Opinion

Everetts

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Apr 2, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SHERITA EVERETTS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:26-cv-869-S-BN

§

KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL §

OF TEXAS, §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Sherita Everetts filed this pro se action

for violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and 18 U.S.C.

§ 242 against Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, claiming that the Attorney

General has stolen money taken through garnishment of her wages for child support

under an order from the 304th District Court in Dallas County rather than using it

to support children. See Dkt. No. 3. The presiding United States district judge

referred this lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial

management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit.

Legal Standards

A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis

(that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint

(or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam).

A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint

on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,

470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).

“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to

dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.

Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court

may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’

More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention

and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”

(citations omitted)).

And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while

the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,

2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).

And, because “‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing

‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.

251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994)), “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own

initiative even at the highest level,” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,

583-84 (1999) (citations omitted).

And, if the party invoking federal jurisdiction fails to establish it, the lawsuit

must be dismissed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

Because federal jurisdiction is not assumed, “the basis upon which jurisdiction

depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established

argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d

1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633,

636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc.,

929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because federal courts have limited jurisdiction,

parties must make ‘clear, distinct, and precise affirmative jurisdictional allegations’

in their pleadings.” (quoting Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259)).

As to dismissal for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, just

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). So,

“[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement

to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). On the other hand, “[a]

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual

matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound to

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of

categories of statements, including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels;

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60

F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th

1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).

And, so, to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that

the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and

directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));

see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899

(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’

is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

Analysis

As always, the Court must first consider its jurisdiction. See Louisiana v. U.S.

Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is always first.”

(citation omitted)).

“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully

expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v.

Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

954 F.3d 268, 374, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)).

That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a

state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its

sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented

by statute, and § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.”

NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore

v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014), then

citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)).

This jurisdiction-stripping immunity extends to the Office of Attorney General

and its employees in their official capacity. See, e.g., El Bey v. Dominguez, 540 F.

Supp. 3d 653, 678 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“The State of Texas and Texas Attorney General’s

Office fall squarely within even the narrowest parameters the Supreme Court has

imposed on the Eleventh Amendment since 1796.” (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v.

Shamburger, No. 1:23-cv-117, 2023 WL 6466577, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2023)

(“Relevant here, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas is an arm of the state

entitled to sovereign immunity.” (cleaned up; collecting cases)), rec. adopted, 2023 WL

6465848 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2023).

There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek

judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing

state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595

U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But Everetts

has not alleged any facts to support applying this exception.

And to the extent that Everetts seeks to allege her claim against Paxton in his

individual capacity based on his supervisory role over prosecutors in the child support

division of the Office of Attorney General, “[u]nder § 1983, officials are not vicariously

liable for the conduct of those under their supervision. Supervisory officials are

accountable for their own acts of deliberate indifference and for implementing

unconstitutional policies that causally result in injury to the plaintiff.” Alderson v.

Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing

Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)).

And a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “for actions ‘initiating a

prosecution and … presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir.

1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). This immunity

“shelters prosecutors even when they act ‘maliciously, wantonly or negligently.’”

Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Morrison v. City of Baton

Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 1985)). This immunity also applies to prosecutors

in the child support division of the Office of Attorney General. See Nixon v. Abbott,

589 F. App’x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Ramirez v. Arteaga, No. 3:23-cv-

2617-X-BN, 2023 WL 11931496, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2023).

Although a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity for certain

administrative activities, see Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009), the

allegations relate to garnishment of Everetts’s wages pursuant to a court order

obtained by prosecutors in the Office of Attorney General.

So to the extent that Everetts brings claims against Ken Paxton in his

individual capacity, those claims are barred by prosecutorial immunity.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint

before dismissal, but leave is not required when a plaintiff has already pled her “best

case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Everetts’s complaint

fails to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim

can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review of her complaint, it is highly

unlikely that, given another opportunity, Everetts could allege viable legal claims.

Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these

circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. □□□□

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: April 2, 2026

DAVID L. HORAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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