Collins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT May 11, 2026

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JEFFREY LEE COLLINS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-1163

§

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF §

REVENUE, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

Pending before the Court1 is Defendant Florida Department of Revenue’s

(“FDOR”) Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55), FDOR’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 59), Defendant

Elvira Bromfield’s (“Bromfield”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60), and FDOR’s

Motion to Take Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61). Based on a review of the motions,

arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS FDOR’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 59) and Bromfield’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) be GRANTED. The Court further DENIES

AS MOOT FDOR’s Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55) and

Motion to Take Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61).

1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 9).

I. Background

Pro se Plaintiff Jeffrey Lee Collins (“Plaintiff”) describes this case as a

civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress ongoing and

prospective violations of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. (ECF No. 58

at ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges FDOR initiated and escalated coercive child-support

enforcement measures without providing constitutionally adequate notice, a

meaningful opportunity to be heard, or sufficient procedural safeguards to

prevent erroneous or arbitrary deprivation of protected liberty and property

interests. (Id. at ¶ 3).

Factually, Plaintiff alleges a “child-support order concerning Plaintiff

was entered in the State of Florida in or around 2008.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff

adds that he was “deprived of meaningful notice and a fair opportunity to

participate in proceedings and administrative processes that materially

affected his rights and obligations.” (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiff further alleges

FDOR undertook a series of enforcement actions against Plaintiff including,

but not limited to, “administrative collection measures, levies or garnishments,

reporting to credit and financial agencies, referral for passport-related

restrictions, and other coercive enforcement mechanisms.” (Id. at ¶¶ 29–30).

Plaintiff states that he seeks “declaratory and prospective injunctive

relief to prevent ongoing and future constitutional violations, as well as

2

compensatory damages for harms already suffered as a result of [FDOR’s]

unconstitutional enforcement practices.” (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff also named

Bromfield as a defendant, describing her as a private individual who benefited

from the child-support enforcement action. (Id. at ¶ 15). However, Plaintiff

does not assert a cause of action against Bromfield. (See id. at ¶¶ 15–16).

FDOR and Bromfield have each filed motions to dismiss. (See ECF Nos.

59–60).

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Whether a federal court has

jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and

without exception.” Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019). The

party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The

Court generally will accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true

and construe those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kumar

v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2020).

“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12

3

motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before

addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

III. Discussion

a. FDOR

FDOR advances numerous reasons as to why Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint should be dismissed, beginning with immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. (See ECF No. 59 at 5–23). The Court ultimately agrees with

FDOR. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against FDOR fails because (1) FDOR is not a

person within the meaning of § 1983 and (2) FDOR is immune from suit under

the Eleventh Amendment. As explained by the District Court for the Middle

District of Florida in a case where a plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case

against FDOR following a state child support proceeding:

Plaintiff cannot assert a section 1983 claim against the Florida

Department of Revenue for at least two reasons. First, section

1983 authorizes suits against “[e]very person who . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The term “person” does

not include states or their agencies. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Taylor v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 142 F.

App’x 373, 374–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). The Florida

Department of Revenue is part of the state executive branch and

administers the state’s child support enforcement program

established under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. See, e.g.,

Fla. Stat. § 20.21(2)(h). The agency is therefore not a person

within the meaning of section 1983. See Newton v. Duke Energy

Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[N]either the

4

State of Florida nor its agencies are “persons” within the meaning

of § 1983.”).

Second, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from

exercising jurisdiction over an action against a state unless the

state has consented to suit or has waived its immunity or Congress

has overridden the immunity. Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490,

1502 (11th Cir. 1995). The immunity is “in the nature of a

jurisdictional bar” and should be decided early. Bouchard Transp.

Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 91 F.3d 1445, 1448 (11th Cir. 1996).

When the immunity applies, dismissal without prejudice for lack

of jurisdiction is warranted. Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d

726, 733 (11th Cir. 2016).

The immunity extends to a state agency or state entity functioning

as an arm of the state. Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep’t of Health, 701

F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir. 2012). The immunity applies whether the

requested relief is legal or equitable. Uberoi v. S. Ct. of Fla., 819

F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016). Florida has not agreed to be sued

under section 1983 for a civil rights violation. Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t

of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986).

And Congress has not overridden a state’s immunity for a section

1983 civil rights violation. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,

1525 (11th Cir. 1990). And Eleventh Circuit “case law is clear that

as a state agency, the [Florida Department of Revenue] is immune

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Brown v. Fla. Dep’t of

Rev. Off. of Child Supp. Enf’t, 697 F. App’x 692, 693 (11th Cir.

2017).

For these reasons, Plaintiff cannot state a section 1983 claim

against the Florida Department of Revenue.

Lewis v. Castro, No. 6:24-cv-1608, 2024 WL 5673709, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 12,

2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:24-cv-1608, 2024 WL

5673724 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2024); Moore v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 3:25-cv-

817, 2025 WL 3646608, at *4 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2025), report and

5

recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-cv-817, 2025 WL 3645866 (N.D. Fla. Dec.

16, 2025) (finding FDOR was immune from suit under the Eleventh

Amendment in a case where a plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 relating to child support orders entered against him in state

court); see also Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 115 (11th Cir. 1989) (“This

Eleventh Amendment bar applies regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks

money damages or prospective injunctive relief.”).

Plaintiff also requests declaratory2 and injunctive3 relief. (ECF No. 58

at ¶¶ 58–64, 71–78). The “Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for

injunctive or declaratory relief against individual state officials acting in

violation of federal law.” Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th

Cir. 2013) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908)). However, in

order “[t]o fall within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, . .

2 Plaintiff seeks the following declarations: (1) Defendants’ enforcement actions, as

alleged herein, violated Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment by depriving him of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests

without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (2) Defendants’

reliance on unverified third-party representations in initiating and escalating enforcement

actions, without implementing appropriate procedural safeguards, is inconsistent with

constitutional requirements governing the exercise of state authority. (ECF No. 58 at ¶¶ 60–

61).

3 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief that (1) prohibits FDOR from “initiating, escalating,

or continuing enforcement actions against Plaintiff unless and until Defendants provide

constitutionally adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to such

actions” and (2) requires FDOR to “implement and adhere to procedural safeguards designed

to ensure accuracy, fairness, and due process in future enforcement actions involving

Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶¶ 75–76).

6

. a plaintiff must name individual state officials as defendants in their official

capacities.” Id. (finding that although plaintiff had asserted claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief, he could not utilize the Ex parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity because he named only state entities, and not

their individual officers, as defendants). Here, Plaintiff clearly named only

FDOR, a state agency immune from suit, and did not name any individual state

officials. As such, Plaintiff’s suit against FDOR is barred by sovereign

immunity. See id. (“Although Raj has asserted claims for injunctive and

declaratory relief, he cannot overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte

Young because he has named only LSU, LSU Health, and the LSU Board as

defendants.”); see also City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1003-04 (5th Cir.

2019) (finding a district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over a state

agency because state agencies are not subject to the Ex parte Young exception).

As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Sanders v. Tex. A&M Univ. Texarkana, No. 5:21-cv-93, 2022 WL 4594218, at

*5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:21-cv-

093, 2022 WL 4594240 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 29, 2022) (noting that sovereign-

immunity-based dismissals are without prejudice).

7

b. Bromfield

Bromfield also filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 60). As discussed,

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not assert a cause of action against

Bromfield. (See ECF No. 58 at ¶¶ 15–16). Further, in response to Bromfield’s

motion, Plaintiff states he does not oppose Bromfield’s dismissal from this case.

(ECF No. 63 at 3–4). As such, the Court recommends Bromfield be dismissed

from the lawsuit without prejudice.

IV. Leave to Amend

“[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure

pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects

are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or

unable to amend in a manner which will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co.

v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). Here,

“any additional opportunity [to amend] would be futile given the Court’s lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.” See Griffin v. Furlow, No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL

3604735, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL 3611448 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2023) (collecting cases).

As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff not be given leave to amend.

8

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS FDOR’s Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 59) and Bromfield’s

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 60) be GRANTED. Specifically, the Court

RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs claims against FDOR be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE and Bromfield be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE from this lawsuit. As such, the Court RECOMMENDS the

case be DISMISSED in its entirety. The Court further DENIES AS MOOT

FDOR’s Motion to Quash Service of Process (ECF No. 55) and Motion to Take

Judicial Notice (ECF No. 61).

The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation

to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file

written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)

and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time

period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual

findings and legal conclusions on appeal.

SIGNED in Houston, Texas on May 11, 2026.

Richard W. Bennett

United States Magistrate Judge