Houser

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LINDA MAI LEE, No. 4:22-CV-01939

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

MORRIS HOUSER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAY 29, 2026

Plaintiff Linda Mai Lee1 filed the instant pro se Section 19832 action in

2022, alleging that prison officials and medical providers at SCI Benner Township

violated her constitutional rights. Presently pending are Defendants’ renewed

motions to dismiss Lee’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’

motions.

I. BACKGROUND

During the pendency of this case, Lee has been transferred multiple times.

When she initiated this lawsuit, she was incarcerated at SCI Albion and filed her

1 Prior to changing her name, Lee—a transgender woman—identified herself as “Ms. S. Hayes.”

See Doc. 2-1 at 1; Doc. 72. That previous name appears throughout the record.

2 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

Section 1983 complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District

of Pennsylvania.3 However, because both the events underlying the lawsuit and

the named defendants primarily concerned SCI Benner Township (which is located

in the Middle District of Pennsylvania), the Western District transferred the case to

this Court.4

From SCI Albion, Lee was transferred to Nevada Southern Detention

Center,5 and then to Oregon State Penitentiary,6 where she remained for several

years. In January 2026, Lee notified the Court that she was being moved out of

Oregon State Penitentiary and was currently in the custody of the U.S. Marshal

Service but did not know her new facility of incarceration.7 Over four months

have passed since that time, yet Lee has not informed the Court of her new facility

of confinement or updated mailing address.

Shortly after the case was transferred to this Court by the Western District of

Pennsylvania, Lee filed an amended complaint.8 That complaint remains the

operative pleading in this action. In her amended complaint, Lee sues eight

identified defendants: Facility Manager Morris Houser, Lieutenant Kauffman,

Deputy Superintendent Bradley Booher, PREA/PRC Staff Jennifer Rossman,

3 See Doc. 2-1 at 1.

4 See Docs. 4, 5.

5 See Doc. 37 at 1.

6 See Doc. 45 at 1.

7 See Doc. 109 at 1.

8 Doc. 12.

CHCA Boland, CHCA Ardery, Doctor Kollman, and Doctor Dancha.9 She also

named “John/Jane Doe[]s” as defendants, but those unidentified actors were later

dismissed from this litigation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).10

Additionally, although a second prisoner-plaintiff—Joel Marrero—was named in

the lawsuit,11 Marrero was dismissed from this case for failure to comply with the

Court’s 30-day Administrative Order requiring either a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis or the full filing fee.12 In her lawsuit, Lee seeks injunctive relief as well

as compensatory and punitive damages.13

Defendants Dr. Kollman and Dr. Dancha (collectively “Medical

Defendants”), as well as defendants Houser, Kauffman, Booher, Rossman, Boland,

and Ardery (collectively “DOC Defendants”) filed motions to dismiss the amended

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).14 The Court

granted those motions and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.15

However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated that

dismissal and remanded the case, finding that the Court had gone beyond the

confines of acceptable material to consider at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.16

9 Id. at 1.

10 See Docs. 99, 108.

11 See Doc. 2-1 at 1; Doc. 12 at 1.

12 See Doc. 28; see also Doc. 51 at 1 n.5.

13 See Doc. 12 at 12-13.

14 See generally Docs. 22, 29.

15 See generally Docs. 51, 52.

16 See generally Doc. 59-2.

Notably, the panel expressly stated, “[W]e decline to evaluate the

sufficiency of [Lee’s] pleading . . . before the District Court has occasion to do so.

Instead, we vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand this matter for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.”17 The Court thus observed that “there

remain unresolved sufficiency-of-the-pleading arguments that must be addressed

before this case proceeds further,” and gave Defendants the opportunity to renew

their Rule 12(b)(6) motions in a manner that complies with the Third Circuit’s

nonprecedential opinion.18

Both the DOC Defendants and the Medical Defendants have renewed their

motions to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.19 Those motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”20 The

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.21 In

17 Id. at 6.

18 See Doc. 99 & n.2.

19 See generally Docs. 101, 105, respectively.

20 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

21 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also

consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as

undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.22

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.23 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”24 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.25 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”26

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”27

Because Lee proceeds pro se, her pleadings are to be liberally construed and

her amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

22 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

23 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

24 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

25 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

26 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”28 This is particularly true

when the pro se litigant, like Lee, is incarcerated.29

III. DISCUSSION

Lee alleges that she was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in 2018 at a

different state prison and prescribed hormone replacement therapy (HRT).30 In

January 2021, she was transferred to SCI Benner Township, where she claims that

prison officials and medical providers violated her constitutional rights.

In her amended complaint, Lee asserts “cause of action one” and “cause of

action two,”31 appearing to focus on two unrelated series of events at SCI Benner

Township. In the first “cause of action,” Lee maintains that from approximately

March to September 2021, multiple Defendants acted with deliberate indifference

to her serious medical need of gender dysphoria.32 In the second “cause of action,”

Lee alleges that she was issued a false misconduct in April 2022 and wrongfully

placed in administrative detention, which led her to engage in a hunger strike and

then cut her right arm “from wrist to elbow” in an attempted suicide.33

During the first round of Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice, the Court liberally

interpreted the amended complaint as asserting, in cause of action one, several

28 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

29 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

30 Doc. 12 at 4.

31 See id. at 2.

32 See id. at 3-6.

33 See id. at 9-12.

Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.34

And in cause of action two, the Court determined that Lee was attempting to raise

an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide and a

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.35 None of the parties have

challenged this initial framing,36 and each party’s renewed brief seems to largely

be a carbon copy of the initial round of Rule 12(b)(6) briefing that occurred in

2023. The Court will therefore assess the sufficiency of the amended complaint

with an eye toward its original framing of the claims asserted.

A. Eighth Amendment Medical Indifference

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has

34 See Doc. 51 at 15-19.

35 See id. at 20-25.

36 Lee contends that in one paragraph of the amended complaint, she alleged a claim under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. See Doc. 107 at 2

(citing Doc. 12 at 5 ¶ 10). But even construing the pro se amended complaint liberally, it

cannot be said that Lee’s single paragraph recounting that she had mentioned the ADA in her

prison grievances is sufficient to put Defendants on notice that she is attempting to raise an

ADA claim in her federal lawsuit. This is particularly true when the ADA is not mentioned

anywhere else in the amended complaint, especially the “Jurisdiction/Claims” section where

Lee outlines the federal claims purportedly asserted in each “cause of action.” See Doc. 12 at

2. Nor has Lee discussed the elements of an ADA claim in her pleading. Moreover, she has

not identified whom this claim is asserted against, although it appears to target CHCA Boland.

See id. at 5 ¶ 10. To the extent that Lee seeks to assert an individual liability claim under the

ADA against Boland (or any other Defendant), that claim would fail, as there is no individual

liability under the ADA. See Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 145 (3d Cir. 2025); see also

Williams v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 870 F.3d 294, 299 & n.27 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding

that Title VII and ADA claims cannot be brought through a “back door to the federal

courthouse” via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and noting that Title VII and ADA claims are intended to

impose liability on employers, not individuals); Fasano v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 457 F.3d

274, 289 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting in dicta that “neither the ADA nor 12 U.S.C. § 1831j permit

individual damages liability on the part of employees”).

incarcerated.”37 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim

regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had

a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that

need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.”38 A serious

medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment

or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.”39

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of

injury.40 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”41 Claims

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.42

Lee’s amended complaint contains several instances where she believes the

Medical or DOC Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to her gender

37 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

38 Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

39 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

40 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

at 346).

41 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

42 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

dysphoria. First, she alleges that on March 8, 2021, she wrote to PREA/PRC Staff

Rossman and asked to purchase several makeup products, but Rossman denied the

request.43 Two months later, Lee wrote a letter to Facility Manager Houser

regarding Rossman’s denial and included a request to purchase “cup style bras”

rather than sports bras, as sports bras are a “binding garment” that is not suitable

for breast development.44 Lee alleges that Houser responded, acknowledging that

the items were approved under prison policy but currently out of stock and denying

the request.45 Lee further asserts that on June 15, 2021, she filed a formal

grievance (#932509) about these issues, but that grievance was denied at all

levels.46

In her second medical indifference claim, Lee alleges that in February 2021,

CHCA Boland denied her requests for treatment for male pattern baldness and

“face/body hair removal,”47 reasoning that these treatments were “cosmetic

procedures.”48 Lee claims that she followed up with a detailed letter to Boland

explaining why the requested treatments were not “cosmetic” but in fact treatment

for gender dysphoria, but received no response.49 Lee once again filed a formal

43 Doc. 12 at 4 ¶ 6.

44 Id. at 4 ¶ 7.

45 Id.

46 Id. at 5 ¶ 9.

47 Lee does not allege in her amended complaint what specific treatments she requested to treat

male pattern baldness or for facial and body hair removal.

48 Doc. 12 at 5 ¶ 10.

49 Id.

grievance (#918898), which was likewise denied at all levels.50 Notably, Lee

asserts that in CHCA Boland’s initial grievance response, Boland explained that

Dr. Kollman and Dr. Dancha “both concured [sic] that the request was cosmetic”

and “not medically necessary.”51

Lee further avers that on August 31, 2021, she saw Dr. LeCleric (who is not

a defendant in this case), and Dr. LeCleric allegedly agreed that the requested

treatments for male pattern baldness and hair removal were medically necessary

for a transgender female.52 According to Lee, Dr. LeCleric spoke privately with

CHCA Audrey during the August 31 examination and then informed Lee that she

would receive a formal written answer concerning these issues.53 On September 1,

2021, Lee received that response, which stated that Dr. Dancha had determined

that Lee “was to use the facility barber to remove her face/body hair,” which would

include her breast and pubic areas.54 Lee promptly wrote another grievance

(#944820), which she asserts was rejected several days later.55

To summarize, Lee raises two claims of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. In her first claim, she alleges that PREA/PRC Staff Rossman and

50 Id. at 5 ¶ 11.

51 Id.

52 Id. at 5 ¶ 12.

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Id. Lee’s amended complaint contains additional allegations about subsequent events at SCI

Albion. See id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 13-15. These events, and any claims implicated, are not part of this

litigation.

Facility Manager Houser improperly denied her requests for cup bras and gender

affirming makeup items. In her second claim, she alleges that CHCA Boland,

CHCA Audrey, Facility Manager Houser, Dr. Dancha, and Dr. Kollman

improperly denied her requests for certain unspecified treatments for male pattern

baldness and facial and body hair removal.

Defendants do not contest that Lee’s diagnosed gender dysphoria is a serious

medical need. Rather, they maintain that she has failed to allege the requisite

personal involvement or deliberate indifference.

Lee’s first claim plausibly alleges deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs by PREA/PRC Staff Rossman and Facility Manager Houser. Lee avers that

she requested gender affirming makeup and medically necessary bras for her

diagnosed gender dysphoria, and those requests were denied by Rossman and

Houser without an adequate reason. Lee further alleges facts indicating that these

Defendants were aware of her gender dysphoria diagnosis.56 Although the

grievance records reflect a much more factually complicated situation,57 those

56 See Doc. 12 at 4 ¶¶ 3-7.

57 See generally Doc. 30-2. Lee’s initial grievance indicates that she was grieving “the lack of

ad[equate] gender expression items offered in the commissary” and the fact that her requests

to purchase certain out-of-stock items from an outside vendor were denied. See id. at 8-9. Lee

sought as the sole remedy that she be permitted to purchase the requested items from an outside

vendor. See id. Notably, Lee does not request monetary compensation in her initial grievance

or appeal filings, despite her claim for money damages in the instant lawsuit and DC-ADM

804 specifically mandating, “If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally

available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial

grievance.” COMMW. OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., Policy Statement DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(11)(d)

(2015), https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-

documents are beyond the scope of the Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry.58 At the pleading

stage, Lee’s first medical indifference allegations suffice to state a claim for relief

against Rossman and Houser.

Lee’s second Eighth Amendment claim plausibly alleges deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs by CHCA Boland, Dr. Dancha, and Dr.

Kollman only. Lee alleges that these Defendants denied her requests for hair-

related treatment for gender dysphoria without a reasonable medical basis.

Although the Medical Defendants contend that Lee is alleging a mere disagreement

as to care provided, the Court disagrees. Lee alleges that Defendants denied

medically necessary treatment based on an erroneous conclusion (lacking medical

support) that her requested treatment was “cosmetic” only. To the extent that the

Medical Defendants argue that Lee’s requested treatment was not “medically

necessary,”59 that issue is beyond the scope of a motion to dismiss.

Nevertheless, Lee’s second medical indifference claim must be dismissed as

to several Defendants. The single allegation that Dr. LeCleric talked with CHCA

Ardery on one occasion and then Lee received a formal, written denial of his

policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf (last visited May 22, 2026). It is unknown

whether Lee sought monetary damages as part of grievance number 918898 or 944820

concerning her second medical indifference claim.

58 In this regard, Lee has attached numerous documents to her brief in opposition to Defendants’

motions to dismiss. See Docs. 107-2 through 107-14. These documents are also off-limits at

the motion-to-dismiss stage, as they are not part of the amended complaint nor relied on

therein.

59 See Doc. 106 at 10.

request for hair-related treatments does not plausibly allege deliberate indifference

by Ardery. This is especially true where Ardery expressly relied on the medical

opinion of Dr. Dancha.60 Ardery, who is not a medical professional, cannot be

held liable for relying on the medical decision of a qualified medical expert.61

Additionally, Lee’s second medical indifference claim fails against Facility

Manager Houser. The only allegation in this claim is that Houser upheld the initial

grievance denial. It is well settled, however, that mere participation in the post-

incident grievance process is insufficient to allege personal involvement for a

Section 1983 claim.62

In sum, Lee has plausibly alleged two different claims of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. The first claim, regarding denial of

medically necessary cup bras and gender affirming makeup supplies, is plausibly

alleged against PREA/PRC Staff Rossman and Facility Manager Houser, in their

individual capacities. The second claim, regarding the denial of hair-related

60 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that nonmedical prison officials

are not “chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate

indifference” unless they have a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or

other medical staff are mistreating or not treating a prisoner).

61 See id. (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official

will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”).

62 See Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of

personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of

[plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015)

(collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential);

Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining

that prisoner’s claims against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the

allegations against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance

process”).

treatments, is plausibly alleged against CHCA Boland, Dr. Dancha, and Dr.

Kollman, in their individual capacities. Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be

denied with respect to these foregoing medical indifference claims.

As a final note, the Court observes that it is unclear what particular harm Lee

is claiming she suffered from the alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs. She vaguely alleges “pain and suffering” at the conclusion of her amended

complaint.63 Defendants, however, have not challenged this element in their

motions to dismiss, so the Court declines to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims

on this basis at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

B. False Misconduct and Self-Harm Episode

In the second half of her amended complaint, Lee discusses “cause of action

two.” She alleges that she was issued a false misconduct on April 27, 2022, in

which she was accused of possessing “K-2” and bringing that controlled substance

into the prison through legal mail.64 Lee alleges that she was not permitted to

explain her position or otherwise defend herself that day and thus immediately

began a “hunger strike,” refusing all food and liquids.65

The next day, Lee alleges that she spoke directly with Facility Manager

Houser and Deputy Superintendent Booher, informing them that she was initiating

63 See Doc. 12 at 13.

64 Id. at 9 ¶¶ 3-4.

65 Id. at 9 ¶ 6.

a hunger strike due to the purportedly false misconduct.66 According to Lee,

Houser responded that if her mail was actual legal mail rather than contraband, the

misconduct would be dismissed.67

Lee alleges that she continuously refused meals from lunch on April 27

through breakfast on May 2, 2022—17 meals over five days.68 She claims that on

May 2, she was seen by medical for the first time, but the nurse did not take any

blood or urine samples and provided only a 3-minute examination.69 Later that

day, Lee alleges that she “found a razor blade on the floor of her RHU cell” and

used it to cut her right arm “from wrist to elbow.”70 She was immediately treated

by a nurse and then sent for emergency care at an outside hospital, where she

received 17 stitches to close the wound.71

As noted above, the Court previously construed Lee’s amended complaint as

asserting a claim of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to the risk of

suicide and a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against some

of the DOC Defendants. Lee concedes that this second cause of action does not

implicate the Medical Defendants.72 However, she fails to state a claim for relief

in “cause of action two.” The Court will explain the numerous deficiencies with

66 Id. at 10 ¶ 8.

67 Id.

68 Id. at 10 ¶ 9; id. at 11 ¶ 13.

69 Id. at 10 ¶ 10.

70 Id. at 10 ¶ 11.

71 Id.

72 See Doc. 107 at 2.

any Section 1983 claim Lee may be attempting to raise in this portion of her

amended complaint.

1. No Section 1983 Claim for False Misconduct Alone

As the Court explained in its August 2023 Memorandum,73 there is no

constitutional tort claim for simply receiving a false misconduct, even if that false

charge affects a protected liberty interest. The filing of a false misconduct report,

in itself, does not violate an inmate’s due process rights.74 As the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit aptly explained in Freeman v. Rideout, an

“inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or

wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected

liberty interest. The plaintiff, as all other prison inmates, has the right not to be

deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of law.”75 Thus, to the

extent that Lee is attempting to claim that her constitutional rights were violated by

being falsely charged with and found guilty of possession of a controlled

substance, that claim is a nonstarter.

73 See Doc. 51 at 23-24.

74 See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808

F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1986)); Seville v. Martinez, 130 F. App’x 549, 551 (3d Cir. 2005)

(nonprecedential).

75 Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951 (emphasis added).

2. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

It is possible that Lee is attempting to assert a procedural due process claim

with respect to the purportedly false misconduct and her placement in the RHU

during the investigation (and possibly as punishment). If so, that claim fails, too.

To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural due

process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual

interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide

‘due process of law.’”76 If a plaintiff cannot identify a protected interest that is “at

stake,” the analysis is at an end.77

Lee cannot state a procedural due process claim because she has not

identified a protected interest that is at stake. Lee has alleged only brief

administrative (and possibly disciplinary) detention in the RHU, which does not

implicate a protected liberty interest.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that disciplinary

segregation alone—under conditions that mirror those “imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation and protective custody”—generally does not reflect an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

76 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki,

227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).

77 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35.

incidents of prison life” such that it implicates a protected liberty interest under the

Fourteenth Amendment.78 And the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation for periods much longer

than that which Lee experienced does not rise to the level of an atypical and

significant hardship.79 Therefore, because Lee has not identified a protected liberty

interest that is at stake for a procedural due process claim, the analysis is at an end

and this claim must be dismissed.

Furthermore, assuming only for the sake of argument that Lee had identified

a protected interest, she has not alleged that she was denied any of the due process

protections mandated for prison disciplinary proceedings.80 Thus, for both reasons,

she has failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.

3. No Section 1983 Claim for Failure to Follow Policy

Several times in “cause of action two,” Lee alleges that prison officials

failed to adhere to certain DOC policy concerning hunger strikes.81 The problem

78 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995).

79 See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months); Torres v. Fauver,

292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (135 days); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir.

1997) (fifteen months); Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 725 (540 days).

80 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974) (requiring (1) the right to appear before

an impartial decision-making body; (2) written notice of the charge(s) at least 24 hours in

advance of the disciplinary hearing; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence (so long as the presentation of such evidence is not “unduly hazardous

to institutional safety or correctional goals”); (4) if the inmate is illiterate or complex issues

are involved, assistance from another inmate or a staff member; and (5) a written decision by

the factfinder setting forth the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action).

81 See Doc. 12 at 9 ¶ 7; id. at 10 ¶ 8; id. at 11 ¶ 13.

with such allegations, however, is that a violation of prison policy is not equivalent

to a constitutional infringement. It is axiomatic that “a prison policy manual does

not have the force of law” and that “a violation of internal policy does not

automatically rise to the level of a Constitutional violation.”82 Lee’s claim that

certain Defendants failed to comply with DOC policy regarding hunger strikes, in

itself, does not plausibly state a constitutional violation.

4. Eighth Amendment Indifference to Risk of Suicide

The gravamen of Lee’s second “cause of action” appears to be a claim that

several DOC Defendants (Ardery, Houser, and Booher) acted with deliberate

indifference to her risk of self-harm or suicide. Notably, although she alleges that

she was not properly monitored by medical staff during her five-day hunger strike,

the only harm she asserts is her attempt to take her own life on May 2, 2022. Thus,

her Eighth Amendment allegations sound in deliberate indifference to the risk of

suicide or self-harm rather than deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

This framing is bolstered by Lee’s “Jurisdiction/Claims” section of her amended

82 Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 556 n.24 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see Bracey

v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 571 F. App’x 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (noting that “a

violation of prison policy is insufficient by itself to support an argument for deliberate

indifference” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Bullard v. Scism, 449 F. App’x

232, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explaining that, even if prison officials violated a

regulation, such a violation “is not actionable”); Jordan v. Rowley, No. 1:16-CV-1261, 2017

WL 2813294, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2017); Williamson v. Garman, No. 3:15-CV-1797,

2017 WL 2702539, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2017); see also United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d

194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that even violations of state law will not automatically have a

“constitutional dimension”).

complaint,83 as well as her failure to object to the Court’s prior construction of her

Section 1983 claims.

To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference to the

risk of suicide or self-harm, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the individual

had a particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning there was a “strong likelihood,

rather than a mere possibility,” that a suicide would be attempted; (2) the prison

official knew or should have known of the individual’s particular vulnerability; and

(3) that the official acted with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning

something beyond mere negligence, to the individual’s particular vulnerability.84

The vulnerability to suicide “must be so obvious that a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for preventative action.”85

Lee fails to plausibly allege that any Defendant knew or should have known

she had a particular vulnerability to suicide or that any Defendant acted with

reckless or deliberate indifference to that vulnerability. While she informed

several Defendants that she was on a hunger strike, there are no plausible facts

alleged that any DOC Defendant knew Lee had a particular vulnerability to suicide

or acted with reckless or deliberate indifference to that vulnerability.

83 See Doc. 12 at 2 (describing “cause of action two” as implicating deliberate indifference and

“failure to protect,” as well as the denial of “due process”).

84 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby

Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988) (Colburn I), Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946

F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991) (Colburn II); Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.

2005).

85 Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 222.

In one paragraph of her amended complaint, she states in conclusory fashion

that “the defendants were aware of [her] suicide history,”86 but that is nothing more

than a legal conclusion which may be disregarded. Lee also maintains that certain

prison policy regarding medical monitoring was not followed, but such

allegations—in and of themselves—do not implicate reckless or deliberate

indifference to a risk of suicide. Simply put, Lee’s pleading is wholly devoid of

facts demonstrating that “a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

preventative action” in Lee’s circumstances.

In sum, Lee’s amended complaint fails to plausibly allege the second and

third elements of a claim of deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide. Dismissal

of that claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is therefore required.87

C. Official Capacity Claims

Lee sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.88

However, any official capacity claim seeking monetary damages from state

officials is barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

86 Doc. 12 at 10 ¶ 8.

87 To the extent that Lee’s amended complaint can be construed as raising an Eighth Amendment

“failure-to-protect” claim, that claim would likewise require dismissal for similar reasons.

That is, there are no allegations establishing that any DOC Defendant was aware of, or acted

with deliberate indifference to, a serious risk to Lee’s health or safety (i.e., a potential for

attempting suicide). See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other

grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). Nor is there any plausible allegation

that any DOC Defendant’s deliberate indifference caused Lee’s harm, i.e., her suicide attempt.

See id.

88 See Doc. 12 at 1.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or citizens of foreign

states—brought against a state.89 This immunity from private suit extends to state

agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity, because such

lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”90 States may waive

this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983.91 There are two

exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting

states: (1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue

state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.”92

Lee seeks compensatory and punitive damages. To the extent these

monetary damages are sought against Defendants in their official capacities, such

claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Lee also requests

the following injunctive relief: (1) requiring Defendants to provide appropriate

medical care for her gender dysphoria, (2) changing certain DOC policy

definitions, (3) ordering the United States Department of Justice to investigate the

89 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997);

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).

90 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

91 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.

2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 42

PA. CONS. STAT. § 8521(b)).

92 Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)

(emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

claims in “cause of action two,” and (4) requiring a change to DOC “802 prison

policy.”93 However, Lee is no longer in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections, and thus any such claims for prospective injunctive

relief as part of this lawsuit are moot.94 Additionally, any claims for prospective

injunctive relief involving “cause of action two” must be dismissed because there

is no underlying constitutional violation alleged.

D. Leave to Amend

Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment

would be inequitable or futile.”95 Further leave to amend will be denied because

Lee has failed to cure the deficiencies with her pleadings even after “amendments

previously allowed.”96 Moreover, this case has languished for nearly four years,

during which time Lee has had ample opportunity to seek leave to amend. Thus,

this case will proceed on the remaining individual capacity Eighth Amendment

medical indifference claims against Jennifer Rossman, Morris Houser, CHCA

Boland, Dr. Dancha, and Dr. Kollman set forth in more detail herein.

93 See Doc. 12 at 12-13.

94 See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) (“An inmate’s transfer from the

facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”); see also Abdul-

Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1993).

95 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

96 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part

Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge