The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION
DONALD FRAZIER, JR., a/k/a Donald
Muhammad PLAINTIFF
No. 4:23-cv-356-DPM
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ARKANSAS;
LAFAYETTE WOODS, JR., Individually
and In His Official Capacity as the Sheriff
of Jefferson County, Arkansas; and
BRADLEY SHELL and MICHAEL
MUSGROVE, Individually and In Their
Official Capacities DEFENDANTS
ORDER
This is a case about alleged excessive force. Donald Frazier was
pulled over for a traffic stop. He drove away, without permission from
the officers on scene. He crashed into a ditch. After Frazier got out of
the car, Deputy Shell” sicced his police-K9, Soder, on Frazier.
Deputies Shell and Musgrove also tazed him. Frazier moves for partial
summary judgment on his excessive force and failure-to-train claims.
The Jefferson County defendants move for partial summary judgment
on Frazier’s official-capacity claims.
Deputy Shell’s name is Bradley Shell, not Shell Bradley. Doc. 35 at 1.
The Court directs the Clerk to update the docket.
Jefferson County’s motion is granted. There was no County
custom or policy leading to a constitutional violation. Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997).
Deputy Shell and Soder met Jefferson County’s training standards for
K9s and their operators. The training logs of record show this. Doc.
34-2 at 2,10 & 34-3 at 1, 31. Frazier presses that Jefferson County didn’t
file Soder’s canine CLEST certificate covering the year of the incident.
But Jefferson County points out that it provided that certificate (and
others) in supplemental discovery responses. In these circumstances,
Frazier hasn’t created a disputed issue of material fact here.
Deputies Shell and Musgrove also were up-to-date on their taser
training. Doc. 34-2 at 69-70. Nothing in the record would suffice to
support a verdict that Jefferson County was deliberately indifferent to
training its employees. Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076-78 (8th
Cir. 1996).
Frazier has an echoing individual-capacity claim against Sheriff
Woods for failing to train, supervise, or discipline Shell and Musgrove.
Doc. 9 at 3. In the Court’s view, the applicable law requires summary
judgment for Woods on this claim, too. Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1078.
But it’s unclear whether Jefferson County’s motion embraces this claim.
The Court therefore gives notice of its tentative decision to enter
judgment for Woods on this point. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The Court
welcomes the parties’ views. Any supplemental brief due by
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24 April 2026. Unless the Court orders otherwise, no responding
supplemental briefs are needed.
Frazier refers to certain exhibits that aren’t in the record. E.g., Doc.
44 at 3. But when the Jefferson County defendants pointed this out, e.g.,
Doc. 45 at 2, Frazier replied without supplying supplementary materials
supporting many of his contentions. Doc. 50 & 50-1. He’s therefore
forfeited any argument from his asserted but unsupported facts.
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17,
19 n.1 (2017). Taking the record in the light most favorable to Frazier,
Oglesby v. Lesan, 929 F.3d 526, 531-32 (8th Cir. 2019), he has not
presented evidence of a practice “so permanent and well settled so as
to constitute a custom[.]” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
127 (1988) (quotations omitted).
Frazier’s motion for partial summary judgment against the
individual officers is denied. He has the burden of proof on his claims.
Frazier says that when Deputy Shell sicced Soder on him, he had exited
his car with his hands up and was standing still. Doc. 34-1 at 36-37.
Compare this with the deputies’ incident reports. They say that, before
Deputy Shell deployed Soder, Frazier ignored Deputy Shell’s verbal
commands to get on the ground. Doc. 34-2 at 58 & 60. The deputies
also say that they tazed Frazier after he hit Soder and ran. Ibid. All this
creates disputed questions of material fact about whether the deputies
used excessive force. It also creates disputed questions of material fact
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about whether Deputy Musgrove failed to intervene. Hollingsworth v.
City of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2015). The jury must answer
these questions. E.g., Adams v. City of Cedar Rapids, 74 F.4th 935,
939-40 (8th Cir. 2023).
The Jefferson County defendants’ motion, Doc. 34, is granted.
Frazier’s motion, Doc. 37, is denied. Frazier’s individual capacity
claims for excessive force against Deputies Shell and Musgrove go
forward. His individual capacity claim against Deputy Musgrove for
failing to intervene goes forward, too. Frazier’s claims against
Lieutenant Baker and the Doe defendants were dismissed without
prejudice in an earlier Order, Doc. 9 at 3. Frazier’s individual capacity
claim against Sheriff Woods for failing to train, supervise, or discipline
the other officers remains under consideration. Any supplemental brief
due by 24 April 2026. All other claims and parties are dismissed with
prejudice. The Court directs the Clerk to terminate Jefferson County,
Lieutenant Baker, and the Doe defendants from this case.
This case is first out for trial on 15 June 2026. A few months ago,
the parties participated in a settlement conference without success.
The Court requests that they, and Magistrate Judge Moore, re-engage
and try again now that the Court has decided the pretrial motions (with
the noted carve out).
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So Ordered.
D.P. Marshall Jr.
United States District Judge
17 Aprl AOAle
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