Orner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRITTNI ORNER,

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-2278

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

KEYSTONE PC HOLDINGS LLC:

tia SMILES FOR KEEPS and

CHILDSMILES PC HOLDINGS NJ :

PA t/a SMILES 4 KEEPS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Keystone

PC Holdings LLC t/a Smiles for Keeps and Childsmiles PC Holdings NJ PA

t/a Smiles 4 Keeps (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 14). For the reasons

set forth below, Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED with respect to

Brittni Orner’s (“Plaintiff’) claim that she was passed over for a new position

in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)

and DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's claim that she was wrongfully

terminated in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Thus, Plaintiff's claim for

wrongful termination will proceed to trial.

l. BACKGROUND‘

Plaintiff began her employment with Defendants in June 2022 as a

dental assistant with a pay rate of $23.00 per hour, which was generally

higher than what Defendants’ other dental assistants were making. (Docs.

14-2, 95; 15, 95; 14-6, 910; 14-7 at 62:12-62:23, 109:11-109:24). Plaintiff

had been studying to become a registered dental hygienist (“RDH”), and

Defendants told Plaintiff that they planned to hire her as an RDH once she

successfully passed the required examinations. (Doc. 14-6, 12). Plaintiff

alleged that she was promised a $2.00/hour raise, however, Defendants’

Vice President of HR, Mark Seber (“Seber”), clarified that Plaintiff would

receive a raise only after she became an RDH. (Doc. 14-7 at 94:5-95:20,

125:15-127:23). Nonetheless, Plaintiff received a pay raise to $24.00/hour

for a team lead position, which she briefly held before stepping down. /d. at

' As required by Local Rule 56.1, Defendants have filed a statement of

material facts, and Plaintiff has filed a statement responding to the numbered

paragraphs in Defendants’ statement of material facts. (Docs. 14-2, 15). For

purposes of this motion only, the Court refers to these averments.

-2-

62:24-63:16. Despite stepping down, Plaintiff's pay remained at $24.00/hour.

Id. at 95:14-19.

Plaintiff took her National Board Dental Hygiene Examination

(‘“NBDHE’) test in August 2023, and Defendants paid the $580.00 testing

fee. (Doc. 14-7 at 240:20-241:12). Plaintiff failed the exam five times. /d. at

33:6-33:8. Nonetheless, Seber assured Plaintiff:

Our primary goal is to see you obtain your RDH license and

progress to the next level. RDHs perform very well and it will

be a significant increase for you in terms of income. We

sincerely hope you can attain that license soon.

(Doc. 14-10 at 3). While Plaintiff had still not yet obtained her RDH

certification, she applied for a team lead position within the hygiene

department. (Doc. 14-7 at 130:5-131:6). Defendants filled the open RDH

“team lead” position with another candidate, John Piezer (“Piezer’). (Docs.

-3-

14-6, 915; 14-7 AT 131:14-19). Plaintiff testified that she believes Piezer is

less qualified for the team lead position than she is:

Q. .. . Is your understanding that he was a less qualified

candidate solely based on the fact that he had been at the

company less time than you had been?

A. No, | knew his dental background.

Q. What was his dental background?

A. He worked for an oral surgery office prior and then he was

an EFDA as well, but he didn’t maintain his license.

Q. Okay. So at some point, he had additional certifications

beyond what you had, but it’s your understanding that those

had lapsed?

A. Yes. But it was the hygiene side, so | knew more about the

hygiene because | went to hygiene school and it’s more in-

depth than EFDA school.

Q. So is it your personal belief that a dental assistant assisting

a dental practice on the oral surgery side would have less

-4-

experience as a dental assistant than a dental assistant on the

dental hygienist side?

A. Yes.

(Doc. 14-7 at 132:9-133:20). Yet, Plaintiff agreed that she was not qualified

to fill the team lead position at the time Piezer was hired, given that she had

not yet obtained her RDH certification. /d. at 117:17-119:7.

While Plaintiff was on vacation, she confronted Melissa Wright

(“Wright”), her office manager, about Piezer’s hiring. (Doc. 14-10 at 5-7).

Wright assured Plaintiff: “Brittni this does not change your future with us at

all. We still have the same amount of hygienist[s] with the new hire while we

wait for your test. [W]hen you pass we will be more than happy to consider

you join our team of hygienist[s].” /d.

Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for the team lead position in

retaliation for a complaint she made to HR regarding alleged race

discrimination. (Doc. 14-6, 420). Specifically, on August 27, 2023, Plaintiff

emailed Seber and two other HR representatives regarding some concerns

she had about the work environment. (Doc. 14-10 at 9-11). Plaintiff's email

begins with general workplace complaints and eventually morphs into a

complaint about racial discrimination. See id. Plaintiff admitted that she,

personally, never felt that she had been discriminated against. (Doc. 14-7 at

_5-

203:15-203:17, 203:24-204:3). Nonetheless, HR performed interviews to

investigate Plaintiffs claims. /d. at 202:10-203:3. At the end of the

investigation, HR wrote Plaintiff, stating: “We have investigated the claims

made before and have acted where needed.” (Doc. 14-10 at 11).

After learning that Defendants hired Piezer for the position, Plaintiff

emailed HR, stating:

Hello, | just wanted to follow up and say | unfortunately wish |

could say that the conversation and email with you did not

affect the decision being made about who would be team lead

in hygiene but | feel as if it did. They announced it to someone

less qualified than me in running the hygiene department.

Those words also came from the person chosen’s mouth

saying I’m not sure how | got it over you because you know

everything here, | have to learn it. It’s definitely because you

made them mad. But it is what it is at this point. | just have to

pass my board and figure out my future and where to go from

there. | wanted to thank you for taking the time out of your

schedule to come and talk with everyone. Have a good day!

(Doc. 14-10 at 2). Jared Cohen (“Cohen”), Director of Operations, stated that

Plaintiff “was not the most qualified person for the job,” noting that she would

have been selected if she had been. (Doc. 14-10 at 1). Subsequently, HR

offered Plaintiff a severance package, allegedly stating, “[w]ell, clearly you’re

miserable here.” /d. at 211:20-211:23. The severance package offered

=~@:

Plaintiff a month of pay, which Plaintiff declined. /d. at 225:7. Plaintiff

responded to the severance package offer py claiming that if she could go

work somewhere else, she would, but family obligations prevented her from

doing so immediately. (Doc. 14-7 at 223:18-224:25).

On September 18, 2023, Cohen and Wright notified Plaintiff that her

employment was terminated. /d. at 226:11. Cohen allegedly stated: “Clearly

you know you've made pretty serious claims against [Wright] . . . We're no

longer wanting you to be employed[.]” /d. at 226:14-226:16. On February 6,

2024, Plaintiff filed an EEOC claim with the PHRC. (Doc. 14-11). On August

13, 2024, Defendants submitted a position statement. (Doc. 14-12). On

October 8, 2024, the EEOC indicated that it would not proceed further with

the investigation, making no determination about whether further

investigation would establish violations of the statute. (Doc. 14-13).

On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants.

(Docs. 1, 14-6). Plaintiff's complaint is twofold. Count | alleges that, because

of her complaints to Human Resources (“HR”) about “race discrimination” in

the office, Defendants retaliated against her by: (1) passing over her for a

“team lead” position; and (2) terminating her employment. (Doc. 14-6, ]15-

18, 9723-25). Count Il alleges wrongful discrimination in violation of the

PHRA on the same grounds. (14-6, 26-32). On April 14, 2026, Defendants

-7-

filed the instant motion for summary judgment, concise statement of material

facts, and accompanying brief. (Docs. 14, 14-2, 14-3). Plaintiff filed her

answer to Defendants’ concise statement of material facts, and brief in

opposition. (Docs. 15, 16). Defendants filed their reply to Plaintiff's response

on May 19, 2026. (Doc. 17). This matter is now ripe for disposition.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery

[including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]

and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is [(1)] no

genuine issue as to any material fact and [(2)] that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough

Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). Material facts are those that “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is

“genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

At the summary judgment stage, “the judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249: see

-8-

also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding

that a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations).

Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482

F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must

affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.

The moving party can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the

essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial,

no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” /n re Bressman, 327

F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003): see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving

party’s burden has recently been explained this way:

In interpreting Rule 56, the Supreme Court has outlined two

closely related methods for a movant to succeed at summary

judgment. First, under the standard approach, the moving

party may produce material facts, established as genuinely

undisputed, that entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

-9-

477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986) (explaining the meaning of the

terms ‘material’ and ‘genuine’). Second, under the Celofex

approach, a moving party may instead demonstrate that the

nonmoving party has not made “a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case ... on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)

(emphasis added).

Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622 (3d Cir. 2024).

If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to material facts,” but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict

in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998)

(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-

movant’s] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof

at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a

failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celofex Corp., 477

U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d

Cir. 2007).

-10-

lll. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Title VII Retaliation

Title VII provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice

by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e—3(a).

Retaliation claims brought under Title VII follow the burden-shifting

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Yeager v.

UPMC Horizon, 698 F. Supp. 2d 523, 543 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing 411 U.S.

792 (1973)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the

burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason”

for its conduct and if it successfully does, “the tclaintiff must be able to

convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanation was

false, and that relation was the real reason for the employment action.” /d. at

342 (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir.

1997). Therefore:

[T]o defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers

the plaintiffs prima facie case with legitimate, non-

-11-

discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to

some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a

factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's

articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious

discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or

determinative cause of the employer's action . . . Thus, if the

plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the

defendant's proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment

the plaintiff need not also come forward with additional

evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.

Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations

omitted).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff

must tender evidence that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII;

(2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3)

there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. Cty. of Philadelphia,

461 F.3d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ne/son v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d

383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)). If Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to any element of her prima facie case, summary judgment is

warranted. Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 580 (3d Cir.

1996). Thus, the Court addresses each element in turn.

-12-

a. Protected Activity

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit defined a

“protected activity:”

With respect to “protected activity,” the anti-

retaliation provision of Title VII protects those who participate

in certain Title VII proceedings (the “participation clause”) and

those who oppose discrimination made — unlawful

by Title VII (the “opposition clause”)... Whether the employee

Opposes, or participates in a proceeding against, the

employer's activity, the employee must hold an objectively

reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is

unlawful under Title VIl . . . Moreover, the employee's

“opposition” to unlawful discrimination must not be equivocal[.]

Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted).

In Moore, the Third Circuit held that three white police officers engaged

in a protected activity by notifying a sergeant’s supervisor that the sergeant

was treating black officers less favorably than white officers. 461 F.3d at 343

(citing Curay—Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d

130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)) (““Opposition’ to discrimination can take the form of

‘informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making

complaints to management.’ To determine if retaliation plaintiffs sufficiently

‘opposed’ discrimination, ‘we look to the message being conveyed rather

than the means of conveyance.’’). In that case, the white police officers

-13-

observed the sergeant refer to black officers by using racial slurs. Moore,

461 F.3d at 336.

In the case before us, Plaintiff sent an email to HR on August 27, 2023.

In relevant part, Plaintiff's email stated:

Another thing that needs to be addressed is the infamous

pigeon incident. . . | watched an employee (the one who was

originally blamed for the incident) in my department[, Emily,] in

tears because she believed this was racially motivated and

watched nothing be done about the situation once it was clear

she was not involved. In my opinion it is due to the fact that the

employee that was claiming to be targeted, [Wright] has stated

she’s “scared of”... The next thing that needs to [be] brought

to attention is the employee surveys ... A staff member in one

of the reviews mentioned something about [Wright] saying

racist comments. In an unprofessional manner, [Wright]

spread that anonymous review throughout the office trying to

find out who submitted it. She ended up making an

announcement in huddle about how it is not tolerated in the

office even though we've all heard many racially insensitive

things come out of her mouth. | was made aware about a

conversation had between all the team leads and the office

manager where Sarah (work room team lead) made a

comment about her being “nicer” to black children because

“they are already at a disadvantage.” My jaw literally dropped

that these are the conversations being had on the clock, right

-14-

next to [Wright] and nothing coming of it. Another disgusting

and completely inappropriate incident that happened involved

someone | work close with in the hygiene department... .

[Wright] and Sarah pulled this pergon[,Sehar,] from hygiene

just to ask her why she did not eat pork as someone who is

Muslim. After explaining the beliefs/practices of the religion

she was told it was both “weird” and “stupid” and was laughed

at by both [Wright] and Sarah. That same employee dismissed

herself and came back to the hygiene department visibly upset

and angry, but didn’t know what to do about the situation, since

her own manager was the one to allow/poke fun at the

insensitive comments made . . . What we currently have is

someone that is not qualified in neither dentistry, assisting, or

even hygiene that continues to play favorites and has clear

racial biases.

(Doc. 14-11 at 9-14).

In her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff's coworker Emily,

not Plaintiff, believed that so-called “pigeon incident” was racially motivated

because it occurred on Juneteenth. The discussion followed:

Q. Is it your belief, then, there wasn’t any type of racial issue

involved in the [“pigeon incident,”] right?

A. Right. Not with the pigeon incident, no. | don’t believe it was

racially motivated.

-15-

Q. So you weren't making—with respect to the pigeon incident,

you weren't making a complaint about there being racial

discrimination, right?

A. Not in this part, no.

(Doc. 14-7 at 160:24-161:7).

With respect to the incident regarding Sarah’s comment about black

children, Plaintiff admitted that she was not present for the alleged comment.

Id. at 172:6-9. Even if she was, Title VII does not protect speech on topics

unrelated to employment discrimination. Slater v. Susquehanna Cnty., 613

F.Supp.2d 653, 663 (M.D.Pa. 2009) (citing Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police

Dept, 528 U.S. 964 (1999) (plaintiff police officer's report of fellow officer's

discriminatory treatment of minorities not protected under Title VII).

Regarding the incident involving Sehar, which if true, may be protected by

Title VII; Plaintiff admitted that she was not present for the incident itself, but

for Sehar’s emotional response to the incident immediately after it occurred.

Id. at 167:5-168:13. Plaintiff agreed that she was only physically present for

Wright’s statements made to the whole staff, “advising the group at large that

it wasn’t appropriate company policy to make insensitive comments of this

nature[.]” /d. at 170:9-12.

For all the allegations regarding racial discrimination, Plaintiff admitted

that she either was not complaining about racial discrimination or was

-16-

complaining about racial discrimination which she did not observe first-hand.

The question therefore becomes whether an employee reporting alleged

racial discrimination which she did not personally observe constitutes a

“protected activity.” A protected activity includes when employees “oppose

discrimination made unlawful by Title VII.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal

citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff “must have held an objectively

reasonable, good faith belief that her employer's activity was unlawful under

Title Vil. She need not prove the merits of the underlying discrimination

complaint, but a reasonable person must be able to conclude that there was

discrimination under Title VII.” Gress v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 784

F.App’x 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2019).

One concern is that some of Plaintiff's allegations are based on

potential hearsay evidence. However, “hearsay statements can be

considered on a motion for summary judgment /f they are capable of being

admissible at trial.” Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. Cty. of Camden,

842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added). Plaintiff has identified the third-party declarants, and there is no

suggestion that any of them are unable to testify at trial, or that hearsay

exceptions or exemptions are inapplicable. Thus, this Court may consider

-17-

these statements for summary judgment purposes. Vermeer v. Univ. of

Delaware, 710 F.Supp.3d 401, n.14 (D.Del. 2024).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to prove she was engaged in a

protected activity, because “any purported race-related concerns were

speculative, secondhand, and not grounded in her own reasonable belief of

unlawful discrimination.” (Doc. 14-3 at 10). While it may be true that Plaintiff

conceded that the so-called “pigeon incident” was not a complaint of race

discrimination by Plaintiffs own admission (Doc. 14-7 at 160:24-161:3),

Defendants fail to address Plaintiff's complaint involving a manager making

fun of a Muslim employee. (Doc. 14-6 at 13). Given the nature of the

allegation and the fact that Plaintiff was allegedly present to observe her

Sehar’s emotional response immediately after that incident, Plaintiff has

satisfied the threshold requirement of making a prima facie showing that she

engaged in a protected activity by emailing HR.

b. Adverse Employment Action

For the second element, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable

employee would have found the alleged retaliafory actions “materially

adverse” in that they “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431

(internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated

- 18 -

against her when they passed over her for a team lead position, and when

she was ultimately terminated. (Doc. 14-4, 9729-30). Piezer, the individual

who was hired over Plaintiff, allegedly told Plaintiff that she “definitely [had]

a target on [her] back” and was surprised that he was hired over her. (Doc.

14-7 at 210:14-23). Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she had more

experience in the hygiene department than Piezer did, and Piezer “was

shocked he got it[.]” /d. at 133:11-136:3.

Plaintiff was also terminated. In her termination meeting, Cohen

allegedly stated: “Clearly you know you’ve made pretty serious claims

against [Wright]... We’re no longer wanting you to be employed[.]” /d. at

14-226:16. These allegedly retaliatory actions, if true, “well might have

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, Plaintiff has met her prima facie burden of showing that

Defendants engaged in adverse employment actions by hiring Piezer for the

team lead position and ultimately terminating Plaintiff.

c. Causation

Finally, to establish the third element, “a plaintiff must show a causal

connection between the plaintiffs opposition to, or participation in

proceedings against, unlawful discrimination and an action that might have

-19 -

dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted). Here,

Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for the team lead position almost

immediately after her email complaint. (Doc. 16 at 8). With respect to her

termination, she presented testimony that the reason for her termination was

due to her claims against Wright. (Doc. 14-7 at 226:14-226:16). Plaintiff also

notes that she was offered severance just days after she complained to HR

and before her termination. (Doc. 16 at 8). Therefore, Plaintiff has made a

prima facie showing that her alleged retaliatory acts were causally connected

to her protected activity.

d. Burden-Shifting Analysis

Finding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case for her retaliation

claim, the burden shifts to Defendants to offer “legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Indeed, Defendants “need

not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered

reasons.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).

Defendants’ burden is a light one. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.

With respect to Defendants’ decision to hire Piezer over Plaintiff for the

RDH team lead position, Defendants presented evidence that Cohen stated

in an email: “[Plaintiff was not the most qualified person for the job[.]” (Doc.

- 99 -

14-10 at 2). Additionally, Plaintiff admitted that Piezer had more certifications

than Plaintiff, and that she was otherwise unfamiliar with his educational

background. (Doc. 14-7 at 132:17135:8).

With respect to her termination, Defendants note that Plaintiff stated

on numerous occasions that she no longer wished to work for the company.

(Docs. 14-3 at 14, 14-7 at 223:18-224:5). Defendants also note that Wright

categorized Plaintiff's behavior as “insubordination.” (Doc. 14-10 at 4). Thus,

Defendants have carried their modest burden of articulating legitimate non-

discriminatory reasons for hiring Piezer for the RDH team lead position and

terminating Plaintiff's employment.

The burden therefore shifts back to Plaintiff, who “must point to some

evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably

either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2)

believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.” Fuentes, 32

F.3d at 764. While the Court declines to evaluate the merits of Plaintiff's

retaliation claim, it finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence such

that a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve Defendants’ nondiscriminatory

reasons for her termination, particularly given Cohen’s stated reasons for her

termination.

-21-

However, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence such that a

fact finder could either disbelieve or find that a discriminatory reason was

more likely than not a motivating cause of Defendants’ decision to hire Piezer

over Plaintiff for the RDH team lead position. By Plaintiff's own admission,

Piezer had additional certifications which she did not have. Additionally,

when Plaintiff was asked, “So this doesn’t have to do with any type of racial

discrimination. It has to deal with the fact that you felt [Wright] wasn’t

appropriately handling the hygiene role?” she responded, “Correct.” (Doc.

14-7 at 183:12-16). Finally, Plaintiff agreed that she could not fill the RDH

team lead position at the time Piezer was hired, given that she had not yet

obtained her RDH certification. /d. at 118:25-119:7. Plaintiff has failed to

present sufficient evidence such that a fact finder would disbelieve

Defendants’ assertions that Piezer was simply a more qualified candidate

than Plaintiff.

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was

wrongfully terminated pursuant to Title VII retaliation. However, there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants retaliated against

Plaintiff by passing over her for the RDH team lead position. Thus,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED to the extent it

222.

applies to Plaintiff's claim that she was denied a new role and DENIED to

the extent it applies to Plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination.

B. Count Il: Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)

The Court next considers whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists with respect to Count II of Plaintiffs complaint: discrimination under

the PHRA. The PHRA is generally interpreted in accord with its federal

counterpart, Title VII. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)

(citing Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (3d

Cir. 1995). “In the employment discrimination context, the analysis for

adjudicating claims under the PHRA is identical to a Title VII analysis.”

Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 210 F.Supp.3d 658, n.9 (E.D.Pa. 2016) (citing

Sheidemanle v. Slippery Rock Univ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006)

(emphasis added).

“In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to discrimination claims brought

under Title VIl and the PHRA.” Donnelly v. Capital Vision Serv., LLC, 644

F.Supp.3d 97, 104 (E.D.Pa. 2022) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792).

Because the Court employed the McDonnell Douglas framework with

respect to Plaintiff's Title VIl claims, supra, the Court renders the same

holding for Plaintiff's PHRA claims.

- 23 -

IV. CONCLUSION

After viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court

concludes with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claim that she was wrongfully

terminated, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether:

Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; the termination was adverse

employment action; the causation element of her retaliation claim could be

satisfied; and Defendants had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her

termination. These issues will need to be resolved by a jury. Under these

circumstances, the motion for summary judgment must be denied with

respect to the retaliation claims based upon Plaintiff's termination.

-24-

The Court concludes, however, that Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient

evidence to support her other retaliation claim—that she was passed over

for an RDH team lead position. Summary judgment must be granted in

Defendants’ favor with respect to that claim. For the foregoing reasons,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. An appropriate order will follow. Additionally, a separate

Order the Court will set a date for the final pretrial conference and trial in this

matter.

United States District Judge

DATE: Sfot/2o

24-2278-01

-25-