VEMAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX VEMAN : CIVIL ACTION

:

:

v. : NO. 5:25-cv-00291-JLS

:

CITY OF EASTON, ET AL. :

:

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. APRIL 8, 2026

Plaintiff, a deaf man who relies on American Sign Language (“ASL”) as his primary means

of communication, brought this action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 and

42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Defendants City of Easton, Easton Police Department, Officer

Matthew Snyder, Easton Hospital, Northampton County, Northampton Department of

Corrections, and Northampton County Assistant District Attorney Robert Eyer (“ADA Eyer”), in

his official and individual capacities, have consciously chosen to operate with a flagrant disregard

for the rights of deaf individuals, by failing to provide interpreter services.

In his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully arrested

despite being the victim of an assault on January 18, 2023, that resulted in serious injuries.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “[d]espite Plaintiff’s visible injuries and desperate attempts to

communicate, Defendant City of Easton, Defendant Easton Police Department, and Defendant

Officer Snyder failed to obtain a qualified interpreter, or any other effective aids for

communication to ensure effective communication with Plaintiff. Defendant Officer Snyder did

not get any statement from Plaintiff, either written or through ASL. Plaintiff was wrongfully

arrested based entirely on the verbal statements of self-interested witnesses.” [ECF 17 at ¶ 6.]

Following his arrest, Plaintiff claims he was incarcerated at Northampton County Prison for four

days, during which he was denied effective communication through qualified ASL interpreters,

necessary medical care for his significant injuries and communication with family or counsel.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant ADA Eyer subsequently initiated and maintained a

malicious prosecution against him for nearly two years, despite possessing substantial exculpatory

evidence, until Plaintiff was ultimately acquitted by a jury.

Defendants Northampton County, Northampton Department of Corrections and ADA Eyer

filed a collective “partial motion to dismiss Complaint on behalf of Defendant, Northampton

County, Northampton County Department of Corrections, and Northampton County Assistant

District Attorney Robert Eyer.” [ECF 27.] As part of the motion, ADA Eyer contended that the

action should be dismissed as to him in his individual capacity based on the doctrines of absolute

and qualified immunity and in his official capacity based on the Eleventh Amendment. [Id. at p.3.]

After careful consideration of the Motion, the Court decided it would be best to allow this case to

proceed to the discovery phase after which the moving Defendants could file a motion for summary

judgment based on a full record. Therefore, by Order dated August 26, 2025, the Court, in part,

denied “Defendant Northampton County’s motion to dismiss.” [ECF 44.] The Court did not

specify in its Order whether it was denying the motion only as to Defendants Northampton County

and Northampton Department of Corrections and not to ADA Eyer. Before the Court could clarify

its intent, ADA Eyer, on August 28, 2025, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit, thereby divesting this Court of further jurisdiction over this issue. [ECF 45.]

On October 27, 2025, ADA Eyer filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure requesting the Court clarify whether its Order denying the Northampton

County Defendants motion to dismiss applied to Defendant ADA Eyer as well. [ECF 57.] After

reviewing the motion, the Court concluded that its August 26, 2025 Order did not apply to ADA

Eyer. However, since an appeal to the Third Circuit had already been taken, thereby divesting the

Court of jurisdiction to consider the Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the Court issued an Order pursuant to

Rule 62.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stating it was “inclined to grant the outstanding

Rule 60(b)(1) motion and clarify that the portion of its Order of August 26, 2025 denying the

Northampton County’s motion to dismiss applied only to Defendants Northampton County and

Northampton Department of Corrections and not to Defendant ADA Eyer, thereby obviating the

need for an appeal by ADA Eyer.” [ECF 61.] The Court further indicated that it would then

“independently consider ADA Eyer’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint as to him in his

individual capacity based on absolute and qualified immunity and in his official capacity based on

the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. On March 9, 2026, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

remanded the case to this Court “for the limited purposes of considering Defendant Robert Eyer’s

motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” [ECF 64.] The Court now considers those issues.

Under Rule 60(b)(1), a party may move for relief from judgment based on a “mistake,”

which includes legal error. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533-34 (2022). In its Order

of August 26, 2025, the Court did not specify whether it was denying the Northampton County

Defendants motion to dismiss only as to Defendants Northampton County and Northampton

Department of Corrections and not to ADA Eyer. [ECF 44.] The Court wishes to do so now and

therefore will grant ADA Eyer’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion. The Court now will address ADA Eyer’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint as to him in his individual capacity based

on absolute immunity and to dismiss the Amended Complaint as to him in his official capacity

based on the Eleventh Amendment.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations ... raise a right to relief above the

speculative level’” has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim

for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense”).

“Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for the decision to initiate a prosecution, for

evaluation of evidence collected by investigators, and even for failure to conduct adequate

investigation before filing charges.” Fuchs v. Mercer Cty., 260 F. App’x 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2008)

(internal citations omitted). See also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d Cir.

1992). But “absolute immunity does not extend to ‘[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and

those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a

prosecution or for judicial proceedings.’” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). When a defendant

asserts absolute immunity, “the onus is on the prosecutor to demonstrate

that absolute immunity should attach to each act he [or she] allegedly committed that gave rise to

a cause of action.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

In analyzing whether absolute immunity attaches, courts first “ascertain just what conduct

forms the basis for the plaintiff's cause of action.” Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 625 (3d Cir.

2024) (citation omitted). Second, courts “determine what function (prosecutorial, administrative,

investigative, or something else entirely) that act served.” Id. This analysis “focuses on the

unique facts of each case and requires careful dissection of the prosecutor's actions.” Id. at

627 (quoting Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 2008)). However, the “ultimate analysis

is whether a defendant has established absolute prosecutorial immunity from a

given claim.” Fogle, 957 F.3d at 161.

“To earn the protections of absolute immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a defendant

must show that the conduct triggering absolute immunity clearly appears on the face of the

complaint.” Weimer v. Cnty. of Fayette, Pennsylvania, 972 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 2020) (cleaned

up). “[T]hat burden is uniquely heavy” at the motion-to-dismiss stage “because ... ‘it is the

[prosecutor's] conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized.” Fogle, 957 F.3d at

160 (emphasis in original) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)) (citing Odd,

538 F.3d at 207).

In his FAC, Plaintiff asserts a federal Section 1983 claim against ADA Eyer for

malicious prosecution (Count IV), and state law claims for malicious prosecution (Count V) and

reckless infliction of emotional distress. (Count VI). The pertinent allegations are as follows:

From May 2024 through October 2024, Defendant Eyer received

multiple letters and communications from Plaintiff's counsel

detailing extensive exculpatory evidence, including: (1) police

records documenting the pattern of false domestic violence reports

at the same residence by the male attacker and/or his female

companion; (2) photographic evidence contradicting claims of

forced entry; (3) evidence that the male attacker’s female

companion had invited Plaintiff to the residence; and (4)

documentation of the male attacker’s history of violence at the

property. Despite receiving this evidence, Defendant Eyer continued

prosecuting Plaintiff for an additional 5 months until Plaintiff's

acquittal in October 2024. Defendant Eyer's decision to continue

prosecution despite clear exculpatory evidence demonstrated malice

and reckless disregard for Plaintiff's rights.

(FAC ¶ 174.)

The County, under Defendant Eyer's direction, ignored mounting

exculpatory evidence including but not limited to: (1) police

photographs showing intact doors contradicting forced entry claims;

(2) eight documented incidents showing the female companion’s

pattern of making and then retracting assault allegations; and (3)

police reports documenting Ragland's violent conduct at the same

residence. Despite this evidence demonstrating the unreliability of

the complaining witnesses, Defendant Eyer maintained the

prosecution for 21 months, causing Plaintiff substantial harm.

(FAC ¶ 175.)

Defendant Northampton County and Defendant Eyer demonstrated

malice through, inter alia: (1) continuing prosecution despite

photographic evidence disproving forced entry claims central to the

criminal trespass charge; (2) relying solely on statements from the

male attacker and his female companion while knowing their

documented history of false reports to police; (3) refusing to

interview other witnesses; (4) maintaining felony charges for 21

months despite lacking probable cause; and (5) intentionally

disregarding the fact that officers deliberately avoided obtaining

Plaintiff's account of events when arresting him.

(FAC ¶ 176.)

Defendant Eyer demonstrated deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's

constitutional rights by: (1) continuing prosecution while

deliberately preventing Plaintiff from providing exculpatory

evidence by refusing interpreter services; (2) maintaining

prosecution despite documentary evidence of complainants' pattern

of false reports; (3) ignoring extensive photographic and

documentary evidence contradicting the prosecution's theory; and

(4) Proceeding with felony charges carrying potential imprisonment

while knowingly relying on demonstrably unreliable witness

statements.

(FAC ¶ 177.)

In short, Plaintiff alleges that ADA Eyer maintained a prosecution of Plaintiff for 21

months despite failing to consider alleged exculpatory evidence. However, the filing of charges

are at the core of the prosecutorial function, and “[a] prosecutor is absolutely immune when

making [the decision to initiate a prosecution], even where he acts without a good faith belief

that any wrongdoing has occurred.” Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1464. ADA Eyer evaluated the

evidence over a 21-month period and then made a decision to continue the prosecution through

trial. Such actions are textbook prosecutorial functions.

Accordingly, ADA Eyer is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions taken in his

individual capacity. Id.

As to the claims asserted against ADA Eyer in his official capacity, a claim against a

governmental actor in his official capacity “generally represent[s] only another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165 (1985) (citation omitted.) Therefore, in order to establish such a claim, a plaintiff must show

“an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative

proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.” Patterson v. City of

Phila., No. 08–2140, 2009 WL 1259968, at *10 (E.D.Pa. May 1, 2009) (quoting Bielevicz v.

Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.1990)). Under Pennsylvania law, however, assistant district

attorneys such as ADA Eyer do not possess policymaking authority for the District Attorney's

Office. Id.; see also Payson v. Ryan, No. 90–1873, 1992 WL 111341, at * 11 (E.D.Pa. May 14,

1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir.1992). As a result, ADA Eyer cannot be held liable in his

official capacity as a matter of law.

Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s state law claims against ADA Eyer for malicious

prosecution and reckless infliction of emotional distress, ADA Eyer, as a “high public official,”

is entitled to absolute immunity from such state law tort claims. Brown v. City of Philadelphia,

2024 WL 1660544, at *6 (E.D. Pa. April 17, 2024); Joobeen v. City of Phila. Police Dep't, No.

09–1376, 2010 WL 844587, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 4, 2010); Domenech v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 06-1325, 2007 WL 172375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan 18, 2007); Durham v.

McElwyn, 565 Pa. 163, 772 A.2d 68, 69 (Pa.2001) (“To subject assistant district attorneys acting

on behalf of the district attorney to liability would deter all but the most courageous or the most

judgment-proof from vigorously performing their prosecutorial functions, and would result in

criminal going unpunished.”).