The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
SUSAN LLOYD, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : No. 5:25-cv-5171
:
PENNSYLVANIA STATE BOARD OF :
VETERINARY MEDICINE; :
MICHELLE ROBERTS, VET BOARD :
ADMINISTRATOR; ASHLEY KEEFER; :
and PAUL JARABECK; :
Defendants. :
_____________________________________
O P I N I O N
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 - Granted
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. March 27, 2026
United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of complaints Plaintiff Susan Lloyd made to the Pennsylvania State
Board of Veterinary Medicine (“PSBVM”) about the deaths of her service dogs. Defendants, the
PSBVM and its employees, allegedly interfered with Lloyd’s ability to speak at a public meeting
about the complaints. Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims based on the immunity of
the PSBVM and Lloyd’s failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Lloyd initiated the above-captioned action on September 5, 2025, based on federal
question jurisdiction against the following defendants: the PSBVM; Michelle Roberts, the Board
Administrator of the PSBVM; Ashley Keefer, legal counsel for the PSBVM; and Paul Jarabeck,
a prosecutor for the PSBVM. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-5, ECF No. 13. Defendants filed a Motion
to Dismiss on November 10, 2025, see ECF No. 10, which was dismissed as moot after Lloyd
filed an Amended Complaint.
In her Amended Complaint naming the same Defendants, Lloyd asserts the following
four causes of action: violations of (I) the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-716,
see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-122, ECF No. 13; (II) the First Amendment right to free speech, see id. ¶¶
123-177; (III) the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection- class of one, see id. ¶¶ 178-
205; and (IV) the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, see id. ¶¶ 206-221.1 Lloyd seeks
monetary relief and various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. at pp. 38-39.
Defendants responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1)2 and 12(b)(6). See Mot., ECF No. 16. Lloyd filed a brief in opposition. See
Opp., ECF No. 17.
B. Factual Allegations
The pertinent3 factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are as follows: Two
1 Counts two through four are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2 Defendants’ “assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity is properly considered ‘a
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1).’” See Shepherd v. Armitage, No. 25-6328-KSM, 2026 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31915, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026) (quoting Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77
F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996)).
3 Lloyd’s Amended Complaint contains numerous allegations. All her allegations, even
those not specifically mentioned herein, have been considered by the Court in deciding the
Motion to Dismiss. However, Lloyd’s conclusory allegations, of which there are many, see, e.g.
Am. Compl. ¶ 18 (alleging “Defendants want to continue to masquerade their fraud to the public
that they in fact do not protect the public as stated on their website, but in fact protect vets who
kill animals”), are not entitled to the presumption of truth, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (holding that “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions”).
individual veterinarians4 allegedly “killed” Lloyd’s service dogs. See, e.g. Am. Compl. ¶ 77.
Lloyd filed complaints against them, but the PSBVM never investigated. See id. ¶ 155. Lloyd
claims that Defendants violated her due process rights by not holding a hearing on her
complaints before dismissing the same. See id. ¶ 207.
On August 28, 2025, Lloyd emailed the PSBVM stating “. . . I want to speak at every
future board hearing starting on Sept 5 at 1030 am about vet medmal which occurs in PA
including the death of both of my dogs domino and double stuff who were killed by a vet.” See
id. ¶ 12. See also Emails, ECF No. 16-2.5 Roberts denied Lloyd’s request. See Am. Compl. ¶
13. Roberts stated:
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Lyness v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992), the Board is prohibited from comingling
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. Accordingly, your request for an
appointment at a future Board meeting for the stated purpose must be denied, as it
would constitute a violation of the Lyness mandate. If you wish to bring a complaint
to the Board’s attention, you may do so through the formal complaint process,
which is available at pals.pa.gov. In the navigation options on the left side of the
page, you will find a link to “File a Complaint.” A complaint submitted through
this process will be directed to the Prosecutorial Division for review.
Email dated Aug. 28, 2025, at 02:18:05 PM. Lloyd wrote back threatening Roberts with civil
action. See Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Keefer sent Lloyd an email the next morning stating: “I would be
happy to explain why your request will not be accommodated.” See id. ¶ 15. Lloyd responded
by again threatening civil action. See Emails Sept. 4, 2025, at 8:02 AM. Keefer replied less than
twenty minutes later, stating:
4 Because the two veterinarians are not parties to this action and given the prejudicial
nature of Lloyd’s accusations against them, their names are not included herein. Also not
included herein are Lloyd’s specific allegations of wrongdoing against them because they are not
material to the claims in the above-captioned action.
5 See Pryor v. Ncaa, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “documents whose
contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are
not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered” in deciding a motion to dismiss).
As explained and pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Lyness
v. State Bd. of Medicine, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992), the Board is prohibited from
comingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. Accordingly, your request for
an appointment at a future Board meeting for the stated purpose of discussing a
pending investigation must be denied, as it would constitute a violation of the
Lyness mandate. If you wish to bring a new complaint to the Board’s attention, you
may do so through the formal complaint process, which is available at pals.pa.gov.
In the navigation options on the left side of the page, you will find a link to “File a
Complaint.” A complaint submitted through this process will be directed to the
Prosecutorial Division for review.
Email dated Sept. 4, 2025, at 8:19 AM.
The next day, September 5, 2025, Lloyd attempted to speak at a public meeting of the
PSBVM,6 but “when” she tried to criticize the PSBVM “they” muted her microphone. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24, 188. She was “never disruptive” during the meeting. See id. ¶ 27. Lloyd
alleges that the “meeting was open to any comment about any topic” and “asked for public
comments.” See id. ¶ 24. Lloyd alleges that Defendants allowed other members of the public to
speak about whatever they wished, while preventing her from doing the same, which she claims
violated her equal protection rights. See id. ¶¶ 188, 200. Lloyd claims that Defendants’ conduct
also violated the Sunshine Act, her First Amendment right to free speech, and her right to due
process. See generally id. ¶¶ 85-177, 209.7
6 Lloyd alleges that Defendants have concealed the minutes from the September 5, 2025
meeting. See Am. Compl. ¶ 82. However, the minutes are available on the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania’s website. See https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/department-and-
offices/bpoa/boards-commissions/veterinary-medicine/board-meetings (last visited March 18,
2026). See also ECF No. 16-3 (containing a copy of the minutes).
7 Additionally, Lloyd alleges she requested all the complaints, including her own, about the
veterinarians who allegedly killed her dogs, but Defendants refused to comply. See Am. Compl.
¶ 161. She alleges Defendants concealed complaints about these, and other, veterinarians who
were allegedly responsible for the deaths of animals. See id. ¶¶ 18, 32. Lloyd alleges
Defendants destroyed evidence and failed to respond to discovery requests. See id. ¶¶ 78-84.
To the extent these allegations could be liberally construed as attempting to state a claim
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), any such claim would fail because Lloyd does
not allege that she exhausted administrative remedies. See Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509,
527 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (stating that “a plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he exhausted his
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(1) – Review of Applicable Law
“[T]here are two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions: those that attack the complaint on its
face and those that attack subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fact.” Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 549
F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “[A] court must first determine whether the movant presents a
facial or factual attack” because the distinction determines the standard of review. In re Schering
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). A
facial attack “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the
complaint, and it requires the court to ‘consider the allegations of the complaint as true.’” Davis
v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petruska, 462 F.3d at 302 n.3). A
factual attack challenges “subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case . . . do not
remedies under FOIA in order to properly plead a case” (internal quotations omitted)).
Moreover, Lloyd cannot state a FOIA claim against any of the defendants named here because
FOIA applies only to federal agencies. See McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1993) (citing “Davidson v. Georgia, 622 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1980) (FOIA has no
application to state governments)”); Gorrio v. Briggs, No. 1:23-cv-01697, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146648, at *89-90 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2025) (dismissing the FOIA claim against the
“individually named defendant because FOIA creates disclosure obligations for federal agencies
but does not impose individual liability on government personnel”).
A claim, if any, under Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”) would also fail to
state a claim because “Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state
statutes.” See Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990). See also 63 Pa. C.S. §
3109(a)(1) (“All records under section 708(b)(17) of the Right-to-Know Law, relating to a
noncriminal investigation . . . shall be confidential and privileged.”).
To the extent Lloyd’s allegations relate to discovery sought in the above-captioned
action, which has not yet been ordered, they do not support a § 1983 claim because Lloyd has no
constitutional or other federal right to discovery at this stage of her case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as
required by Rule 26(f). . . .”); Bath Auth., LLC v. Anzzi LLC, No. 18-00834, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 179754, at *22-23 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2018) (explaining the discretionary standards courts
have applied for deciding requests for expedited and/or early discovery).
support the asserted jurisdiction.” Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d
Cir. 2014). A factual attack “cannot occur until plaintiff’s allegations have been controverted[,]”
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 n.17, which occurs when the movant files an answer or “otherwise
presents competing facts.” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358. “When a factual challenge is made, ‘the
plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist,’ and the court ‘is free to
weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.’” Davis,
824 F.3d at 346 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891). “[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches
to [the] plaintiff’s allegations. . . .” Id. (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
B. Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6)– Review of Applicable Law
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court construes pro se pleadings liberally.
See Higgs v. AG of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). Only if “the ‘[f]actual
allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” has the plaintiff stated a
plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that
determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”).
“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts
ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). See also Mayer
v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well
as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these
documents.”); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (A
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Courts may also consider “an undisputedly authentic document that a
defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
“[T]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private
parties against States and their agencies.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). “This
protection from suit extends to state agencies as well as state officials sued in their official
capacities for monetary damages.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir.
2003). “Individual state employees sued in their official capacity are [] entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because ‘official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action’ against the state.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).
“Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to three exceptions: 1) congressional
abrogation, 2) state waiver, and 3) suits against individual state officers for prospective relief to
end an ongoing violation of federal law.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pennsylvania, 271
F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). Under the second exception, a state’s waiver of immunity must
“be unequivocally expressed.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984). See also 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b) (listing the nine areas in which immunity has been
waived). Under the third exception, which is based on the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), the “relief sought must be prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an
officer’s future conduct and cannot be retrospective, such as money damages,” MCI Telecomm.
Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (citing Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 102-03). The plaintiff has the “burden
of showing a substantial likelihood that he was likely to suffer some future injury at the hands of
a named party.” O’Callaghan v. X, 661 F. App’x 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2016).
D. Section 1983 Claims – Review of Applicable Law
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §
1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “To state a claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 48. The first step for the court analyzing a claim
under § 1983 “is to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been
violated.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). The court must
determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” See
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Id.). Section “1983 is not itself a
source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations
omitted). The court must also determine whether a defendant is acting under color of state law,
i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor, which depends on whether there is “such a ‘close
nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). A “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
E. First Amendment Free Speech
“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech . . .
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
(internal citations omitted). In deciding whether the plaintiff has a free speech right guaranteed
by the First Amendment, “the court must determine whether defendant has created a forum, and
if so, what type, i.e., was it ‘public’ or ‘limited,’ and if ‘limited,’ in what manner.” Gregoire v.
Centennial Sch. Dist., 674 F. Supp. 172, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1987). The Supreme Court has
“identified three types of fora: [1] the traditional public forum, [2] the public forum created by
government designation, and [3] the nonpublic forum.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). The courts have identified a sub-category of the designated
public forum known as “a limited public forum.” Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242,
1261 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.
1991)). “When the facilities . . . are limited by the government in respect to the use because of
genuine special concerns and public obligations, the locale, though open as a forum, is deemed to
be a limited one.” Gregoire, 674 F. Supp. at 177.
In a limited public form,8 “content-based restraints are permitted, so long as they are
designed to confine the ‘forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.’”
Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). This test “is less strict than that applied
in the case of a general open forum.” Id.9 “Two limitations remain. Any restrictions on speech
must be viewpoint neutral and must be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”
Id. (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (cleaned up)).
F. Equal Protection - Review of Applicable Law
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
8 “An example of [a] limited public forum is a university facility open for meetings of
student groups, but not for the general public.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 280
(3d Cir. 2004).
9 “Streets and parks are examples of traditional public forums.” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at
280. “Absent a compelling interest, speech in a public forum may not be regulated based upon
content. Furthermore, in a public forum any restrictions as to time, place, and manner of speech
(1) must be unrelated to content; (2) must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest; and (3) must allow alternative ways of communicating the same
information.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
amend. XIV, § 1. “To succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim, Plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating ‘purposeful discrimination’ and that he ‘receiv[ed] different treatment from that
received by other individuals similarly situated.’” Green v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 89 F.
Supp. 3d 682, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (internal citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. A.G. v. Chester
Upland Sch. Dist., 655 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2016). “To meet the prima facie elements, Plaintiff
must allege that he was: (1) a member of a protected class; (2) similarly situated to members of
an unprotected class; and (3) treated differently from members of the unprotected class.” Id.
(italics omitted) (citing Oliveira v. Twp. of Irvington, 41 Fed. Appx. 555, 559 (3d Cir. 2002);
Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992)). See also Cash v. Wetzel, 8 F.
Supp. 3d 644, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2014). To state a claim for a “class-of-one” equal protection
violation, a plaintiff must allege that he ‘has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).
G. Due Process - Review of Applicable Law
The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Property interests are not created by the
Constitution. See The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Rather,
“[c]ore to the existence of an individual property interest is the requirement that the plaintiff
have ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement to’ the interest at issue that stems from ‘an independent
source such as state law’ or ‘rules or understandings that secure certain benefits.’” Siemens USA
Holdings Inc v. Geisenberger, 17 F.4th 393, 415 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting McKinney v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 915 F.3d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577)). “The Supreme
Court has made clear ‘that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may
grant or deny it in their discretion.’” Geisenberger, 17 F.4th at 415 (quoting Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)). By contrast, a “liberty interest may arise from the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980)), or “it may arise
from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies,” see id. (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974)). After determining the interest at stake, the next
question is what process is due to protect this interest. See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143
(3d Cir. 2000). “The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
1. Substantive Due Process - Review of Applicable Law
“The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against arbitrary action
of the government.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. To state a claim for a violation of substantive due
process rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) the interest at issue is protected by
the substantive due process clause; and (2) “the government’s deprivation of that protected
interest shocks the conscience.” Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2018). As to the
first element, the Supreme Court has long recognized “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child . . . .” Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). But see A.J. v. Lancaster Cty., No. 5:19-cv-01768, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 221035, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2019) (qualifying that a parent’s liberty interest “is not
implicated by conduct short of actual separation of parent and child”). As to the second element,
the defendant’s conduct “must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a
level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed ‘shocks the conscience.’” Miller v. City of
Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375-76 (3d Cir. 1999). “‘[O]nly the most egregious official conduct’
violates substantive due process.” J.R. v. Lehigh Cty., 534 F. App’x 104, 108 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 375).
2. Procedural Due Process - Review of Applicable Law
“To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures
available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill, 455 F.3d at 233-34 (citing Alvin v.
Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). As to the second element, the “fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Additionally, to assert a
procedural due process claim against a state actor, the plaintiff “must, at a minimum, prove
recklessness or ‘gross negligence’ and in some instance may be required to show a ‘deliberate
decision to deprive’ the plaintiff of due process.’” Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, 706 F.3d
227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1277 (3d Cir. 1994)). A “state may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later procedural
remedy.” Bonilla v. City of Allentown, 359 F. Supp. 3d 281, 297 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (referencing
Marchionni v. SEPTA, No. 98-6491, 2000 WL 730348, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2000)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. All claims against the PSBVM are dismissed.
As the Honorable Jeffrey Schmehl of this Court10 explained to Lloyd less than two weeks
10 Judge Schmehl and the Undersigned have been assigned to more than a dozen cases filed
by Lloyd in the last four years alone.
before she initiated the above-captioned action: Lloyd’s “§ 1983 claims against . . . the State
Board of Veterinary Medicine fail as a matter of law because a state and its arms are not
‘persons’ under § 1983 and, in any event, enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.” See Lloyd v.
Pennsylvania, No. 5:22-cv-05148-JLS, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164073, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
25, 2025) (denying Lloyd’s motion to reconsider the order that denied her request to file a fifth
amended complaint against various parties, including the Pennsylvania State Board of Veterinary
Medicine).
The PSBVM is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.11 See MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (The Eleventh “amendment has been interpreted to make
states generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court.”); Glunk v. Pa. State Bd. of
Med., 687 F. App’x 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the Pennsylvania State Board of
Medicine was “immune from a suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment”). None
of the exceptions to immunity apply here. First, there has been no congressional abrogation.
Second, “the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ha[s] not waived its immunity in § 1983 civil
rights cases.” Petsinger v. Pa. DOT, 211 F. Supp. 2d 610, 610 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Pennsylvania
also has not waived its immunity to Sunshine Act claims in federal court. Rather, the Sunshine
Act gives the “Commonwealth Court [] original jurisdiction of actions involving State agencies
and the courts of common pleas [] original jurisdiction of actions involving other agencies to
render declaratory judgments or to enforce this chapter by injunction or other remedy deemed
appropriate by the court.” 65 Pa. C.S. § 715. See also Miller v. Goggin, 672 F. Supp. 3d 14, 50
n.35 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (stating that because the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act puts original
jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court, it was “unclear whether this Court even has jurisdiction
11 Defendants make a facial attack to jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
over Plaintiff’s Sunshine Act claim”). As to the third exception, it does not apply to the
PSBVM. Rather, it applies, if at all, only to § 1983 claims against Roberts, Keefer, and
Jarabeck. See MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (explaining that the exception applies to
“suits against individual state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of
federal law” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, the PSBVM is not a “person” under § 1983. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (holding
that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under §
1983”); Madden v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 438 F.2d 1189, 1190 (3d Cir. 1971) (“[I]t has been
squarely held in this Circuit quite recently that [the a state parole] Board is not a person within
the language of 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983”); Zilich v. Doll, No. 3:13-2814, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2684, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016) (adopting the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
the “SCI Medical Review Board is not a person under § 1983”); Law Offices of Christopher S.
Lucas & Assocs. v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 320 F. Supp. 2d 291, 296-97 (M.D.
Pa. 2004) (holding that the state attorney “Disciplinary Board is not a person within the meaning
of § 1983”). Thus, Lloyd’s § 1983 claims in Counts II, III, and IV fail as a matter of law.
All claims against the PSBVM are dismissed with prejudice.12
B. The § 1983 claims for monetary damages against Roberts, Keefer, and
Jarabeck are dismissed.
Eleventh Amendment “protection from suit extends to state agencies as well as state
officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages.” A.W., 341 F.3d at 238.
12 This Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229,
235 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court may deny leave to amend if an “amendment would be
inequitable or futile”); Rufo v. Fox, No. 21-3318, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30518, at *8 (3d Cir.
Nov. 3, 2022) (agreeing with the district court that an amendment would be futile where the
defendants were immune from suit); Harper v. Dinella, 589 F. App’x 67, 69 (3d Cir. 2015)
(finding that an amendment would be futile because the claims failed as a matter of law).
However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Lloyd’s claims against Roberts, Keefer, and
Jarabeck to the extent she requests “prospective, declaratory, or injunctive relief governing an
officer’s future conduct.” MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (citing Pennhurst II, 465 U.S.
at 102-03). See also O’Callaghan, 661 F. App’x at 182 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not
generally bar prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.”). This Court finds that Lloyd’s first13
request for injunctive relief to “allow Lloyd to make public comments at any future vet board
meeting,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 1, p. 38, seeks prospective injunctive relief. Lloyd has sufficiently
alleged that Defendants will not allow her to make such comments at future meetings. See
O’Callaghan, 661 F. App’x at 182 (holding that the plaintiff has the “burden of showing a
substantial likelihood that [s]he was likely to suffer some future injury at the hands of a named
party”). Accordingly, if this restriction violates Lloyd’s Constitutional rights, which will be
analyzed below, she may obtain injunctive relief. See Berthesi v. Pa. Bd. of Prob., 246 F. Supp.
2d 434, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[T]he federal courts can issue an injunction against a state officer
if there is evidence of ongoing violations of federal law and the injunction will afford a plaintiff
prospective relief from the illegal state action.”). Eleventh Amendment immunity is therefore
13 Lloyd’s remaining injunctive relief requests, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-7, p. 38 (directing
Defendants to provide copies of records, ordering that “any complaint against any vet is made
public,” and requiring Defendants to discipline veterinarians), are not based on an ongoing
violation of federal law. See Thornton v. New Jersey, No. 24-3084, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS
5606, at *5-6 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2026) (finding that the immunity exception did not apply because
the plaintiff “did not sufficiently plead an ongoing violation of federal law—her allegations
related to past conduct, and to the extent that she claimed that she was at risk of further harm, her
allegations were conclusory and speculative at best”).
Lloyd’s request for “[d]eclaratory relief that states Defendants have violated the 1st
amendment and Sunshine law by refusing to allow Lloyd to speak and muting Lloyds [sic]
microphone on September 5 2025,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 8, p. 39, is not proper. See O’Callaghan,
661 F. App’x at 182 (A declaration that a defendant previously violated the plaintiff’s rights “is
not a proper use of a declaratory judgment, which is meant to define the legal rights and
obligations of the named parties in anticipation of future conduct, not to proclaim their liability
for past actions.”).
not a bar to Lloyd’s injunctive relief claims against Roberts, Keefer, and Jarabeck. This Court
will address the merits of her claims.
C. The Sunshine Act claim is dismissed.
As previously explained, the PSBVM is immune from suit in federal court on Lloyd’s
Sunshine Act claim. See 65 Pa. C.S. § 715 (“The Commonwealth Court shall have original
jurisdiction of actions involving State agencies and the courts of common pleas shall have
original jurisdiction of actions involving other agencies to render declaratory judgments or to
enforce this chapter by injunction or other remedy deemed appropriate by the court.”). Thus, as
to the PSBVM, Count I is dismissed without prejudice to an action to be filed in state court.14
The Sunshine Act claim is also dismissed as to Roberts, Keefer, and Jarabeck because it
“is clear from the language of the statute that any action brought under the Sunshine Act must be
brought against an agency.” Miller, 672 F. Supp. 3d at 49-50 (finding that the Sunshine Act
claims against the individual defendants failed as a matter of law). As to Roberts, Keefer, and
Jarabeck, Count I is dismissed with prejudice.15
D. Lloyd’s First Amendment claim is dismissed.
Lloyd alleges that her First Amendment right to free speech was violated when
Defendants muted her microphone at the PSBVM meeting on September 5, 2025. See Am.
14 This Court expresses no opinion on the merits of the Sunshine Act claim against the
PSBVM. Lloyd is advised that if she intends to refile this claim in the appropriate state court she
may need to take additional steps to preserve the filing date for statute of limitation purposes.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5103(b)(1) (“Where a matter is filed in any United States court for
a district embracing any part of this Commonwealth and the matter is dismissed by the United
States court for lack of jurisdiction, any litigant in the matter filed may transfer the matter to a
court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth by complying with the transfer provisions set
forth in paragraph (2).”).
15 This Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235;
Harper, 589 F. App’x at 69 (finding that an amendment would be futile because the claims failed
as a matter of law).
Compl. ¶ 20. This meeting was a limited public forum. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of the
Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 142 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that “a school board
meeting is a limited public forum”); Galena, 638 F.3d at 199 (determining that the “Council
meeting was a limited public forum inasmuch as the meeting was held for the limited purpose of
governing Erie County and discussing topics related to that governance”).
As such, the PSBVM could lawfully limit speech “so long as the content is tied to the
limitations that frame the scope of the designation, and so long as the regulation is neutral as to
viewpoint within the subject matter of that content.” See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281. See also
Zeigler v. Bartha, No. 2:24-CV-01573-MJH, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219630, at *4 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 4, 2024) (referring to such limitations as “relevancy-based restrictions”). Contrary to
Lloyd’s suggestion that the “meeting was open to any comment about any topic,” see Am.
Compl. ¶ 24, a PSBVM meeting is “not open for endless public commentary speech but instead
is simply a limited platform to discuss the topic at hand,” Miller, 672 F. Supp. 3d at 40 (internal
quotations omitted). See also Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429
U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976) (“Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject
matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business.”). Public comments were limited
to matters within the PSBVM’s adjudicatory functions.16 See Minutes17 9:17-21 (“Keefer stated
16 Accord Minutes 3:6-22 (The PSBVM met in a separate, closed session “for the purpose
of conducting quasi-judicial deliberations.”).
17 Because the minutes are a matter of public record, see
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/department-and-offices/bpoa/boards-commissions/veterinary-
medicine/board-meetings (last visited March 18, 2026), this Court may consider them in
deciding the Motion to Dismiss, see Clark v. Colwyn Borough, No. 12-3668, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18447, at *12-13 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2013) (holding that the court could consider the
minutes from the borough’s council’s meeting on a motion to dismiss because they were a matter
of public record (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006); 5B
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004))).
that pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Lyness v. State Bd. of Medicine, 605
A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992), the Board was prohibited from commingling the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions.”); Lyness v. Commonwealth, 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the
state board was prohibited from the “commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions”).
Such restrictions were viewpoint neutral as they limited any discussion about specific
veterinarians that were the subject of individual complaints. See Mesa v. Hudson Cnty. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, No. 09-3576 (KSH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112358, at *22-23 (D.N.J.
Sep. 30, 2011) (concluding that the restriction on the plaintiff’s speech during a board meeting
“had nothing to do with [his] viewpoint;” rather, the objection was “to the discussion of a matter
that was not on the agenda” and was therefore not based on viewpoint); McBreairty v. Miller,
No. 1:23-cv-00143-NT, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87231, at *16-17 (D. Me. May 15, 2024)
(concluding that the board’s policy restricting any discussion about the conduct of a particular
school employee was viewpoint neutral). The restrictions were reasonable as they limited
comments to topics of public interest, as opposed to a private complaint, and to topics within the
PSBVM’s adjudicatory functions, as opposed to its prosecutorial duties. See Eichenlaub, 385
F.3d at 281 (concluding that the actions of “the chairman of the meeting[, who] sought to restrict
the discussion to topics of public interest and requested that [the plaintiff] not discuss matters of
private concern . . . served the function of confining the discussion to the purpose of the
meeting”). See also Marshall v. Amuso, 571 F. Supp. 3d 412, 426 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (stating that
the “School Board could sensibly prohibit personal attacks not related to the School Board’s
business”); Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 760 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding
that the school board’s policy prohibiting comments about a particular individual was reasonable
because such speech “could derail the agenda for the meeting and risk unnecessary disclosure of
private information about employees or students”).
Moreover, Defendants notified Lloyd of these restrictions, before and at the meeting, and
only limited her speech in accordance with these restrictions. See Emails. They afforded Lloyd
the opportunity to continue speaking at the meeting if “she had something else to discuss.” See
Minutes 9:15 – 12:11. Defendants also provided Lloyd with an avenue to voice her concerns: by
filing a complaint with the PSBVM. See https://www.pals.pa.gov/#!/ComplaintForm. She was
specifically informed about this process. See Roberts Email dated Aug. 28, 2025, at 02:18:05 (“.
. . If you wish to bring a complaint to the Board’s attention, you may do so through the formal
complaint process, which is available at pals.pa.gov. In the navigation options on the left side of
the page, you will find a link to “File a Complaint. . . .”); Keefer Email dated Sept. 4, 2025, at
8:19 AM (same). Lloyd admits that she filed a complaint(s).
For all these reasons, Lloyd fails to state a First Amendment violation. Count II is
dismissed with prejudice.18
E. Lloyd’s equal protection claim is dismissed.
Lloyd alleges that Defendants allowed other members of the public to speak about
whatever they wished, while preventing her from doing the same, which she claims violated her
equal protection rights. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 188, 200. The Amended Complaint does not
identify any specific person or define what topics such person was permitted to discuss. Without
18 This Court denies leave to file another amended complaint because Lloyd failed to cure
her pleading deficiencies after receiving notice of the same in the first Motion to Dismiss. See
Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A District
Court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to
the deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1113
(2003). Furthermore, under the facts of this case, leave to amend would be futile. See Alston,
363 F.3d at 235.
specific factual allegations, Lloyd fails to state a claim. See Joey’s Auto Repair & Body Shop v.
Fayette Cty., 785 F. App’x 46, 49 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of a “class of one” equal
protection claim where the plaintiffs failed to allege specific examples of how the one identified
business was similarly situated).19
Moreover, the minutes of the meeting show that only one other person spoke after the
meeting was open to public comment. This person “informed the Board that she is working with
the Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Association (PVMA) on the amendment of HB 1750[20]
that is being drafted to address some of their concerns.” See Minutes 9:9-13,
https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/department-and-
offices/bpoa/veterinary/minutes/Vet-09-05-25.pdf. This comment was directly related to
Keefer’s “Report of Board Counsel - HB1750 and SB950,” which was discussed earlier in the
meeting. See Minutes 7:4 – 8:14 (Keefer “provided information on legislation that could affect
veterinarians. This legislation included House Bill 1750 and Senate Bill 950, both involving the
mishandling of pet remains. . . .”). More importantly, this comment was not about a specific
veterinarian, a pending investigation, or in any way related to a complaint or to the Board’s
19 Defendants also argue that qualified immunity bars Lloyd’s class-of-one equal protection
claim because her theory of liability is not clearly established. See Mot. 9-11. Defendants rely
on Judge Marston’s decision in Miller, but that case is distinguishable. See Miller v. Goggin,
No. 22-3329-KSM, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59153 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2024). Although Miller
also involved an equal protection class-of-one claim arising from a public meeting, the right at
issue in that case was removing one participant from a public meeting over another. See id. at
*18-19. In finding that the right was not clearly established, Judge Marsten noted that “it is the
established law in the Third Circuit that disruptive individuals do not have a constitutional right
to remain at public meetings.” Id. (citing cases). In contrast here, Lloyd was not being
disruptive and the right at issue is allowing one person to speak on a particular topic while
precluding similarly situated persons from doing so.
20 House Bill 1750 is “[a]n Act providing for disclosure of cremation services for deceased
animals, for distribution and certification, for required notices, for holding facility standards, for
recordkeeping requirements and for enforcement; and imposing penalties.” See
https://www.palegis.us/legislation/bills/2025/hb1750 (last visited March 18, 2026).
prosecutorial functions, which was all Lloyd was precluded from discussing. See id. 9:21 – 10:8
(Ms. Keefer told Ms. Lloyd that she “must refrain from presenting to the Board information
relating to a specific licensee that may be in the investigatory process and matters which had not
yet come to the Board after formal charges were filed” and “asked Ms. Lloyd if she wanted to
remark on matters that did not fall within the scope Ms. Keefer outlined.”). Accordingly, Lloyd
was not “intentionally treated differently from others;” rather, there was a rational basis21 for
allowing the other person to speak about an administrative/legislative matter while precluding
Lloyd from speaking about a prosecutorial/investigative matter, which defeats her equal
protection claim. See Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564 (holding that to state a successful equal
protection claim on a class-of-one theory, the plaintiff must allege “that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment” from others similarly situated).
Count III is dismissed with prejudice.22
F. Lloyd’s due process claims are dismissed.
Lloyd’s due process claims are based on Defendants: (1) not allowing her to speak at the
PSBVM meeting on September 5, 2025, (2) not investigating her complaints, and (3) dismissing
her complaints about the deaths of her dogs without holding a hearing, at which she could
present evidence. The Amended Complaint does not specify whether Lloyd is alleging a
substantive or procedural due process claim, so this Court will consider whether she has stated
either claim. Lloyd’s allegations suggest two possible protected interests.
21 See Section IV(D) infra
22 This Court denies leave to file another amended complaint because Lloyd failed to cure
her pleading deficiencies after receiving notice of the same in the first Motion to Dismiss. See
Krantz, 305 F.3d at 144-45. Furthermore, in light of the minutes from the meeting, this Court
finds that leave to amend would be futile. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235.
First, Lloyd has a protected liberty interest in her right to free speech. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (holding that “the ‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the liberty of speech”). This interest impacts only the first basis of her due
process claims: that Defendants did not allow her to speak at the PSBVM meeting on September
5, 2025. However, because the First Amendment claim fails for the reasons set forth above, the
due process claims based on this interest also fails to state a claim. See Robinson v. Limerick
Twp., No. 04-3758, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4079, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2005) (concluding
that the deprivation of liberty claim, which was based on freedom of speech, failed because the
First Amendment claim was unsubstantiated). The first basis of the due process claims also fails
because Lloyd’s allegations do not show that Defendants were either reckless or grossly
negligent in denying her the opportunity to speak about her complaints, or that they made a
deliberate decision to deprive Lloyd of due process. See Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277 (holding that “a
plaintiff who wishes to sustain a § 1983 claim based upon a violation of procedural due process
must, at a minimum, prove recklessness or ‘gross negligence’ and in some instance may be
required to show a ‘deliberate decision to deprive’ the plaintiff of due process”). To the
contrary, the allegations, emails, and minutes from the meeting show that Defendants only
denied Lloyd’s ability to speak about a limited topic- specific veterinarians that may be the
subject of a complaint under investigation. See Emails dated Aug. 28, 2025 (Roberts, in
response to Lloyd’s request to speak about “vet medmal. . .,” denied Lloyd’s request to speak
“for the stated purpose”); Minutes 9:21 – 10:1 (Keefer advised Lloyd that she “must refrain from
presenting to the Board information relating to a specific licensee that may be in the
investigatory process and matters which had not yet come to the Board after formal charges were
filed and a hearing held”); Minutes 10:20-22 (Jarabeck “objected to Ms. Lloyd’s commenting on
somebody in the public based upon a complaint process”). Further, Defendants restricted Lloyd
from speaking about these issues because they believed it violated state law. See, e.g. Email
dated Aug. 28, 2025 (Roberts advised Lloyd that her request to speak “for the stated purpose
must be denied, as it would constitute a violation of the Lyness mandate”); Minutes 9:21 – 10:2
(Keefer limited Lloyd’s speech because “it would constitute a violation of the Lyness mandate”);
Minutes 10:11-22 (Jarabeck objected because “any case could not be discussed before the Board
due to the prejudice noted by the Lyness ruling”). Before muting her microphone, Defendants
repeatedly warned Lloyd about the limited topics that could not be discussed at the meeting and,
also, gave her an opportunity to continuing speaking if “she had something else to discuss.” See
Minutes 9:15 – 12:11. Accordingly, their actions were neither reckless nor grossly negligent, nor
did they made a deliberate decision to deprive Lloyd of due process.
Second, Lloyd has a property interest in her dogs, which impacts the second and third
basis of her due process claims regarding her complaints. However, because Lloyd alleges that
two private veterinarians, not Defendants, “killed” her dogs, Defendants did not deprive her of a
protected property interest. See U.S. Const. amend 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). Moreover, the second and third bases of
her claims also fail because Lloyd did not have a right to either an investigation of or a hearing
on her complaints.23 See Whitehead v. City of Phila., No. 13-2167, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23 Although this conclusion is based on the due process required by law, this Court also
notes that the PSBVM did not promise an investigation, a hearing, or any other particular
outcome. See https://www.pa.gov/services/dos/file-a-complaint-against-a-pa-licensed-
professional#accordion-91ca259f6c-item-fdeb954fe6 (last accessed March 20, 2026)
(explaining that the Professional Compliance Office “reviews thousands of complaints per year .
. . to determine what investigation, if any, is appropriate in light of the allegations”);
https://www.pals.pa.gov/#!/ComplaintForm (last accessed March 20, 2026) (The verification on
the PSBVM complaint form advises the complainant that the “matter [may be] closed without
the initiation of formal disciplinary action.”).
21000, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2014) (“There is no constitutional right to a police
investigation.”); Collura v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., No. 11-5637, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119194, at *34 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff, who filed a
complaint with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, had “no right to
any particular outcome or procedure beyond, perhaps, the ability to file a complaint, which he
was, according to his own Amended Complaint, permitted to do”). The procedural due process
claim is therefore dismissed.
For these reasons and because the Amended Complaint contains no allegations that
Defendants’ conduct shocked the conscience, Lloyd also fails to state a substantive due process
claim. See Kane, 902 F.3d at 192 (To state a claim for a violation of substantive due process
rights, a plaintiff must show that “. . . the government’s deprivation of that protected interest
shocks the conscience.”); J.R., 534 F. App’x at 108 (“‘[O]nly the most egregious official
conduct’ violates substantive due process.” (quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 375 (“To generate
liability, executive action must be so ill-conceived or malicious that it ‘shocks the
conscience.’”))). Accepting all allegations as true, Defendants’ behavior does not rise to the
level of conscious-shocking. See Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. 3d 409, 416-21 (3d
Cir. 2003) (concluding that where the police responded to a neighbor’s 911 call reporting a
woman screaming in an apartment, the officers’ failure to kick down the door to the apartment
where the victim was inside being raped and murdered did not amount to “shocks the conscious”
in the absence of other evidence). Moreover, to the extent the substantive due process claim is
based on Lloyd’s liberty interest of free speech, it fails because this claim is more properly
analyzed under the First Amendment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (holding that where a
Constitutional Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection. . .,
that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide
for analyzing these claims”); Dennison v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 268 F. Supp. 2d 387, 400-01 (M.D.
Pa. 2003) (determining that the plaintiff could not prevail on his free speech/substantive due
process claim because the “free speech claim falls under the First Amendment”). The
substantive due process claim is therefore dismissed.
Count IV is dismissed with prejudice.24
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, all claims against the PSBVM are dismissed because it is
immune from suit in federal court and, additionally, it is not a “person” under § 1983. All §
1983 claims are dismissed against Roberts, Keefer, and Jarabeck because the Amended
Complaint fails to show a violation of Lloyd’s right to free speech, to equal protection, or to due
process. The Sunshine Act claim is dismissed as to the individual defendants because such a
claim may only be brought against state “agencies.” All claims are dismissed with prejudice,
except for the Sunshine Act claim against the PSBVM, which is dismissed without prejudice to
Lloyd’s ability to file in the appropriate state court.
A separate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr._________
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge
24 This Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235.