Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

29SC FOUR POINTE LP,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-243

Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

JESSICA BROWN,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 12, 2026, Plaintiff, 29SC Four Pointe LP, filed a Petition in Forcible Entry

and Detainer against Defendant, Jessica Brown, in the Municipal Court of Franklin County,

Ohio. See 29SC Four Pointe LP v. Jessica Brown, Franklin County M.C. No. 26 CVG 008106.

The petition sought possession of the premises in question due to Defendant’s failure to pay rent

in violation of the lease agreement. The Municipal Court issued a writ of restitution and setout

on March 4, 2026, requiring Defendant to vacate the premises, but the writ was stayed after

Defendant appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. (See docket Municipal Court docket

entries of March 4, 2026, and April 1, 2026.)

In the meantime, on February 27, 2026, Defendant, an Ohio resident proceeding without

the assistance of counsel, filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is

now before the Court for consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis, which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial

officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Permission to File

Electronically (ECF No. 5), which is GRANTED. Defendant may participate in e-filing only as

to this particular case and conditional on her compliance with all applicable e-filing

requirements. If she has not already done so, Defendant is DIRECTED to create a PACER

account, and then complete the electronic filing registration for the Southern District of Ohio, as

explained at https://pacer.uscourts.gov/register-account/non-attorney-filers-cmecf. Defendant is

REMINDED that failure to adhere to all applicable e-filing requirements will likely result in the

revocation of permission to participate in e-filing. Defendant is specifically CAUTIONED that

failure to update her email address and monitor her email account (including her “junk mail” or

spam folder) for court filings may result in the Court’s dismissal of the action. Cf. Yeschick v.

Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s denial of motion for relief

from judgment where counsel’s neglect in failing to check docket until more than a month after

he learned that he was not receiving notice of electronic filings because he failed to update his

email address on file with the district court); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Indi’s Fast

Food Rest., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00590, 2016 WL 7473130, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2016) (noting

that defense counsel represented that “he did not receive any Court-related notices or emails

because they were all sent to his ‘junk mail’ folder” and finding that “[d]efense counsel’s non-

receipt of emails does not relieve his responsibility to monitor the Court’s docket and keep

apprised of developments within his active cases, which he failed to do here”). Defendant is

further CAUTIONED that her electronic filing access may be revoked at any time.

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Defendant’s Notice of

Removal (ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for

the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court REMAND this action

to the Franklin County Municipal Court.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

When the Notice of Removal provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may

dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urb. Apts., No.

1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams,

182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).

Defendant’s Notice of Removal fails to provide a basis for a claim over which this Court

has jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are

contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal-question jurisdiction, and § 1332,

which provides for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

501 (2006) (cleaned up). Federal-question jurisdiction is implicated when a plaintiff pleads a

claim “arising under” the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Id. For a federal court to

have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a), complete diversity of citizenship must exist

(which means that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant) and

the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68

(1996).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires a pleading to contain “a short plain

statement of the grounds for jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, “a [party] seeking

diversity jurisdiction [must] set forth the factual basis on which that jurisdiction is predicated.”

Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x 554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the

Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party

asserting jurisdiction.”). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up).

Here, Defendant has not identified any claims arising under federal laws or the United

States Constitution to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To the

contrary, the claims against Defendant for eviction under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1923 are

creatures of state law. Defendant briefly references a federally funded rental assistance program

under which she was entitled to, but did not, receive several months’ worth of rental payments.

But Defendant’s assertion of defenses or counterclaims involving federal programs or statutes

does not create a basis for jurisdiction. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,

535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (holding that “a counterclaim—which appears as part of the

defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising

under’ jurisdiction”).

Nor can Defendant rely on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to

establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant neither alleges that the parties are

citizens of different states nor alleges the citizenship of the parties at all. Nor does Defendant

allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendant therefore has not plausibly

alleged that § 1332’s diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy requirements are satisfied.

Further, to the extent that Defendant seeks to overturn the March 4, 2026 Writ of

Restitution and Set Out, those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v.

Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that

appellate review of state-court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings is limited

to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009).

The undersigned therefore concludes that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

this action. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court REMAND this action to the Franklin County

Municipal Court. It is further RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Emergency Motion for

Hearing (ECF No. 6) and Motion for Injunction (ECF No. 8) be DENIED AS MOOT.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE