Mendoza

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MADELINE MENDOZA, )

) No. 23 CV 2441

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________________ )

MARILYN MULERO, )

) No. 23 CV 4795

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., )

) June 11, 2026

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiffs Madeline Mendoza and Marilyn Mulero bring this action against

Defendants City of Chicago (“City”), Reynaldo Guevara, Geri Lynn Yanow (as

Special Representative for Decedent Ernest Halvorsen), Anthony Riccio, Stephen

Gawrys, and Robert Biebel (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) for causing

their wrongful convictions for the May 1992 murders of Jimmy Cruz and Hector

Reyes. Before the court are the City’s objections to Plaintiffs’ Monell discovery

requests. For the following reasons, the objections are sustained in part and

overruled in part:

Background

Having completed fact discovery on non-Monell claims, Plaintiffs propose

proceeding with Monell discovery and serving a set of Interrogatories, Requests for

Production of Documents (“RFPs”), and Rule 30(b)(6) topics on the City.

(See R. 122.) As directed, the City posed their objections thereto in May 2025.

(R. 133; R. 134; R. 135.) The court then held a hearing in July 2025 during which

Plaintiffs explained that they are not aware of any specific written policies or

directives Individual Defendants followed when violating their constitutional rights.

(R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 4-5.) However, Plaintiffs allege that several City-

sanctioned, widespread practices led to the violations of their constitutional rights.

(Id. at 5-6, 16, 34.)

Plaintiffs seek extensive information and documents from the City, but the

core of their Monell claim targets ranking Chicago Police Department (“CPD”)

officials, specifically those in Area 5, (id. at 53), for allowing the alleged

unconstitutional police practices to continue unabated. Plaintiffs allege that Area 5

ranking CPD officials were aware of their Detectives’ brazen and unlawful tactics,

including the practices of coercing confessions and fabricating witness testimony.

Nevertheless, these officials fostered such tactics, creating a de facto policy that

systematically ignored the constitutional rights of the arrested and accused. Based

on this theory, whether CPD officials had notice of its Detectives’ alleged

misconduct—specifically, coercing confessions and fabricating evidence—and what

if any actions they took in response are the threshold factual issues underlying

Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.

Analysis

Plaintiffs bring a claim against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged

constitutional violations its Detectives, namely Reynaldo Guevara and Ernest

Halvorsen, allegedly committed. Claims against a municipality under Section 1983

are referred to as “Monell claims,” after Monell v. Department of Social Services of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because Plaintiffs’ Monell claims may

drastically expand the scope, duration, and cost of discovery, some background on

the purpose and proper scope of Monell claims is warranted here.

Monell evolved from the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961), which held that individuals could sue government officials

who violate their constitutional rights under Section 1983 but not municipalities

because Congress did not intend for local governments to be subjected to

Section 1983 liability when it enacted the statute in 1871. Monell backtracked on

the latter part of the Monroe decision and held that Section 1983 claims may be

filed against municipalities under limited circumstances—specifically, where the

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 663 n.7, 694. But the Court reserved judgment on “the

full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be” and “expressly le[ft]

further development” of these claims for “another day.” Id. at 695.

A “highly complex body of interpretive law” on when plaintiffs can establish a

municipal policy or custom developed in the wake of Monell. See Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Ultimately, a

plaintiff may prove Monell liability by demonstrating that: (1) the municipality had

a written unconstitutional policy, Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-62, 682, 694-95; (2) a

widespread pattern of unconstitutional behavior exists that functions as a state-

enforced custom, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970); (3) a

municipality acted with deliberate indifference to unconstitutional actions and at

the direction of a “final policymaker,” see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 474, 483-84 (1986); or (4) the municipality failed to properly screen, hire, train,

or supervise its employees, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989);

Brown, 520 U.S at 411; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). But

individual actions—like an unjustified yet isolated incident where a city’s police

officer shoots a citizen—cannot result from official policy or give rise to municipal

liability. See, e.g., City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821 (1985).

Plaintiffs’ success rate prosecuting Monell claims is generally low.

See Joanna C. Schwartz, Municipal Immunity, 109 Va. L. Rev. 1181, 1207-13 (2023)

(“Schwartz”). Schwartz points out that:

it is more difficult to prevail on Monell claims against local

governments than on Section 1983 claims brought against individual

officers. Of the 955 cases in the dataset in which Monell claims were

pled and could be challenged, 30.2% of the Monell claims were

dismissed at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages,

whereas 19.9% of the 955 cases were dismissed in their entirety at

these stages. A total of 614 (64.3%) cases settled, but only 491 (51.4%)

Monell claims were settled or voluntarily dismissed.

Id. Critics say this is because the standards are impracticably difficult to satisfy.

See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 Fordham L. Rev.

2183, 2191 (2005) (“[T]he standard for awarding compensatory damages against

cities under § 1983 is even higher than the standard for awarding punitive damages

against private employers.”).

Despite the uphill battle and expense—often with little to no monetary value

because local governments indemnify 99.98% of the judgments entered against law

enforcement officers in police misconduct cases, Schwartz at 1189, or without

demanding injunctive relief—plaintiffs in Section 1983 cases routinely bring Monell

claims. To be sure, there are strategic benefits to pursuing them. Successful

Monell claims can “provide[] a path to recover[]” compensatory damages “for

plaintiffs stymied by the doctrine of qualified immunity.” Matthew J. Cron,

Municipal Liability: Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway Toward Effective

Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 Denver L. Rev. 583, 606 (2014) (“Cron”). And in the

rare event that a municipality refuses to indemnify a defendant officer, a Monell

judgment may be the plaintiff’s only opportunity to recover money damages.

Schwartz at 1189.

There are also non-financial reasons for bringing Monell claims. A Monell

claim “permits wider discovery, broadens the scope of admissibility at trial,

facilitates holding supervisory and command officials responsible, and allows

plaintiffs’ litigators to properly apportion the blame between the individual officers

and the municipality.” G.F. Taylor, A Litigator’s View of Discovery and Proof in

Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 747, 749 (1999)

(“Taylor”). Monell discovery can “also facilitate the development of systemic

evidence of deliberate indifference to police brutality,” expose evidence “concerning

‘repeater’ officers,” and reveal how the “police disciplinary and counseling system”

functions. Id. at 748. Moreover, “aggressive discovery and litigation” of these

claims can impact public sentiment and lead to systemic change of police policies

and practices while “increas[ing] the value of the case for settlement or at trial.” Id.

at 749. Plaintiffs stated as much during the hearing in this case—they hope the

jury will hold the City accountable for their unlawful practice as it existed in 1992.

(R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 18.) Although the court questions the practical

value of such a judgment, it will not presume that the requested relief offers zero

benefit to Plaintiffs.

That said, these claims are costly for both the government and plaintiffs. The

government’s burden of aggregating and producing broader Monell discovery is self-

evident, especially in cases like this one where the discovery sought includes reports

and documents going back to the 1980s. Such discovery often must be recovered,

scanned, and electronically indexed before being assessed for relevance and

eventually produced, if at all. And while Monell claims across different cases may

share common threads and discovery from other cases can sometimes be

reproduced—as the City has offered to do in the context of Rule 30(b)(6) depositions

here—there must be sufficient overlap to reduce the burden on the government.

Monell claims also burden plaintiffs by “greatly increas[ing] the cost[] of

litigation, the attorney time expended, [and] the effort of the opposition.” Taylor at

749. Extensive Monell discovery and litigation may result in unnecessary delay

getting to trial and, if unsuccessful in response to a motion for summary judgment

or at trial, plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees incurred and must reimburse the

municipality for taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Indeed, even members of the

plaintiffs’ bar acknowledge that plaintiffs are “best served” by “craft[ing] narrow

discovery requests targeted at the specific type of municipal liability claim.” Cron

at 600. Where a plaintiff serves overbroad Monell discovery requests, courts have

discretion to limit the scope of discovery to that which is relevant and proportional

to the needs of the case. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, (1998)

(“Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.”).

As such, this court must weigh the benefit to be gained from Monell discovery

sought where there is no dispute over indemnification or qualified immunity

against the cost and delay of producing such discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Plaintiffs here allege that CPD had “official policies and customs that

facilitated, encouraged, and condoned the misconduct” of Individual Defendants,

including failing to discipline, supervise, and control its officers and maintaining a

department-wide “code of silence” around misconduct. (See R. 26, Mendoza Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 30-45.) Plaintiffs thus seek discovery on any “widespread practice”

within CPD that “high-ranking officials knew about [where detectives] coerc[ed]

confessions . . . and false witness statements.” (R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 4-5;

see also R. 108, Jt. Status Rep. at 2 (noting Plaintiffs allege CPD policies included:

“(a) coercing confessions; (b) procuring false witness statements from detainees and

jailhouse informants; (c) concealing exculpatory evidence; (d) manipulating

witnesses to obtain false identifications from suspects and witnesses;

(e) manipulating witnesses to influence their testimony; and (f) using these tactics

to secure the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of people without regard to their

actual guilt or innocence”).) Plaintiffs further allege ranking CPD officials “either

ignored” or “did not discipline” Detectives who engaged in this practice such that it

amounted to a “de facto policy.” (R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 5-6.)

Plaintiffs also claim CPD has policies of “[c]oerc[ing] confessions, fabricat[ing]

witness statements, and [] fabricat[ing] jailhouse informant statements” based on

its failure to properly train its officers. (Id. at 8, 10, 47-49.) For example, Plaintiffs

say sufficient training would be to “tell [CPD detectives] to be on guard” against

police behavior that may coerce testimony from a witness or suspect, but that

training was not given and was “never changed despite higher-ups having notice

about misconduct” caused by the insufficient training. (Id. at 10-11.) The court

notes, however, that Plaintiffs do not show how deficient training caused their

convictions. Their theory is that Individual Defendants fabricated incriminating

testimony from various individuals.

Plaintiffs suggest that discovery into these issues is especially necessary

where, as here, Individual Defendants have stated that they may raise a qualified

immunity defense. (R. 60, Guevara Ans. at 14, R. 64, Halvorsen Ans. at 13; see also

R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 18 (Guevara noting he is “certainly not abandoning

a qualified immunity defense”).) But as the court noted, if the conduct alleged

occurred—deliberate fabrication of evidence—“there cannot be qualified immunity.”

(R. 151, July 16, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 20.) As such, Individual Defendants cannot

escape liability based on a qualified immunity defense if Plaintiff’s theory of the

case is indeed true. Defendants do not dispute this point. Plaintiffs also argue that

their Monell claim is not for naught even if the City indemnifies Individual

Defendants because of the “public benefit of holding the [C]ity accountable for their

wrongdoing.” (Id. at 18.) But such findings speak to what took place as of 1992—

more than three decades ago. Plaintiffs need to consider the level of tangible

“public benefit” their Monell claim truly confers.

Plaintiffs say their discovery requests are narrowly tailored to seek only

“discovery in the specific cases” they identified as involving the same policy they

allege here. (Id. at 21-22.) Defendants, on the other hand, emphasize the difficulty

not only in the logistics of producing the discovery sought, (see, e.g., id. at 37, 40-

42), but also in determining exactly what Plaintiffs seek, given the nebulous nature

of the policies they allege, (see id. at 34-36). Based on the complexity of the Monell

discovery sought and the slight benefit to be drawn from such discovery, the court

limits the scope of Plaintiffs’ discovery requests as set forth below to ensure there is

at least some nexus between Monell discovery requested and their theory of Monell

liability.

A. Interrogatories

Plaintiffs propose serving 15 interrogatories—all of which City objects to as

overly broad. (See R. 133.) Based on the discussion held during the July 16, 2025

hearing, this court finds that information relevant and proportional to the needs of

the case must relate to CPD’s notice as to any wrongdoing in which Area 5

Detectives were engaging and ranking Area 5 officials’ response thereto, if any.

Accordingly, information regarding officer training on various subjects (Nos. 1-6)

and written orders, standards, or policies regarding the same subjects (Nos. 7-12)

are not relevant to Plaintiffs’ Monell theory and certainly not proportional to the

needs of this case. The training CPD provided to all officers and written orders,

policies, and procedures on interrogating witnesses will not be helpful to the

prosecution of Monell claims unless ranking Area 5 officials were aware of egregious

deviation therefrom or absence of necessary training. Merely asking a witness

whether Individual Defendants violated their training and any policies then

existing in 1992—which is what Plaintiffs seek to do with the information—is not

relevant or proportional because Plaintiffs allege that Area 5 officials permitted the

widespread practice during that period, leading to violations of their constitutional

violations.

However, the court finds that Plaintiffs do seek information that may be

relevant and proportional to the needs of this case in Interrogatory Nos. 13-15. The

relevant portions state as follows:

13. State the approximate date that the CPD and/or City of Chicago

became aware of the nature of the allegations raised by the plaintiffs

in the below identified cases:

14. State whether any CPD officers were investigated by CPD, the

City of Chicago, or any related entities, in connection with the

allegations raised by the plaintiffs in the cases identified below. If the

answer is in the affirmative, identify any Documents or materials

related to any such investigation.

15. State whether any CPD officers were disciplined by CPD, the

City of Chicago, or any related entities, in connection with the

allegations raised by the plaintiffs in the cases identified below. If the

answer is in the affirmative, describe the nature of the discipline.

(R. 133, City’s Obj. at 15, 18, 20.) These interrogatories also include a list of 47 civil

cases and 2 criminal cases. The City objects to many of the terms Plaintiffs use in

these interrogatories. For example, the City says the following terms are too vague:

“CPD and/or City of Chicago,” “aware,” “allegations,” “any other entities,”

“investigated,” and “disciplined.” (Id. at 17, 19, 22.) The City also objects that the

scope of these interrogatories is overly broad because nearly half of the cases

Plaintiffs identified concern criminal investigations occurring after 1992.

The court sustains the City’s scope objection in part. The theory of liability

here is discrete in that Plaintiffs allege the City—more specifically Area 5 ranking

officials—allowed and fostered the widespread practice of their Detectives coercing

witnesses and arrestees to offer up false testimony with a singular purpose of

charging and convicting innocent individuals. As such, this court narrows the scope

of the interrogatories to Area 5, complaints related to coercing and fabricating false

testimony, and actions Area 5 ranking management officials took once becoming

aware of such complaints and practice.

The court overrules the objection that the City should not be obligated to

produce information regarding those cases where the criminal investigations began

after 1992. Information related to post-1992 investigations may be relevant in

understanding what if any actions Area 5 took after 1992—which may explain the

actions Area 5 could have taken in response to similar pre-1992 complaints—and

may serve as corroborating evidence of Area 5’s indifference to complaints of

coercion and false testimony if ranking management officials failed to take any

action in response to complaints of wrongdoing. Accordingly, the City is ordered to

answer the following interrogatories as amended as they relate to the 49 cases

Plaintiffs identified:

13. State the approximate date that Area 5 management officials

(those above Detective level, such as Sergeants, Lieutenants,

and Area Commander) became aware of complaints (including

federal civil lawsuits), if any, of coercion and intimidation to

secure false testimony from witnesses and arrestees.

14. Of the complaints Area 5 management officials became aware of,

state whether they caused the investigation of any Area 5

Detectives and, if so, explain the nature of the action they took,

the approximate date of such actions, and documents their

action would have generated. The City must also explain

whether Area 5 management officials took any remedial actions

in response to complaints they became aware of, whether

sustained or not, including additional and/or new training or

issuance of area-wide warnings or directives.

15. State whether the City or Area 5 management officials

disciplined any Detectives as a result of any investigation, and if

so, identify the names of the officers, date of discipline,

disciplinary action taken, and the reasons for such action.

These interrogatories as amended seek relevant information that is proportional to

the needs of the Monell claim Plaintiffs allege in this action. If the City does not

have responsive information, it must answer, “None.”

B. Requests for Production of Documents

Plaintiffs propose serving 16 RFPs in connection with their Monell claim.

Considering the above analysis and the City’s objections to the RFPs, the court

orders the City to produce the documents specified herein in response to

RFP Nos. 1, 2, 15, and 16:

No. Ruling

Many of the documents are not relevant to the primary inquiry into

whether those with the authority to take remedial action were aware of

alleged misconduct—specifically, fabricating evidence by coercing

witnesses, detainees, and arrestees to give false testimony—and what

they did or failed to do in response. As such, of the 49 cases Plaintiffs

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identified involving Detectives from Area 5, the City is ordered to

produce the certificates of innocence and the deposition transcripts of

the City’s Rule 30(b)(6) designees and any Area 5 management

individuals (e.g., Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Area Commanders), if

any.

The City is ordered to produce those reports generated through any

investigation into Area 5 Detectives named in the 49 cases Plaintiffs

identified for their alleged misconduct—specifically, fabricating

evidence through coerced testimony from witnesses, detainees, and

2 arrestees. The City is also ordered to produce documents reflecting the

reasons for identifying Guevara for the City’s Behavioral Intervention

Program, his participation and requirements during the program, the

basis for removing him from the program, and all dates in which he was

placed into and removed from the program.

The court finds that these RFPs do not seek documents that are

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proportional to the needs of this case.

The City is ordered to produce reports it prepared, caused to be

prepared, or received since 1988, investigating, examining, and/or

suggesting remedial measures regarding complaints of official

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misconduct that include claims of evidence fabrication lodged against

Area 5 Detectives, Reynaldo Guevara, Ernest Halvorsen, Stephen

Gawrys, and Anthony Riccio. The scope of this ruling is not limited to

murder investigations. The City is also ordered to produce

communications distributed to Area Commanders (not limited to Area

5) from 1988 to the present highlighting the need to ensure that their

Detectives are/were not employing intimidation or coercive tactics

resulting in false testimony and/or false witness identifications.

C. Rule 30(b)(6) Topics

Plaintiffs propose deposing the City on 8 topics, some including several

subtopics, in connection with their Monell claim. Considering the above analysis

and the City’s objections to the topics, the court orders the City to produce a

designee or designees to answer questions on Topic Nos. 1-8 as specified below:

No. Ruling

The City is ordered to designate previous Rule 30(b)(6) testimony—to

the extent it has proposed doing so, (R. 135 at 3, 7), as the City’s

testimony in this case. The City is also ordered to prepare a designee to

answer questions concerning: (a) the practice and policy regarding

coercing and/or securing false testimony from witnesses, detainees, and

arrestees during the period of 1988 to 1992, if there was any; (b) the

1 & 6 practice and policy of considering the number of arrests and/or

convictions for purposes of promotions, awards, and/or Detective

compensation and the same for management officials above Detective

rank; and (c) any remedial measures, changes, and/or specialized

training Area 5 implemented since 1988 to present to address any

claims and complaints about its Detectives fabricating evidence and

coercing false testimony and how Area 5 implemented them.

The City is ordered to designate previous Rule 30(b)(6) testimony—to

the extent it has proposed doing so, (R. 135 at 4-8), as the City’s

2-5 & 7

testimony in this case in response to these Topics. The City is not

required to do anything further.

The City is ordered to designate previous Rule 30(b)(6) testimony—to

the extent it has proposed doing so, (R. 135 at 8), as the City’s

8 testimony in this case in response to this Topic. The City must also, as

noted in its objection, produce a designee to cover this Topic as it

pertains to Halvorsen, Gawrys, and Riccio.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s objections to Plaintiffs’ Monell discovery

requests are sustained in part and overruled in part as specified herein. The City is

ordered to respond to Interrogatory Nos. 13-15, RFP Nos. 1, 2, 15, and 16, and

Rule 30(b)(6) Topic Nos. 1-8 as ordered.

ENTER:

ited States Magistrate Judge

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