Woods

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

DELTA DIVISION

DEMETRIUS L. WOODS PLAINTIFF

ADC # 108514

v. 2:24CV00026-DPM-JTK

DOE, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United

States District Judge D.P. Marhsall, Jr. Any party may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or

legal basis for your objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14)

days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of

fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Demetrius L. Woods (“Plaintiff”) is incarcerated at the East Arkansas Regional Unit of the

Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”). Plaintiff sued multiple individuals alleging violations

of his constitutional rights. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14). Only Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against

Defendant Curry Branham remain pending. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 15, 18, 55, 57).

Defendant Branham has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims, Brief in Support, and Statement of Facts. (Doc. Nos. 66-68). Plaintiff has responded. (Doc.

Nos. 74-76). Defendant Branham has not filed a reply and the time for doing so has passed.

After careful consideration of the record before me, and for the reasons explained below, I

recommend Defendant Branham’s Motion be granted.

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant Branham remains pending. (Doc. No.

13 at 40; Doc. No. 14 at 42). According to Plaintiff, he was in his cell with his arms handcuffed

behind him. (Doc. No. 13 at 45; Doc. No. 14 at 47). Plaintiff explained that he wanted to get his

property and “just stood there calling Sgt. Knight’s name.” (Doc. No. 13 at 40; Doc. No. 14 at

42). Defendant Branham then became combative and allegedly used excessive force against

Plaintiff even though Plaintiff never resisted. (Doc. No. 13 at 40; Doc. No. 14 at 42). Defendant

Branham took a set of leg irons and “placed them on the handcuffs that [were] already holding

[Plaintiff’s] arms behind [his] back.” (Doc. No. 13 at 45; Doc. No. 14 at 47). Defendant Branham

allegedly placed “the other side of the leg iron through the bean hole, closed the door, placed his

foot on the door, and pulled with brute force intending to hurt” Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 13 at 45; Doc.

No. 14 at 47).

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1997). “The moving party

bears the initial burden of identifying ‘those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Webb v. Lawrence County, 144

F.3d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (other

citations omitted)). “Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot

simply rest on mere denials or allegations in the pleadings; rather, the non-movant ‘must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 1135. Although the facts are

viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, “in order to defeat a motion for summary

judgment, the non-movant cannot simply create a factual dispute; rather, there must be a genuine

dispute over those facts that could actually affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id.

In addition, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement (of undisputed material facts)

filed by the moving party...shall be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement filed by

the non-moving party . . . .” Local Rule 56.1, Rules of the United States District Court for the

Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. Failure to properly support or address the moving

party’s assertion of fact can result in the fact considered as undisputed for purposes of the motion.

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff sued Defendant Branham in his personal and official capacities. (Doc. No. 13 at

2; Doc. No. 14 at 4).

A. Personal Capacity Claims

Defendant Branham maintains that there was no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 68 at 4-8). And even if there was a

violation, Defendant Branham maintains that no clearly established law would have put him on

notice that his actions were unlawful. (Id. at 8-9).

1. Qualified Immunity

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them in their individual

capacities based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields a government official from

liability when his conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. McClendon v. Story County

Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, issues concerning qualified immunity

are appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526

(1985) (the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an

absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.”).

To determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, courts generally

consider two questions: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether

that right was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his or her

actions were unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).1 “‘A clearly established

right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what

he is doing violates that right.’” Thurmond v. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2020)

(internal citation omitted). In considering whether a right is clearly established, courts do not look

at precedent “at a high level of generality.” Id. Instead, courts “look for a controlling case or a

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority. There need not be a prior case directly on point,

but ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”

Id. (internal citation omitted). A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity only if no reasonable

fact finder could answer both questions—whether the facts alleged or shown, construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and

whether that right was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his

1Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

hand.” Nelson, 583 F.3d at 528 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236).

or her actions were unlawful—in the affirmative. Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583

F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2009).

2. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Branham used excessive force against him when Defendant

Branham used leg chains to secure the cuffs on Plaintiff’s hands while Plaintiff was in his cell.

“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969,

974 (8th Cir. 2017). The core judicial inquiry in an excessive force claim is whether the force was

used in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or was instead used maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Flemons v. Devane, 779 Fed. Appx. 423, 425 (8th Cir. 2019) (per

curiam) (citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36-39 (2010)). An officer acts maliciously when

he takes a course of action, without just cause or reason, that was intended to injure the inmate.

United States v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). An officer

behaves sadistically if he acts with “extreme or excessive cruelty or by delighting in cruelty.” Id.

In making the inquiry whether an officer acted in good faith to restore or maintain

discipline, or if the officer acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, courts consider: “the

need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that

was used, and the extent of the injury inflicted . . . .” Jackson, 866 F.3d at 974. Courts may also

consider the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, and “any efforts used to diminish the

severity of a forceful response.” Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1188 (8th Cir. 2008). Pain

inflicted during a prison security measure is not cruel and unusual punishment only because in

hindsight the degree of force used for security purposes was unreasonable. Ward v. Smith, 844

F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Rather,

guards will be liable only “if they are completely unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it

maliciously and sadistically.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Whether the force used was

reasonable is ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene’ and in the light of

the particular circumstances.” Story v. Norwood, 659 F.3d 680, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).

Even with malicious and sadistic motivation, not every use of physical force rises to the

level of a constitutional violation. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008). “The

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force . . . .’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992). But “any use of force greater than de minimis, or any use of force that is

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind’ does” constitute a violation. Irving, 519 F.3d at 446.

There is no significant injury threshold in an excessive force claim. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.

34, 37 (2010). However, “[t]he extent of injury may . . . provide some indication of the amount of

force applied.” (Id.). Threats of death together with readily available means may “form the basis

of an injury sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment.” Irving, 519 F.3d at 449.

***

A little background provides context for the September 20, 2023, incident giving rise to

this lawsuit. During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that on June 18, 2023, he assaulted another

inmate because Plaintiff witnessed the inmate at the foot of Plaintiff’s bed “with his private part

in his hand.” (Doc. No. 66-1 at 4:23-5:2). A PREA investigation was opened. (Id. at 5:2). At the

time of the incident, Defendant Branham was trying to move Plaintiff into a cell with a different

inmate; Plaintiff refused because he did not want a cellmate considering his recent experience. (Id.

at 5:2-5:10). Consequently, Plaintiff was placed on behavior control for 72 hours and Plaintiff’s

property was then taken from him. (Id. at 5:10-5:20). After 72 hours, Defendant Branham asked

Plaintiff if he was going into a cell with another inmate and Plaintiff refused. (Id. at 5:21-6:3).

Plaintiff was placed on behavior control again and was denied his property and a shower, among

other things, and was held in a dirty hallway cell. (Id. at 6:4-6:14). This pattern continued

generally until July 10, 2023, when Plaintiff was “moved to the handicap” – cell six in the north

wing of the east building. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 6:15-7:19). At that point, some of Plaintiff’s property

was returned to him. (Id. at 7:20-8:8). But Sergeant Knight refused to give Plaintiff some of his

belongings. (Id. at 8:18-8:21).

On September 20, 2023, Defendant Branham went to the yard to escort Plaintiff back to

his cell. (Id. at 9:13-9:14). Plaintiff was placed in cuffs. On the way back to Plaintiff’s cell,

Defendant Branham and Plaintiff walked past Knight’s office and Plaintiff “just stood there” and

began yelling at Knight to come out. (Id. at 10:3-10:). Defendant Branham physically tried to

move Plaintiff along but Plaintiff urged Defendant Branham to tell Knight to come out and talk.

(Id. at 10:20-8:8). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Branham advised Plaintiff at that time “you

don’t do what you want to do, you do what I tell you to do.” (Doc. No. 66-1 at 10:12-10:13).

Defendant Branham then continued escorting Plaintiff to his cell. Correctional Officers Sutton

and Copeland assisted Defendant Branham with the escort. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 4; Doc. No. 76).

The incident on which Plaintiff bases his claim against Defendant Branham followed.

Plaintiff does not contest the sequence of events and much of what took place was captured on

video. (Doc. No. 70).

Defendant Branham and the accompanying officers entered a hallway with Plaintiff. (Doc.

No. 67 at ¶ 6; Doc. No. 76). Plaintiff’s hands were cuffed behind his back. (Doc. No. 70). Upon

reaching Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant Branham entered the cell, inspected the cell, and locked the

cell door after Plaintiff was back inside. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶¶ 7-9; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 7). Defendant

Branham asked Plaintiff to turn his back to the door and lean against the trap so Defendant

Branham could remove Plaintiff’s handcuffs. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 10; Doc. No. 76). But Plaintiff

admittedly refused to relinquish the cuffs. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 11; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 12). Plaintiff

did not want to surrender the cuffs until he talked to Captain Mixon or Knight. (Doc. No. 67 at

¶ 12; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 12). Plaintiff admits he was retaining the cuffs as a tool to get his property

back. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 13; Doc. No. 76).

At this point Defendant Branham asked another officer to bring leg restraints because he

was trained on how to remove handcuffs using leg restraints. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶¶ 14, 15; Doc. No.

76). The technique involves attaching one end of the leg restraints to the inmate’s handcuffs and

running the other end through the trap. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 76). This enables an officer

to keep an inmate near the trap by exerting pressure on the leg restraints. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15;

Doc. No. 76). This method also prevents an inmate from jerking away when one cuff is released.

(Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 76). Cuffs are made of hard metal and can be swung and used as

a weapon. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 76). An inmate with one cuff unsecured is thus a serious

safety concern. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15; Doc. No. 76).

Defendant Branham entered Plaintiff’s cell at approximately 8:11:27 to secure one end of

the leg restraints to Plaintiff’s handcuffs. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 19; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 19). Defendant

Branham passed the other end of the leg restraints through the trap to Officer King, who took the

other end of the leg restraints at 8:11:50. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶¶ 20, 21; Doc. No. 76). Plaintiff

continued to resist and refuse verbal commands. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶¶ 20, 21; Doc. No. 76).

Defendant Branham then exited Plaintiff’s cell. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 22; Doc. No. 76). Between

8:12:10 and 8:12:34, Defendant Branham and Officer Sutton struggled with Plaintiff to maintain

control of the leg restraints as Plaintiff continued to resist by pulling away from the door. (Doc.

No. 67 at ¶ 23; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 23). Officer King ran for help. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 23; Doc. No.

76 at ¶ 23). Defendant Branham then waited for additional officers to arrive. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶

25; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 25). Captain Mixon and others appeared roughly one-and-a-half minutes

later. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 26; Doc. No. 76). During the interim there was not much struggle. (Doc.

No. 67 at ¶ 25; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 25). After Captain Mixon arrived, Defendant Branham gave

Plaintiff permission to move away from the trap; Plaintiff’s cell door was opened at 8:14:03. (Doc.

No. 67 at ¶¶ 26, 27; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 26, 27). At that time, several officers removed Plaintiff from

his cell. (Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 28; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 28). Plaintiff never turned over the cuffs. (Doc.

No. 67 at ¶ 29; Doc. No. 76 at ¶ 29). The remainder of the video footage shows Plaintiff waiting

in the hallway while items were removed from his cell.

As mentioned above, Plaintiff does not contest the sequence of events offered by

Defendants. Plaintiff also acknowledges that he resisted and refused to surrender the handcuffs.

But Plaintiff challenges Defendant Branham’s use of leg restraints under the circumstances.

Plaintiff asserts that the use of leg restraints was not necessary because Plaintiff’s hands were

cuffed behind his back so he was not a danger to anyone. (Doc. No. 76 at ¶¶ 12, 19, 25, 29, and

32). Plaintiff also maintains that Defendant Branham should have donned a body camera and used

pepper spray instead of the leg restraints. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 30).

Plaintiff’s argument that he was not a threat fails to acknowledge an important aspect of

prison life: following orders. And Plaintiff admits that he was holding the cuffs hostage to both

speak with other officers and have his property returned. This was not an instance of Plaintiff’s

passive resistance or day-to-day policing of a prison though means of violence. Hickey v. Reeder,

12 F.3d 754, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff actively resisted the efforts of Defendant Branham

and others and acknowledged that he did so. Further, cuffs can be misused and may present a

threat to prison officials. Without the leg restraints, an officer would have had to enter Plaintiff’s

cell to remove the cuffs.

Plaintiff testified that he suffered a laceration on his wrist and nerve damage because of

Defendant Branham’s actions. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 16:13-16:16; 28:21-28:24). Plaintiff said his

arm was numb after the incident and remained numb for a few days. (Id. at 33:12-33:20).

According to Plaintiff, he was cuffed when he was examined by medical at 8:30 that morning;

medical saw no injury or trauma. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 32:9-33:5; Doc. No. 66-4 at 4-5). During the

exam, Plaintiff told LPN Hollingsworth: “I’m straight”—slang for “I’m ok.” (Doc. No. 66-4 at

4). Plaintiff said after he was in his cell and the cuffs were removed he noticed a cut. (Doc. No.

66-1 at 32:9-33:5). Plaintiff was seen for a sick call on September 22, 2023. He complained that

Defendant Branham “pulled [his] arms handcuffed through the bars, causing damage” and

complained of “numbness and pain to B/L hand.” (Doc. No. 66-4 at 2-3). Hollingsworth saw no

swelling or bruising; she prescribed acetaminophen. While she did not diagnose Plaintiff with a

sprain, she did educate Plaintiff about sprains. (Id.).

Plaintiff wrote a witness statement that Defendant Branham did not hurt him, but Plaintiff

said he signed the statement only out of fear. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 34:12-36:19).

Even accepting all of this as true, Plaintiff has not offered any medical evidence suggesting

that he ever sought further attention for numbness or other problems with his arm after the incident

occurred. Plaintiff even changed units in November 2023. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 4:11-4:17). Nothing

in the record suggests Plaintiff sought medical assistance in the new unit. In short, there is no

evidence beyond Plaintiff’s statement that he suffered lasting nerve damage because of Defendant

Branham’s use of the leg restraints.

Where Plaintiff was actively resisting Defendant Branham’s orders and attempts to secure

Plaintiff’s cuffs, Defendant Branham was entitled to use some degree of force to restore order and

recover the cuffs—especially considering that cuffs may be misused and present a danger to prison

officers. The Court notes that the inside of Plaintiff’s cell is not visible in the video. Johnson v.

McCarver, 942 F.3d 405, 412 (8th Cir. 2019) (“where security camera footage of alleged

excessive-force incident was inconclusive, court would accept non-movant’s version of facts in

reviewing motion for summary judgment”). But the only force Plaintiff alleges Defendant

Branham used was pulling the leg restraints to gain access to Plaintiff’s cuffs, which took place

from outside of Plaintiff’s cell.2 And the only documented evidence of Plaintiff’s injuries are his

reports of pain and numbness on September 22, 2023. Again, pain inflicted during a prison

security measure is not per se cruel and unusual punishment. Ward v. Smith, 844 F.3d 717, 721

(8th Cir. 2016). Rather, guards will be liable only “if they are completely unjustified in using

force, i.e., they are using it maliciously and sadistically.’” Id.

Plaintiff has not presented proof with proof to establish facts in dispute that would preclude

summary judgment in Defendant Branham’s favor. Wilson v. Miller, 821 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir.

2016) (allegations must be substantiated with sufficient probative evidence); Bolderson v. City of

Wentzville, Missouri, 840 F.3d 982, 986-87 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting plaintiff’s duty to meet proof

with proof in affirming summary judgment in defendant’s favor). Considering the facts particular

to this case, the Court believes no reasonable juror could find that Defendant Branham acted

maliciously and sadistically when trying to remove Plaintiff’s cuffs. Under these circumstances,

Defendant Branham is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s personal capacity claims

2 If Plaintiff had walked to the door of his cell after the leg restraints were attached to his

handcuffs, the need to pull on the leg restraints would have been diminished. But Plaintiff

acknowledged that he resisted. Plaintiff did not voluntarily move towards the door.

against him. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001). The Court further notes that even if there was a violation, the Court is not aware

of clearly established law that would put Defendant Branham on notice that his actions were

unconstitutional, and Plaintiff has not provided the Court with such precedent.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Because Plaintiff has not established that Defendant Branham acted unlawfully, Plaintiff's

official capacity claim also fails. Moreover, Plaintiff has not identified an unconstitutional policy

or practice that caused his alleged injury, and any official capacity damages claim against

Defendant Branham is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

V. Conclusion

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Branham’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 66) be

GRANTED; and

2. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Branham be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

3. This case be CLOSED.

Dated this 9" day of March, 2026. “

JEROME T. KEARNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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