Rutherford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON W. MILLER,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01506

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

JEREMY RUTHERFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court are a motion for appointment of counsel and two motions for leave

to file an amended complaint filed by Plaintiff Jason W. Miller (“Miller”) (Doc. 51; Doc. 53;

Doc. 61). The Court will deny the motion to appoint counsel, grant the first motion to amend

the complaint, have the proposed amended complaint filed as the operative complaint in this

matter, screen the amended complaint, and dismiss the amended complaint. The Court will

deny the second motion to amend the complaint because he did not attach a proposed

amended pleading pursuant to Local Rule 15.1. Miller will be granted one final opportunity

to raise his claims by filing a second amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action began as three separate actions filed by Miller, an inmate currently housed

at the State Correctional Institution Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”), in September of 2024.

(Doc. 13). All three complaints addressed the attempted removal of a ring upon Miller’s

arrival at SCI-Camp Hill.

The initial complaint in this matter named a single defendant, Jeremy Rutherford

(“Rutherford”), a physician’s assistant at SCI-Camp Hill, and concerns attempts at removing

a ring from Miller’s right hand after his arrival at SCI-Camp Hill on May 17, 2023. (Doc. 1)

The first supplemental complaint, originally filed in No. 3:24-CV-01523-KM-EW, named

Correction Officer Renee (“Rangi”)1 and Correction Officer Dowling (“Dowling”), both

employed at SCI-Camp Hill, as defendants and raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) based on the attempted removal of the ring upon Miller’s

arrival at SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 12). The second supplemental complaint, originally filed

under No. 3:24-CV-1526, named Allysa Hartraft, a physician’s assistant at UPMC Hospital

in Harrisburg, as the sole defendant and raised claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

FTCA based on her attempts to remove the after Miller was transported from SCI-Camp Hill

to the hospital. (Doc. 14).

On October 25, 2024, the Court consolidated all three cases and filed the complaints

from the other two actions as supplemental complaints in the above captioned actions. (Doc.

13). The Court also screened these complaints and dismissed all claims raised under the ADA

and FTCA. (Doc. 13). The Court then served a copy of the complaints to the named

Defendants. (Doc. 13). On December 9, 2024, the Court denied a pending request by Miller

to appoint counsel in this action. (Doc. 16). On January 10, 2025, Defendants Rangi and

Dowling filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against them accompanied by a brief in

support. (Doc. 23; Doc. 24).

On January 27, 2025, Defendant Rutherford filed a suggestion of bankruptcy notifying

the Court that Wellpath, LLC, Defendant Rutherford’s employer, had filed bankruptcy, and

1 Defendants clarified that the correct spelling of Renee is Rangi. (Doc. 24, at 1).

the automatic stay entered in that bankruptcy action applied in this case. (Doc. 27). On

February 3, 2025, the Court received and docketed what appeared to be a response to

Defendants Rangi and Dowling’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 28). On February 11, 2025, the

Court entered a stay in this action pending the outcome of the automatic stay hearing in the

Wellpath bankruptcy case. (Doc. 29). On May 28, 2025, Defendant Rutherford filed status

report stating that the automatic stay no longer applied in the above captioned action. (Doc.

31). That same date, the Court lifted the stay in this action. (Doc. 32). On July 8, 2025,

Defendant Rutherford filed a motion to dismiss the complaint along with a brief in support.

(Doc. 40; Doc. 41). Miller did not file a responsive briefing within the time set forth in Local

Rule 7.6.

On August 20, 2025, the Court addressed the pending motions to dismiss. (Doc. 45;

Doc. 46). The Court granted Rangi and Dowling’s motion dismissing all Eighth Amendment

and negligence claims. (Doc. 46). The Court granted Defendant Rutherford’s motion and

dismissed all claims against him without prejudice. (Doc. 46). The Court then granted Miller

thirty days to notify the Court of Defendant Hartraft’s correct name and address and to file

an amended complaint. (Doc. 46).

Following an extension of time, the Court received and docketed Miller’s motion to

amend his complaint with a proposed amended complaint on September 29, 2025. (Doc. 51;

Doc. 51-1). This proposed amended complaint does not correct the name or address of

Defendant Hartraft. (Doc. 13; Doc. 53-1). In addition to Defendant Hartraft, Miller names

Rangi, Dowling, Rutherford and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) as

Defendants in the action. (Doc. 53-1, at 1, 3). Miller provides the following sparce statement

of facts:

After Defendant Rutherford attempted to remove ring from Plaintiff Millers’

right hand for (5) five hours on 05/17/2024. Plaintiff was transported to

U.P.M.C. Harrisburg on 05/23/2024 where defendant Hartraft also attempted

to remove ring from right hand of Plaintiff Miller. After utilizing “Raptor

Scissors” in public hallway at hospital defendant Hartraft handed “Raptor

Scissors” [illegible] device to Defendant Rangi who then broke off tip of raptor

scissors under plaintiff[’] ring band further harming, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff

Miller alleges he was handcuffed and in wheelchair outside of examination

room, in public hallway. He repeatedly said “Please stop!”

(Doc. 53-1, at 3). Elsewhere in the amended complaint, Miller states that he has no record of

misconducts on file, he is a current custody level 2, and has never acted out defiantly,

disruptively or obscenely to consider him by prison officials as being a safety or security risk.

(Doc. 53-1, at 2). He states that after being notified and ordered to remove the religious ring

from his right hand, he exhausted the grievance procedures within the DOC, but the ring was

identified as unauthorized or prohibited. (Doc. 53-1, at 2).

Based on these alleged facts, Miller brings First Amendment retaliation claims, Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference, excessive force claims, and “Enhancement of Damages”

claim, Fourteenth Amendment claims, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”) claims, and “ADAAA” claims under 42 U.S.C. § 12102, which the Court

construes as American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims. (Doc. 53-1, at 2).

The Court will grant the pending motion to amend the complaint and direct the Clerk

of Court to file the proposed amended complaint as a separate document on the docket. Now,

the court will screen the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II. STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen

a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 Fed.

App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v.

Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with

respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In this case, because

Miller is a prisoner suing a governmental employee and brings his suit in forma pauperis, both

provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the

same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579,

588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor

need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged.

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation

omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened

pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded

complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief

beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of

action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d

at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)

requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing

Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 545).

With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally

construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully

pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if

a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit

a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

A. ALL ADA CLAIMS WILL BE DISMISSED.

The Court has construed Miller’s reference to the “ADAAA” as an attempt to raise an

ADA claim.

“To state a claim under either the ADA or the RA, [a plaintiff] must allege that he is

a qualified individual with a disability, who was precluded from participating in a program,

service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.”

Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F3.d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2019). Miller’s amended complaint

is devoid of any alleged disability. Therefore, his claim under the ADA will be dismissed

without prejudice.

B. ALL RLUIPA CLAIMS WILL BE DISMISSED.

The RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable to freely attend to

their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and

accommodation for exercise of their religion”. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).

In relevant part, RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results

from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).

To establish a prima facie case under RLUIPA, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1)

he engaged in a religious exercise; and (2) the religious exercise was substantially burdened.

RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled

by, or central to, a system of religious belief 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). The Third Circuit

has defined “substantial burden” as follows:

For the purposes of RLUIPA, a “substantial burden” exists where: (1) a

follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and

forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus

abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR

2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially

modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). A “substantial

burden” includes a rule or regulation which compels the prisoner to engage in “conduct that

seriously violates [his] religious beliefs.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 352-53 (2015) (quoting

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 717 n.28 (2014). “RLUIPA’s ‘substantial burden’

inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened religious exercise . . . not

whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.” Holt,

135 S.Ct. at 862.

Here, Miller simply makes a reference to the ring being associated with religious

beliefs: “After being notified, ordered to remove religious ring from right hand.” (Doc. 53-1,

at 2). Miller also references that other inmates are permitted to wear jewelry that identify them

as a member of a specific religion or belief system. (Doc. 53-1, at 2). Miller’s amended

complaint does not allege the religious significance of the ring with any specificity so as to

establish the substantial burden requirement set forth in Washington. Specifically, there is

nothing to suggest that the removal of the ring is equivalent to abandoning one of the precepts

of his religion. Therefore, the claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

Miller makes reference to a First Amendment claim in his complaint. (Doc. 53-1, at

2). To the extent that he is attempting to raise a First Amendment freedom of religion claim,

the allegations in the amended complaint also fall short. Two threshold requirements must be

met before particular beliefs, alleged to be religious in nature, are accorded First Amendment

protection. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981). The beliefs avowed

must be (1) sincerely held, and (2) religious in nature. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1029-30. Again,

Miller made no allegation in his amended complaint that the ring is associated with a sincerely

held religious belief. Instead, he merely referred to the item as a “religious ring.” Therefore,

these sparce allegations do not trigger First Amendment protections.

C. ALL SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST THE DOC WILL BE DISMISSED.

Miller attempts to bring claims against the DOC for the first time in this amended

complaint. (Doc. 53-1).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold

requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have

personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a

constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, Miller names the DOC as a defendant. (Doc. 53-1). It is well-settled that neither

a state nor its agencies, are considered a “person” as that term is defined under § 1983 and,

therefore, are not subject to a § 1983 suit. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–27 (1997). Therefore,

the DOC is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and all claims raised

against it will be dismissed with prejudice.

D. ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT DOWLING WILL BE DISMISSED

In the amended complaint, Miller again names Defendant Dowling as a party to the

action but he does not allege any personal actions or involvement by Defendant Dowling

within the alleged statement of facts. (Doc. 53-1).

As set forth above, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a

constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” See Baraka, 481

F.3d at 210. Without allegations of personal involvement, all claims against Defendant

Dowling will be dismissed without prejudice.

E. ALL CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT HARTRAFT WILL BE DISMISSED.

All remaining claims against Defendant Hartraft are constitutional claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 53-1). As set forth above, to bring a claim under Section 1983, Miller

must allege the following: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a person acting

under color of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West, 487 U.S. at 48; see

also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of state law

element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color

of law.” (citation omitted)).

Here, Defendant Hartraft is a Physician’s Assistant at UPMC Harrisburg Hospital, not

a medical provider at a DOC facility. (Doc. 53-1, at 1). “Whether or not outside medical

providers, to whom prison officials refer inmates for medical treatment that the prison cannot

itself provide, can be deemed to be state actors generally turns on whether those providers do

so pursuant to a contract with the state.” Collazo v. Rosenthal, No. 23-3475, 2023 WL 8720136,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2023) (citing, inter alia, Illescas v. Annucci, No. 21-8473, 2022 WL

17539696, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2022) (collecting cases and distinguishing between

defendants that treat prisoner plaintiffs at private hospitals where there is no allegation that

the treatment is “provided pursuant to a contract between the government and the private

hospital” and non-public medical providers that provide inmates with medical treatment

outside of a prison pursuant to a contract, and holding that the latter may be state actors)). In

the amended complaint, Miller only alleges that Defendant Hartraft is employed at UPMC

Harrisburg. Miller has not alleged that any contract exists between the DOC and UPMC

Harrisburg to establish that Defendant Hartraft is acting under the color of state law.

Therefore, all claims against Defendant Hartraft will be dismissed without prejudice.

F. ALL FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS WILL BE DISMISSED.

Miller attempts to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim against all Defendants.

(Doc. 53-1, at 2).

It is well-settled that prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate because he

exercises his right of access to the courts. Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015).

A prisoner asserting a retaliation claim must allege the following elements: (1) he engaged in

constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a

person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the

constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse

action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). The filing of a lawsuit or a prison grievance constitutes protected

activity under the First Amendment. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191. Miller makes no allegations

that he was involved in constitutional protected conduct at the time of the ring’s removal.

(Doc. 53-1). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claims without

prejudice.

G. ALL EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS WILL BE DISMISSED.

In the amended complaint, Miller alleges Eighth Amendment claims under the

theories of deliberate indifference, excessive force, and “Enhanced Damages.” (Doc. 53-1, at

3).

1. Deliberate Indifference

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. To sustain a

constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical treatment, a

plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a

subjective showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs.

See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is

“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr.

Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). A prison

official is deliberately indifferent when he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

However, the Third Circuit is found that generally “a non-medical prison official will

generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372

F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison

doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison

official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of

deliberate indifference.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.

Miller alleges that Defendant Rangi was handed the Raptor scissors by Defendant

Hartraft and he broke off the tip of the scissors under Miller’s ring. (Doc. 53-1, at 3).

Therefore, Defendant Rangi was involved in the removal of the ring under the direction of a

medical professional, Defendant Hartraft. While Miller alleges that he requested that

Defendants stop, he does not allege that the Defendants continued to attempt to remove the

ring following his requests to stop. (Doc. 53-1, at 3). As set forth at length below, a

disagreement with treatment is not akin to indifference under the Eighth Amendment. See

White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). Therefore, Miller’s requests to stop do

not rise to the level of alleging mistreatment or lack of treatment. The Court will dismiss the

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Rangi.

Turning to the deliberate indifference claims raised against Defendant Rutherford, the

Court finds, as it did in August of 2025, that the alleged facts only demonstrate that the

treatment amounted to a disagreement and not deliberate indifference. “Prison medical

authorities are given considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of medical problems

of inmates and courts will ‘disavow any attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of

a particular course of treatment . . . which remains a question of sound professional

judgment.’” Byrd v. Shannon, No. 1:09-CV-1551, 2010 WL 5889519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24,

2010) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)).

Mere disagreement over proper treatment does not state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. White, 897 F.2d at 110; Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Courts,

determining what constitutes deliberate indifference, have consistently held that mere

allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth amendment

violation.”).

The alleged minimal facts demonstrate that Miller disagrees with the attempts to

remove the ring. (Doc. 53-1, at 3). He also alleges that he asked the Defendants to stop, but

he does not allege that the Defendants continued with the attempted removal of the ring after

his requests to stop. (Doc. 53-1, at 3). In fact, Miller’s prior statement of facts was much more

detailed than the current statement of facts. Therefore, his amended complaint fails to cure

the pleading defects that were set forth in the Court’s August of 2025 memorandum and order

and the claims will be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 45; Doc. 46).

2. Use of Excessive Force

Miller alleges that Defendants Rangi and Rutherford used excessive force in the

removal of the ring. (Doc. 53-1, at 2).

The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment is the

“primary source of substantive protection in cases ... where the deliberate use of force is

challenged as excessive and unjustified.” See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). The

question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7, (1992)

(citing Whitley, 475 U.S. 312).

Again, Miller’s alleged facts in this amended complaint are significantly less than the

alleged facts in his prior complaints. There are no allegations in the amended complaint that

the force used was applied in a malicious or sadistic manner to cause harm. (Doc. 53-1). There

are no allegations that Defendants continued to make attempts to remove the ring after Miller

asked them to stop. (Doc. 53-1). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the excessive use of force

claim without prejudice.

H. THERE IS NO EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM TO JUSTIFY ENHANCEMENT OF

DAMAGES.

Miller alleges that he is seeking enchantment of damages under the Eighth

Amendment. (Doc. 53-1, at 2). As set forth above, no Eighth Amendment claims have

survived screening under Section 1915A. Therefore, there will be no enhancement of damages

associated with these claims.

I. MILLER WILL BE GRANTED LEAVE TO FURTHER AMEND THE COMPLAINT.

As set forth above, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to

dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment,

unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. This is Miller’s

fourth complaint in this matter. The first three complaints were filed in different cases and

consolidated under the above captioned case number. (Doc. 13). The Court previously

dismissed these three complaints for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and granted Miller leave to cure the pleading defects in the

original three complaints. (Doc. 46). This amended complaint failed to cure the pleading

defects previously set forth by the Court as demonstrated by a truncated statement of facts

when compared to the facts alleged in the original three complaints. (Doc. 53-1). On May 18,

2026, the Court received a second motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 61). This moton will

be denied because Miller did not attach the proposed amended pleading as required under

Local Rule 15.1. Since the Court will grant Miller the opportunity to file a second amended

complaint, he is not required to file a motion to amend. He may simply file an amended

complaint titled “Second Amended Complaint” and raising all the claims against all

Defendants.

J. THE MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL WILL BE DENIED.

Since there is no current operative complaint in this matter, the Court will deny the

motion for appointment of counsel. Representation by counsel may be appropriate under

certain circumstances after a finding that the plaintiff’s case has arguable merit in fact and

law. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). Since the court finds that this amended

complaint has no arguable merit in fact, the Court will deny the motion for appointment of

counsel without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, the Court will grant Miller’s first motion for leave to file

an amended complaint and file the proposed amended pleading as on the docket. The Court

will dismiss this amended complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief may be granted

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Miller’s motion for appointment of counsel will be denied without

prejudice. The second motion for leave to file an amended complaint will be denied because

he did not attach a proposed amended pleading in accord with Local Rule 15.1. The Court

will grant Miller leave to file a second amended complaint. He is not required to seek leave

of the Court to file the second amended complaint so long as it is timely filed.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: May 18, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge