Reaves

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

No. 7:26-CV-00016-FL

Kathy Reaves,

Plaintiff,

Order &

v.

Memorandum & Recommendation

Freddie Williamson, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Kathy Reaves, proceeding pro se, filed an employment action against the Public

Schools of Robeson County and several of the school district’s officials and employees, as well as

the School Board, its former counsel, and his law firm. Compl., D.E. 1. Brought under various

laws, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it alleges retaliation, improper seizure and dissemination of

private information, due process violations, unlawful policies, and claims under the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA) and North Carolina state law. Id. She also asks to proceed without paying

the filing fee associated with bringing a civil lawsuit. See IFP Mots., D.E. 10, 14. And Reaves

moved for other relief. See Mots., D.E. 4, 11, 12.

The court will not require Reaves to pay the filing fee. And it will deny her other motions.

And because her proposed complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the

undersigned recommends that the court dismiss her complaint without prejudice.

I. Background

Reaves has filed several actions in this court.1 The Complaint and filings in other cases set

out the following background.

1 Reaves has filed actions against the same Defendants, or many of them, based on identical facts and raising the same

claims in the following cases: Reaves v. Williamson, No. 7:22-CV-00002-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2022); Reaves v. Pub.

Reaves worked as a Career and Technology Education (CTE) teacher at Townsend Middle

School, in Robeson County, North Carolina. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 19; see also Mem. &

Recommendation at 3, Reaves v. Pub. Schs. of Robeson Cnty, No. 7:22-CV-00039-FL (E.D.N.C.

Nov. 22, 2022), D.E. 149. In December 2021, she filed a grievance alleging the assistant principal,

Debbie McKenzie, threatened her. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 19. The next day, the assistant superintendent of

human resources, Freddie Williamson, arranged for Reaves to meet him the following morning.

Id. ¶ 16. She was unsuccessful in her request to hold the meeting virtually. Id. ¶¶ 17, 18. Upon

discovering that Williamson had backdated his signature on her employment contract, she filed a

grievance against him. Id. ¶¶ 20, 28.

Williamson accused her of violating an electronics communications policy and instructed

the IT department to disable Reaves’s employee email account. Id. ¶¶ 39, 40. Reaves was thus

unable to login, access her curriculum, or perform her teaching duties. Id. ¶¶ 31, 35, 37.2

Reaves maintains that during her employment, school board attorney Daniel Smith and his

law firm, Brooks Pierce improperly accessed her personnel records. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 42, 43. And she

claims Robeson County Public Schools provided information about her to another school district

in December 2025. Id. ¶ 46.

In January 2026, Reaves filed the instant action alleging retaliation, Fourth Amendment

violations, procedural due process violations, unlawful policies, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Compl. at 9–16. She also brings a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Schs. of Robeson Cnty, No. 7:22-CV-00039-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2022); Reaves v. Faulkner, No. 7:22-CV-00040-

FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2022); Reaves v. Brooks Pierce, No. 7:22-CV-00053-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2022); Reaves v.

Maxton Police Dep’t, No. 7:22-CV-00204-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2022); and Reaves v. Maxton Police Dep’t, No.

7:26-CV-00014-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 29, 2026).

2 Reaves’s email access was restored on March 1, 2022. See Reaves v. Pub. Schs. of Robeson Cnty, No. 7:22-CV-

00039-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2022), Compl. ¶ 11, D.E. 1-1. She was subsequently suspended for 90 days. Id. ¶ 55.

Id. Although it seeks no specific monetary damages, the Complaint requests compensatory and

punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief by restoring her email access and

correcting her employment records. Id. at 16–18.

II. IFP Motions

Reaves asks the court to allow her to proceed against the Defendants without paying the

required filing fee or other costs normally associated with a civil lawsuit (otherwise known as

proceeding “in forma pauperis” or “IFP”). The court may grant her request if she submits an

affidavit describing her assets and the court finds that she cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can

pay the costs associated with litigation “and still be able to provide himself and his dependents

with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The court has reviewed Reaves’s applications and finds that she lacks the resources to pay

the costs associated with this litigation. The court thus grants Reaves’s motions (D.E. 10, 14) and

allows her to proceed IFP.

III. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Along with determining whether Reaves is entitled to IFP status, the court must also

analyze the viability of the claims contained in the complaint.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court

reviews a complaint to eliminate claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the

administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.  Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

The court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous because of either legal or factual

shortcomings. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Legally frivolous claims are based

on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory’ and include ‘claims of infringement of a legal interest

which clearly does not exist.’” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 327). A complaint is factually frivolous when its factual allegations are “fanciful, fantastic,

and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992).

A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Reaves’s pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that her complaint

contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s allegations,

but it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v.

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F. Supp. 2d 766, 776 (E.D.N.C. 2011).

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 creates civil liability for any person acting under the color of state law who

deprives a plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”

of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

1. Unlawful Policies

Reaves asserts that the Public Schools of Robeson County (PSRC) and its School Board

violated her constitutional rights by failing to respond to her grievances. She asserts that that the

Board “ratified adverse actions and baseless allegations while ignoring the grievance(s)[.]” Compl.

¶ 57(d). And Reaves argues that the failure to address her grievances constitutes an official policy

or custom because there was a lack of adequate training and supervision. Id. ¶¶ 57(b), (c).

This cause of action is subject to dismissal on several grounds. First, the limitations period

has run. Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Owens v. Baltimore City State’s

Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). Instead, courts borrow the statute of limitations from

the most analogous state-law cause of action which, for § 1983 suits, is a personal-injury suit. Id.;

see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989). While § 1983 borrows

the limitations period from state law, “accrual of a federal action is a question of federal law[]”

and “a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis

of the action.” Perry v. Pamlico Cnty., 88 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529–30 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (internal

citations omitted).

In North Carolina, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 1–52(5). Reaves knew of the facts underlying this claim since late in 2021. In fact,

she filed several lawsuits about the grievances and IT issues she now alleges resulted from the

Defendants’ policies. See Reaves v. Williamson, No. 7:22-CV-00002-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2022);

Reaves v. Pub. Schs. of Robeson Cnty., No. 7:22-CV-00039-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2022); Reaves

v. Faulkner, No. 7:22-CV-00040-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2022). The three-year limitations period

expired in 2024. This claim, raised over a year later, appears untimely and thus subject to dismissal.

Second, the school district is not a proper defendant. The Fourth Circuit has explained that

“a governmental entity may only be sued if the law of the state in which the court is located permits

it.” Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing cases); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3).

Under North Carolina law, no statute permits a suit against a local school system. Instead, suits

against local education agencies must be brought against the local board of education. See I.M. v.

Granville Cnty. Sch., No. 5:22-CV-7-FL, 2022 WL 3441835, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2022)). It

is that body which is “capable . . . of prosecuting and defending suits for or against the

corporation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-40. Since Reaves attempts to sue an entity which lacks the

capacity to be sued, her claim against PSRC is subject to dismissal. See Sawyer v. Elizabeth City

Pasquotank Pub. Sch. Sys., No. 2:23-CV-00026-M, 2023 WL 9065957, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 6,

2023), adopted by 2024 WL 41625 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2024).

Third, the Complaint fails to state a claim. The School Board is considered a municipality

subject to liability under § 1983. See e.g., Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d

518, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the liability of a school board as a municipality for the

purposes of § 1983). To hold a governmental entity liable for constitutional violations under §

1983, a complaint must contain sufficient allegations to show that the alleged constitutional injury

is attributable to an official policy, procedure, or custom of the county. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may meet this burden by showing that the

unconstitutional custom flows from an express policy, the decisions of a policymaking official, a

failure to train officers that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens[,]” or

through a practice so widespread as to become a “custom or usage with the force of law.” Lytle v.

Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.

1999)).

Yet the Complaint’s mere reference to a policy or custom is insufficient to state a claim. It

identifies no policy, practice, or custom of the school district or school board on grievances or

email communications to trigger Monell liability. Whether they establish constitutional violations,

Reaves has not alleged there is an official policy or custom to deny email access or fail to address

a grievance. And efforts to create a policy or custom from her isolated experience are inadequate

to state a Monell claim. See Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing

that “proof of a single violation will not support the inference that the violation resulted from a

municipal ‘policy’ of deficient training,” or a “custom of comparable practices.”); Boyd v. Mun.

Robersonville, No. 4:24-CV-59-FL, 2024 WL 4982828, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2024) (finding no

“persistent and widespread practice” or “continued inaction in the face of documented widespread

abuses,” and concluding that a single constitutional violation alleged was inadequate to state a

Monell claim) (internal citations omitted), recons. denied, 2025 WL 3471708 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 16),

aff’d, No. 25–1537, 2025 WL 3451539 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2025), and 2025 WL 3451539 (4th Cir.

Dec. 1, 2025).

For these reasons, the court should dismiss this claim of Reaves’s Complaint.

2. Retaliation

Reaves also claims that Williamson retaliated against her for her grievances by disabling

her state email and IT access, impairing her ability to perform her work. Compl. ¶ 50. She

maintains that their actions violated the First Amendment and § 1983.3 And Reaves contends that

the Defendants’ actions in failing to act on her grievance and restricting her IT access would chill

an ordinary person from exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. ¶¶ 49, 51.

In the context of public employment, a First Amendment retaliation claim requires a

plaintiff to plausibly allege three elements. First, the speech must involve a matter of public

3 Reaves filed a similar claim asserting that Defendants retaliated against her for filing a grievance in violation of

North Carolina’s Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA). The court adopted a recommendation to

dismiss that cause of action for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. See Reaves v. Faulkner, et al., No. 7:22-

CV-00040-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2023).

concern. Watson v. Wake Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 797 F. Supp. 3d 591, 610 (E.D.N.C. 2025). Second,

the interest of the employee “in speaking upon the matter of public concern outweighed the

government’s interest in providing effective and efficient services to the public.” Id. And third, the

expression “was a substantial factor” in the adverse employment action. Massaro v. Fairfax Cnty.,

95 F.4th 895, 905 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998)).

On the first factor, a matter of public concern involves an issue of social, political, or other

interest to the community. See James v. City of Monroe, No. 3:22-CV-00178-RJC-DSC, 2022 WL

3268744, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 2022) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,

269 (1964); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 776 (4th Cir. 2004)). Wrongdoing by government

officials can constitute speech that raises issues of public concern. See Kirby v. City of Elizabeth

City, 388 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2004).

Upon satisfying the first prong, the burden shifts to the government to show that the speech

substantially interfered with official responsibilities. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).

To meet the third element, a plaintiff must show a causal connection between the speech and

adverse action. Id. (citations omitted). Temporal proximity may create the inference of causation.

Porter v. Bd. of Trs. of N.C. State Univ., 72 F.4th 573, 582–83 (4th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

Without deciding whether the Complaint sufficiently states a First Amendment retaliation

claim, it is untimely.4 Reaves filed her grievances in December 2021. And her IT access was

restored three months later. Given the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the statute of

limitations expired no later than March 2025, well before Reaves filed this action.

4 For purposes of this Order & Memorandum & Recommendation, the undersigned assumes, without deciding, that

Reaves may be able to meet the first factor given that the Complaint contends that she filed a grievance alleging

Williamson backdated an employment contract, which could arguably state a matter of public concern. And her

grievances occurred within a few days of the suspension of her IT access, so the temporal proximity could suggest a

causality. The second factor, on which the Defendants would bear the burden, could not be ruled out for purposes of

review under § 1915(e).

For these reasons, the district court should dismiss this claim.

3. Accessing Records

Reaves next maintains that the School Board’s attorney Daniel Smith, and his firm, Brooks

Pierce, wrongfully accessed her employment and personnel records and disseminated their

contents. According to the Complaint, this action constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth

Amendment. Compl. at 9–10.

As with other claims, Reaves knew of the facts underlying this claim since late in 2021.

She filed another action challenging the fact that Smith and Brooks Pierce accessed her

employment records, which the court dismissed. See Reaves v. Brooks Pierce, et al., No. 7:22-CV-

00053-FL (E.D.N.C. June 30, 2022). The claim is also untimely because Reaves raised it well-

after the three-year limitations period expired.5

Based on these reasons, the district court should dismiss this cause of action.

4. Procedural Due Process

Reaves also asserts that the Defendants infringed on her procedural due process rights by

falsely accusing her of violating the electronic communications policies and failing to address her

grievances.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides, “No State shall . . . deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV §

1. To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege three things. Kendall v.

Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 528 (4th Cir. 2011). First, she has a cognizable liberty or property

interest. Id. Second, she was intentionally deprived of that interest by some state action. Id. And

5 For school employees, North Carolina law provides “[a]ll information contained in a personnel file, except as

otherwise provided in this Chapter, is confidential and shall not be open for inspection and examination except to any

of the following persons . . . [m]embers of the local board of education and the board’s attorney.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

115C-321(a)(3). So it appears that the School Board was permitted to share Reaves’s records with Smith and his firm.

third, the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate. Id. At a minimum, procedural

due process typically requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 528–29.

The Complaint has not plausibly alleged that suspending her state IT privileges deprived

Reaves of any liberty or property interest. And assuming she has a property interest in her

employment, Reaves fails to plausibly allege that her inability to access the IT platform constituted

a procedural due process violation.

As with other causes of action, this claim accrued in 2021 and the statute of limitations has

run. And the court dismissed Reaves’s other lawsuits that challenged the Defendants over her

grievances and suspended IT access. See Reaves v. Williamson, No. 7:22-CV-00002-FL (E.D.N.C.

No. 22, 2022); Reaves v. Pub. Schs. of Robeson Cnty., No. 7:22-CV-00039-FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 26,

2023); Reaves v. Faulkner, No. 7:22-CV-00040-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23. 2023) (equal protection).

So her due process claim should be dismissed.

B. Fair Credit Reporting Act

The Complaint claims that the Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),

15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., when Smith was allowed to access her personal information while she

was employed by PSRC. Compl. ¶ 58. She maintains her employment information was furnished

to an unidentified third-party, as recently as December 2025. Id. ¶¶ 61, 66. And Reaves asserts that

these actions have interfered with her prospective employment opportunities. Id. ¶ 64.

To achieve its purpose of ensuring “fair and accurate credit reporting,” the FCRA creates

requirements about credit information. See id. The FCRA imposes certain duties and procedures

on various entities including credit reporting agencies, furnishers of credit information to credit

reporting agencies, and users of consumer reports.6 Id. “Consumer reporting agencies and

6 A “consumer report” includes any communication by a consumer reporting agency that bears on an individual’s

character or reputation that may be used for certain purposes, including employment. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B). The

furnishers, though interrelated, serve discrete functions: furnishers report data to incentivize the

repayment of debts, while consumer reporting agencies compile and report that data for a fee.”

Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc., 131 F.4th 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Denan v. Trans Union

LLC, 959 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2020)).

Furnishers must ensure that the information they provide to consumer reporting agencies

is accurate. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). When a consumer believes their credit report contains

inaccurate or incomplete information, they can raise a direct dispute with the furnisher or an

indirect challenge by notifying a consumer reporting agency. See id. §§ 1681i(a)(2), 1681s-2(a)(8),

(b). A consumer may sue a furnisher for willfully or negligently failing to reasonably investigate

a dispute over the accuracy or completeness of information in her credit report. Roberts, 131 F.4th

at 246.

This claim fails for two reasons. First, Reaves alleges that Defendants were “‘furnishers of

information’ under the FCRA and knowingly furnished employment information” entitling her to

relief under §§ 1681n and 1681o. Compl. ¶ 68. Those provisions create private rights of action for

those who violate the FCRA’s provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (right of action against willful

violators); § 1681o (right of action against negligent violators). But such actions are limited to

claims against consumer reporting agencies. Id. The FCRA creates no private right of action for

violating provisions that require furnishers to provide accurate information. Id. § 1681s-2(c); see

Weber v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 627 F. Supp. 3d 538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 2022).

defined term excludes a “report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer

and the person making the report[.]” Id. §1681a(d)(2)(A)(i). The statute also states that a “consumer reporting agency”

is one “which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in

the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the

purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” Id. § 1681a(f).

Second, there is no evidence that the Defendants provided information to a consumer

reporting agency. Beyond the School Board’s attorney and his firm, the Complaint fails to identify

to whom Reaves maintains her personnel records were allegedly disclosed.

For these reasons, the court should dismiss Reaves’s FCRA claim.7

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Reaves’s Complaint also alleges a cause of action under North Carolina law for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Compl. at 14–16. To state an IIED claim, plaintiffs must

allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3)

severe emotional distress to another.” Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335

(1981). Liability for IIED arises only when a defendant’s conduct is “so outrageous in character,

and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App.

672, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1985) (quotation omitted). “The determination of whether the conduct

alleged was intentional and was extreme and outrageous enough to support such an action is a

question of law[.]” Lenins v. K-Mart Corp., 98 N.C. App. 590, 391 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990).

As with other causes of action, this claim is untimely. As noted above, North Carolina tort

claims have a three-year limitations period. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–52(16). This cause of action

accrued over three years before Reaves filed the present action. See Spencer v. Town of Chapel

Hill, 290 F. Supp. 2d 655, 661 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (observing that suffering of emotional distress “is

the triggering event for statute of limitations purposes.”) (citing Soderlund v. Kuch, 546 S.E.2d

632, 637 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)). And the Complaint asserts no continuing violation by the

Defendants. So Reaves’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time-barred.

7 A two-year statute of limitations applies to FCRA claims. Because the Complaint contends that the Defendants

furnished Reaves’s employment information as recently as 2025, the claim would not be time-barred.

And the court dismissed Reaves’s other lawsuits that raised similar claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. See Reaves v. Faulkner, No. 7:22-CV-00040-FL (E.D.N.C. Mar

23, 2023); Reaves v. Brooks Pierce, No. 7:22-CV-00053-FL (E.D.N.C. June 30, 2022); Reaves v.

Maxton Police Dep’t, No. 7:22-CV-00204-FL (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12, 2023). So her IIED claim is

subject to dismissal.

This claim should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Reaves alleges no conduct

on the part of any Defendant that could be regarded as so extreme and outrageous to support an

IIED action. The Complaint asserts that Reaves received threatening directives and emails, was

unable to perform her job because her IT access was disabled, and faced baseless accusations of

policy violations. It further claims that the Defendants failed to address her grievance, accessed

and disseminated information in her personnel file, and ignored her medical condition.8 Her claims

are not only conclusory but fall well short of alleging the magnitude of conduct that forms a basis

of an IIED claim. See, e.g., Pardasani v. Rack Room Shoes, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D.N.C.

1996) (observing that most adverse employment actions, save for certain types of sexual

harassment, do not qualify as extreme and outrageous). So they do not meet the pleading standard.

The undersigned recommends dismissing all the claims that establish this court’s original

jurisdiction. Alternatively, should the District Court adopt the recommendations to dismiss all of

Reaves’s federal claims, it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress considering the interests of judicial economy,

fairness, federalism, and comity.

8 The Complaint claims Reaves sought a virtual meeting because of COVID-19 and became ill and sought care from

her cardiologist because of Williamson’s threatening emails. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 27. No other details of a medical condition

are alleged. Nor does the Complaint suggest the Defendants had any knowledge of any medical condition.

Thus, Reaves’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed

without prejudice.

IV. Other Motions

A. Motion to Seal

Reaves has requested the court seal her IFP application. Mot., D.E 11. The submission set

out her monthly expenditures as well as the amount of income she made in past jobs. D.E. 10.

Reaves claims that the information could be embarrassing and implicate privacy concerns. Mot. at

1. And she alleges that courts routinely seal financial information contained in an IFP application

to safeguard the sensitive information. D.E. 11–1.

The court disagrees. As this court has recognized, the public’s right to inspect and copy

judicial records and documents “may be abrogated only in unusual circumstances.” Stone v. Univ.

of Md., 855 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1988). This tenet “promotes not only the public’s interest in

monitoring the functioning of the courts but also the integrity of the judiciary.” Doe v. Public

Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Columbus-Am. Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins.

Co., 203 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2000)).

The right of access court filings arises from either the common law or the First Amendment.

Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Reaves’s

motion appears to implicate the common law right of access, she must show that “countervailing

interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access[]” to overcome the presumption of access.

Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).

Although they include basic personal financial information, applications to proceed

without prepayment of costs are generally matters of public record. Feehan v. Grand Canyon

Univ., No. 7:23-CV-287-FL, 2023 WL 4554101, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 27, 2023). And sealing

every IFP application would deny the public “important transparency in the working of the

judiciary,” deprive opposing parties “the opportunity to raise objections,” and limit the court’s

ability to “check on potential misstatements or omissions in IFP affidavits.” Id. (quoting SAI v.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 127–28 (D.D.C. 2015).

The grounds Reaves relies on in her motion to seal are not unique to those who seek to

proceed in forma pauperis. Instead of establishing a particularized need, she cites the general

interests in keeping such matters private. Her conclusory arguments fail to overcome the

presumption of public access. So the court will deny the motion to seal (D.E. 11).

B. Motion for an Extension of Time

Reaves also asks for additional time to satisfy the deficiencies in her pleadings. Mot., D.E.

12. In February, the court noted that Reaves’s IFP application was incomplete, she had filed no

notice of self-representation or financial disclosure, and she had failed to submit proposed

summonses. Order, D.E. 8. So it directed her to correct those matters. Id.

Reaves submitted new applications to proceed IFP (D.E. 10, 14), along with a financial

disclosure statement (D.E. 9). But the docket reflects no notice of self-representation or proposed

summonses have been filed.

Because the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss the complaint, the

request for additional time is moot and thus denied.

C. Motion to Suppress

Reaves has also moved the court to suppress the Defendants’ use of evidence she claims

was unlawfully seized. Mot., D.E. 4. Reaves maintains that the Defendants unlawfully accessed

her personnel records, state email account, and digital employment information and disseminated

them to other Defendants. Doing so, Reaves claims, implicated protections afforded to her under

the Fourth Amendment and FCRA. And no good-faith workplace exceptions applies under these

circumstances.

There are several reasons to deny her request. First, Reaves puts forth no evidence to

establish the premise of her motion—that the Defendants wrongfully obtained information in her

records.

Second, Reaves does not identify the specific documents or information she seeks to limit.

Nor is there any indication at this juncture what context the Defendants may use that evidence. So

a blanket exclusion of personnel records, emails, or employment information is not warranted.

Third, to the extent the motion seeks a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of evidence

outside of an evidentiary motion or trial, it is premature. To the extent they are needed, evidentiary

determinations will be made at the appropriate stages of litigation.

And fourth, Reaves’s Complaint claims that the Defendants’ actions were retaliatory and

violated legitimate employment policies and governing law. Arguably, then, some of the

documents she seeks to limit use of like her employment and personnel records and work email

account could contain information relevant to this case. See Cason v. Builders FirstSource-

Southeast Grp., Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (W.D.N.C. 2001) “[W]here the files sought are

those of employees whose action or inaction has a direct bearing on the Plaintiff’s claims or

Defendant’s affirmative defenses . . . personnel files are subject to discovery.”); Howard v. Coll.

of the Albemarle, No. 2:15-CV-00039-D, 2016 WL 4384658, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2016)

(finding that personnel records were relevant when employee alleged employment discrimination

and wrongful termination).9 To the extent any of the documents Reaves references contain

9 And an argument may be made that Reaves has waived any interest in the confidentiality of her own employment

records that are relevant to her claims by filing the action, thereby placing such information in issue. See Koch v. Cox,

489 F.3d 384, 389–90 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (observing that evidentiary privileges otherwise enjoyed by a plaintiff are

waived when the plaintiff files a suit that necessarily depends on disclosure of the privileged information).

sensitive and confidential information, for which privacy concerns attach, the parties would be

able to seek an appropriate confidentiality order. See Reeves v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.

3:20-CV-00423, 2020 WL 6688863, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 12, 2020).

In sum, there is no merit to the motion to suppress. So the court will deny it.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons above, the court grants Reaves’s motions to proceed IFP (D.E. 10, 14). It

denies her motions to seal (D.E. 11) and suppress (D.E. 4). And it denies her motion for additional

time (D.E. 12) as moot. The undersigned also recommends that the court dismiss Reaves’s

Complaint without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation

(“M&R”) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to

the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically

note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other

party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on

them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the

matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the

party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R)

reviewed by the Court of Appeals.

Dated: May 8, 2026 To

Kotet 7 Alemben

Robert T. Numbers, II

United States Magistrate Judge

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