Dantin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

CODY C. DANTIN CIV. ACTION NO. 5:25-00580 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

MICHELE DAUZAT MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, is a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion to strike [doc. # 65] filed by Defendants

Captain Davis and Major Nathaniel Gillentine. The motions are unopposed. For reasons

detailed below, IT IS RECOMMENED that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike be DENIED.

Background

Plaintiff Cody Dantin (“Dantin”) is an inmate at David Wade Correctional Center

(“DWCC”), who is proceeding in forma pauperis and representing himself in this matter. He

filed the instant civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 21, 2025, against

various Defendants, including, as pertinent here, two officers at the DWCC: Captain Davis

(“Davis”) and Major Nathaniel Gillentine (“Gillentine”). On July 23, 2025, pursuant to an initial

review of the record, as reflected in the associated report and recommendation (“R&R”), the

Court dismissed all of Dantin’s claims against myriad Defendants sustaining only his Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Davis and Gillentine. See Aug. 26, 2025 Judgment

and July 23, 2025 R&R [doc. #s 44 & 36, respectively]. The Court ordered service on Davis and

Gillentine, which the U.S. Marshal Service perfected on September 15, 2025. (Service Order

and Return of Service [doc. #s 37 & 45, respectively]).

Over three months later, on December 26, 2025, Davis and Gillentine (collectively,

“Defendants”) filed the instant Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Dantin’s amended complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis of qualified immunity.

Also, embedded within their motion, Defendants alternatively urged the Court to strike

immaterial and prejudicial allegations from the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dantin did not file a response to the motion and the time to do so has passed. See Notice

of Motion Setting [doc. # 66]. Accordingly, the motion is deemed unopposed. Id. The matter

is ripe.

Analysis

I. Motion to Dismiss

a) Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim

for relief when, inter alia, it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 667-668 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A

claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility

does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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556. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation

that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is

unlikely. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint,

the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading

comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. Moreover, Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes courts to dismiss a claim

on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, notwithstanding that it otherwise might be well-

pleaded. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327 (1989) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, “[t]he notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

and case law do not require an inordinate amount of detail or precision.” Gilbert v. Outback

Steakhouse of Florida Inc., 295 Fed. App’x. 710, 713 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Further, “a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a

precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires only

a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of [her] legal

argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U. S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[c]ourts

must focus on the substance of the relief sought and the allegations pleaded, not on the label

used.” Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what

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the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and

its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). However, courts may rely upon “documents incorporated into the complaint

by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Id.

b) Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 provides that any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of

“any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”

Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section

1983, however, does not create any substantive rights; it simply provides a remedy for the rights

designated therein. Id. “Thus, an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to

liability under § 1983.” Id. (citation omitted).

To state a cognizable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must plead

two—and only two—allegations . . . First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has

deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of

that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266-67

(5th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a claim against a

state actor in his personal-capacity need not be attributed to a governmental “policy or custom.”

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).

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In addition, when, as here, a plaintiff seeks money damages from government officials in

their individual capacities under § 1983, the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is

available to protect defendants “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The qualified immunity doctrine balances two often conflicting interests:

“the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Id. As such, “[t]he protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether

the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on

mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In effect,

qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230

(5th Cir. 2000) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Qualified immunity is nominally characterized as an affirmative defense. However, once

raised by defendants, it devolves upon the plaintiff to negate the defense by showing that the

official’s conduct violated clearly established law. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s burden is two-pronged. Club Retro LLC v. Hilton, 568

F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoted sources omitted). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a

defendant(s) violated a constitutional right under current law. Id. “Second, [plaintiff] must

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claim that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was

clearly established at the time of the actions complained of.” Id. (quoted source and internal

quotation marks omitted). The courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in

deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in

light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214,

217 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

A law is clearly established when there exists “controlling authority—or a ‘robust

consensus of persuasive authority’—that defines the contours of the right in question with a high

degree of particularity.” Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 735 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoted

source omitted). Although a case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must have

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). “Courts must not define clearly established law at a high level of

generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the

particular circumstances that he or she faced.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2018)

(quoted source and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] rule is too general if the

unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the

rule] was firmly established.” Id. Nonetheless, there is the “rare possibility that, in an obvious

case, analogous case law is not needed because the unlawfulness of the [challenged] conduct is

sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.”

Joseph on behalf of Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

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In the end, the question becomes whether the right is “sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.” Hogan,

722 F.3d at 735 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because it is plaintiff’s burden

to establish that the challenged conduct violated clearly established law, the district court may,

but is not obliged to, undertake the clearly established law analysis on its own. Joseph, 981 F.3d

at 338 (court need not limit its analysis to the cases cited by plaintiff).

When responding to a defendant’s invocation of qualified immunity within the context of

a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not “exceed the short-and-plain-statement standard of Rule

8.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d at 267 (citation omitted). Instead, “a plaintiff seeking to

overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a

qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id. (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d

645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)). In other words, plaintiff must plead qualified immunity facts with the

“minimal specificity” required by Twombly and Iqbal. Id. (“an assertion of qualified immunity

in a defendant’s answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened

pleading standard.”).

c) Excessive Force

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 838–39 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hudson v.

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McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). Several, non-exhaustive factors are relevant to determine

whether unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain was used in violation of a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, including,

1. the extent of the injury suffered;

2. the need for the application of force;

3. the relationship between the need and the amount of force used;

4. the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and

5. any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.

Id. (citation omitted).1

1 Furthermore, “although a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to

satisfy the injury requirement is ‘directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally

permissible under the circumstances.’” Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 309 (5th

Cir. 2017 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Lynch, 524 F. App’x 69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Accordingly, “[a]ny force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily exceeds the de

minimis threshold, and, conversely, objectively reasonable force will result in de minimis injuries

only.” Id. (quoting Brown, 524 F. App’x at 79); see generally Thomas v. Comstock, 222 F.

App’x 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that “the use of de minimus force—including chemical

sprays— can support an excessive-force claim[.]”).

In other words, “as long as a plaintiff has suffered ‘some injury,’ even relatively

insignificant injuries and purely psychological injuries will prove cognizable when resulting

from an officer’s unreasonably excessive force.” Id. (quoting Brown, 524 F. App’x at 79). This

means that if the use of force was unreasonably excessive, a plaintiff only needs to show “some

injury.” See Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975, 982 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that nerve pain and a

pulling pain was enough injury); Bone v. Dunnaway, 657 Fed. App’x. 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2016)

(“Although Bone’s allegation of injury could be characterized as de minimis—bruising and a

swollen cheek—whether an injury is cognizable depends on the reasonableness of the force, not

just the extent of injury.”); Schmidt v. Gray, 399 Fed. App’x. 925, 928 (5th Cir. 2010) (pain,

soreness, and bruising resulting from an officer’s slamming a car’s trunk lid on a suspect’s finger

was a legally cognizable injury).

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As relevant here, Dantin alleges that he feared that his life was in danger at the DWCC

because he previously had reported inmates for wrongdoing at other prisons. On March 24,

2025, Dantin gave a letter to a prison guard, Sergeant Crane, documenting his safety concerns.

[doc. # 32-1]. However, Sergeant Crane read the letter to other inmates and then handed it to an

inmate, thereby exposing Dantin to danger. [doc. # 11-1, p. 2]. As a result, Dantin became

alarmed and secured his cell door with a sheet. [doc. # 32, pg. 1].

At some point, Gillentine arrived at Dantin’s cell and ordered him to untie the door. Id.

According to Dantin, Gillentine and Davis then sprayed him with a chemical agent in his cell

while he was posing no threat. However, in a disciplinary report that Dantin attached to his

complaint, Gillentine stated that he sprayed Dantin with a chemical agent because he “had his

cell door tied closed with a sheet” and refused two direct verbal orders to “untie the sheet and

come to the cell door to be restrained[.]” [doc. # 32-1, p. 6].

Thereafter,

[Dantin] suggests that after Gillentine sprayed him, he was unable to untie his cell

door due to the effects of the chemical agent: he was panicked, could not breathe,

had chest pains, and was screaming for help. [doc. # 32, p. 2]. It “took 2 hours for

Capt. Davis and Major Gillentine to cut through” the sheet tied on his door. Id.

When they cut the sheet off, [Dantin] “came to the bars and got restrained.” Id. He

claims that Gillentine then escorted him to “N-4 lobby pipe chase in between N-4-

A and N-4-B” and ordered him to kneel. Id. He claims that while he was on his

knees and in full restraints, Gillentine and Davis struck him in his back, neck, and

head and sprayed him with a chemical agent in his eyes, mouth, ears, and face “over

and over” for over two hours. [doc. #s 11-1, p. 2; 32, p. 2]. He screamed for help,

stating that his life was in danger. [doc. # 11-1, p. 2]. He alleges that Gillentine

and Davis beat him and sprayed him “out of anger because they had to cut [the

sheet] off [his] door[.]” [doc. # 32, p. 2]. He was then escorted to a shower and

subsequently placed in “cell # 2 on B-Tier/strip cell.” [doc. # 11-1, p. 2]. He

suggests that because of the chemical agent and/or beating, nerves in his face near

his left eye twitch, and his left ear became infected. [doc. # 32, p. 3].

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(R&R, pg. 4).

Because Dantin is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court conducted a

preliminary screening of his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and/or 1915(e)(2), which

authorizes the sua sponte dismissal of any portion of a complaint that, inter alia, fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. (R&R, pg. 5). In this case, the undersigned applied the

Hudson factors to the two sets of sprayings (plus the strikes) alleged by Dantin against Gillentine

and Davis, and, after liberally construing Dantin’s allegations, found that the Court should retain

both sets of excessive force claims against Gillentine and Davis. (R&R, pgs. 10-15). In other

words, the undersigned found that Dantin had alleged sufficient facts to support an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants. Id. The District Court adopted these

findings. (Judgment [doc. # 44]).

To the extent that Defendants argue that Dantin’s pleadings’ are insufficient to support an

excessive force claim against Defendants, their argument is foreclosed by the Court’s prior

determination. Defendants make no effort to address the R&R and do not move the Court to

reconsider its prior Judgment. The undersigned is not at liberty to reconsider the Court’s prior

Judgment or even to make such a recommendation, in the absence of an express motion seeking

that relief and/or a concomitant referral for that purpose.

Furthermore, Defendants’ argument appears to be limited to the initial application of

chemical spray because the motion otherwise ignores Dantin’s additional allegations that, after

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he was in full restraints, Defendants repeatedly struck him and sprayed him with a chemical

agent for a period of over two hours. [doc. #s 11-1, p. 2; 32, p. 2].2

While the Court’s prior determination that Dantin stated a plausible Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim against Defendants resolves the first prong of Defendants’ qualified

immunity defense, Dantin still must overcome the second prong, i.e., that Defendants’ actions

were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident.

Defendants contend that there is no binding precedent establishing an Eighth Amendment

violation for deploying a chemical agent against an inmate who has tied his cell door shut and

refuses commands to untie the sheet.

The undersigned previously cited cases that did not rule out an excessive force claim for

Defendants’ initial use of chemical spray. See, e.g., Woolverton v. Gratz, 793 F. App’x 341, 342

(5th Cir. 2020) and Kitt v. Bailey, 676 F. App’x 350, 351 (5th Cir. 2017). In Kitt, the Fifth

Circuit remarked that, “no clearly established law forbids the application of a single burst of a

chemical irritant in order to compel a prisoner to comply with an order.” Kitt, 676 Fed. App’x at

352. On initial review, the undersigned observed that there potentially were two bursts of

chemical irritant, which could distinguish this case from Kitt. In response to Defendants’

motion, however, Dantin has not argued that the bursts were applied sequentially or, even if they

were, provided any authority to show that two bursts of spray under the circumstances violated

2 Defendants also contend that Dantin’s allegations that they acted “out of anger” are conclusory.

Certainly, it is plausible that Defendants acted out of anger or malice given Dantin’s allegations

that they struck him and doused him with chemical spray for over two hours.

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clearly established law. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity as to Dantin’s excessive force claim for the initial administration of chemical

spray.

As stated previously, Defendants’ motion does not address the subsequent two-hours long

spraying and strikes that Dantin alleges Defendants inflicted on him after he was subdued, on his

knees, and in restraints. In any event, it is manifest that such actions violated clearly established

law in March 2025 when Dantin alleged they occurred.3 Accordingly, insofar as Defendants

sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim related to the two-hours’ long spraying and

strikes, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s allegations suffice to overcome Defendants’

qualified immunity defense.

3 See Polk v. State of Louisiana, Civ. Action No. 25-126, 2026 WL 1130618, at *5 (W.D. La.

Feb. 5, 2026) (at the time of the alleged macing in August 2022, the Fifth Circuit and several

district courts in this circuit had recognized that a correctional officer’s use of force—including

the use of a chemical spray like mace—without provocation on a restrained and compliant

inmate supports an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim); Rivens-Baker v. Collier, Civ.

Action No. 23-0334, 2025 WL 642927, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL

642051 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2025) (citing, inter alia, Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th

Cir. 2016) (“the Fifth Circuit and a ‘robust consensus’ of persuasive authority recognized that a

prison official’s use of force – including the use of a chemical spray – without provocation on a

compliant and restrained inmate supports Eighth Amendment excessive force claims”); Jones v.

Gooden, 2025 WL 1913376, at *3 (M.D. La. Feb. 24, 2025) (clearly established at the time of

the violation that an officer could not spray chemical agent on a compliant inmate with no

justification for the use of force); Skinner v. Gautreaux, 593 F. Supp.3d 383, 393 (M.D. La.

2022) (Fifth Circuit precedent provides that “courts have frequently found constitutional

violations in cases where a restrained or subdued person is subjected to the use of force.”);

Williams v. Town of Clinton, Civ. Action No. 23-00119, 2024 WL 72645, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 5,

2024) (plaintiff’s allegations of an unprovoked beating accompanied by pepper spray, are

sufficient to overcome defendant’s qualified immunity defense).

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II. Motion to Strike

Motions to strike are governed by Rule 12(f), which authorizes a court to “order stricken

from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently

granted.” U.S. v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 275 F. Supp.2d 763, 767 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (citing

Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Florida, 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th

Cir. 1962)). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:

[p]artly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record

it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used

by the courts. * * * It is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for

the purpose of justice. * * * The motion to strike should be granted only when the

pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.

Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868 (citing Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. U.S., 201 F.2d 819, 822

(6th Cir. 1953)).

Moreover, “[a] disputed question of fact cannot be decided on a motion to strike . . . [and]

when there is no showing of prejudicial harm to the moving party, the courts generally are not

willing to determine disputed and substantial questions of law upon a motion to strike.”

Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868. When questions of fact or law are present, the court should “. . .

defer action on the motion and leave the sufficiency of the allegations for determination on the

merits.” Id.

Defendants contend that Dantin included narrative assertions regarding their alleged

motives, generalized claims of retaliation, and conclusory accusations of misconduct that are

unsupported by factual allegations and unrelated to the elements of an Eighth Amendment

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excessive force claim. Defendants suggest that striking these allegations will narrow the case to

the dispositive legal issues and will promote the just and efficient resolution of the matter.

(M/Dismiss, Memo., pgs. 3-4).

The Court disagrees. Striking the allegations from Dantin’s pleading(s) serves no

material or useful purpose where the allegations, even if “stricken,” will not be removed from the

record. Furthermore, the undersigned previously conducted an initial review of Dantin’s

pleadings which resulted in the dismissal of all his claims and parties, save for his Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim. Therefore, the case already has been streamlined. In short,

Defendants have not established that the drastic remedy of striking allegations is available or

warranted.

Conclusion

For the above assigned reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion [doc. # 65] be

GRANTED IN PART and that Plaintiff’s Cody C. Dantin’s excessive force claim related to the

initial spraying be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss [doc. # 65] otherwise be

DENIED. Moreover,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to strike [doc. # 65] is DENIED.4

4 As this motion is not one of the motions excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), nor dispositive

of any claim on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, this ruling is issued under the authority thereof, and in accordance with the standing

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Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties

have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific,

written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any

objection or response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at

the time of filing. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before he makes a

final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS

REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE

SHALL BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR,

FROM ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL

FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 12th day of May, 2026.

KAYLA DYE McGLUSKY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

order of this court. Any appeal/objection must be made to the district judge in accordance with

Rule 72(a).

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