Brantley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ICEE CO ET AL CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-008

VERSUS JUDGE VAN HOOK

JEFF BRANTLEY MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Introduction

The Icee Company and J&J Snack Foods Corp. (“Plaintiffs”) filed this civil action

against former employee Jeff Brantley based on allegations that Brantley was inadvertently

overpaid $86,088.96. Before the court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed Motion for Default

Judgment (Doc. 14). For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion be

granted and that the court enter the proposed judgment submitted by Plaintiffs.

Default Judgment Requirements

A default judgment involves three steps: (1) default, (2) entry of default, and (3)

default judgment. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)). “A default occurs when a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise

respond to the complaint within the time required by the Federal Rules. An entry of default

is what the clerk enters when the default is established by affidavit or otherwise. After

defendant’s default has been entered, plaintiff may apply for a judgment based on such

default. This is a default judgment.” Id. (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

“The defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of

fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal

the facts thus established.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d

1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). However, “a defendant’s default does not in itself warrant the

court in entering a default judgment” because the defendant does not by his default “admit

conclusions of law,” and there “must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for judgment to

be entered.” Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206. The facts pleaded in the complaint

may be supported by testimony at a hearing if needed to “establish the truth of any

allegation by evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(b)(2)(C); Wooten v. McDonald Transit

Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2015).

Analysis

A. Jurisdiction, Service, and Entry of Default

When entry of default is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise

defend, the district court has an affirmative duty to look into its subject matter jurisdiction.

Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th

Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs’ complaint, the well-pleaded facts of which are admitted via default,

set forth a factual basis for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are citizens of

Delaware, Tennessee, and New Jersey, Mr. Brantley is a citizen of Louisiana, and the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

Personal jurisdiction over the defendant is also required. When a district court lacks

jurisdiction over a defendant because of improper service of process, a default judgment is

void. Rogers v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs

submitted evidence that Mr. Brantley, a Louisiana citizen, signed a Waiver of the Service

of Summons that included his representation that he understood he must file and serve an

answer or a motion within 60 days from January 3, 2025, failing which a default judgment

would be entered against him. Doc. 9. Plaintiffs waited until May 1, 2025, well past the

deadline, to file a request for the clerk of court to enter a default. Doc. 10. The clerk of

court granted the request. Doc. 11.

B. Service of the Motion for Default Judgment

There was no further action in the case over the next several months. The court then

directed Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment. Doc. 13. Plaintiffs’ motion was

accompanied by a certificate that it was served on Mr. Brantley by mailing it to his address

in Ringgold and by emailing it to him.

The clerk of court issued a notice of motion setting that allowed Mr. Brantley 14

days to file a response to the motion. The clerk mailed the notice to Brantley at his last

known address in Ringgold. Doc. 16. The notice was returned by the USPS with an

indication that Brantley’s mail forwarding time associated with that address had expired.

The clerk of court then mailed the notice to a new Minden address for Brantley that the

USPS provided. Doc. 20. That mailed item has not been returned, more than 14 days have

passed since the second mailing, and Brantley has filed no response to the motion.

C. Liability and Damages

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Mr. Brantley was previously employed by Icee as the

Vice President of Field Service Operations from October 1, 2019 until June 9, 2023. Icee

and Brantley mutually agreed to terminate their employment relationship on June 9, and

they entered into a Severance Agreement and General Release.

The agreement called for Icee to pay Brantley a severance payment equivalent to 26

weeks of pay at Brantley’s base salary. Icee began making biweekly payments to Brantley

in the amount of $7,147.08. The final payment should have been made on the next

regularly scheduled payday on or around December 22, 2023, but due to a payroll error

Icee continued to make biweekly payments to Brantley for a total overpayment of

$86,088.96.

A payroll manager emailed Brantley to notify him of the overpayments, but Brantley

did not respond. Icee sent Brantley a letter to his last known address and requested that he

contact the company to discuss a repayment plan. Brantley did not respond. Yet another

letter was sent, and Brantley again did not respond.

The complaint sets forth a count of unjust enrichment under Louisiana law. “A

person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to

compensate that person.” La. Civ. Code art. 2298. “The amount of compensation due is

measured by the extent to which one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished,

whichever is less.” Id. “A person who has received a payment or a thing not owed to him

is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it.” La. Civ. Code art. 2299.

These articles have been applied to require an overpaid employee to reimburse the

employer, and negligence by the employer is not a bar to recovery. Leftwich v. New

Orleans Weddings Mag., 165 So. 3d 916, 923-34 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiffs have established subject matter jurisdiction, waiver of service, entry of

default, and entitlement to default judgment based on the allegations of the complaint and

applicable law. The proposed judgment that accompanies the motion for default judgment

asks only for the sum certain amount of the overpayment, $86,088.96, plus judicial interest

from the date of entry of judgment.1 It is appropriate, based on the showing made, for the

court to enter that judgment.

Accordingly,

It is recommended that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 14) be granted

and that the court enter the proposed judgment that accompanies that motion.

Objections

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this report and

recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an

extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the

District Judge at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendation set forth above, within 14 days after being served with a copy, shall bar

1 Federal law governs post-judgment interest in federal cases, including diversity cases,

and it is calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a);

Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Int’l, Ltd., 718 F.3d 448, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2013).

that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See

Douglass v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 27" day of May,

2026.

“Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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