Logsdon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

RICHARD LOGSDON

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:23-cv-215-TPB-PRL

BILLIE WOODS, Sheriff, and

WILLIAM OLIVER, Chaplain,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

Richard Logsdon, formerly a pretrial detainee in the Marion County jail,1 sues

Sheriff Billie Woods and Chaplain William Oliver for federal civil rights violations

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the center of Logsdon’s complaint is a jail policy that

requires verification of a prisoner’s religious affiliation before the prisoner is eligible

to receive a religious diet. He proceeds pro se on his Third Amended Complaint. (Doc.

32).

The defendants move to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 82), and

Logsdon responds in opposition (Doc. 88). For the reasons explained herein, the

motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the Third Amended Complaint is dismissed

with prejudice.

1 Logsdon is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections and presently confined at

the Santa Rose Correctional Institution. See Florida DOC Offender Information Search at

https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search (last accessed March 12, 2026).

Logsdon serves a five-year sentence for soliciting a child for unlawful sexual conduct using

computer services or devices in violation of 847.0135(3)(a),F.S. State v. Logsdon, No. 2019-

CF-000123 (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir.).

I. Complaint

Logsdon alleges the following facts in his operative pleading (Doc. 32, at 13–

16): On or about January 14, 2023, Logsdon was booked into the Marion County jail,

at which time he told the booking officer that he is Jewish and requires a kosher diet.

(Id. at 13). The booking officer told Logsdon that a request for kosher food must be

sent to the chaplain for approval. (Id.).

Logsdon submitted a request to Chaplain Oliver for a kosher diet, and on

January 23, 2023, Oliver responded that Logsdon must complete a religious dietary

form. (Id.). On January 24, 2023, Logsdon submitted the completed form. (Id.).

On January 31, 2023, Logsdon submitted another request advising that he had

not received the kosher diet. (Id.). He was given a second form, which he submitted

on February 5, 2023. (Id.). Chaplain Oliver stated that he never received Logsdon’s

first form. (Id., at 14). Logsdon requested to speak to the sector sergeant. (Id.). The

sergeant told Logsdon he would not receive a kosher diet because he failed to provide

a name or phone number to verify his request. (Id.). On February 27, 2023, Logsdon

submitted a request to file a formal grievance but did not receive a response to the

request. (Id.).

On April 9, 2023, Logsdon spoke with Chaplain Oliver about his request for a

kosher diet. (Id.). Chaplain Oliver instructed him to submit a request. (Id.).

On June 11, 2023, Logsdon filed his third request for a kosher diet and

indicated that his religious diet could be verified by contacting the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC). (Id.). On June 13, 2023, Chaplain Oliver

delivered a response that stated, “You were responded to on 1/23/23 and 2/7/23 with

denials due to ‘unable to verify.’” (Id.).

On February 26, 2024, Logsdon submitted a request to Chaplain Oliver and

stated that he wished to participate in kosher foods and prayers for Passover. (Id.,

at 15). On March 4, 2024, Oliver responded, “you will receive information and

guidelines on observance procedures for those on nonkosher meals desiring to observe

Passover.” (Id.). A few days later, Oliver sent Logsdon a form from the Aleph

Institute, which could be used to verify that he is Jewish. (Id.).

On March 14, 2024, Logsdon submitted a request to speak with the sergeant

to file a formal grievance against Chaplain Oliver about the Passover holiday. (Id.).

On March 18, 2024, the request was denied. (Id.).

On March 19, 2024, Chaplain Oliver spoke to Logsdon about the Aleph

Institute form. (Id.). Logsdon explained that he did not need Rabbi Katz to verify

that he is Jewish, and he walked away from Oliver. (Id.).

On March 20, 2024, Logsdon filed a request to speak with the sector sergeant

about the verification policy. (Id.). On March 21, 2024, Chaplain Oliver again told

Logsdon that he needed to verify that he is Jewish to get on the list for the Passover

holiday. (Id., at 16). Logsdon responded that another inmate did not have to get

verification that he is Jewish and that there is no legal basis for the verification

policy. (Id.).

Logsdon alleges that the defendants’ enforcement of the verification policy

violates his constitutional rights and Florida state law.2 (Id., at 12–13). He sues

Sheriff Woods and Chaplain Oliver in both their individual and official capacities.

(Id., at 2). He seeks an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the verification

policy and ordering the defendants to provide him with the kosher meals required by

his Jewish faith. (Id., at 16). He also seeks to recover compensatory and punitive

damages. (Id., at 17).

II. Procedural Background

After initiating this case, Logsdon moved for a preliminary injunction. (Doc.

40). The Court denied the motion and found that Logsdon “failed to meet his burden

to preliminarily enjoin Defendants from enforcing the Jail’s religious verification

policy and require Defendants to provide [him] with kosher meals because he has

failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” (Doc. 56, at 4). The

Court found that Logsdon completed the jail’s Religious Dietary Request Form and

provided the name and number of his brother, John, as the person to contact to verify

his religious affiliation, noting that John was the “worship pastor at his church.” (Id.,

at 6). When Logsdon brother was contacted, he stated that “he was a leader at a

Baptist church and that he could not authenticate [Logsdon’s] religion.” (Id.).

Importantly, the Court found that “the Jail’s verification policy is not a

substantial burden on an inmate’s religious practice under the RLUIPA—nor the

2 In his Third Amended Complaint, Logsdon invokes the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”), Article I, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution, and § 761.03, F.S.

First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.” (Id., at 6). And because Logsdon failed to

provide information to verify his religious affiliation after being afforded multiple

opportunities to do so, he was not entitled to a preliminary injunction. (Id., at 7).

Logsdon appealed the Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. On March

28, 2025, the circuit court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Logsdon’s motion for preliminary injunction. Consistent

with the Court’s ruling, the circuit court found that, “[w]hile the verification policy

may be considered inconvenient, as it requires that Logsdon undertake the additional

step of having his religious affiliation confirmed before he is given a kosher diet, such

a requirement is not enough to constitute a substantial burden on Logsdon’s religious

practices, . . . and the fact that Logsdon’s brother has stated that he cannot verify

Logsdon’s religious affiliation does not turn it into one.” (Doc. 76, at 3).

After the circuit court dismissed the appeal, the Court reopened this action,

and Sheriff Woods and Chaplain Oliver moved to dismiss Logsdon’s Third Amended

Complaint. (Docs. 80;82). Logsdon filed a response in opposition to the motion. (Doc.

88).

III. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

a pleading must include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements

of a cause of action are not sufficient. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, mere naked assertions are not sufficient. Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The court, however, is not bound to accept

as true a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the complaint. Id.

IV. Analysis

Logsdon challenges the jail’s policy that requires verification of his Jewish

religious affiliation before he is eligible to receive a kosher diet. This claim—whether

pleaded under the protections of the Constitution, RLUIPA, or state law—rests on

the same set of factual allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint. (Doc.

32, at 12–16); see Brocato v. Comm’r Hamm, No. 7:24-cv-489, 2026 WL 346007, at *5

(N.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2026) (resolving a prisoner’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim

concurrently with his RLUIPA claim because the claims “rest on the same factual

allegations”).

The First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any law “prohibiting

the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend I. “It applies to the states (and their

political subdivisions) through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing 44

Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996) (citing cases)).

Importantly, however, “[a]lthough prison inmates retain protections afforded by the

First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, prison officials may impose limitations on

an inmate’s exercise of sincerely held religious beliefs if the limitations are

‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Johnson v. Brown, 581 F.

App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

349 (1987)); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). “To plead a valid free exercise

claim, [a plaintiff] must allege that the government has impermissibly burdened one

of his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1294

(11th Cir. 2007); see also Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 801 (11th Cir. 2019)

(citing GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012) (“First

Amendment Free Exercise Clause precedent is clear: a plaintiff must allege a

constitutionally impermissible burden on a sincerely held religious belief to survive

a motion to dismiss.”)).

“The RLUIPA was enacted, in part, to address the ‘frivolous or arbitrary

barriers imped[ing] institutionalized persons’ religious exercise.” Dorman, 36 F.4th

at 1313 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005)). RLUIPA provides,

in pertinent part:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates

that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—1(a). To establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, the plaintiff

must demonstrate his engagement in religious exercise was substantially burdened

by the challenged law, regulation, or practice. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 425

(2022). The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the challenged action is the

least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id.

RLUIPA provides only prospective, injunctive relief. Davila v. Marshall, 649 F. App’x

977, 980 (11th Cir. 2016) (“RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages

against prison officials in their individual capacities.”).

“RLUIPA provides greater religious protection than the First Amendment.”

Dorman, 36 F.4th at 1313. RLUIPA protects inmates “who are unable freely to attend

to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission

and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721; Smith v.

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 844 F. App’x 286, 289 (11th Cir. 2021) (same).

Importantly, the circuit court has recognized that “[i]f a claim fails under the

RLUIPA—which embeds a heightened standard for government restrictions of the

free exercise of religion—it necessarily fails under the First Amendment.” Dorman,

36 F.4th at 1313 (citing Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007))

(“Because we conclude that Mr. Dorman’s free exercise claim fails under the more

protective framework of the RLUIPA, we need not separately discuss the First

Amendment.”).

A. Failure to state a claim

Defendants argue that Logsdon’s Third Amended Complaint must be

dismissed because he fails to allege a violation of his constitutional rights. They

simply argue that the Court’s earlier ruling denying Logsdon’s request for a

preliminary injunction, which was affirmed by the circuit court3—that the jail’s

verification policy does not constitute a substantial burden on Logsdon’s religious

rights—is fatal to Logsdon’s case. (Doc. 82, at 14).

In response, Logsdon argues the opposite: he argues that the jail’s verification

policy4 does impose a substantial burden on the exercise of his sincerely held religious

beliefs. He concedes that he “has never belonged to an organized religious group, but

he still has sincerely held religious beliefs.” (Doc. 88, at 4). He believes that the policy

which requires that his Jewish faith be verified by an outside organization is

unconstitutionally burdensome and that his sincerely held religious beliefs alone

should be sufficient to verify his Jewish faith. (Id., at 6).

3 The circuit court dismissed Logsdon’s appeal after concluding that this Court did not abuse

its discretion in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 76, at 3).

4 The verification policy reads as follows (Doc. 82-1, at 21–22):

3. Religious Services – Religious guidance and scripture study

are provided by the Chaplaincy Program. See posted meeting

schedules. Religious diets may be provided upon receipt of a

written request and approval of the Chaplain.

a. Special religious diets shall only be provided to

those inmates who are members of an organized

religious group requiring adherence to religious

dietary laws.

b. Affiliation with recognized religious groups must

be verified by the Chaplain prior to approval of the

religious diet.

c. All requests for religious diets must be submitted,

in writing, to the Chaplain within 30 days of

arrival at the facility.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court asks whether Logsdon has plausibly

alleged that the jail’s verification policy substantially burdened the exercise of his

Jewish faith. See Dorman, 36 F.4th at 1314 (“[T]he first inquiry under the RLUIPA

is whether Mr. Dorman has plausibly alleged that the 45-day Passover registration

requirement substantially burdened the exercise of his Jewish faith.”). The Court

agrees with Defendants that its prior ruling and the ruling of the circuit court are

determinative here. “Under the law of the case doctrine, courts may not revisit issues

that were decided explicitly or by implication in a prior appeal.” Murray v. Archer,

No. 25-12309, 2026 WL 412020, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (citing Schiavo ex rel.

Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005)). “[T]he law is clear that

[the law of the case doctrine] comprehends things decided by necessary implication as

well as those decided explicitly.” Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437,

1440 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original). “The doctrine’s purpose is to bring an

end to litigation[,] . . . [to] protect[] against the agitation of settled issues and [to]

assure[] obedience of lower courts to the decisions of appellate courts.” Id. (quotations

and citations omitted).

In denying Logsdon’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court found that

the “Jail’s verification policy is not a substantial burden on an inmate’s religious

practice under the RLUIPA—nor the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.”

(Doc. 56, at 6). The Court reasoned:

While it may be considered an inconvenience to have to

provide information to verify one’s religious affiliation, it

does not, however, pressure, force, or coerce Plaintiff or any

other inmate with religious dietary requests to abandon,

forego, confirm, or delay their religious beliefs or practices.

See Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.

2022) (finding the jail’s registration requirement for

inmates to participate in Jewish Passover not to be a

substantial burden on an inmates Jewish faith because it

does not “pressure, force, or coerce” inmates to “abandon,

forego, conform, or delay any of their religious beliefs or

practices”); see also Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d

1317, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding ordinance which

required a rabbi to apply to a zoning board for a special

exception in order to operate a “religious organization” did

not constitute a substantial burden under the RLUIPA

because it did not “coerce conformity of a religious

adherent’s behavior”).

(Id., at 6–7).

Similarly, in dismissing Logsdon’s appeal, the circuit court found that “[t]he

policy with which Logsdon takes issue does not substantially burden his free exercise

of religion[,]” citing both Dorman and Konikov, the cases on which this Court relied.

(Doc. 76, at 3). The circuit court reasoned, “[w]hile the verification policy may be

considered inconvenient, as it requires that Logsdon undertake the additional step of

having his religious affiliation confirmed before he is given a kosher diet, such a

requirement is not enough to constitute a substantial burden on Logsdon’s religious

practices[.]” (Doc. 76, at 3). (emphasis added).

Although this case is in a different procedural posture now (motion-to-dismiss

stage) than it was when the circuit court issued its ruling (appeal from a denial of a

preliminary injunction), the Court concludes that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars

reconsideration of whether the jail’s verification policy substantially burdened the

exercise of Logsdon’s religious rights. None of the common exceptions to this doctrine

are relevant as no change in controlling authority has occurred and application of the

doctrine will not result in manifest injustice. See Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure

Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005). And, although this Court considered

evidence that showed Logsdon could not authenticate his Jewish religion before

denying the preliminary injunction, that evidence is not “substantially different”

from—but rather, consistent with—the facts alleged in the Third Amended

Complaint. See id. (explaining that the doctrine may not apply when “substantially

different evidence is produced”). Indeed, the “issue presented” has not changed now

that this case has returned from appeal. Cf. id. (“When the record changes [on

remand from an appeal], which is to say when the evidence and the inferences that

may be drawn from it change, the issue presented changes as well.”). Logsdon

continues to allege (as he did in his motion for preliminary injunction and on appeal)

that he was denied a kosher diet because he was unable to verify his Jewish faith,

and the verification policy imposes an impermissible burden on his exercise of his

sincerely held religious beliefs. (Doc. 32, at 16). The law-of-the-case doctrine

precludes reconsideration of the circuit court’s ruling that Logsdon’s claim fails

because the requirement that he verify his faith does not “constitute a substantial

burden on Logsdon’s religious practices[.]” (Doc. 76, at 3). Accordingly, Logsdon’s

claims under RLUIPA and the First Amendment must be dismissed.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the claims

asserted against them in their individual capacities. “Qualified immunity offers

complete protection for individual public officials performing discretionary functions

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690

F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). To receive qualified immunity, an official must first

“establish that he or she acted within the scope of discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332, 1340 (11th Cir.

2022). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that (1)

the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 1340–41. Thus, a motion to

dismiss on qualified immunity grounds “will be granted if the complaint fails to allege

the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” St. George v. Pinellas

Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

There is no dispute that Defendants acted within the scope of their

discretionary authority at all relevant times. Accordingly, the Court considers

whether the Third Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendants Woods

and Oliver violated Logsdon’s clearly established constitutional rights.

1. Sheriff Woods

Sheriff Woods argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because

Logsdon neglects to allege any facts that he violated Logsdon’s constitutional rights.

(Doc. 82, at 8). Although Logsdon alleges in one sentence that Sheriff Woods

“authorized the use of this [verification] form and has agreed with [Chaplain] Oliver,”

this singular allegation is insufficient, Sheriff Woods argues, because no facts support

the allegation. (Id.) (citing Doc. 32, at 14). Sheriff Woods emphasizes that Logsdon

fails to allege any facts that show he was aware of Logsdon and his demands, he

interacted with Logsdon, or that he participated in any decisions concerning

Logsdon’s requests. (Id.).

In response, Logsdon points to the Introduction to the Marion County Jail

Inmate Rules and Regulations Handbook, which provides that “[t]he rules and

regulations in this handbook are subject to change at the discretion of the Sheriff

and/or his designee.” (Doc. 88, at 3) (citing Doc. 82-1, at 2). He argues that Sheriff

Woods authorized the verification policy at issue because the Handbook states that it

“is reviewed at least once each year, and necessary revisions made.” (Id.).

Sheriff Woods is entitled to dismissal of the individual-capacity claim alleged

against him because Logsdon neglects to allege sufficient facts to show that he was

personally involved the alleged constitutional violation. An earlier screening order

cautioned Logsdon that “[t]o state a plausible claim for relief, the facts alleged by the

Plaintiff must contain sufficient allegations to show that the individual defendant

personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation.” (Doc. 6, at 6)

(emphasis in original) (citing Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)).

There is no vicarious liability for constitutional claims against individual government

actors: “[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for

his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; see Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga.,

749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that generally, supervisory officials

are not liable under § 1983 for the acts or omissions of their subordinates based on a

theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability). The Court’s earlier screening

order cautioned Logsdon that he must “clearly describe how each named defendant is

involved in the alleged constitutional violation(s) in the body of the complaint.” (Doc.

6, at 3) (emphasis in original). Logsdon neglected to do so.

Logsdon’s bare allegation that Sheriff Woods “authorized the use of this

[verification] form and has agreed with [Chaplain] Oliver” is not supported by any

other facts. (Doc. 32, at 14). Logsdon alleges no facts to show the circumstances

surrounding Sheriff Wood’s authorization of the verification form or to show how he

agreed with Chaplain Oliver or about what matter he agreed with Chaplain Oliver.

This allegation, standing alone, is not “enough to raise a right to relief [against Sheriff

Woods] above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Instead, it amounts

to a conclusory statement in support of a threadbare recital of the elements. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that the law requires something more “than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”).

Furthermore, Logsdon cannot save his claim by arguing that the Handbook’s

Introduction shows that Sheriff Woods was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violations. A complaint may not be amended by briefs in opposition to

a motion to dismiss. See Huls v. Llabona, 437 F. App’x 830, 832 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011)

(citing Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Regardless, the Handbook’s Introduction merely states that the Handbook is subject

to change at the Sheriff’s discretion and that the Handbook is reviewed annually by

an unidentified person or entity. Nothing in the Handbook’s Introduction shows that

Sheriff Woods was personally involved in applying the verification policy to Logsdon’s

request for kosher meals. Because Logsdon’s Third Amended Complaint alleges

insufficient facts to show Sheriff Woods personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violation, the claim asserted against him in his individual capacity

must be dismissed.5

2. Chaplain Oliver

Chaplain Oliver argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because

Logsdon fails to show that he violated Logsdon’s clearly established constitutional

rights by requiring that he verify his Jewish faith before being eligible for a kosher

diet. Oliver argues, and the Court agrees, that the Court’s earlier ruling that the

jail’s verification policy does not constitute a substantial burden on Logsdon’s

constitutional rights, and the circuit court’s consistent ruling, bars Logsdon’s claim.

Furthermore, Oliver emphasizes that Logsdon’s admits in the Third Amended

Complaint that other inmates of various religions who complied with the verification

policy received a kosher diet. According to Oliver, this admission is fatal to Logsdon’s

claim because it establishes that the verification policy is applied equally to all

inmates who request a religious diet.

To the extent Logsdon attempts to state a distinct claim (against either

defendant) under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, such claim

fails. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws[,]” which is essentially

5 Logsdon’s individual-capacity claim against Sheriff Woods fails for the additional reason

that, as explained supra in section III.A., Logsdon fails to state claim under RLUIPA or the

First Amendment.

a mandate that all similarly situated persons be treated alike. U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. An earlier screening order set forth the applicable law for an Equal

Protection Claim. (Doc. 6, at 4). “To establish an equal protection claim, a [plaintiff]

must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated with other [persons] who received

more favorable treatment,’ Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quotation omitted), and (2) the defendant ‘engaged in invidious discrimination

against him based on race, . . . national origin, . . . or some other constitutionally

protected interest,’ Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932–33

(11th Cir. 1986).” Mohit v. West, No. 21-12483, 2023 WL 239992, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan.

18, 2023).

Logsdon fails to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Logsdon

alleges, “[o]ther inmates in this pod—House of Yahweh, Muslim Christian—are

receiving the kosher diet and provided contact information and/or FDOC information

to get such. Plaintiff has provided the same information but is being denied the

kosher diet.” (Doc. 32, at 15). According to Logsdon’s own allegations, he is not

similarly situated to other inmates who are receiving the kosher diet because those

inmates have “provided contact information” to verify their religious affiliation. See

Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d

1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 200) (“Different treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does

not violate the equal protection clause.”). Additionally, Logsdon alleges no facts to

show that the verification policy establishes a preference for one religion over

another, that it is racially discriminatory, or is being unequally applied to inmates

who request a religious diet.

C. State law claims

Defendants argue that, to the extent Logsdon has separately alleged claims

arising under Article 1, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution and under § 761.03, F.S.,

such claims should be dismissed. Again, they argue that because this Court and the

circuit court have upheld the verification policy as not imposing a substantial burden

under RLUIPA and the First Amendment, the same holding should apply to

Logsdon’s claims arising under Florida state law. (Doc. 82, at 14–15). In response,

Logsdon repeats his challenge to the verification policy, arguing that it substantially

burdens his freedom to exercise his sincerely held religious beliefs. (Doc. 88, at 11).

Article I, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution mirrors the Establishment

Clause of the United States Constitution and provides “[t]here shall be no law

respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise

thereof.” Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“FRFRA”), § 761.03(1), F.S.,

provides that the government cannot “substantially burden a person’s exercise of

religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the

application of the burden is in “furtherance of a compelling governmental interest”

and is the “least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.” “[T]he FRFRA applies to and protects those in custody[.]” Dorman, 36

F.4th at 1315 (citing Yasir v. Singletary, 766 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).

“(T]he substantial burden standard is the same under both FRFRA and

RLUIPA.” Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Fla.

4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted) (“[F]ederal and state courts have applied the same

analysis under FRFRA and RLUIPA.”). Therefore, because the verification policy

does not pose a substantial burden under RLUIPA, and because the FRFRA and

RLUIPA use equivalent substantial burden standards, Logsdon fails to state a claim

under the FRFRA.

V. Conclusion®

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 82) is GRANTED and the Third

Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to

enter a judgment in favor of Defendants Wood and Oliver and to CLOSE this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 13th day of March,

2026.

-TOMBARBER □

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

8 Because the Court concludes that dismissal is warranted for the reasons explained herein,

the Court need not address Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal.

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