Petrucci

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARQUIS JOHNSON, : Civil No. 3:25-CV-328

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Mehalchick)

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

JAMES PETRUCCI, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

This case, which comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss

filed by defendant James Petrucci, (Doc. 32), illustrates how the procedural posture

of cases can often determine their immediate substantive outcomes. The plaintiff,

Marquis Johnson, is a state prisoner who is proceeding pro se in this case. Johnson

is suing Officer Petrucci along with two county detectives as a result of events which

took place at the time of his April 2024 arrest on state drug charges. (Doc. 13). In

particular, Johnson challenges the degree of force used by police in the course of a

search incident to his arrest. While Johnson’s pro se pleading is not a model of

clarity, as we construe the complaint it brings a Fourth Amendment claim that

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Officer Petrucci and the other defendants used excessive force when they sexually

assaulted and sodomized him in the course of a body cavity search.

Citing to cases which involved what is colloquially referred to as a “reach in”

search involving police efforts to reach inside a suspect’s clothing to retrieve some

contraband, Officer Petrucci argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on

Johnson’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. The difficulty with accepting

this proposition, however, stems from the procedural posture of this case which

comes before us on a motion to dismiss. On a motion to dismiss, we must accept the

plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts and the inferences which flow from those facts. Here,

Johnson alleges that he was sexually assaulted and essentially sodomized. With our

discretion cabined and confined by these well-pleaded facts, we conclude that it

cannot be said as a matter of law that Officer Petrucci is entitled to qualified

immunity. Therefore, it is recommended that this motion to dismiss be denied,

without prejudice at a later date to further scrutiny through a motion for summary

judgment, where we can consider undisputed facts outside the pleadings.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The operative pleading in this case is Johnson’s amended complaint. (Doc.

13). Fairly construed, the well-pleaded facts in this amended complaint allege that,

on April 11, 2024, defendants James Petrucci, along with two detectives, Munely

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and Zach, arrested him and transported Johnson to the Lackawanna County District

Attorney’s Office. (Id. at 3). At the district attorney’s office Johnson alleges that he

was forcibly held down by the defendants and sodomized “with brute force.” (Id.)

According to Johnson, the defendants “went forcefully into my buttocks and

retrieved blooded [sic] bag,” an act which he characterized as a sexual assault which

resulted in night terrors, racing thoughts, anxiety, depression and physical pain. (Id.

at 4). Based upon his allegations that he was “sexually assaulted” by the defendants,

Johnson’s amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with

damages. (Id. at 2-5).

Defendant Petrucci has now moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that he

is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law since cases have permitted

discrete reach in searches of suspects to retrieve items concealed beneath their

garments when those searches entail incidental contact with the suspect’s body.

While we concede that Johnson’s amended complaint is not a model of clarity, with

our review cabined and confined to the well-pleaded allegations set forth in the

complaint, we conclude that the question of qualified immunity cannot be

determined in favor of Petrucci on the pleadings alone. Accordingly, we recommend

that this motion to dismiss, (Doc. 32), be denied.

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III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss–Standard of Review

The defendants have moved to dismiss Johnson’s amended complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides

that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard

for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in

federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

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20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,

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in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

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The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and

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matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).

The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the

[attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged

in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd.

v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court

may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or

explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the

motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not

rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or

when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,

O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the

requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what

a complaint should say and provides that:

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(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the

court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional

support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,

which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that

are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. These

legal guideposts guide us in assessing the sufficiency of this amended complaint.

B. Johnson Has Stated a Plausible Excessive Force Claim and the

Question of Qualified Immunity Cannot be Determined on the

Pleadings Alone.

We acknowledge that the amended complaint does not describe Johnson’s

claim with clinical precision. But we are also mindful that Johnson’s pro se

“pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Taylor

v. Spraga, 236 F. Supp. 3d 875, 880 (D. Del. 2017), aff'd, 741 F. App'x 884 (3d Cir.

2018) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d

1081 (2007)). Adopting this analytical lens, we believe that Johnson’s amended

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complaint, properly read, describes a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. On

this score, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that claims against law

enforcement officers that allege the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest,

investigatory stop, or other “seizure” are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's

“reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Indeed,

“[t]he use of excessive force is itself an unlawful ‘seizure’ under the Fourth

Amendment.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006). In assessing such

a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation under § 1983, the inquiry is whether the

force used by the law enforcement officers was objectively reasonable in light of the

totality of the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. As the Supreme Court

explained:

Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is

“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful

balancing of “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's

Fourth Amendment interests’” against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake. Id., at 8, 105 S.Ct., at 1699, quoting

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77

L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) . . . Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under

the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct.

1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application

requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

particular case[.]

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Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Thus, when considering such claims, the reasonableness

of a particular use of force is often dependent upon factual context and must be

“judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396-97.

This is an intensive, fact-bound analysis and one which often is not amenable

to resolution on the pleadings alone. As our colleague, Judge Mariani, has observed:

Because such a determination depends on “all of the relevant facts and

circumstances leading up to the time that the officers allegedly used

excessive force,” the Third Circuit has held that “[t]he reasonableness

of the use of force is normally an issue for the jury.” Rivas, 365 F.3d at

198 (citing Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290–91 (3d Cir.1999)).

But, even if, following discovery, the reasonableness of Defendant's use

of force is settled before the case reaches the jury, it is surely premature

to expect the Court to make such a resolution at the motion to dismiss

stage, when the only issue before it is to determine whether Plaintiffs

Complaint alleges facts that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement for

relief.” Connelly, 706 F.3d at 212 (emphasis added).

Williams v. Papi, 30 F. Supp. 3d 306, 312 (M.D. Pa. 2014).

In the instant case, a fair reading of Johnson’s amended complaint reveals that

Johnson alleges that he was forcibly held down by the defendants and sodomized

“with brute force,” (Doc. 13 at 3), and avers that the defendants “went forcefully

into my buttocks and retrieved blooded [sic] bag,” an act he characterized as a sexual

assault which resulted in night terrors, racing thoughts, anxiety, depression and

physical pain. (Id. at 4). Viewing these allegations through the legal lens of Fourth

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Amendment excessive force jurisprudence, such claims are inherently fact-bound.

But Johnson’s assertions that he was sodomized with such force that articles

retrieved during this body cavity search were bloodied states a plausible claim which

cannot be summarily disposed of on the pleadings alone.

Given these allegations, this is not a case one which permits a determination

of qualified immunity as a matter of law based solely upon the pleadings. In

considering this question we are mindful that:

In deciding whether to grant qualified immunity, the Court must

consider two questions: First, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121

S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Second, “if a violation could

be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next,

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id.

This latter requirement means that the “contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at 2156 (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97

L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). If the answer to both questions is “yes,” then there

can be no qualified immunity.

However, the Third Circuit has cautioned that “it is generally unwise to

venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is

necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.”

Newland v. Reehorst, 328 Fed.Appx. 788, 791 n. 3 (3d Cir.2009). It has

likewise held that when a “complaint failed to disclose whether the

defendants' actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional

right, dismissal on qualified immunity grounds was premature.”

Debrew v. Auman, 354 Fed.Appx. 639, 642 (3d Cir.2009) (citing

Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir.2006)).

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Williams, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 313–14. See Anthony v. Seltzer, 696 F. App'x 79, 83

(3d Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of qualified immunity on motion to dismiss

excessive force claim); Rankin v. Majikes, No. 3:CV-14-699, 2014 WL 6893693, at

*10 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss excessive force claim on

qualified immunity grounds).

So it is here. Simply put, we find that Johnson’s amended complaint alleges a

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and the well-pleaded facts alleged by

Johnson plausibly state an excessive force claim. Given these well-pleaded facts, we

further find that it is unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the

pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record before it can be

determined whether this was the brutal act alleged by the plaintiff, or the reasonable

and discrete reach in search averred by Defendant Petrucci. Accordingly, this motion

to dismiss, (Doc. 32), should be denied without prejudice to further scrutiny at a later

date through a motion for summary judgment, where we can consider undisputed

facts outside the pleadings.

IV. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss

lodged by Defendant Petrucci, (Doc. 32), be DENIED, without prejudice to further

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scrutiny at a later date through a motion for summary judgment, where we can

consider undisputed facts outside the pleadings.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party

shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and

all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which

objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing

requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or

where required by law, and may consider the record developed before

the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis

of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall

witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 10th day of April 2026.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

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