HWANG

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JIHBIN HWANG,

Civil Action No. 25-16048 (SDW) (AME)

Plaintiff,

WHEREAS OPINION & ORDER

v.

MARYANN AUTUNNALE, et al., April 22, 2026

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Plaintiff Jihbin Hwang’s

(“Plaintiff”) Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (D.E. 21 (“TRO”)) pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 65 and Local Civil Rule (“Local Rule”) 65.1. For the reasons

set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO is DENIED; and

WHEREAS Plaintiff filed the instant Motion and an accompanying Amended Complaint

alleging that Defendants Borough of Highland Park, MaryAnn Autunnale, and Christian Sumano

(“Defendants”) illegally seized his residential property in violation of his constitutional rights.

(D.E. 27 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 19–33; TRO at 1.) Plaintiff maintains that the property was seized

due to retaliation for filing this instant matter. (TRO at 1–2); and

WHEREAS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs TROs and preliminary

injunctions. Generally, a TRO temporarily preserves the status quo, Hope v. Warden York County

Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2020), while a preliminary injunction “grants ‘intermediate

relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally,’” Brown v. Tolerico, No. 16-

9413, 2017 WL 838802, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2017) (quoting De Beers Consolidated Mines v.

United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). “The standard used to evaluate whether the issuance of

a temporary restraining order is warranted is the same as that used to evaluate whether the issuance

of a preliminary injunction is appropriate.” Int’l Foodsource, LLC v. Grower Direct Nut Co., No.

16-3140, 2016 WL 4150748, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2016); and

WHEREAS a party seeking a preliminary injunction must first establish (1) a likelihood

of success on the merits and (2) that “it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief.” Mallet & Co. v. Lacayo, 16 F.4th 364, 380 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting

Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017)). Only if the movant establishes

these two factors does a court consider (3) whether granting preliminary injunctive relief will harm

the nonmoving party or other interested persons and (4) the public interest. Reilly, 858 F.3d at

178–79. Lastly, the court “determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together,

balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Id. at 179. “An injunction is a

drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course.” Monsanto

Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010); and

WHEREAS Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or that he

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the issuance of a TRO. A party moving for a

preliminary injunction bears the burden to prove its likelihood of success on the merits of its case.

Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Opticians

Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990)). The moving party

must “‘demonstrate that it can win on the merits,’ which involves a showing that its chances of

establishing each of the elements of the claim are ‘significantly better than negligible.’” Lacayo,

16 F.4th at 380 (quoting Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179 n.3). Here, Plaintiff ignores that although he

abated the violations issued by the Middlesex County Fire Marshall, such violations were separate

and distinct from the code violations alleged by Defendant Borough of Highland Park. Plaintiff

does not substantively address the violations alleged by Defendant Borough of Highland Park and

instead relies on conclusory assertions that Defendants’ actions were retaliatory.1 As such,

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits; and

WHEREAS a plaintiff seeking an injunction has “the burden of proving a ‘clear showing

of immediate irreparable injury.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)

(quoting Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980)); see

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“Our frequently reiterated standard

requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the

absence of an injunction.”). “The ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable—not merely

serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot

atone for it.’” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91–92 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting

ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s

economic use of his property and as a result, he has suffered substantial financial loss. (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 32–33.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown how he will be irreparably harmed as he

does not reside in the home, and any deprivation of his property interests can be remedied with

monetary damages. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Economic

loss does not constitute irreparable harm”); and

1 This Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims should have been brought before a state or municipal court, rather than federal

court. In fact, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff has appealed the municipal code violations to the Middlesex

County Construction Board of Appeals. (D.E. 26.)

WHEREAS given Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits

or irreparable harm, this Court declines to address the remaining factors necessary for the issuance

of a TRO. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 178–79; therefore

IT IS, on this 22nd day of April 2026,

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO is DENIED; and

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: Parties

André M. Espinosa, U.S.M.J.