The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
RACHEL KAY, and :
JOHN KAY and SUSAN KAY, H/W, :
Plaintiffs, :
:
v. : No. 5:26-cv-0009
:
OFFICER KEVIN GODFREY, :
CHIEF CHRISTOPHER ENGELHART, :
JOHN/JANE DOES #1-5, HILLTOWN :
TOWNSHIP, COLIN WAHLERS, and :
JOHN WAHLERS and :
WENDY WAHLERS, H/W, :
Defendants. :
____________________________________
O P I N I O N
Defendants Godfrey, Engelhart, and Hilltown Township’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13 –
Granted in part
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. April 7, 2026
United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs bring this matter before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the alleged
grounds that several Hilltown Township law enforcement officers violated the rights of Joseph
W. Kay, Decedent, and his survivors, by executing a high-speed vehicle chase that led to the
Decedent’s death. Plaintiff Rachel Kay, the Decedent’s widow, brings this action individually
and as personal representative for his Estate, alongside Plaintiffs John and Susan Kay, the
Decedent’s parents. Plaintiffs’ federal claims include civil rights violations, unlawful seizure,
excessive force, failure to train or supervise, and supervisory liability, brought against
Defendants Hilltown Township, Officers Kevin Godfrey and Christopher Engelhart, and several
unnamed officers, labeled John and Jane Does #1-5 (collectively, “Hilltown Defendants”).
Plaintiffs also bring several state law claims, including negligence, recklessness, wrongful death,
and loss of consortium, against the Hilltown Defendants and three individuals named Colin,
John, and Wendy Wahlers. The Hilltown Defendants have since moved to dismiss all claims
against them, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Motion to Dismiss
is granted in part.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations
On the evening of June 1, 2024, Defendant Colin Wahlers (hereinafter “Wahlers”)
borrowed his parents’ 2019 Polaris Ranger Off-Highway Utility Task Vehicle (“UTV”),1 and
drove it to the residence of Joseph W. Kay (Plaintiffs’ Decedent, hereinafter the “Decedent”).
Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Wahlers had permission from his parents, John and Wendy Wahlers
(hereinafter “Mr. and Mrs. Wahlers”), to use their UTV, id. at ¶ 32, though the UTV was not
designed for use on regular streets and roadways, id. at ¶ 34. Around 1:00 a.m. on June 2, 2024,
Wahlers and the Decedent left the Decedent’s residence for a ride in the UTV. Id. at ¶ 36.
Wahlers was driving, and the Decedent was a passenger. Id. Wahlers drove through a stop sign,
drove over the lawn around an eating establishment, reentered the roadway, and drove through
another stop sign. Id. at ¶ 39. Defendant Police Officer Kevin Godfrey (hereinafter “Officer
Godfrey”) of the Hilltown Township Police Department was “in a stationary position in his
patrol car in close proximity to that intersection,” id. at ¶ 38, where he “observed the UTV
committing various motor vehicle violations,” id. at ¶¶ 41. Officer Godfrey then chose to follow
the UTV, and upon getting closer, “activated his emergency lights and later his siren to initiate a
traffic stop.” Id. at ¶ 51. Wahlers “slowed down but did not stop” the UTV, id. at ¶ 52, and
proceeded to turn right onto another street, bypassing another stop sign, id. at ¶ 53. A police
1 A UTV is a type of All-Terrain Vehicle (“ATV”). Compl. at ¶ 31.
chase ensued, with both vehicles reaching “speeds nearing 70 miles per hour (thirty miles per
hour over the posted speed limit),” and with only one car length distance between them. Id. at
¶ 65. Wahlers accelerated the speed of the UTV, id. at ¶ 68, and, at times, swayed partially off
the roadway, id. at ¶ 66. Wahlers then attempted to make a sharp right turn onto a different road,
id. at ¶ 73, at which point “the UTV’s back end slid out, went airborne, flipped on the driver’s
side and completed a barrel roll,” id. at ¶ 74. “The UTV landed on its passenger side and came to
an uncontrolled rest on the grass,” id. at ¶ 75, partially ejecting Wahlers and the Decedent, id. at
¶ 76. The Decedent suffered a head injury and excessive bleeding from the impact. Id. at ¶ 78.
He was found motionless, yet still “alive and struggling to breathe.” Id. Emergency aid was
provided, id. at ¶ 79, but to no avail. The Decedent was pronounced dead at the scene. Id. at ¶ 80.
B. Procedural History
On January 2, 2026, Plaintiffs Rachel Kay (the Decedent’s widow)2 and John and Susan
Kay (the Decedent’s parents) filed a Complaint in this Court against the following Defendants:
Kevin Godfrey (“Officer Godfrey”); Christopher Engelhart, Chief of the Hilltown Township
Police Department; Hilltown Township; unnamed officers John and Jane Does #1-5; Colin
Wahlers; and John and Wendy Wahlers (h/w). See Compl., ECF No. 1. The Complaint brings
five federal causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including: a civil rights claim
grounded in a state-created danger theory (Count I); a claim for unlawful seizure under the
Fourth Amendment (Count II); a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment (Count
III); a Monell claim for failure to train or supervise (Count IV); and a supervisory liability claim
2 Plaintiff Rachel Kay is suing individually and as personal representative for the
Decedent’s Estate.
(Count V).3 See id. The Complaint also brings seven state-law causes of action, including:
negligence (see Counts VI, VII, and VIII); recklessness (see Counts VI and VII); negligent
entrustment (Count IX); wrongful death (Count X); a survival action (Count XI); and loss of
consortium (Count XII). See id.
On February 11, 2026, the Hilltown Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against them
(Counts I-V, VII, and X-XII) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims
for unlawful seizure and excessive force must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege
a Fourth Amendment seizure, that the state created danger claim must be dismissed because
Officer Godfrey’s actions did not shock the conscience, and that the claims for failure to train or
supervise and supervisory liability must be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege a
constitutional violation. See Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs responded to
the Motion to Dismiss on February 25, 2026. See ECF No. 18. The Hilltown Defendants filed a
Reply thereto, on March 2, 2026, see ECF No. 23, and Plaintiffs filed a Sur-Reply in further
support of their Motion to Dismiss, on March 10, 2026, see ECF No. 26. The Court is now ready
to render a decision on the Motion.
3 In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that the Hilltown Defendants—Hilltown Township, Officer
Godfrey, Christopher Engelhart, and John and Jane Does #1-5—deprived the Decedent of his
rights to “safety, bodily integrity, well-being, liberty, and substantive due process” by “engaging
in an unjustified high-speed pursuit” that placed the Decedent in harm’s way. Compl. at ¶¶ 110-
12. Count II alleges that the “Decedent was subjected to [an] unlawful seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,” id. at ¶ 128, because “Officer Godfrey
intentionally applied force to terminate Decedent’s freedom of movement,” id. at ¶ 125. Count
III alleges that Officer Godfrey’s force was excessive. See id. at ¶¶ 135-36. Count IV alleges that
“Defendants Hilltown, Engelhart, and John/Jane Does #1-5 . . . fail[ed] to train or supervise
patrol officers like Godfrey, and [failed] to train or supervise patrol officers in vehicle pursuits”
generally, id. at ¶ 154, instead “maintain[ing] a widespread custom and practice of allowing its
patrol officers to initiate and maintain vehicle pursuits over minor traffic, summary, and/or
misdemeanor offenses,” id. at ¶ 158. Count V alleges that Defendants Hilltown Township,
Engelhart, and John/Jane Does #1-5 “were the individual or collective policymakers for
establishing such things concerning vehicle pursuits.” Id. at ¶¶ 161-62.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) – Review of Applicable Law
When deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept all factual allegations as true
[and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d
361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if “the ‘[f]actual
allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” has the plaintiff stated a
plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. at 678-79
(explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense”). “[I]n light of Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket
assertion of an entitlement to relief . . . without some factual allegation in the complaint, a
claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
n.3). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring the complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). “In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims
are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Also, a
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered.” In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and
italics omitted). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims – Review of Applicable Law
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is the vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Additionally, a “defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Moreover, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
“In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts apply the state’s statute of limitations
for personal injury.” Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The
statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Pennsylvania is two years. See id.; 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 5524. “A section 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known
of the injury upon which its action is based.” Sameric Corp., 142 F.3d at 599. “Rule 15(c) can
ameliorate the running of the statute of limitations on a claim by making the amended claim
relate back to the original, timely filed complaint.” Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.,
266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). The Rule provides: an “amendment to a pleading relates back
to the date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). “The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been
notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes
of limitations were intended to provide.” Baldwin Cty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
149 n.3 (1984).
C. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure – Review of Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. A seizure “does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of
an individual’s freedom of movement,” nor even whenever a government actor desires to
terminate an individual’s freedom of movement. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1989). Rather, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Id. at 597 (emphasis
in original).
D. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force – Review of Applicable Law
“To state a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, [the plaintiff] must
show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.” Phong Duong v. Telford Borough,
186 F. App’x 214, 216 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). “In evaluating whether a
plaintiff’s rights were violated by an arresting officer’s use of force, a court must determine
whether the officer’s actions in gaining custody of the plaintiff were ‘objectively reasonable.’”
Woods v. Grant, 381 F. App’x 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381
(2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
E. Substantive Due Process – Review of Applicable Law
“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular
interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the government’s
deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.” Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200,
219 (3d Cir. 2008), overruled in part, on other grounds, by Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., 588
U.S. 180 (2019). “[W]here another provision of the Constitution ‘provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection,’ a court must assess a plaintiff’s claims under that explicit
provision and ‘not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’” Conn v. Gabbert,
526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
1. State-Created Danger Theory – Review of Applicable Law
While the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not impose on the
state an affirmative duty to protect its citizens,” the state-created danger doctrine, adopted by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, acts as an exception to that rule. Van Orden v. Borough of
Woodstown New Jersey, 703 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235).
To assert a state-created danger claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a
plaintiff must plead:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;
(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;
(3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff
was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class of
persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions, as
opposed to a member of the public in general; and
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger
to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the
state not acted at all.
Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). The
more-specific-provision rule mentioned in relation to substantive due process claims also applies
to claims brought under the state-created-danger doctrine. See Wheeler v. City of Phila., 367 F.
Supp. 2d 737, 746-47 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (finding that Graham’s more-specific provision rule
applied, and that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard should guide unlawful seizure
and excessive force determinations, even if brought pursuant to the state-created-danger theory).
F. Monell Liability – Review of Applicable Law
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, a
municipality can be sued under Section 1983 in two contexts: First, if the municipality is
responsible for a failure or inadequacy that “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice,” Forrest v.
Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019), such as a failure to train or supervise which “amounts to
‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom [the municipality’s] employees will
come into contact,” Johnson v. City of Phila., 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Thomas
v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014)); see also Carter v. City of Phila., 181
F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999). To establish “deliberate indifference” on the part of the
municipality, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will
confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of
employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citing Carter, 181 F.3d at 357).
Second, “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . may be sued where ‘the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.’” Lebie v. Borough, No. 13-cv-6819,
2014 WL 2085518, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). “Liability
is imposed when the policy or custom itself violates the Constitution, or where the policy or
custom is the ‘moving force’ behind a constitutional violation by an employee of the local body.”
Id. (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991)).
“A policy is made ‘when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Id.
(quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “A custom may exist
when, ‘though not authorized by law, such practices of state officials are so permanent and well
settled that they operate as law.’” Id. (quoting Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., 363 F. App’x 917,
923 (3d Cir. 2010)). “Custom requires proof of knowledge and acquiescence by the
decisionmaker.” Robinson v. City of Phila., No. 15-1574, 2015 WL 5965003, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 13, 2015) (quoting McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)). “It is
incumbent upon a plaintiff to show that a policymaker is responsible either for the policy or,
through acquiescence, for the custom.” Lebie, 2014 WL 2085518, at *2 (quoting Andrews, 895
F.2d at 1480); see also id. at *3 (concluding that Third Circuit case law “unequivocally imposes
on [p]laintiff an ‘obligation to plead in some fashion that [a natural person] had final policy
making authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim’”) (cleaned up) (quoting Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 135 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010)) (italics not in original).
G. Supervisory Liability - Review of Applicable Law
“[I]n limited circumstances[,] supervisors may be held liable for the unlawful conduct of
subordinates.” Diorio v. Harry, No. 21-1416, 2022 WL 3025479 at *7 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2022).
There are two theories of liability under which a supervisory defendant may be personally liable:
(1) the defendant-supervisor participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to
violate them, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations; or (2) the
defendant, in his role as policymaker, acted with deliberate indifference in establishing and
maintaining a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused the plaintiff’s constitutional
harm. See A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Under the
second theory, the plaintiff “must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions
demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the [plaintiff’s] risk of injury and must
establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent
standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” Board of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
410 (1997).
IV. ANALYSIS
Where a specific Constitutional Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Accordingly, a substantive due process analysis—like
that demanded by Plaintiffs’ Count I—is only appropriate here if the underlying federal claims
are not otherwise “covered by” a specific Constitutional provision, like the Fourth Amendment.
The Court will therefore address Plaintiffs’ claims in an order appropriate to satisfy Graham.
A. Unlawful Seizure and Excessive Force
The Court is first tasked with determining whether the facts pleaded in the Complaint
allege a Fourth Amendment seizure, i.e., “a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied.” Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs
allege that their “Decedent was subjected to [an] unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,” Compl. at ¶ 128, because “Officer Godfrey
intentionally applied force to terminate Decedent’s freedom of movement,” id. at ¶ 125, referring
to the vehicle pursuit of the UTV in which the Decedent was a passenger. The Hilltown
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot allege a Fourth Amendment seizure based on these facts.
They are correct. The Supreme Court in County of Sacramento v. Lewis made clear that “a police
pursuit in attempting to seize a person does not amount to a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.” 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001). Nor could it, as a police chase suggests an active attempt to make a stop,
not a stop itself. Even if Plaintiffs argue that Officer Godfrey succeeded in seizing the Decedent
when the UTV was stopped by its fatal flip and crash, “a Fourth Amendment seizure does not
occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom of
movement.” Id. (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–597) (emphasis added). Even if Officer Godfrey
desired to terminate the Decedent’s freedom of movement by making a traffic stop, this too is
insufficient to demonstrate a Fourth Amendment seizure, unless it can be shown that “there
[was] a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied.” Id. (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–597 (emphasis in original)). The facts of the Lewis
case help to illustrate this intentionality requirement.
In Lewis, a police officer in pursuit of a speeding motorcycle accidentally struck its
passenger when a sharp turn by the motorcyclist partially ejected the passenger, placing him in
the path of the police vehicle mid-chase. See id. The facts in Lewis presented a closer case for
unlawful seizure than the instant matter, because there, the pursuing police officer made direct
contact with the passenger. Still, the Supreme Court in Lewis found that no Fourth Amendment
seizure had occurred, because the officer had not intended to hit the passenger and immobilize
him. See id. at 844-54. By contrast, the instant case does not involve any such contact. The facts
show that the impact of the UTV’s crash rendered the Decedent immobile, Compl. at ¶ 78,
though it remains in question whether it was Officer Godfrey’s pursuit, or the sharp turn made by
Wahlers, which proximately caused the UTV to barrel roll and “land[] on its passenger side,” id.
at ¶¶ 74-75. At most, the allegations in the Complaint suggest that Officer Godfrey only sought
to stop the UTV “by the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit,”
which the Supreme Court held does not amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (“The pursuing police car sought to stop
the suspect only by the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit;
and though he was in fact stopped, he was stopped by a different means—his loss of control of
his vehicle and the subsequent crash.”)). Plaintiffs have failed to show that Officer Godfrey, by
continuing his police pursuit, intentionally applied means to restrict the Decedent’s freedom of
movement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unlawful seizure based on that
pursuit. Since the Supreme Court made clear that no such claim can be brought on this factual
basis, granting leave to amend of this cause of action would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a
District Court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or
futile”), abrogated on other grounds by, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court will dismiss Count II
of the Complaint with prejudice.
Having determined that no seizure occurred, the Court is also obligated to find that
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Phong Duong,
186 F. App’x at 216 (“To state a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, [the
plaintiff] must show that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that it was unreasonable.”) (internal quotations
omitted). Since no seizure may be alleged on these facts, the Court finds that leave to amend the
excessive force claim would also prove futile. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. Count III of the
Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Having found that Plaintiffs state no Fourth
Amendment claims, the Court finds no bar to considering Plaintiffs’ substantive due process
claim under Graham’s more-specific provision rule. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
B. State-Created Danger Claim
Section 1983 requires that Plaintiffs plead a deprivation of a constitutional right and show
that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under the color of state law. Phillips, 515 F.3d
at 235 (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)). In Count I, Plaintiffs allege
a deprivation of the Decedent’s rights to “safety, bodily integrity, well-being, liberty, and
substantive due process.” Compl. at ¶¶ 110-11. The Court recognizes that “[i]ndividuals have a
constitutional liberty interest in personal bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235 (citing D.R. by L.R. v.
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1369–73 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993)). Yet, Plaintiffs’ civil rights claim can only survive a motion
to dismiss if they have pleaded all four of the required elements for state-created danger. See
Bright, 443 F.3d at 281.
Here, Plaintiffs fail to establish that Defendants acted with a degree of culpability that
shocks the conscience, as needed for the second part of the state-created danger test. See id. In
Sanford v. Stiles, the Third Circuit found an inverse relationship between a state actor’s
culpability and the amount of deliberation time that actor has:
The level of culpability required to shock the conscience increases as the time state
actors have to deliberate decreases. In a “hyperpressurized environment,” an intent
to cause harm is usually required. On the other hand, in cases where deliberation is
possible and officials have the time to make “unhurried judgments,” deliberate
indifference is sufficient.
456 F.3d 298, 309 (3d Cir. 2006). The continuum created by this inverse relationship is said to
present three possible standards by which courts can determine whether a state action has
shocked the conscience: (1) deliberate indifference (where the state actor has plenty of time to
deliberate); (2) gross negligence or arbitrariness (where the state actor has some, but not
unlimited, time to deliberate); or (3) intent to cause harm (where the state actor has almost no
time to deliberate). Phillips, 515 F.3d at 241 (citing Sanford, 456 F.3d at 306). “[I]n any state-
created danger case, the state actor’s behavior must always shock the conscience.” Sanford, 456
F.3d at 310 (emphasis in original).
Of course, there are plenty of cases involving situations described by the middle standard
of culpability, “when a state actor is not confronted with a ‘hyperpressurized environment’ but
nonetheless does not have the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion.” Id. at 310.
“Generally, this category will include situations in which the state actor is required to act ‘in a
matter of hours or minutes.’” Id. (quoting Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir.
2002)). When deciding the culpability of an officer in such a situation, the relevant question for
the court is “whether the officer consciously disregarded a great risk of harm.” Id. In determining
whether a defendant’s actions rise to the level of conscious disregard, a court should examine the
“apparent gravity of the risk” and whether the defendant can “be said to have disregarded” that
risk. See id. at 311.
Here, after watching Wahlers commit multiple traffic offenses, Compl. at ¶¶ 41, 44,
Officer Godfrey decided to initiate a traffic stop of the UTV—by turning on his lights and siren
and following at a close distance, id. at ¶ 51. When Wahlers did not pull over the UTV, instead
running another stop sign, Officer Godfrey made a choice to pursue the UTV. Id. at ¶¶ 52, 53,
61, 65. The ensuing vehicle chase reached speeds of up to 70 miles per hour, id. at ¶¶ 65, 72, and
when Wahlers made a sharp right turn, the UTV flipped and crashed, fatally injuring the
Decedent, id. at ¶¶ 74-78, 80. Plaintiffs argue that these facts demonstrate culpability, but fail to
narrow down the applicable standard, instead arguing that the Hilltown Defendants “were
deliberately indifferent to the safety, bodily integrity, well-being, liberty, and substantive due
process rights of Plaintiff’s Decedent,” id. at ¶ 111, that they “consciously disregarded a great
risk of serious harm to the safety, bodily integrity, well-being, liberty, and substantive due
process rights of Plaintiffs’ Decedent,” id. at ¶ 110, and that their actions “constituted an intent
or purpose to cause harm to the Plaintiff’s Decedent,” id. at 112. As stated above, the relevant
standard is whether the Hilltown Defendants consciously disregarded a great risk of harm to the
Decedent, but the facts, as pleaded, do not support answering this question in the affirmative.
“A police officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand the need to
stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other, the
high-speed threat to all those within stopping range, be they suspects [or] their passengers.”
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. Here, the risk of danger in a high-speed chase, generally, might have
been apparent to Officer Godfrey, but the risk of sudden death, or even the risk of inciting more
reckless driving by Wahlers, might not have been. Even if Officer Godfrey knew there was a
chance that a police chase (particularly one involving a UTV) could result in injury to the fleeing
driver and his passenger, there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that he consciously
disregarded that risk. Rather, there is ample evidence to suggest that, by his show of authority,
Officer Godfrey was trying to bring the UTV to a stop and eliminate the risk that Wahlers’s
reckless driving caused. These actions do not shock the conscience. The Court cannot find that
Plaintiffs have demonstrated culpability on the part of Officer Godfrey or any of the Hilltown
Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not met their pleading burden for state-created danger
and Count I of the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235.4
C. Failure to Train or Supervise and Supervisory Liability
Since Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against any state actor under the Fourth or
Fourteenth Amendment, their Monell claim must fail as well. See Mulholland v. Govt. Cnty. of
Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is well-settled that, if there is no violation
in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.”) (citing Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (finding that if a municipal employee “inflicted no constitutional injury . . .
it is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable”)); see also Zucal v. Cnty. of Lehigh,
660 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (“An underlying constitutional violation is required for
4 As an aside, the Court will again mention the close factual parallels between this case and
the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, see 523 U.S. 833, insofar as it is
instructive regarding another aspect of the state-created danger test: whether the resultant harm
was a “fairly direct” result of state action. The police pursuit in Lewis was of a fleeing
motorcyclist, who, like Wahlers, exceeded the speed limit, flouted traffic laws, and had an
innocent passenger in tow. See 523 U.S. 833, 836-37. Similarly to the facts presented here, the
patrol car in Lewis followed the motorcycle at close distance while both vehicles traveled at high
speed, and the chase ended after the motorcyclist made a sharp turn, causing the motorcycle to
tip over, injuring both the motorcyclist and his passenger. See id. at 837. The major difference
between the instant case and Lewis is that the pursuing patrol car in Lewis actually struck the
passenger once he had been ejected from the motorcycle, “propelling him some 70 feet down the
road” and inflicting fatal injuries. See id. By contrast, here it appears to have been Wahlers’s
sharp turn of the UTV, and its ensuing flip and barrel roll, that resulted in the death of the
Decedent. See Compl. at ¶¶ 73-80. Officer Godfrey is not alleged to have run the UTV off the
road, to have made contact with the UTV, or to have caused Wahlers to make a right turn. Nor
did Officer Godfrey strike the Decedent with his vehicle upon the Decedent’s ejection from the
UTV. Still, Plaintiffs assert that, by engaging in the pursuit at all, Officer Godfrey encouraged or
incited Wahlers’s reckless driving and created a dangerous situation for the Decedent. The Court
disagrees, and finds (without needing to, given its dismissal for lack of culpability) that
Plaintiffs’ Count I also fails to satisfy the first state-created danger element, because the alleged
harm was not shown to be a “fairly direct” result of Defendants’ behavior. Bright v.
Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.,
132 F.3d 902, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1997)).
a plaintiff to prevail on a Monell claim.”) (citing Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 238 n.15).5 To the
extent Plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of the Decedent’s right to life, liberty, and bodily
integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment, see section IV(B) supra, they still have not
demonstrated that an identifiable state actor was responsible for that violation, see id. (finding
that Plaintiffs failed to establish Officer Godfrey’s culpability). Even if they had, the allegations
in the Complaint fail to establish a policy or custom by which the Hilltown Defendants
encouraged or “allow[ed] [their] patrol officers to initiate and maintain vehicle pursuits over
minor traffic, summary, and/or misdemeanor offenses,” Compl. at ¶ 158, or that a failure by the
Hilltown Defendants to train or supervise their officers in this area amounted to deliberate
indifference. Plaintiffs do not point to any identifiable policy within the Township’s police
department which engendered this alleged course of conduct and fail to identify the specific
policymaker responsible for it. See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105; Lebie, 2014 WL 2085518, at *3
(explaining that plaintiff must “plead in some fashion that [a natural person] had final policy
making authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim’”). Plaintiffs’ broad allegations
regarding a failure to train or supervise similarly fail to establish that the Hilltown Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons with whom their officers would come into
contact. See Johnson, 975 F.3d at 403.
Moreover, without establishing liability on the part of Officer Godfrey, there can be no
municipal liability against Hilltown Township, nor supervisory liability against Police Chief
Christopher Engelhart for the conduct of Officer Godfrey, his subordinate. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to train or supervise (Count IV), and supervisory liability (Count V)
5 The Court notes that a constitutional deprivation is also a threshold requirement of any
claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
against Hilltown Township, Christopher Engelhart, and John and Jane Does #1-5, must be
dismissed. This dismissal will be without prejudice. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. Since the Court
has dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims (Counts I-V) and granted limited leave to amend, it
need not address Plaintiffs’ state law claims (Counts VI-XII) at this time.6 Because Plaintiffs
have an opportunity to amend their Complaint to state a federal claim, the Court shall decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims until Plaintiffs have pleaded a
federal cause of action. See Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth, 468 F. App’x 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2012)
(finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims once federal cause of action was dismissed).
V. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim for state-created danger,
unlawful seizure, excessive force, Monell liability, or supervisory liability. Counts I through V of
the Complaint are therefore dismissed. Counts II and III are dismissed with prejudice. Counts I,
IV, and V are dismissed without prejudice, and with leave to amend. The Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims until Plaintiffs amend their pleading
to state a federal question. Thus, the Hilltown Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part.
A separate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.___________
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge
6 Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend Counts I, IV, and V of the Complaint, and advised
that failure to state a federal claim will result in the Court declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over their state law claims.