for a writ of

mandamus and a writ of prohibition (Id., at 22-23). Nothing asserted in the operative complaint

indicates that Judge Weaver lacked jurisdiction over either proceeding.

The Campbells allege that Judge McSpadden threatened to hold the Campbells in contempt

if the Campbells attempted to file evidence in a probate case to which the Campbells were not

party (Id., at 21). The Campbells assert that Judge McSpadden presided over the probate hearing

in Independence County instead of Fulton County to prevent an elderly woman from attending the

hearing (Id.). The Campbells contend that Fulton County was the correct venue and, therefore,

Judge McSpadden lacked jurisdiction in the case (Id.). However, both counties are within the 16th

Judicial Circuit where Judge McSpadden serves, and Judge McSpadden was clearly operating

within the approved administrative plan for the 16th Judicial Circuit.1

Because the Campbells have not alleged that Judges Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden

acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies; the

Court grants Judges Taylor, Weaver, and McSpadden’s motion to dismiss the Campbells’ claims

against them based on judicial immunity (Dkt. No. 49).

2. Prosecutorial Immunity

1 See Administrative Plan for the 16th Judicial Circuit, (May 13, 2026),

https://arcourts.gov/sites/default/files/files-

list/16th%20Circuit.pdf#:~:text=The%2016th%20Judicial%20Circuit%20is%20a%20five,Judges

%20who%20serve%20the%2016th%20Judicial%20District.

The Campbells contend that prosecutors Smith and Plumlee violated their civil rights by

charging and prosecuting Dave Campbell for battery (Dkt. No. 32, at 19-20). The Campbells

complain that Plumlee wrongly accepted a probable cause affidavit for Dave Campbell’s arrest

and that Smith prosecuted Dave Campbell for battery based on the affidavit (Id.).

Like judges, “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from suits for damages arising out of

their official duties in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.” Williams v. Hartje, 827 F.2d

1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)); see also Brodnicki

v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996) (“If the prosecutor is acting as advocate for

the state in a criminal prosecution, then the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity.”).

However, “[a] prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not

relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are

not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Here,

prosecutors Smith and Plumlee clearly acted in their capacity as prosecuting attorneys in deciding

to file charges against and prosecuting Dave Campbell. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the

Campbells’ claims against Smith and Plumlee; the Court grants Smith and Plumlees’ motion to

dismiss the Campbell’s claims against them based on prosecutorial immunity (Dkt. No. 49).

The Court having granted McSpadden, Weaver, Taylor, Smith, and Plumlee’s motion to

dismiss based on immunity declines to analyze their arguments regarding the Campbells’ other

claims.

3. Arkansas Freedom Of Information Act Claim Against APS

The Campbells assert that APS failed to comply with a lawful request for information under

the AFOIA. The Campbells allege that, on September 22, 2024, a report was filed with APS listing

Dave Campbell as an alleged perpetrator and Betty K. Dunn as an alleged victim. Id., at 23-24.

On January 6, 2025, the Campbells submitted a formal AFOIA request to APS requesting the

investigative reports (Id., at 23). According to the operative complaint, an APS representative

initially informed the Campbells that they were entitled to the records under the AFOIA but upon

further review concluded that the records were not available to the Campbells because the

documents that are “[u]ndisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected

criminal activity” are not to be made open to the public (Id., at 24). See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-

105(b)(6). The Campbells do not assert any ground which would exclude the documents they seek

from this provision of the Arkansas Code.

The Court concludes that the Campbells fail to allege a valid AFOIA claim against APS.

Therefore, the Court grants APS’s motion to dismiss the Campbell’s AFOIA claim (Dkt. No. 49).

4. Iron Rock’s Motion To Dismiss

Also before the Court is Iron Rock’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 51). Iron Rock argues

that the Campbells’ claims against Iron Rock arise from adverse litigation conduct, which is

protected under Arkansas law, and that the Campbells fail to allege plausible claims against Iron

Rock under any applicable exception.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 16–22–310 protects attorneys from liability to those not in

privity with them, but the statute excepts from this protection actions of intentional fraud. See

Wiseman v. Batchelor, 864 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Ark. 1993). The Campbells do not allege that they

were Iron Rock’s clients or that any other privity of contract existed between themselves and Iron

Rock. Therefore, in order to state a claim against Iron Rock, the Campbells must sufficiently

allege intentional fraud.

To state a claim for fraud in Arkansas, the following elements must be well pled: (1) a

false representation of material fact; (2) knowledge that the representation is false or that there is

insufficient information upon which to make the representation; (3) intent to induce action or

inaction in reliance upon the representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation; and (5)

resulting damage. Brennan v. Wadlow, 270 S.W.3d 831, 834-35 (Ark. 2008). Under Rule 9(b) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claims for fraud must be plead with particularity. A

complaint must allege “such matters as the time, place, and contents of false representations, as

well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what was obtained or given up

thereby.” Drobnak v. Anderson Corp., 561 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2009). Complaints that fail to

state the “who, what, where, when, and how of the alleged fraud” do not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s

heightened pleading standard. Id.

In the operative complaint, the Campbells do not assert that Iron Rock made a false

representation of material fact with knowledge that the representation was false or without basis

or that they were damaged by such a statement from Iron Rock (Dkt. No. 32). Instead, the

Campbells provide only conclusory statements that Iron Rock “participated in the ‘enterprise’ by

committing predicate acts (mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion via the $500 demand) as part of the

ongoing pattern of corruption” and “facilitated the overall scheme which involved multiple

fraudulent legal filings and communications.” (Dkt. No. 32, at 26). The Court determines that the

Campbells’ vague and conclusory fraud claims against Iron Rock fail to satisfy the pleading

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). There are no allegations about what acts

Iron Rock undertook to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, or extortion. It is unclear what “overall

scheme” the Campbells allege has occurred or to what the “$500 demand” refers. Therefore, the

Court grants Iron Rock’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 51). The Campbells assert that the use of

Iron Rock Law Firm, PLLC is somehow improper, but the Campbells do not base this claim on a

particular false statement, justifiable reliance, or assert damage caused by that reliance in order to

assert a claim for fraud with the particularity necessary under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

III. Motions To Sever

Also before the Court are the motions to sever of defendants Alexander, Brenda Dunn, Gary

Dunn, Randy Dunn, Peterson, O’Neill, Kauffman, and Peterson Properties LLC (Dkt. Nos. 45, 53,

54). In their motions to sever, defendants Alexander, Brenda Dunn, Gary Dunn, Randy Dunn,

Peterson, O’Neill, Kauffman and Peterson Properties LLC contend that the multiple parties and

counts in the operative complaint are not related (Dkt. Nos. 45, 53, 54).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(1) “allows multiple plaintiffs to join in a single action

if they assert claims ‘with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences;’ and (ii) ‘any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will

arise in the action.’” In re Prempro Products Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 622 (8th Cir. 2010).

Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) allows multiple persons to be joined in one

action as defendants if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will

arise in the action.” The Eighth Circuit recognizes “a very broad definition for the term

‘transaction.’” In re Prempro, 591 F.3d 622.

“Transaction” is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many

occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as

upon their logical relationship.

Accordingly, all “logically related” events entitling a person to institute a legal

action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or

occurrence. The analogous interpretation of the terms as used in Rule 20 would

permit all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be

tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.

Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).

This assessment is made on a “case by case” basis. Id. Rule 20 is in place “to promote trial

convenience and expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple

lawsuits.” Id. at 1332. Further, “[s]ingle trials generally tend to lessen the delay, expense and

inconvenience to all concerned.” Id.

At this stage of the case, given the dismissal of several of the defendants based on immunity

and failure to state a claim, and based on the Court’s review of the Campbells’ filings, the Court

denies without prejudice the motions to sever of defendants Alexander, Brenda Dunn, Gary Dunn,

Randy Dunn, Peterson, O’Neill, Kauffman, and Peterson Properties LLC. Defendants may,

however, renew their motions to sever as this case progresses to trial.

IV. Motion To Strike

The Campbells request that the Court strike the answer of the City defendants under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), arguing that the answer is a “sham pleading” and contains

impertinent and frivolous allegations in its affirmative defense assertions (Dkt. No. 55, at 2). The

City defendants filed a response in opposition to the Campbell’s motion to strike (Dkt. No. 68).

The City defendants argue that their general denial in their response to the operative complaint

complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(3), which permits a party to deny generally all

except those portions of a pleading specifically admitted (Id., at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(3)).

The City defendants invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(3) and then specifically

admitted or denied designated paragraphs of the operative complaint, which is permissible under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The City defendants also argue that their affirmative

defenses are legally sufficient and provide fair notice (Id., at 3), and the Campbells’ assertions

about extrinsic events cannot support striking any portions of their response to the operative

complaint (Id., at 3–4).

“‘Motions to strike under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) are viewed with disfavor and are

infrequently granted.’ A court must deny a motion to strike ‘if the defense is sufficient as a matter

of law or if it fairly presents a question of law or fact which the court ought to hear.’” United

States ex rel. Rille v. Sun Microsystems. Inc., Case No. 4:04-cv-00986-WRW, 2008 WL 4756170,

at *18 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 28, 2008) (quoting Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir.

1977)). Further, “motions to strike are not generally granted unless the moving party has shown

prejudice.” Id.

“Because the rule is stated in the permissive . . . it has always been understood that the

district court enjoys liberal discretion” under Rule 12(f). Stanbury Law Firm P.A. v. IRS, 221 F.3d

1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (other citations omitted). Despite that discretion, granting a motion to

strike pleadings is an “extreme measure.” Id. When moving to strike, “a plaintiff must show that

the allegations being challenged in the defendant’s answer are ‘so unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims

as to be unworthy of any consideration as a defense and that their presence in the pleading

throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to the moving party.”’ Sobba v. Elmen, 462 F. Supp.

2d 944, 946 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2004)).

The Court declines to strike the answer of the City defendants. The Campbells have neither

demonstrated that the allegations being challenged are unworthy of the Court’s consideration nor

that they will be prejudiced by the answer as a whole or by any of the City defendants’ specific

affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the Court denies the Campbells’ motion to strike all or part of

the City defendants’ answer.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss of Judge Weaver, Judge Taylor,

Judge McSpadden, Prosecutor Smith, Prosecutor Plumlee, and APS (Dkt. No. 49) and the motion

to dismiss Iron Rock (Dkt. No. 51). At this stage of the case, the Court denies without prejudice

the motions to sever of defendants Alexander, Brenda Dunn, Gary Dunn, Randy Dunn, Peterson,

O’Neill, Kauffman, and Peterson Properties LLC (Dkt. Nos. 45, 53, 54). The Court denies the

Campbells’ motion to strike the answer of the City defendants (Dkt. No. 55).

So ordered this 14th day of May, 2026.

Kristine G. Baker

Chief United States District Court Judge

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