Simmons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NYESHA LASHAE SIMMONS,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-01946

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE

BOARD,

Respondent.

ORDER

Nyesha Lashae Simmons, incarcerated at SCI-Muncy, proceeds on

a petition for writ of pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging the denial of parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation

and Parole (the “Board”). (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, the Court

will deny the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2017, in the Allegheny County Court of Common

Pleas, Simmons received an aggregate sentence of 4.5 to 11 years

incarceration after pleading guilty to aggravated assault, prohibited

possession of a firearm, and related charges.

, No. CP-02-CR-0008908-2016 (Allegheny Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.);

(Doc. 8-1 at 5-7). She became eligible for parole no earlier than January

6, 2021, and at the time of this petition, she had been reviewed for parole

five times. ( . at 6-27). In the most recent parole review reflected in

the record1, dated July 17, 2024, the Board interviewed Simmons and

cited the following factors in denying her parole: a “negative

recommendation” made by the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), her

“reports, evaluations and assessments” indicating a risk to the

community, and inconsistent compliance with mental health services and

medication. Factors to be considered at Simmons’s next review would

include the DOC’s recommendation, Simmons’s conduct record in prison,

and her “reentry plan.” ( . at 26).

Simmons filed this petition on November 13, 2024. In broad

summary, she argues that the Board’s conclusion about her mental health

and medication compliance was based on outdated information, and that

the Board has violated her constitutional rights by relying on “arbitrary,

1 The record indicates that Simmons likely received another parole

review while this petition was pending. (Doc. 8-1 at 26). Although

such a review would likely render this petition moot, , ,

, No. 1:25-CV-00943, 2025 WL 2178422, at *6

(M.D. Pa. July 31, 2025), the Court addresses Simmons’s arguments on

the merits.

egregious, and capricious reasons” in denying her parole.

II. DISCUSSION

The respondent first argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction

because Simmons has not exhausted available state remedies. The

application of the exhaustion requirement to parole challenges is

disputed among courts in this circuit.

, No. 1:25-CV-00943, 2025 WL 2178422, at *7-8 (M.D. Pa. July 31,

2025) (reviewing case law and concluding that exhaustion is not

required). Because the record demonstrates that Simmons is not entitled

to relief, we resolve the petition on the merits.

“[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person

to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,” nor

has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right.

, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979);

, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing the general

principle that the Pennsylvania parole statute does not create a liberty

interest in the right to be paroled); , 770 A.2d 287, 289

(Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that [an inmate] does not have a clear legal

right to the grant of parole, nor does the board have a corresponding duty

to grant the same.”).

Pennsylvania law grants the Board vast discretion to refuse or deny

parole, see 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137, and Pennsylvania courts have affirmed the

Board’s complete discretion to parole a convict. , ,

, 514 A.2d 967, 971 (Pa. Comm. Ct.

1986). The parole statute indicates that the Board “shall consider”: the

nature and circumstances of the offense; any recommendations made by

the trial judge and prosecuting attorney; the general character and

background of the inmate; the notes of testimony of the sentencing

hearing, if any, together with such additional information regarding the

nature and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence

was imposed; and the conduct of the person while in prison along with

her physical, mental and behavioral condition, history, and criminal

record. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6135(a).

Based on Simmons’s claim of “arbitrary, egregious, and capricious”

denial of parole, the Court construes her petition as a claim that the

Board’s actions violated her substantive due process rights.2 In such a

2 Simmons also argues that the Board considered “factors that bear

no rational relationship to rehabilitation or deterrence” and that the

(continued on next page)

case, a federal court’s role is limited to reviewing the decision to

determine whether the Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary,

capricious or constitutionally impermissible manner. , 631

F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). To show a violation of substantive due

process rights, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) she was

arbitrarily denied parole for impermissible reasons such as race, religion,

or political beliefs; or (2) the Board failed to apply appropriate, rational

criteria in reaching its determination. , 631 F.2d at 236. “[F]ederal

courts are not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess

parole boards and the requirements of substantive due process are met if

there is some basis for the challenged decision.” , 251 F.3d at 487.

The “relevant level of arbitrariness required to find a substantive due

process violation involves not merely action that is unreasonable, but,

rather, something more egregious, which we have termed at times

‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately indifferent.’” ,

Board has “no standard procedure . . . every board member has different

expectations for granting parole.” Beyond these vague allegations, she

has not demonstrated how the procedure of her reviews was inadequate,

nor explained how any specific factor cited by the Board is unrelated to

the purpose of parole. , 617 F.3d 775, 783-84 (3d

Cir. 2010). Therefore, her petition could not support a procedural due

process claim.

308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Simmons first objects to the Parole Board’s reliance on the DOC’s

recommendation, which was premised in part on her inconsistent

compliance with medication and mental health services. She appears to

claim that the DOC’s assessment should be disregarded because she has

since been “reevaluated by the psychiatry department [and] was

concluded misdiagnosed . . . I’ve now been diagnosed PTSD instead [and]

my psych medication has been discontinued.” (Doc. 1 at 5).

The attachments to Simmons’s petition indicate that at the time of

the review, Simmons believed she needed medication only as a “sleep aid

for periodic anxiety, not behavioral restraint,” but the prison disagreed.

(Doc. 1-1 at 3-9); (Doc. 1 at 6) (Simmons’s claim that the

prison “enforced psych medication use although not court ordered to”).

Regardless of Simmons’s disagreement with the DOC’s assessment, it

was not arbitrary or “conscience shocking” for the Board to consider that

assessment, nor was it unlawful “discrimination” for the Board to

consider Simmons’s mental health. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6135(a)(7) (the Board

shall consider “mental and behavioral condition and history”).

Simmons lists other circumstances that she views as proof of an

“arbitrary, egregious, [or] capricious” determination, including her own

complaints about the prison’s response to her allegations of sexual

harassment.3 However, there is no indication that these complaints about

her conditions of confinement were considered by the Board, or even

presented to the Board, and they have only arguable relevance to the

issue of parole. Although such allegations could have been considered, it

was not a constitutional violation for the Board to base its decision on

other factors.

Simmons points to evidence of her rehabilitation in prison, such as

her completion of educational programming, that in her view makes the

denial of parole “egregious.” While Simmons believes this commendable

conduct warrants greater weight in the parole analysis, the Board’s

judgment to prioritize other factors, including her misconduct history,

risk to the community, and inconsistent compliance with mental health

treatment, was not a violation of her constitutional rights. ,

251 F.3d at 487 (“[T]he requirements of substantive due process are met

if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”). Ultimately, Simmons

3 For example, Simmons vaguely attributes her “lengthy [and]

excessive misconduct history” to a “lack of protection against sexual

harassment” at the prison. (Doc. 1 at 6-7, Doc. 1-1 at 2).

has not presented evidence of arbitrary, irrational, or “conscience

shocking” considerations by the Board that would entitle her to habeas

relief. , 308 F.3d at 247.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Simmons’s petition (Doc.

1) is DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

Dated: May 7, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge