Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JEREMY R., on behalf of JAMES R., )

who is deceased,1 ) No. 23 CV 4888

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

)

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

) June 9, 2026

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

James R. sought disability insurance benefits based on a combination of

physical and mental impairments he said prevented him from working. His son

Jeremy became the substitute party after James died in May 2022. (Administrative

Record (“A.R.”) 15, 185-86.) Jeremy brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying

James’s application for benefits. For the following reasons, Jeremy’s remand request

is granted:

Procedural History

James filed his benefits application in June 2021 claiming disability onset on

March 31, 2019. (A.R. 15, 260-66.) After James’s application was denied at the

administrative level, (id. at 78-82, 90-94), he sought and was granted a hearing, (id.

1 Pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure 22, the court uses Jeremy’s and James’s

first names and last initials in this opinion to protect their privacy to the extent

possible.

at 115-20). But James died before his February 2023 hearing, so his son Jeremy and

a vocational expert testified before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).2 (Id. at

34-59.) The ALJ concluded later that month that James was not disabled. (Id. at 15-

28.) After the Appeals Council denied Jeremy’s request for review, (id. at 1-6), he

sought judicial review, and the parties consented to this court’s jurisdiction,

28 U.S.C. § 636(c); (R. 8).

Analysis

Jeremy argues that the ALJ failed to: (1) properly evaluate his father’s

subjective symptom statements; (2) accept state agency psychologist Dr. Steven

Fritz’s worksheet assessing moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and

pace (“CPP”) and social interaction; (3) take into account treating psychiatrist

Dr. Mary Cherian’s opinion; and (4) develop the record by seeking updated VA

records. (See generally R. 18, Pl.’s Br.) When reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court

asks only whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and the decision has

the support of substantial evidence, Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510

(7th Cir. 2019), which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion,” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(quotation and citations omitted). This deferential standard precludes the court from

reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment for the ALJ’s, allowing reversal

2 Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(4), an ALJ may dismiss a hearing request if the

claimant dies, but an eligible survivor can seek to replace the claimant if a hearing

request is made within 60 days of the dismissal. See SSA’s Program Operations

Manual System HA 01240.035.

“only if the record compels” it. Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quotation and citation omitted). However, the ALJ’s “analysis must say enough to

enable a review of whether the ALJ considered the totality of a claimant’s

limitations,” Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1233 (7th Cir. 2021), and “provide an

explanation . . . that is ‘sufficient to allow [the] reviewing court[] to assess the validity

of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford [the claimant] meaningful judicial

review,’” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Moore v.

Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014)). Viewing the record under this standard,

remand is warranted.

A. Symptom Evaluation

The court turns first to Jeremy’s complaint that the ALJ offered “very little

evidence” as to how he assessed James’s symptom statements in function reports and

as Jeremy reported at the administrative hearing because that analysis informs

several other aspects of the ALJ’s decision, including the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) assessment. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14-16.) An ALJ’s symptom evaluation is

entitled to great deference and may be reversed only where “patently wrong.”

Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2014). The ALJ must consider

factors like medication efficacy and side effects, daily activities, treatment received,

and precipitating pain factors. SSR 16-3p, No. SSA-2015-0055, 2017 WL 5180304, at

*3 (Oct. 25, 2017). That said, the court will not disturb a subjective symptom

evaluation that is logically based on specific findings and evidence. See Murphy, 759

F.3d at 815-16.

The ALJ briefly summarized Jeremy’s testimony that his father “traveled

independently and [] lived on his own” during the relevant period, “regularly cared

for his grandchild,” “often [sat] in a dark room, dozing off possibly due to sleep apnea

or depression,” and “struggled with mental health concerns, including depression and

PTSD,” leading him to “spen[d] most of his days in bed unless he had

‘responsibilities.’” (A.R. 21.) The ALJ followed this summary with “boilerplate”

language discrediting the symptom allegations, (see R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14-15), without

providing any evaluation of such statements or factors that must be considered, such

as daily activities or treatment, see SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. In other

words, the ALJ did not discuss why statements describing James’s “symptoms or

activities were not supported by the evidence.” (R. 32, Pl.’s Reply at 11.)

As Jeremy argues, the government “sidesteps these concerns” and asserts that

Jeremy “ask[s] the court to make [] perfect the enemy of the good.” (Id.) While it is

true that the ALJ’s analysis need not be perfect, it must “say enough to enable a

review of whether the ALJ considered the totality of [James’s] limitations,” Lothridge,

984 F.3d at 1233, and provide a sufficient explanation “to allow [the] reviewing court[]

to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings,” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1054

(internal citations omitted). The ALJ’s symptom evaluation here does not satisfy

these standards.

Particularly troubling is the fact that the ALJ’s summary of the objective

medical evidence appears to accept findings that are consistent with subjective

symptoms James and Jeremy reported. (See A.R. 21-25.) For instance, the ALJ

acknowledged that James was admitted to the hospital in May 2019 for stress and

depression with “passive suicidal ideations” and that he “reported two prior traumatic

experiences” associated with his military service. (Id. at 21-23 (citing id. at 572);

see also id. at 257 (April 2023 letter from James’s attorney stating that James

experienced “severe depression and PTSD due to repressed military sexual trauma,”

which was “later referred to as ‘rape[]’” by a sergeant).) Although James’s “mood,

sleep, and general appearance improved” during this hospital stay, the ALJ noted

that later in the month James presented as “slightly malodorous and sad-appearing,

with occasional tearfulness” and reported that “he had stayed in bed most of the

weekend.” (Id. at 23 (citing id. at 1365); but see id. at 23 (citing id. at 2283 (ALJ

noting that despite “stay[ing] in bed most of the weekend,” James was able to enjoy

“dinner and a movie” with family)).)

The ALJ continued that the following month, in June 2019, James’s “mood and

affect were depressed” and he experienced “passive suicidal ideation for the next few

months,” despite having an “otherwise normal mental status examination” (“MSE”).

(Id.) The ALJ remarked that James’s providers “frequently described his thinking as

tangential or said that he had moderately impaired concentration beginning in

August 2019” and that throughout 2019 James’s treatment records showed

“depressed mood and affect.” (Id. (citing e.g., id. at 825 (May 2021 hospital record

noting depression and anxiety)).). And the ALJ “considered [James’s] history of

passive suicidal ideation, with at least one long-term residential program for PTSD

[in May 2021] and several emergency room visits for depression” when evaluating the

objective medical evidence. (Id. at 24; see also id. at 61-63, 73 (noting at the initial

level of administrative review James’s history of depression, diagnosis of major

depressive disorder, and PTSD, as well as “[n]ightmares, suicidal thoughts, extreme

anxiety and depression”).) Given that such evidence seems to support symptom

allegations James and Jeremy reported—including statements that James “struggled

with mental health concerns, including depression and PTSD,” leading him to

“spen[d] most of his days in bed,” (id. at 21)—the court cannot say that the ALJ

provided a symptom analysis logically based on substantial evidence. See Murphy,

759 F.3d at 815-16.

Jeremy also contends that the ALJ improperly “omitted discussion of [James’s]

consistent employment and earnings history as a correctional officer for the State of

Illinois,” further “bolster[ing] the need for remand.” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 15-16.) The

Seventh Circuit has “observed that a ‘claimant with a good work record is entitled to

substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work because of a disability.’”

Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2015). However, an ALJ’s “silence”

regarding the claimant’s work history “is not enough to negate the substantial

evidence supporting the adverse credibility finding.” Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502,

508 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528-29 (7th Cir.

2017) (“Although a consistent work history weighs in favor of a positive credibility

finding, it is still just ‘one factor among many, and it is not dispositive.’” (quoting

Loveless, 810 F.3d at 508)). Nevertheless, because remand is required for the reasons

explained above, on remand the ALJ should address whether and how James’s work

history impacts his ultimate decision.

B. Mental RFC

Jeremy asserts that the ALJ failed to account for state agency psychologist

Dr. Fritz’s worksheet findings—assessing moderate CPP and social interaction

limitations—when assigning James’s mental RFC. (See R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 6-10.) An

RFC measures the tasks a person can perform given his limitations based on “all the

relevant evidence” in the administrative record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1);

see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013). When developing the

RFC, the ALJ must incorporate a claimant’s limitations, including those that are not

severe, and may not dismiss a line of evidence that is contrary to the ruling. Bruno

v. Saul, 817 Fed. Appx. 238, 242 (7th Cir. 2020). In so doing, the ALJ must “say

enough to enable review of whether she considered the totality of a claimant’s

limitations,” Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2022), providing a

“logical bridge” between the evidence and her conclusions, Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th

498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021).

The ALJ found that Jeremy had the mental RFC to “persist on non-complex

tasks and maintain occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the

public.” (A.R. 21.) In so finding, the ALJ considered James’s history of suicidal

ideation, residential treatment for PTSD, ER visits for depression, and moderate

limitations in the paragraph B areas of CPP and social functioning. (Id. at 24-25.)

The ALJ also relied on Dr. Fritz’s opinions, which he deemed “considerably

persuasive” because they were “supported by clinical findings and consistent with

adaptive functioning.” (Id.) Dr. Fritz opined in relevant part that James has “the

cognitive capacity at the initial level of administrative review to perform and sustain

three to four step tasks that require some skills but do not require complex duties of

a routine and repetitive type” and “limited social tolerance[,] therefore [he] would do

best in a socially undemanding and restricted setting that requires reduced

interpersonal contact, away from the public.” (Id.) His worksheet notes moderate

limitations in James’s ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended

periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, be

punctual within customary tolerances, and work in coordination with or in proximity

to others without being distracted by them, as well as limitation in James’s ability to

interact appropriately with the general public. (Id. at 66-67.)

However, the ALJ found no support for Dr. Fritz’s three-to-four-step-task

restriction because James “drove and cared for himself and his grandchild without

assistance” and performed other multi-step tasks. (Id.) He also rejected Dr. Fritz’s

working-with-the-public restriction because James traveled and interacted with

other members in telephonic group therapy. (Id.) Jeremy argues that these errors

warrant remand. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 6-8.)

The government responds that the RFC “substantially captured Dr. Fritz’s

opined limitations and [the ALJ] reasonably explained his minor departures”

therefrom. (R. 27, Govt.’s Mem. at 4.) “[S]ome latitude with the exact wording of the

RFC” is required, the government says, so long as necessary limitations are included.

(Id.) The problem here is that the RFC does not account for James’s moderate CPP

or social interaction limitations other than restricting him to “non-complex tasks” and

“occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public.” (A.R. 21.) And

while the ALJ rejected Dr. Fritz’s opinions pertaining to these functional areas, he

did not explain how or whether he accounted for Dr. Fritz’s worksheet findings or the

portion of Dr. Fritz’s opinion limiting James to “routine and repetitive” tasks in the

RFC he assessed. (See id. at 21, 25.)

Starting with CPP deficits, the ALJ offered some explanation for rejecting the

three-to-four-step-task limitation but did not clarify how the daily activities he

noted—driving, caring for a grandchild and himself, and performing “other multi-step

tasks as described elsewhere,” (id. at 25)—translate to an ability to perform more

than three-to-four-step tasks. Nor did the ALJ identify the “other” multi-step tasks

to which he referred. (Id.) Even assuming the ALJ supplied substantial evidence to

support his rejection of the three-to-four-step-task limitation, he did not explain how

a non-complex task restriction accommodates the moderate difficulties Dr. Fritz

identified in his worksheet—maintaining attention and concentration for extended

periods, performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance,

being punctual within customary tolerances, and working in coordination with or in

proximity to others without being distracted by them. (See id. at 66-67.) The ALJ

also failed to explain why he rejected Dr. Fritz’s findings that tasks be of “a routine

and repetitive type,’” (id.), both of which address James’s ability “to stick with a given

task over a sustained period” as opposed to his ability to “do tasks of a given

complexity.” (R. 32, Pl.’s Reply at 2; see also A.R. 25.)

The government claims that any error here is harmless because Dr. Fritz

“provided an extended narrative demonstrating that he did not intend his worksheet

ratings to suggest further limitations beyond those the ALJ assessed.” (R. 27, Govt.’s

Mem. at 7.) For example, Dr. Fritz said that James “retains sufficient attention and

concentration to persist at and complete work activities for the usual periods required

in the general work force” and “has the capacity for adequate pace and perseverance

to maintain a schedule and on time attendance.” (Id. (citing id. at 67).) Even so, the

ALJ failed to account for CPP deficits other than non-complex tasks, despite

Dr. Fritz’s opinion endorsing moderate limitations in several CPP categories and his

limiting James to tasks of “a routine and repetitive type.” (A.R. 66-67.) Without any

reasoning as to why the ALJ excluded those limitations in the RFC, the court cannot

uphold the ALJ’s assessment.

The government insists that the ALJ’s RFC is not erroneous because “non-

complex” work can be construed as “simple” work, and “a limitation to non-complex

work is consistent with the ability to perform work involving three-to-four-step

tasks.” (R. 27, Govt.’s Mem. at 4-5.) The government cites Surprise v. Saul, 968 F.3d

658, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2020), for support. But the assessed RFC in Surprise limited

the claimant to “work that’s considered routine, repetitive, noncomplex, [and]

simple.” Id. The same is not true here, where the mental RFC was limited only to

“non-complex tasks.” (A.R. 21.) Surprise is therefore not helpful for the government’s

position.

The ALJ also failed to clarify how an occasional social interaction restriction

accommodates James’s moderate limitation in interacting appropriately with the

general public. (Id. at 66.) Dr. Fritz opined that James has “limited social tolerance”

and “would do best in a socially undemanding and restricted setting that requires

reduced interpersonal contact, away from the public.” (Id. at 67.) The ALJ rejected

this limitation, adopting instead a limitation allowing for “occasional interaction with

co-workers, supervisors, and the public” because he said James could travel and

participate in telephonic group therapy. (Id. at 21, 25.) But the evidence shows that

during a family trip in April 2021 James experienced significant “anxiety and

hypervigilance” and “stayed in [the] room the whole time.” (Id. at 913, 2646; see also

id. at 897, 1681 (noting that in May 2021 James suffered chest pain after being on a

flight and he stayed in the airplane bathroom during the flight trying to calm

himself).) On another occasion, James took a “trip” to Cincinnati for residential

treatment but had to cut it short after his brother was murdered. (Id. at 614.) The

ALJ did not explain how such travel experience or James’s ability to engage in

telephonic group therapy supplies substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s social

interaction limitation. In any event, the ALJ does not square Dr. Fritz’s finding that

James has a moderate limitation in interacting with the general public with the RFC

he assessed—limiting James to occasional social interaction with the public.

(Compare id. at 21 with id. at 66.) As such, the ALJ failed to supply substantial

evidence to support the assessed mental RFC.3

C. Opinion Evidence

Jeremy complains that the ALJ did not properly evaluate treating psychiatrist

Dr. Cherian’s opinions. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 10-14.) An ALJ may not “defer or give any

specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, he must assess the persuasiveness

of all medical opinions by considering and explaining the most important factors—

supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c(b)(2); Albert v.

Kijakazi, 34 F.4th 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2022). The supportability factor requires

consideration of the objective medical evidence and explanations presented and used

by the medical source, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1), while the

consistency factor directs the ALJ to assess how the opinion is consistent with all

other medical and nonmedical sources, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).

The ALJ also may, but is not required to, explain how he considered the medical

source’s specializations and relationship with the claimant and any other factors that

3 Jeremy further contends that the ALJ failed to consider the effects of James’s

obesity when assessing his physical RFC. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 9-10.) However, the ALJ

determined that James’s obesity qualified as a severe impairment and found at step

three that James was “clinically obese, with a Body Mass Index (BMI) around 50.”

(A.R. 18-19 (noting that James had bariatric surgery, suggesting that “obesity

impacted his mobility and functioning to a significant degree”).) But the ALJ

determined that James’s obesity “did not cause or contribute to listing-level

functional limitations in any affected body system.” (Id. at 19.) Given this analysis,

the ALJ adequately considered the effects of James’s obesity. (See id. at 25 (citing id.

at 62, 64-65 (state agency physician’s finding that James could perform light work

despite his obesity and other physical impairments)).)

tend to support or contradict the source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c,

416.920c(b)(2).

Dr. Cherian’s January 2021 opinion was limited to the assertion that James

was “unable to work” because he suffered from major depressive disorder and PTSD.

(A.R. 405 (noting clinical findings of suicidal ideation and mood dysregulation, as well

as treatment with Zoloft and BuSpar).) However, “[a] claimant . . . is not entitled to

disability benefits simply because a physician finds that the claimant is ‘disabled’ or

‘unable to work.’” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, “the

Commissioner is charged with determining the ultimate issue of disability.” Id.

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)). As such, the ALJ did not err when finding

Dr. Cherian’s opinion unpersuasive. (See A.R. 25.)

D. VA Records

Finally, Jeremy contends that the ALJ failed to abide by his duty to develop

the record by requesting and obtaining updated records from Hines and Jesse Brown

VA Medical Centers, including records related to James’s death. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at

13-14.) In his decision, the ALJ said he requested “medical evidence of the source

identified as the place of death, Jesse Brown VA Medical Center,” but “the source had

nothing to produce.” (A.R. 18; see also id. at 2782-83 (reflecting the ALJ’s request for

VA medical records).) The government claims the ALJ’s efforts were reasonable, as

evidenced by the fact that even Jeremy’s attorney was unable to secure the missing

VA records. (R. 27, Govt.’s Mem at 11.) The court agrees with the government on

this point because while it is unclear whether the ALJ made a “follow-up request to

obtain the medical evidence necessary to obtain a determination,” 20 C.F.R.

404.1512(b)(i), there is nothing more for him to do when the VA says it has nothing

to produce, as noted in the decision.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Jeremy’s remand request is granted. This matter is

remanded for further proceedings.

ENTER:

ited States Magistrate Judge

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