EMRIT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RONALD SATISH EMRIT,

Civil Action No. 25-13293 (JXN)(MAH)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

MOORE, et al.,

Defendants.

NEALS, District Judge

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit1 (“Emrit” or “Plaintiff”)

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 1-2) and Complaint (ECF No. 1)

against Defendants Wes Moore, Aisha Braveboy, Jamie Raskin, Angela Alsobrooks, Chris Van

Hollen, and Anthony Brown (collectively, “Defendants”). Based on the information contained in

the Plaintiff’s IFP application, the Court finds that leave to proceed in this Court without

prepayment of fees is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and grants Plaintiff’s IFP application. As

the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application, the Complaint is subject to the Court’s sua sponte

screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s IFP application is

GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND2

On July 14, 2025, Emrit filed the instant Complaint against several federal and state public

officials representing the State of Maryland, including Governor Wes Moore, Prince George’s

1 Plaintiff also refers to himself as Presidential Candidate Number P60005535 & Presidential Committee/Political

Action Committee/Separate Segregated Fund (SSF) Number C00569897 d/b/a United Emrits of America. (Compl. at

*1.)

2 The factual allegations are taken from the Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court

makes no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (“[T]he §

County Executive Aisha Braveboy, United States Representative Jamie Raskin, United States

Senator Angela Alsobrooks, United States Senator Chris Van Hollen, Attorney General of

Maryland Anthony Brown (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Complaint (“Compl.), ECF No. 1.)

While the Complaint is difficult to decipher, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants are

negligent for failing to provide Plaintiff with a Section 8 Housing Voucher, adequate EBT/SNAP

benefits, and for not assisting him in securing employment as a professor of entertainment law in

the State of Maryland. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5, 6.) Plaintiff claims against Defendants for negligence,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business relations/contracts,

tortious interference with family relationships, civil rights violations, and violations of

constitutional law. (Id. ¶¶ 28-35.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $250,000. (Id. at * 8.)

Plaintiff claims to be a resident of the states of Florida and Maryland. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff

alleges that the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332 because there is complete diversity of jurisdiction between Plaintiff and Defendants,

given that Plaintiff primarily resides in Florida, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

(Id. ¶¶ 15, 19.) Plaintiff also alleges the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland has federal

question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “because this proceeding involves a discussion

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Equal

Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Fourth Amendment, and Privileges and Immunities

Clause.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. District Court for the District of

Maryland is the proper venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391 1400. (Id. ¶ 18.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In submitting the IFP application, the Complaint is subject to sua sponte screening and may

be dismissed if, among other things, the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); Brown, 941 F.3d at 662.

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although courts construe pro se pleadings less

stringently than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys, pro se litigants are still required to “allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the former §

1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.

Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (3d Cir. 1995). A claim may be determined

malicious through the application of a subjective inquiry into the litigant’s motivations at the time

of filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the action is an attempt to “vex, injure or harass the

defendant.” Hurst v. Counselman, 436 F. App’x 58, 60 (3d. Cir. 2007w (quoting Deutsh v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995)). Plaintiffs may not repackage their previously dismissed

3 “[A] court has the discretion to consider the merits of a case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even

simultaneously.” Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019); Schwager v. Norristown State Hosp., 2023 WL

8458236, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2023) (screening the complaint before addressing the IFP application).

complaint by adding new defendants or alternate legal theories. See, e.g., Ouaziz v. Murphy, No.

23-cv-2696, 2024 WL 397708, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2024) (citing Gambocz v. Yelencsis, 468 F.2d

837 (3d Cir. 1972)) (holding that a plaintiff could not reassert a dismissed claim even where he

has added new defendants); Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing United

States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)) (stating that “a plaintiff who

asserts a different theory of recovery” in their new suit must have their claim dismissed “when the

events underlying the two suits are essentially the same”).

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, this Court takes judicial notice of Emrit's status as a “vexatious”

litigant. See Emrit v. United States Pat. & Trademark Off., No. 25-278, 2025 WL 2988663, at *2

(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (citing Emrit v. Prince George's Cnty. Police Dep't, No. 25-249, 2025

WL 2345179, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2025) (recounting “Plaintiff's proclivity for initiating

frivolous and vexations litigations on various topics in multiple U.S. District Courts throughout

the country”); Emrit v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 24-13, 2024 WL 436385, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan.

11, 2024) (identifying Plaintiff as a “‘serial pro se filer’ who has been a party in more than 700

federal cases and the plaintiff in more than 400 federal cases”), report and recommendation

adopted, 2024 WL 420143 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-10413, 2024 WL

3664060 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2024); Emrit v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, No. 22-00110, 2022 WL

4287659, at *1 & n.1 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2022) (court noting that Emrit had filed cases

“nationwide, from Maine to Hawaii” and cataloguing all the various cases that were dismissed as

meritless and frivolous), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3594518 (S.D. W. Va.

Aug. 23, 2022).

A. Venue

Plaintiff does not make a colorable claim that venue lies in the District of New Jersey.

Plaintiff states that he is a resident of Florida and Maryland. (See Compl. ¶ 7.) A civil action may

be commenced in a judicial district in which (1) “any defendant resides”; (2) where “a substantial

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”; or (3) “if neither of the foregoing

provisions applies, in a district in which ‘any defendant is subject to the court's personal

jurisdiction.’” Blanding v. Walmart, Inc., No. 23-3303, 2023 WL 11228068, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec.

11, 2023) (summarizing the statutory venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)). A court may

raise considerations of venue sua sponte. Bent Glass Design v. Scienstry, Inc., No. 13-4282, 2014

WL 550548, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2014) (“[W]hile venue is initially reliant on a plaintiff's

preference as reflected in the pleadings, a district court may upon motion or sua sponte dismiss or

transfer a civil action to any other district in the interest of justice and/or for the convenience of

parties and witnesses.”).

Here, none of the Defendants identified in the Complaint are residents of New Jersey, nor

do Emrit’s allegations suggest that any part of the events or omissions giving rise to his claims

occurred here. Notably, Emrit identifies himself as a resident of both Florida and Maryland, but

not New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 1.) He further claims that the U.S. District Court for the District of

Maryland is the proper forum for his claims. (See Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16, 18.) Ultimately, no facts are

alleged in the Complaint to support venue in the District of New Jersey. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In the absence of venue, the Court has the authority to sua sponte dismiss the case. Baptiste

v. Tapestry, Inc., No. 18-3275, 2018 WL 3772678, at *2, 4 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2018 (“Having found

that venue is improper, the Court may sua sponte consider if a transfer or dismissal under Section

1406 is appropriate.”). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a

district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it

be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have

been brought.” While the Third Circuit has established that “[d]istrict courts generally should not

dismiss in forma pauperis complaints for improper venue” but rather, should “expressly consider

whether the interests of justice weigh in favor of transferring [Plaintiff's] complaint instead of

dismissing it.” Fiorani v. Chrysler Grp., 510 F. App'x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, dismissal is

particularly appropriate, as Emrit has filed identical or substantially similar complaints in

numerous jurisdictions across the country, including in the District of Maryland, only to have his

claims consistently dismissed for lack of proper venue and/or failure to state a cognizable claim.

See e.g. Emrit v. Moore, et al., No. 25-2185 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2025); Emrit v. Moore, 2025 WL

2858880 (D. S.C. Oct. 9, 2025) (complaint dismissed for improper venue); Presidential Candidate

No. P60005535 v. Moore, 2025 WL 2604495 (M.D. Pa. Jul. 18, 2025) (same); Presidential

Candidate No. P60005535 v. Moore, No. 25-64 (W.D. Va. Sept. 3, 2025) (same); Emrit v. Moore,

No. 25-03014 (D. S.D. Aug. 27, 2025) (same); Emrit v. Moore, No. 25-157 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 15,

2025) (same); Presidential Candidate No. P60005535 v. Moore, 2025 WL 2355776 (S.D. Ga. July

23, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2345082 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2025)

(dismissing Plaintiff’s claims because “[a] duplicative complaint is an abuse of the judicial

process,” and they are, therefore, “malicious.”); Presidential Candidate No. P60005535 v. Moore,

2025 WL 2412341 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2025) (transferring Plaintiff’s claims to the proper venue

of the District of Maryland); Presidential Candidate No. P60005535 v. Moore, 2025 WL 2269788

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2025) (transferring Plaintiff’s claims to the proper venue of the District of

Maryland); Presidential Candidate Number P60005535 v. Moore, et al., No. 25-03014, ECF No.

(unknown, can’t access District of Maryland dockets through PACER) (D. Md. Sep. 17, 2025);

Emrit v. Moore, et al., No. 25-2185, ECF No. 11 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2025). Moreover, a pre-filing

injunction4 in the District of Maryland against Plaintiff took effect on September 5, 2025. See

Presidential Candidate Number P9004435, (D. Md. Sep. 17, 2025) (citing In re Emrit, Misc. No-

25-488 (D. Md.), ECF No.2). For the foregoing reasons, there is no cause to conclude that a transfer

is in the interest of justice.

The final inquiry is whether the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims is with or without prejudice

and whether to grant leave to amend his claims. Leave to amend is appropriate unless an

amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir.

1984). Here, an amendment would be inequitable because Plaintiff has demonstrated bad faith

through his continuous and vexatious litigation against the Defendants, and futile, as this is an

improper venue. For the reasons previously expressed, the Court finds that leave to amend any of

Plaintiff’s claims would be futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s IFP application (ECF No. 1-2) is GRANTED, and the Complaint (ECF No. 1)

is DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate Form of Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: 4/17/2026

_______________________

JULIEN XAVIER NEALS

United States District Judge

4 Pre-filing injunctions prohibit plaintiffs with histories of vexatious litigation from filing any further actions or

documents relating to the subject matter of the litigation in any other court. See In re David M. Kissi Litig., 12-MC-

287, 2012 WL 10011197 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2012)