Rozniakowski

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHEN ROZNIAKOWSKI, : Civ. No. 1:25-CV-2164

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

:

DR. JACQUELINE HOWARD, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This case comes before us for consideration of two motions to

dismiss, filed by two groups of defendants: one from Kimberly Ardery,

Bradley M. Booher, Laurel Harry, and Morris Houser (“the

Commonwealth defendants”) and another by Dr. Jacqueline Howard,

Nicolas Rause, Tiffany Sottile, and Taylor Talasky (“the medical

defendants”).1 The plaintiff, Stephen Rozniakowski, filed this action

against the defendants asserting, , violations of his

constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.2 Rozniakowski has

sued each defendant in their individual capacities for damages, and in

1 Docs. 12-13.

2 Doc. 1.

their official capacities for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief.3

Each group of defendants has moved to dismiss all claims against them,

arguing, , that the complaint fails to state a claim.4

The complaint asserts injuries from a broken foot that

Rozniakowski suffered while incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Benner Township, in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.5

Rozniakowski alleges he broke his foot getting out of bed on November

12, 2023, and first sought treatment on November 30.6 He further alleges

that he consulted with Defendant Talasky and requested a wheelchair

(as a prior gunshot injury to his arm made crutches, in Rozniakowski’s

view, unsafe), but Talasky denied that request.7 X-rays were performed

on December 4 and 13, and on December 14, Dr. Howard signed off on x-

rays that showed a fracture at the base of Rozniakowski’s second

metatarsal.8

3 ¶ 15.

4 Docs. 12-13.

5 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 16.

6 . ¶¶ 16-18.

7 ¶ 18.

8 ¶¶ 19, 21.

According to the complaint, nobody informed Rozniakowski of the

break until December 23, when Talasky and Sottile met with

Rozniakowski, confirmed the break and that Dr. Howard had done

nothing to treat it, issued Rozniakowski a walking boot and a cane, and

again denied him a wheelchair.9 Rozniakowski saw an orthopedist on

February 16, 2024, who casted his foot and opined that it should have

been casted when the break was first confirmed.10 In the following weeks,

Rozniakowski’s cast got wet in the prison showers and became moldy,

causing burning and itching.11 Rozniakowski met with Rause and

requested an earlier orthopedic follow up because of the cast, but Rause

denied the request.12 Rozniakowski eventually returned to an

orthopedist on March 22, reporting persistent pain and limited range of

motion.13 The orthopedist re-casted the foot and stated it should have

been treated immediately.14 At another follow-up appointment on April

9 , ¶¶ 22-24.

10 ¶ 25

11 ¶¶ 26-27.

12 ¶ 27.

13 ¶ 28.

14

22, 2024, the orthopedist told Rozniakowski his foot had still not healed

and he might never regain full mobility.15

Based on these averments, Rozniakowski brings claims pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims under the Eighth Amendment,

negligence and/or medical malpractice, and violations of Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act

(“RA”).16 As relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well

as injunctive relief in the form of certain medical treatments and

accommodations while incarcerated.17

As we have explained, the defendants have now moved to dismiss

the complaint, arguing, , that it fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.18 After consideration, the Commonwealth

defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and the

medical defendants’ motion will be denied.

15 ¶ 29.

16 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 39-53.

17 at 9.

18 Docs. 12, 13.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review

The defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.19 Under federal pleading

standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”20

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true,21 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the

non-movant.”22 However, a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.”23

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

21 , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

22 , 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d

Cir. 1994).

23 .; see also , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”).

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-

part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any

legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for

relief.” at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. ,

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in ,

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—’that the pleader is

entitled to relief.’ ” , 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” 24

Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public

record.25 A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]

that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”26 Additionally,

24 , 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

25 , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).

26 , 998 F.2d 1192,

1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the

court may consider such document in its determination.27 However, the

court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion

to dismiss.28

B. The Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion Will be Granted in

Part and Denied in Part, and the Medical Defendants’ Motion

Will be Denied.

The complaint alleges four distinct violations. Count I alleges a

claim under Section 1983 that the medical defendants and Defendant

Ardery violated Rozniakowski’s Eighth Amendment rights by exhibiting

deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. Count II alleges that

Defendants Booher, Harry, and Houser, are liable under the Eighth

Amendment as supervisors. Count III alleges negligence and medical

malpractice by the medical defendants and Ardery. Count IV alleges

violations of the RA and Title II of the ADA by Defendants Booher, Harry,

and Houser.

27 , 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002).

28 , 20 F.3d at 1261.

After consideration, we will dismiss the plaintiff’s supervisory

liability claim, as well as his request for compensatory damages under

the RA. However, the remainder of the plaintiff’s claims survive the

instant motions.

1. Count I – Deliberate Indifference

The first count alleges that Defendants Howard, Talasky, Sottile,

Rause, and Ardery violated Rozniakowski’s Eighth Amendment rights by

exhibiting deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. The

plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from these

defendants in their individual capacities.

Rozniakowski faces a high burden. The Eighth Amendment

protects inmates from “cruel and unusual punishment.”29 Prison officials

have a duty to provide inmates with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and

medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.’”30 To be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation,

prison officials must have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,”31 which,

29 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

30 , 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting

, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

31 , 511 U.S. at 834.

in the prison context, is one of “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health

and safety.”32 This state of mind requirement is subjective, and the

“official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.”33

In the medical context, an inmate alleging an Eighth Amendment

violation must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to a serious medical need.34 Accordingly, an inmate asserting

a claim of deliberate indifference must establish that he had a serious

medical need, and that prison officials, by affirmative acts or omissions,

were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need.35 Deliberate

indifference in this context can be shown by a failure to provide care, the

delay of medical care for non-medical reasons, or denial of reasonable

requests for treatment.36 However, mere disagreement over a course of

treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference.37 Further, non-

32 , 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted).

33 , 511 U.S. at 837.

34 , 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

35 , 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

36 , 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).

37 , 230 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).

medical correctional staff cannot be deemed to be deliberately indifferent

“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or

their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.”38

Ardery is the only Commonwealth defendant named in Count I.

She argues that there are insufficient allegations to maintain this claim

against her as her only participation in this matter was to deny one of

Rozniakowski’s grievances, which does not create liability. Rozniakowski

does not dispute that grievance participation is itself insufficient for

liability. Instead, he argues Ardery is liable because the grievance

process put Ardery on notice of an ongoing constitutional violation (the

denial of a wheelchair) being perpetuated by her subordinates, making

her failure to intervene an acquiescence to that action.39

One theory of Section 1983 liability is that “a supervisor may be

liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the

plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge,

38 , 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

39 Doc. 21 at 6.

.”40 Resolving all inferences in Rozniakowski’s favor, we find

the complaint sufficiently alleges liability under this theory.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count I against Ardery will be denied.

This count can only proceed against the medical defendants with a

showing that each defendant was subjectively aware of a substantial risk

of harm to Rozniakowski.41 The defendants argue that such subjective

awareness is not plead in the complaint, and therefore the claim should

be dismissed. For his part, the plaintiff argues that Dr. Howard’s

subjective awareness is shown by her signature on the x-ray showing his

broken bone; Talasky’s by his refusal of a wheelchair despite being aware

of Rozniakowski’s foot and arm injuries; Sottile’s by his comment that

waiting on treatment “a little longer won’t hurt”; and Rause’s by his

refusal to send Rozniakowski for an earlier orthopedic consult despite his

deteriorating cast and associated symptoms.42 We believe these

allegations are sufficient at this stage to support the plaintiff’s claim that

these defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.

40 , 372

F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphases added).

41 , 511 U.S. at 837.

42 Doc. 22 at 6-8.

Further, Rozniakowski also alleges that an orthopedic specialist

stated that Rozniakowski’s foot should have been casted immediately.43

In the context of a medical deliberate indifference claim, “the judgment

of prison authorities will be presumed valid unless it is shown to be such

a

as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not

base the decision on such judgment.”44 Here, Rozniakowski has alleged

that these defendants’ care, or lack thereof, departed from accepted

professional judgment since they declined to treat his injury in a more

immediate fashion. This is sufficient at this stage for this claim to

proceed. Accordingly, the medical defendants’ motion to dismiss this

claim will be denied.

2. Count II – Supervisory Liability

Rozniakowski brings Count II against three of the Commonwealth

defendants, Booher, Harry, and Houser, alleging supervisory liability

under theories of “policy or custom” and “failure to train.”45

43 Doc. 1 ¶¶25, 28.

44 , 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

45 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 42-43.

The Third Circuit has established that there are two ways to plead

a “supervisory liability” claim. The first makes a supervisor liable where

they “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which

directly caused the constitutional harm,” and the other finds liability

where a supervisor “participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, directed

others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and

acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”46 Under either theory, a

plaintiff must satisfy five elements:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that

the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing

custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or

procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury,

(3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk

existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5)

the underling’s violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure

to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.47

As for a “failure to train” allegation, the Court of Appeals has held

that a claim of supervisory liability for a failure to train is “considered a

subcategory of policy or practice liability.”48 The Court explained that

46 , 629 F.3d 121, 129 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2010)

(cleaned up).

47 , 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing

, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).

48 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.

2014) (rev’d on other grounds).

“the standard of individual liability for supervisory public officials will be

found to be no less stringent than the standard of liability for the public

entities that they serve [.]”49 Therefore, to impose liability, a plaintiff

must show “that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom those employees will come into contact [,]”50

and for a failure to train, a plaintiff must also show “the deficiency in

training actually caused”51 the constitutional violation.

The Commonwealth defendants argue that Rozniakowski failed to

allege factual averments to support either theory of supervisory liability.

We agree. Rozniakowski states flatly that his injuries are the result of

policies or customs to allow diagnostic “sign-offs” without informing the

patient or initiating treatment, downgrade urgent referrals to “routine”,

and deny wheelchair accommodations where crutches were unsafe, as

well as from a failure to train staff to ensure timely orthopedic care.52

But these “policies” are just events that allegedly occurred in this case—

it does not follow that they were necessarily a result of custom or policy,

49 , 885 F.2d at 1118.

50 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.1999) (cleaned up).

51 489 U.S. 378, 388, 391 (1989).

52 Doc. 1 ¶43(a)-(d).

or that the defendants here have supervisory involvement in any of the

alleged policies.53 All five of the elements cited above are lacking in this

complaint. Rozniakowski presents only bare legal conclusions,

insufficient to state a claim.54 Accordingly, we will dismiss Count II.

3. Count III – Negligence

The medical defendants argue, and Rozniakowski tacitly concurs,

that his negligence claim cannot proceed without a certificate of merit as

required by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3. We disagree.

While this rule previously applied in federal litigation,55 the Court of

Appeals found that the recent Supreme Court case

abrogated that precedent.56 Therefore, Rule 1042.3, which is functionally

53 Even assuming that these alleged injuries were the result of

a policy, Rozniakowski has not alleged that these supervisors, who are

prison officials, were supervisors of the medical professionals alleged to

have executed those policies.

54 , 20 F.3d at 1261; , 556 U.S. at 678.

55 , 659 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir,

2011) (concluding the doctrine applied and finding Rule 1042.3 to be

substantive law and therefore applicable in federal court).

56 , 171 F. 4th 622, 633 (3d Cir. 2026) (holding that

supersedes ); , 146 S. Ct. 546,

554-57 (2026) (holding that Delaware’s law requiring a plaintiff present

an “affidavit of merit” to bring a medical malpractice action conflicts with

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and so does not apply in

federal court).

identical to the Delaware statute the Court found inapplicable in

federal litigation, does not apply here.

This claim was also brought against one Commonwealth defendant,

Ardery. She argues that Rozniakowski has failed to plead essential

elements of negligence, including a duty owed to the plaintiff and a

breach of that duty. Rozniakowski’s references to the elements of

negligence are relatively threadbare.57 That said, resolving inferences in

his favor, we conclude there is little question that the defendants here

owed Rozniakowski a duty of care under the circumstances, and that he

has alleged facts which, if believed, show a breach of that duty and

injuries proximately caused by the breach. Accordingly, we will deny the

motions to dismiss Count III.

4. Count IV – ADA and RA

Rozniakowski alleges violations of the ADA and RA by Booher,

Harry, and Houser. In response, those defendants argue that

Rozniakowski fails to state a claim because he has alleged inadequate

treatment, not exclusion due to disability. They also argue that even if

57 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 45-47.

this court construes the claim as a Title II violation, all three essential

elements of such a claim are absent here.

Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall,

by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”58 To state

a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation

in or denied the benefits of services or programs; and (3) that the

exclusion or denial was because of his disability.59

Individuals cannot be personally liable under Title II or the RA.60

A Title II claim made against an individual in their official capacity is

analogous to a claim against the state itself, and an RA claim against an

individual in their official capacity is tantamount to bringing a claim

against the state agencies that employ those officials.61 A claim under

58 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

59 , 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023).

60 , 505 F. Supp. 3d 360, 405-06 (M.D. Pa.

2020).

61 , Civ. No. 3:22-CV-1067, 2025 WL 2422615, at *8

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2015).

Title II or the RA may result in compensatory, but not punitive,

damages.62 However, compensatory damages under either act require a

plaintiff to show “intentional discrimination under a deliberate

indifference standard [.]”63

We consider this claim as alleging only official capacity liability

against these defendants. Rozniakowski argues that an inmate request

for mobility-related accommodation can support a claim under the ADA

and the RA. We agree. In , the Court of Appeals held

that a plaintiff’s diagnosis of lumbar stenosis and prescription for a cane

were sufficient to find him a qualified individual with a disability.64 The

Court explained that one of the statutory definitions of disability is “a

physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities. A physical impairment is a ‘physiological disorder or

condition, . . . or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems [,]’

and ‘major life activities’ include walking and standing.”65 The same logic

applies here, where Rozniakowski was diagnosed with a broken foot and

62

63 , 993 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019).

64 , 82 F.4th at 225.

65 (cleaned up).

was prescribed crutches. That is sufficient at this stage to allege that

Rozniakowski was a qualified individual with a disability.

Rozniakowski also must allege he was excluded from participation

in, or denied the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or

activities. Again, we look to , where the Third Circuit found that

the provision of showers inside of a prison qualified as a service, and that

because that plaintiff had alleged a denial of “services, programs, or

activities,” he had alleged enough to satisfy this element.66 Rozniakowski

argues that the denial of a wheelchair meant he could not “safely

ambulate” and therefore “plausibly alleges loss of access to the ordinary

incidents of confinement.”67 Resolving all inferences in Rozniakowski’s

favor, we think this is sufficient to avoid dismissal.

Rozniakowski must also plead facts showing that the denial of

services was because of his disability. Because “[r]efusing to make

reasonable accommodations is tantamount to denying access,”68 and the

complaint alleges that Rozniakowski’s request for a wheelchair was

refused, this element is satisfied, both under the “but-for” causation

66 , 82 F.4th at 225.

67 Doc. 21 at 9.

68 82 F.4th at 226.

standard that applies under the ADA, and the “sole cause” standard of

the RA.69

Accordingly, we conclude Count IV generally survives the instant

motion to dismiss. However, as part of this claim, Rozniakowski seeks

compensatory damages under the RA.70 As explained, compensatory

damages are only available under the RA if there is a showing of

intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard.

While Rozniakowski claims that this standard is met in his prayer for

relief, he fails to allege any fact that would support such a finding. We

therefore conclude that the claim for compensatory damages under the

RA must be dismissed.

5. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Finally, Ardery argues that she is entitled to immunity from

Rozinakowski’s claims pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. We

disagree. As to the Section 1983 claims, government officials sued in

their individual capacity are generally not immune from suit.71 Claims

69

70 Doc. 1 at 9.

71 , 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh

Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual

and personal liability’ on state officials under § 1983.”)

against a government official in her official capacity are also not immune

from suit, though such claims are limited to injunctive relief.72 We

conclude Ardery is not immune from Count I in either capacity.

As to the state-law negligence claim, Pennsylvania law is clear that

“the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the

scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and

official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General

Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.”73 Pennsylvania law has

codified ten such waivers.74 One of those waivers is designed to remove

immunity for “health care employees of Commonwealth agency medical

facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor,

dentist, nurse, or related health care personnel.”75 We agree with other

courts that have found that a Corrections Health Care Coordinator

(“CHCA”) such as Ardery be subject to this specific waiver, but that

this determination depends on the specific nature of her work.76 In the

72 209 U.S. 123 (1908)

73 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310.

74 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)(1)-(10).

75 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)(2).

76 Civ. No. 1:22-

CV-277, 2023 WL 11645842 at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (holding that where

the CHCA’s functions “include providing or directing medical services”

Third Circuit, sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense and so must

be plead and demonstrated by the defendant.77 Because Ardery has not

argued anything about the nature of her work, we presume the waiver

applies here and conclude Ardery has not shown she is entitled to

immunity from Count III.

As to Ardery’s claim of immunity from the RA, we concur with the

plaintiff that this immunity was waived as a condition of Pennsylvania

accepting federal funding.78 Therefore, the claim of Eleventh

Amendment immunity for Ardery with regards to Count IV is denied.

In sum, we will deny Ardery’s motion to dismiss on the basis of

sovereign immunity.

they are not immune, but “where the duties of a CHCA are entirely

administrative, she is outside the medical-profession exception and

retains sovereign immunity.”)

77

, 13 F.3d 62, 63 (3d Cir. 1993) (referring to “the affirmative

defense of sovereign immunity.”).

78 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7;

, 302 F.3d 161, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining the

operation of this waiver and identifying the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections as an entity that accepts federal funds and so has waived

Eleventh Amendment immunity).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the medical defendants’ motion to

dismiss will be DENIED, and the Commonwealth defendants’ motion to

dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:.

1. The motion will be GRANTED as to Count II, and to the

compensatory damages claim associated with Count IV; and

2. The motion will be DENIED as to Counts I, III, and the

remainder of Count IV.

An appropriate order follows.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: May 27, 2026