Wortmann

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

CARL WORTMANN PLAINTIFF

V. No. 4:25-CV-00982-JM-ERE

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Commissioner DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

This Recommended Disposition (“RD”) has been sent to United States

District Judge James M. Moody, Jr. You may file objections if you disagree with

the findings and conclusions set out in the RD. Objections should be specific,

include the factual or legal basis for the objection, and be filed within fourteen days.

If you do not object, you risk waiving the right to appeal questions of fact.

I. Background

On April 11, 2023, Mr. Carl Wortmann filed an application for benefits due

to shoulder problems, back problems, bilateral De Quervain syndrome, hip

osteoarthritis, borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,

anxiety, depression, knee problems, and tinnitus. Tr. 108, 341.

Mr. Wortmann’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr.

108-131. At Mr. Wortmann’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held

a hearing, and the ALJ heard testimony from Mr. Wortmann and a vocational expert

(“VE”). Tr. 61, 132-149. The ALJ issued a decision on December 19, 2024, finding

that Mr. Wortmann was not disabled. Id. The Appeals Council remanded,

instructing the ALJ to obtain additional evidence as warranted, and to further

consider Mr. Wortmann’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Tr. 150-155

After a second hearing, the ALJ issued a decision on August 26, 2025, finding

that Mr. Wortmann was not disabled. Tr. 13-26. The Appeals Council declined to

review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Tr. 1-5.

Mr. Wortmann, who was forty-four years old at the second hearing, has past

relevant work experience as a military police officer. Tr. 37, 54.

II. The ALJ’s Decision1

The ALJ found that Mr. Wortmann had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity from his alleged onset date of October 1, 2019, through the date last insured

of December 31, 2024. Tr. 16. The ALJ also concluded that Mr. Wortmann had the

following severe impairments: lumbar and cervical degenerative changes; left upper

extremity carpal tunnel syndrome; hand degenerative changes; obesity; anxiety

disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; borderline personality disorder;

post-traumatic stress disorder; and cannabis use disorder. Id. However, the ALJ

1 The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant

was engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe

impairment; (3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a

listed impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments)

prevented the claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment

(or combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available

in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g).

concluded that Mr. Wortmann did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

P, Appendix 1. Tr. 17-19.

According to the ALJ, Mr. Wortmann had the RFC to perform sedentary

work, with the following limitations: (1) no more than occasional climbing,

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; (2) less than constant use

of the upper extremities, but frequent use the upper extremities to reach, handle,

finger, and feel; (3) can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions;

and (4) occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Tr. 20.

Based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that a substantial number

of potential jobs were available in the national economy that Mr. Wortmann could

perform, including document preparer and addresser. Tr. 25, 55. Accordingly, the

ALJ determined that Mr. Walker was not disabled.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

In this appeal, the Court must review the Commissioner’s decision for legal

error and determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on

the record as a whole. Brown v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing

Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). “Substantial evidence” in

this context means “enough that a reasonable mind would find [the evidence]

adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the Court must consider

not only evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision, but also evidence that

supports a contrary outcome. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015).

The Court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision, however, “merely because

substantial evidence exists for the opposite decision.” Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185,

187 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

B. Mr. Wortmann’s Arguments for Reversal

Mr. Wortmann contends that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported

by substantial evidence, because the ALJ: (1) failed to properly evaluate Mr.

Wortmann’s subjective complaints; (2) did not properly characterize Mr.

Wortmann’s sparse treatment; and (3) did not properly evaluate the medical opinion

evidence. Doc. 6. After carefully reviewing the record as a whole, I recommend

affirming the Commissioner.

C. Analysis

1. Subjective Complaints

When evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must

consider objective medical evidence, the claimant’s work history, and other

evidence relating to (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency,

and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the claimant’s functional

restrictions. See Schwandt v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1004, 1012 (8th Cir. 2019). “An

ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor,” and he may “decline to credit a

claimant’s subjective complaints if the evidence as a whole is inconsistent with the

claimant’s testimony.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

After considering the medical record and Mr. Wortmann’s hearing testimony,

the ALJ concluded that Mr. Wortmann’s “statements concerning the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Tr. 21. The ALJ provided

good reasons for this conclusion. For example, the ALJ noted objective imaging

showing mild-to-moderate lumbar degenerative changes, and referenced a history

of lumbar discectomies, while discussing the nature and intensity of Mr.

Wortmann’s pain. Tr. 21-22, 467, 649, 739, 1462. While some straight-leg raises

were positive, Mr. Wortmann had normal range of motion in his thoracic and

lumbar spine. Tr. 22, 532, 539, 554, 725. Mr. Wortmann also regularly had a normal

gait, despite occasionally using a cane. Tr. 22, 450, 648, 725, 1468.

The ALJ discussed Mr. Wortmann’s positive response to treatment, noting

pain relief following radiofrequency ablations and steroid injections and the fact

that prescribed medications reduced pain. Tr. 21-23, 570-571, 582, 593, 726, 1002,

1032. Improvement in a condition supports an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not

disabled. See Duvall v. Bisignano, No. 4:25-cv-00120 KGB-PSH, 2025 WL

1812626, n.6 (E.D. Ark. July 1, 2025); Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 728 (8th

Cir. 1992).

The ALJ found multiple severe mental impairments but observed that mental

status examinations generally showed good eye contact, fluent speech, goal-

directed thought process, and good attention and concentration. Tr. 22, 742, 773,

808, 812-813, 854, 889, 1238. Also, Mr. Wortmann reported good benefits from

sertraline and did not seek regular or continuing psychiatric care. Tr. 22, 275, 963,

979. When a claimant has not treated his mental impairment, the ALJ is justified in

ruling it out as a disabling condition. Smith v. Shalala, 987 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (8th

Cir. 1993).

The ALJ discussed Mr. Wortmann’s daily activities, which included taking

care of chickens and a garden, walking his acreage, converting a shed into a house,

laying sewer pipes, performing chores, and cooking. Tr. 19, 23, 350-355, 741, 772,

807-812, 853, 1237. Such daily activities undermine his claims of disability.

Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 2015); Edwards v. Barnhart, 314

F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003).

Mr. Wortmann argues that the ALJ did not properly account for his allegation

that he could sit for only 5-15 minutes, which would preclude sedentary work.2 Doc.

6 at 9, Tr. 49. The record contains no objective evidence showing Mr. Wortmann

could sit for no more than 15 minutes, and no doctor placed such a restriction on

him. Subjective allegations alone do not serve as a basis for an award of benefits.

See Reter v. Railroad Retirement Board, 465 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2006). Mr.

Wortmann’s positive response to conservative treatment for his back supports the

ALJ’s conclusion that he would be capable of performing sedentary work. Thomas

v. Barnhart, 130 Fed. Appx. 62, 63 (8th Cir. 2005).

The ALJ sufficiently discussed the relevant factors correlated to subjective

complaints.

2. Sparse Treatment

Mr. Wortmann alleges that the ALJ was required to determine whether he

had good cause for treatment gaps before discrediting that evidence, citing SSR 18-

3p. Doc. 6 at 18. That SSR only applies to cases where the ALJ found that the

claimant would be eligible for disability benefits but for the gaps in treatment. See

2018 WL 4945641, at *3. The ALJ made no such finding here. The ALJ simply

pointed to Mr. Wortmann’s gaps in treatment in the holistic review of the evidence.

2 Sedentary work involves mostly sitting, with only occasional walking and standing, and

lifting of no more than ten pounds at a time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).

The ALJ discussed Mr. Wortmann’s sparse and conservative treatment.

Pierce v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 769, 773 (8th Cir. 2022) (upholding ALJ’s finding that

conservative treatment tended to show that plaintiff’s impairments were not

disabling). The ALJ noted that Mr. Wortmann had nerve ablations twice in 2024,

which provided good relief. This contradicts Mr. Wortmann’s claim that gaps in

pain management treatment occurred because the clinic “fumbled” his referral. Tr.

43-47, 52. Mr. Wortmann also said he spent eight or nine months in bed, but as

noted above, he was able to perform a variety of contradictory daily activities, such

as walking around his acreage. Tr. 1237.

Mr. Wortmann contends that he did not seek mental health counseling

because his psychiatrist did not recommend it. Tr. 47. To the contrary, his

psychiatrist recommended therapy and counseling on several occasions. Tr. 742,

808, 890, 1239, 1413, 1427. Mr. Wortmann attended therapy only a handful of

times, undermining his claims that mental impairments were disabling. Tr. 785,

802-804, 813, 854.

Mr. Wortmann has not shown that the ALJ erred in how he considered gaps

in treatment.

3. Medical Opinion Evidence

Mr. Wortmann asserts that the ALJ erred in how he evaluated medical

opinion evidence.

The ALJ must “evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions by

considering (1) whether they are supported by objective medical evidence, (2)

whether they are consistent with other medical sources, (3) the relationship that the

source has with the claimant, (4) the source's specialization, and (5) any other

relevant factors.” Bowers v. Kijakazi, 40 F.4th 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)). However, “[t]he first two factors—supportability and

consistency—are the most important.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)).

Pursuant to the regulations, “treating physicians are [no longer] entitled to special

deference.” Austin v. Kijakazi, 52 F.4th 723, 728 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a)).

Two state-agency medical experts found that Mr. Wortmann could perform

light exertional work, with postural limitations, and use a cane at work. Tr. 23, 113-

116, 125-128. The ALJ found these opinions not fully persuasive. Tr. 23. The ALJ

referenced consistency and supportability and found that Mr. Wortmann was able

to perform only sedentary work. The fact that the ALJ assigned a more restrictive

RFC than that proposed by the medical experts undermines Mr. Wortmann’s

argument. While the ALJ did not go into great detail about persuasiveness, this does

not constitute error, especially when the balance of the opinion supports his

findings. See Sloan v. Saul, 933 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 2019).

Two state-agency psychology experts found that Mr. Wortmann would be

limited to simple work with only incidental interpersonal contact. Tr. 112-124. The

ALJ found these opinions generally persuasive, but somewhat vague. 7r. 23. The

ALJ did not use the experts’ language verbatim in the RFC, but an ALJ is not bound

to rely on any particular medical opinion and can decline to incorporate any portions

of an opinion that he deems inconsistent with the record as a whole. See Prosch v.

Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000); Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 897

(8th Cir. 2011); Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016). Also, the

RFC accounted for mental limitations, despite the ALJ observing that Mr.

Wortmann did not treat his symptoms to the extent one would expect if the

conditions were disabling.

Mr. Wortmann has not shown that the ALJ erred in how he evaluated the

medical opinion evidence.

IV. Conclusion

The ALJ applied proper legal standards in evaluating Mr. Wortmann’s

claims, and substantial evidence supports the decision to deny benefits.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court affirm the decision

and enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner.

Dated 8 May 2026. ~

ZLYVe_.

LAMA

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