ALEXANDER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TIMOTHY H. ALEXANDER, Civil Action No. 21-15002 (SDW) (CF)

Plaintiff,

WHEREAS OPINION

v.

TOWNSHIP OF GUTTENBERG, et al., May 4, 2026

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Plaintiff Timothy Alexander’s

(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Reconsideration, (D.E. 226 (“Motion”)), filed in connection with this

Court’s January 14, 2026 Opinion and Order, (D.E. 216 & 217), granting Defendants’ Motions for

Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of Cathy L. Waldor’s,

U.S.M.J. (“Judge Waldor”) April 3, 2025 decision addressing Plaintiff’s Second Motion for

Discovery; and

WHEREAS the genesis of this case dates back to August 9, 2021. (D.E. 1.) This Court

addressed the merits of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, (D.E. 71 (“AC”))—the operative pleading

at the time Defendants1 filed their motions for summary judgment—in its January 14, 2026

1 All Defendants in the case moved for summary judgment. Defendants the Township of Guttenberg (“the

Township”), Magenheimer, and Barrera (hereinafter, “the Administrative Defendants”) jointly moved.

Similarly, Defendants Lugo, Ramadanovic, Rysiec, Martinez, and Dominguez (“Officer Defendants”)

jointly moved.

decision.2 (D.E. 216 at 7–8.) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contained the following claims:

municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for an unconstitutional policy,

practice, or custom pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978) (Count I); violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

through false imprisonment, false arrest, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution (Count

II); conspiracy to engage in the acts alleged in Count II, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count III);

failure to train and/or supervise (Count IV); negligent hiring/retention (Count V); intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights

Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:6-1 and -2 (Count VII); and punitive damages (Count VIII).

(See generally D.E. 71); and

WHEREAS this Court addressed Plaintiff’s federal claims and then turned to the

remaining state claims. This Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations of false arrest, false

imprisonment, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution asked it to question the

underlying probable cause determination made in the state matter adjudicating the charges brought

against Plaintiff following the August 16, 2019 incident—an inquiry the Court could not engage

in pursuant to the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). (D.E. 216

(“Op.”) at 16–17.) Similarly, this Court concluded Defendants Magenheimer, Barrera, and the

Officer Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the officers did not act in such a

way that it would be apparent to a reasonable officer that his or her conduct was unlawful at the

time. (Id. at 19–20.) Given Plaintiff’s failure to identify either the rights or means used to violate

said rights by those Defendants in a supervisory capacity, this Court found no basis for vicarious

liability borne out of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. (Id. at 20 n.17); and

2 A full recitation of the facts can be found in this Court’s decision.

WHEREAS as to Plaintiff’s Monell, negligent hiring, and failure to train claims, upon

reviewing the January 17, 2019 Internal Affairs (“IA”) Report and Plaintiff’s expert report relied

upon by Plaintiff, this Court determined there was no genuine issue of material fact. (Id. at 22–

29.) More specifically, this Court concluded Plaintiff’s expert report was excludable because it

violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56(c)(4) and ran afoul of the Federal Rules of

Evidence by offering “ultimate issue” opinions on issues such as use of force and custom. (Id. at

24–27.) Upon reviewing the 2019 IA Report, this Court found no genuine issue of material fact

given the lack of temporal proximity between when the investigations occurred and when the

incident with Plaintiff took place as well as the remedial actions taken by the Township. (Id. at

27–28.) As to negligent hiring and failure to train, Plaintiff’s failure to set forth elements such as

deliberate indifference and causation were detrimental to said claims. (Id. at 28–29); and

WHEREAS turning to Plaintiff’s state law claims, this Court held that because § 1983 and

NJCRA claims are interpreted coterminously in this district, Plaintiff’s failure to prevail on his

federal claims necessarily meant his state claims failed too. (Id. at 30.) Finding no basis for

liability, Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages was denied. (Id.); and

WHEREAS this Court also denied Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Waldor’s decision

pertaining to reopening discovery. (Id. at 12–13.) After reviewing the way in which discovery

was carried out, this Court determined Judge Waldor’s decision was not an abuse of discretion or

clearly erroneous or contrary to law, giving credence to the fact that Judge Waldor managed

discovery from the case’s inception. (Id. at 12–13); and

WHEREAS on February 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion. (D.E. 226.) Officer

Defendants opposed the Motion on February 26, 2026. (D.E. 228.) Administrative Defendants

filed their Opposition on March 2, 2026. (D.E. 229); and

WHEREAS “[t]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is ‘to correct manifest errors

of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669

(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). A

motion for reconsideration has merit only when the movant shows “(1) an intervening change in

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct [a] clear error of

law or prevent manifest injustice.” Id.; and

WHEREAS although the Third Circuit has “never adopted strict or precise definitions for

‘clear error of law or fact’ and ‘manifest injustice,’” it has suggested “there is substantial, if not

complete, overlap between the two concepts,” with the focus being “on the gravity and overtness

of the error.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 904 F.3d 298, 311–12 (3d Cir. 2018). A litigant

“must show more than mere disagreement with [an] earlier ruling,” he or she must show “a direct,

obvious, [or] observable error,” and “one that is of at least some importance to the larger

proceedings.” Id. at 312 (second alteration in original) (quoting Manifest Injustice, Black’s Law

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Cf. Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 272 (D.N.J. 2018) (“A court

commits clear error of law ‘only if the record cannot support the findings that led to the ruling.’”

(quoting ABS Brokerage Servs. v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09-4590, 2010 WL 3257992, at *6

(D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010)); and

WHEREAS motions for reconsideration are “extremely limited procedural vehicle(s)”

that are to be granted “very sparingly.” Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 940 F. Supp. 2d 185,

189 (D.N.J. 2013). “Mere disagreement with a court’s decision normally should be raised through

the appellate process and is inappropriate on a motion for re[consideration].” United States v.

Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999); and

WHEREAS in reviewing the arguments presented by Plaintiff in his moving brief, this

Court concludes that Plaintiff has not put forth any basis for reconsideration consistent with the

requisite standard. Plaintiff has utilized his Motion as a vehicle to express his disagreement with

this Court’s disposition of the matter; he does not put forth new evidence “that was not available

when [this] [C]ourt issued its order,” an intervening change in controlling law, or a clear error of

fact or law or manifest injustice.3 See Gibson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 182,

190 (3d Cir. 2021); and

WHEREAS for example, Plaintiff raises several of the same arguments he previously

made to this Court. (Compare D.E. 187 at 17–18 (discussing OPRA 222-20 in his opposition brief

to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment), with D.E. 226-1 at 14 (claiming OPRA 222-20 is

“evidence of cover-up culture”), and D.E. 176 at 21 (noting Sergeant Patrick Giannini met with

Mr. Renaud and Deputy Chief Pelaez on May 2, 2024 and participated in the “cover-up” culture),

with D.E. 226-1 at 8 (mentioning the May 2, 2024 meeting while discussing Giannini’s “many

3 Notwithstanding that no reply brief was permitted, Plaintiff submitted a notice of supplemental authority

on March 25, 2026 highlighting the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926

(2026) and why “[s]ummary [j]udgment cannot stand here.” (D.E. 234 at 1.) Plaintiff claims his case in

unlike Zorn because it “involves force used without warning.” (Id. at 2.) By Plaintiff’s own admission,

Zorn is inapposite and irrelevant to this case.

In Zorn, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision holding that Amnesty America v. West

Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2004) “clearly established that the ‘gratuitous’ use of a rear wristlock on a protester

passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force” and application of Amnesty America to conclude an

arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. 146 S. Ct. at 929–31. The Court reasoned that

because Amnesty America did not clearly establish that the arresting officer’s specific conduct violated the

Fourth Amendment, reasonable officials would not have understood said conduct to violate the

Constitution. Id. at 930–31. Thus, the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 931.

Upon review, Zorn underscores the principle that “[w]hether any particular use of force violated the Fourth

Amendment depends on ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular case,’” particularly since precedent

must define a clearly established right with a high degree of specificity. Id. at 930 (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). This further supports this Court’s reasoning and ultimate holding that

Defendants Magenheimer, Barrera, and Officer Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Op. at 19–20.)

roles”).) The arguments advanced by Plaintiff in his Motion are inappropriate for a motion for

reconsideration and should be raised through the appellate process; therefore

Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. An appropriate order follows.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

Cari Fais, U.S.M.J.