Sevilla

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MERLENY SEVILLA, Individually and on

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

21-CV-3698 (PKC) (TAM)

- against -

PORFIRIO VINCENTE SAY TZUL, et al.,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On June 30, 2021, Plaintiff Merleny Sevilla initiated this action, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated, against Defendants Restaurante Panaderia Guate Linda Inc.

(“Panaderia”), Maria Leticia Marroquin Chan1, and Porfirio Vincente Say Tzul (“Tzul”), alleging

violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York labor laws. (See Compl.,

Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 39–55.) On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint, removing Defendant

Marroquin Chan and adding Herminia Maria Tiu Pacheco (“Pacheco”) as a Defendant in this case.

(See Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. 48.) On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff moved for default

judgment against the remaining Defendants for a sum certain under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b)(1). (See Mot. for Default J., Dkt. 61; Pl.’s Ltr., Dkt. 65.) On December

20, 2023, the Clerk of Court entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding all three

remaining Defendants, jointly and severally, liable in the amount of $211,601.50 plus attorneys’

fees and statutory post-judgment interest. (12/20/2023 Dkt. Order; Default J., Dkt. 66.) On April

10, 2025, Defendants filed the motion to vacate the default judgment that is currently before the

1 In the original complaint, Defendant Maria Leticia Marroquin Chan was identified by her

first two names only. (Compare Compl., Dkt. 1, with First Am. Compl., Dkt. 20.)

Court. (Mot. to Vacate Default J. (“Mot. to Vacate”), Dkt. 72.) For the reasons described below,

Defendants’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff states that she worked at Defendant Panaderia, a business in Queens, from around

December 1, 2017 until around March 1, 2021. (SAC, Dkt. 48, ¶¶ 8–9, 27.) According to the

complaint, while Plaintiff was employed there, her tasks included cooking, preparing food,

cleaning, and waiting tables. (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendants Tzul and Pacheco owned the Panaderia at the

time and had power over all of its payroll and personnel decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 11–16, 18–23.) Also

according to the complaint, Defendants failed to: (1) pay Plaintiff the minimum wage for her

regular hours and time-and-a-half of her regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours

in a week; (2) post notices of the minimum wage and overtime wage requirements in a conspicuous

location; and (3) keep accurate and contemporaneous payroll records. (Id. ¶¶ 30–36.) Plaintiff

brought this collective action on behalf of herself and other employees similarly situated, of which

she estimates there are 20, for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and New York Labor Law

(“NYLL”). (Id. ¶¶ 40–42, 52–85.)

In May and June 2023, Plaintiff filed proofs of service of the SAC on Defendants.

(Dkts. 52–54.)2 Defendants did not appear or file an answer to the SAC. (See 06/29/2023 Status

Report Order.) On August 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for the Clerk of Court to enter default

against Defendants. (Req. for Certificate of Default, Dkt. 57.) On September 1, 2023, the Clerk

of Court entered Defendants’ default. (Dkt. 58.) Defendants were served the entry of default the

same week. (Dkt. 59.) On October 10, 2023, Plaintiff moved for default judgment for a sum

2 Plaintiff also filed proofs of service showing that Defendants were served with the

Complaint on August 4, 2021, (Dkts. 7–10), and with the First Amended Complaint between

December 30, 2021 and January 11, 2022, (Dkts. 23–25).

certain pursuant to Rule 55(b)(1), (Mot. for Default. J., Dkt. 61; Dkt. 65), and served Defendants

with her motion, (Dkt. 64). On December 20, 2023, the Clerk of Court entered default judgment

against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the liquidated amount of $211,601.50, plus attorneys’

fees and statutory post-judgment interest accruing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 from the date of

entry of judgment until judgment is paid in full. (12/20/2023 Dkt. Order; Default J., Dkt. 66.)

Defendants now seek to vacate the default judgment on the grounds of mistake,

inadvertence, and excusable neglect, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). (Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at

ECF3 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)).) They do not deny that they were served as Plaintiff

claims. Instead, the motion focuses primarily on the proffered reasons why Defendant Tzul did

not respond to the SAC: he lacks proficiency in English, as Spanish is his primary language; he

has limited familiarity with the legal system, as his involvement with litigation is limited to a prior

case concerning an automobile accident in which his son was involved; he is dedicated to his son’s

“serious medical issues”; and Plaintiff’s attorney did not contact him further to ask if he intended

to answer the complaint. (See id. at ECF 3; Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶¶ 2–5, 7, 22.) Tzul claims to

have only realized the significance of the complaint once he received a garnishment order from

his bank. (Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 3; Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶ 7.)

Tzul also denies certain allegations in the SAC, claiming that he has “always paid [his]

employees the appropriate hourly rate for their work,” that Plaintiff “never worked over 10 hours

per day” nor 79 hours during a single week, and that Panaderia’s gross income is below $500,000.

(See Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶¶ 8–17.) Defendants provide as support for their motion a 2020

physician’s affirmation from the litigation concerning the accident of Tzul’s son, (see Physician’s

3 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing

system and not the document’s internal pagination.

Aff., Dkt. 72-3); a document listing 2019 appointments for Tzul’s son’s medical appointments,

(Dkt. 73-2); copies of checks allegedly provided to Plaintiff, (Dkt. 72-4); Plaintiff’s payroll

records for one week in November of 2018, (Payroll Rs., Dkt. 72-5); a timesheet for one week in

January 2020, (Dkt. 73-1); copies of Plaintiff’s W-2s for 2019, 2020, and 2021, (see W2s, Dkt. 72-

6); and part of Panaderia’s tax returns for 2019, 2020, and 2021, all of which list Tzul as the

business’s proprietor, (see Forms 1040, Dkt. 72-7).

To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a court may set aside a judgment due to “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The defaulting party bears the burden

of proof. Melo v. Milagro Grocery Corp., No. 21-CV-4438 (PKC) (PK), 2026 WL 366639, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2026) (quoting NuBridge Com. Lending REO SPV I Inc. v. KA & B Props.,

Inc., No. 22-CV-1468 (LDH) (SIL), 2023 WL 11261908, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2023), R. & R.

adopted, 2024 WL 1364321 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2024)). The Second Circuit has expressed “a

strong ‘preference for resolving disputes on the merits’” since “a default judgment is ‘the most

severe sanction which the court may apply.’” New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)

(first quoting Powerserve Int’l, Inc. v. Lavi, 239 F.3d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 2001); and then quoting

Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1995)). But, ultimately, “[a] motion to vacate a default

judgment is ‘addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.’” Id. (quoting State Street

Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2004)).

The Court’s decision on a motion to vacate a default judgment “is guided by three principal

factors: ‘(1) whether the default was willful, (2) whether the defendant demonstrates the existence

of a meritorious defense, and (3) whether, and to what extent, vacating the default will cause

[Plaintiff] prejudice.’” In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc., 95 F.4th 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting

SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 738 (2d Cir. 1998)). “Of these factors, willfulness carries the most

weight.” Id. (citing Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991)); see

also Jaramillo v. Banana King Rest. Corp., No. 12-CV-5649 (NGG) (RML), 2016 WL 1084729,

at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016) (finding willfulness alone to be sufficient to deny a motion to

vacate before Orion HealthCorp and collecting cases), R. & R. adopted, No. 12-CV-5649 (NGG)

(RML), 2016 WL 1108956 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Jaramillo v. Vega, 675 F.

App’x 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). Similarly, a district court “has discretion to deny the

motion to vacate if it is persuaded that the default was willful and is unpersuaded that the defaulting

party has a meritorious defense.” McNulty, 137 F.3d at 738 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Default was Willful

A. Willfulness Standard

The Second Circuit “has ‘interpreted “willfulness,” in the context of a default, to refer to

conduct that is more than merely negligent or careless.’” In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc., 95 F.4th

at 104 (quoting McNulty, 137 F.3d at 738). But “the degree of negligence in precipitating the

default is a relevant factor to be considered.” Jaramillo, 675 F. App’x at 76 (quoting Green, 420

F.3d at 108). And “a finding of bad faith is [not] a necessary predicate to concluding that a

defendant acted ‘willfully.’ Rather, ‘it is sufficient’ to conclude ‘that the defendant defaulted

deliberately.’” Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Loc. 2, Albany, N.Y. Pension Fund v. Moulton

Masonry & Constr., LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted) (quoting

Gucci Am., Inc. v. Gold Ctr. Jewelry, 158 F.3d 631, 635 (2d Cir. 1998)). Where a defendant does

not deny that they received the complaints, the court’s orders, or the notice of the default, and does

not argue that their non-compliance was due to circumstances beyond their control, “an inference

of willful default is justified.” Id. (citing Guggenheim Cap., LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d 444, 455

(2d Cir. 2013)); see also Murphy v. Snyder, No. 10-CV-1513 (JS) (AKT), 2013 WL 934603, at *6

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013) (“In general, a defendant’s failure to answer the complaint and respond

to a motion for default judgment demonstrates willfulness.” (citations omitted)), R. & R. adopted,

No. 10-CV-1513 (JS) (AKT), 2013 WL 1335757 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013); Todtman, Nachamie,

Spizz & Johns, P.C. v. Ashraf, 241 F.R.D. 451, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[C]ourts have held the

default to be willful when a defendant simply ignores a complaint without action.” (quoting Brown

v. DeFilippis, 695 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))), aff’d, 316 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2009)

(summary order).

B. Application

Here, Defendants do not contest any of Plaintiff’s representations about service of

Plaintiff’s three complaints and numerous court filings or the Court’s orders in this case.

Defendants also recognize that “Defendant [Tzul] could have taken some action such as contacting

his prior attorney.” (Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 3.) Defendants instead rely on only Tzul’s

proffered reasons for not answering the complaint: that English is not his first language, he is

unfamiliar with the legal system, his son was dealing with medical issues, and Plaintiff’s attorney

did not contact him further to ask if Defendants intended to answer the complaint.4 (See id.; Tzul

Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶¶ 3–4, 7, 22.)

But none of these reasons are sufficient, individually or in aggregate, to justify the failure

to answer or take any action in this case for over three years. Defendants were served, individually

and through Panaderia, with Plaintiff’s three complaints, two motions for default judgment, two

4 The Court puts little to no weight on this last argument. Defendants concede that “it is

not necessarily the Plaintiff’s responsibility to do any more than is required by law.” (See Mot. to

Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 3.) Additionally, as discussed below, the record in this case includes

direct evidence and representations by Plaintiff’s counsel that Defendants, in fact, had substantial

contact with Plaintiff’s attorneys and the Court.

motions for extension of time, memorandum on damages calculations, the Clerk’s entry of default,

and at least four Court orders. (See Dkts. 7–10 (executed summons for Plaintiff’s Complaint);

Dkts. 23–25, 27–28, 30 (executed summons for Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint); Dkts. 34-2–

34-6 (affidavits of service for Plaintiff’s first motion for default judgment); Dkt. 37 (scheduling

order for hearing); Dkt. 38 (certificate of service for the motion hearing); 06/13/2022 Min. Entry;

08/31/2022 Scheduling Order; 09/06/2022 Dkt. Order (scheduling hearing); 09/09/2022 Min.

Entry; Dkt. 40 at ECF 2–3 (Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time, including proof of service on

all Defendants); Dkts. 42–43 (Plaintiff’s second motion for extension of time, and affidavit of

service on all Defendants); Dkt. 45 (affidavit of service for Plaintiff’s damages calculations);

Dkts. 51–53 (executed summonses for Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint); Dkt. 59 (affidavit

of service for Clerk’s entry of default); Dkt. 64 (affidavit of service for Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment).) Defendants do not claim to have taken any action with respect to any of these

filings or orders. Subject to the same constraints Defendants rely on, however, Defendants

reportedly handled litigation relating to Defendant Tzul’s son’s accident, (see Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-

1, ¶¶ 3–4, 6), and continued to operate a business in New York City, including preparing and filing

the necessary business documentation, (see, e.g., Forms 1040, Dkt. 72-7 (parts of Panaderia’s tax

records)). Reviewing all of these factors as a whole, the Court finds that Defendants were properly

served, that Defendants’ justifications do not excuse their inaction in this case, that Defendants

consciously chose to ignore the substantial number of communications they received from the

Court and Plaintiff, and that, accordingly, Defendants’ default was willful.5

5 See also Quintana v. Young Blooming, Inc., No. 12-CV-0120 (DLI) (MDG), 2016 WL

1273231, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) (finding willful default by businessowner defendants

who claimed to have English limitations and medical conditions of their own but had incorporated

and operated multilingual businesses, and previously retained an attorney); Dave’s Specialty

Imports, Inc. v. Roduce for Less, Inc., No. 19-CV-7136 (LDH) (PK), 2021 WL 1207121, at *1–2

Finally, the evidence in this case also calls into question the veracity of some of

Defendants’ proffered reasons for their default. Defendants themselves have submitted testimony

from a physician who examined Tzul’s son in 2020—three years prior to Defendants’ default—

and opined that Tzul’s son had “reached maximum medical benefit for the injuries he sustained,”

“would not benefit from further treatment,” was “in good and normal physical condition,” and was

not expected “to have any future effects or disabilities as a result” of the accident in question.

(Physician’s Aff., Dkt. 72-3, ¶¶ 6–7.) Additionally, Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff’s attorney did

not contact them to ask if they were going to answer the complaint is contradicted by the

representations of Plaintiff’s counsel that her office “spoke to Defendants . . . via telephone in

Spanish, prior to the entry of default,” on seven occurrences between November 2021 and June

2023, and reminded Defendants “that they were being sued and must appear in this matter and/or

hire counsel at the risk of being found in default.” (Pl.’s Ltr., Dkt. 70, at 2.)

Thus, because Defendants’ reasons are insufficient and partially belied by the evidence,

the Court finds that Defendants willfully defaulted.

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding willful default where defendant, a businessperson, admitted

receiving notice of default and failing to contact a lawyer, but claimed that the Covid-19 pandemic

and unfamiliarity with the legal system hampered their ability to respond); Jamarillo, 2016 WL

1084729, at *4 (finding willful default where defendant, a successful businessperson, received

“many documents” but alleged lack of familiarity with English and the American legal system,

and reasoning that “forwarding the documents to [defendant’s] company’s attorney would simply

have been a matter of common sense” (collecting cases)); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. MC Physical

Therapy, P.C., No. 23-CV-3536 (OEM) (PK), 2024 WL 4648143, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 12,

2024) (reasoning that defaulting defendant’s fear or confusion does not excuse default where they

had knowledge of the case and failed to act).

II. Defendants Have Not Demonstrated a Meritorious Defense

A. Meritorious Defense Standards

“Whether a defense is meritorious ‘is measured not by whether there is a likelihood that it

will carry the day, but whether the evidence submitted, if proven at trial, would constitute a

complete defense.’” In re Orion HealthCorp, Inc., 95 F.4th at 105 (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v.

Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1993)). The defaulting defendant “need only meet a low

threshold to satisfy this factor.” MD Produce Corp. v. 231 Food Corp., 304 F.R.D. 107, 110

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). “A court will find that a

‘defendant’s allegations are meritorious if they contain even a hint of a suggestion which, if proven

at trial, would constitute a complete defense.’” E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Johnson, No. 13-CV-6070

(AMD) (ST), 2020 WL 1452461, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (citation modified) (quoting Sea

Hope Navigation Inc. v. Novel Commodities SA, 978 F. Supp. 2d 333, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). But

“a defendant ‘must present more than conclusory denials when attempting to show the existence

of a meritorious defense.’” Id. (quoting Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 173 (2d

Cir. 2001)); see also Cordero v. AT&T, No. 15-CV-5601 (RRM) (ST), 2017 WL 52591, at *4 n.8

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2017) (“A defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment bears the burden of

offering evidence sufficient to establish a complete defense.” (citation omitted)).

B. Application

Defendants argue that they have a meritorious defense because Defendant Tzul denies

Plaintiff’s allegations about her work and pay conditions, as substantiated by the evidence

Defendants have now provided. (See Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 4–5.) Defendants also claim

that Defendant Panaderia is not a covered employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act, since it

earns less than $500,000 in gross profits annually and is a “single location, local restaurant[].”6

(See id. at ECF 5.)

1. Defendants Fail to Show a Viable Factual Defense

Defendants’ allegations that they followed the correct practices regarding the wage

payments find scant, if any, support in the extremely few records they provide. The alleged copies

of Plaintiff’s W-2s and checks include no details as to Plaintiff’s wage rate or the hours she worked.

(See Dkt. 72-4; W2s, Dkt. 72-6.) The sole documents provided by Defendants bearing on

Plaintiff’s work hours cover only two weeks—approximately 1% of the over three years of

employment at issue. (See Payroll Rs., Dkt. 72-5; Dkt. 73-1; SAC, Dkt. 48, ¶¶ 27, 30.) The same

is true for at least part of Defendants’ arguments regarding FLSA’s application. Although

Defendants provide tax forms suggesting that their revenue is below $500,000, Defendants provide

no evidence or specifics, other than Tzul’s conclusory statement that Panaderia “do[es] not sell

goods across state lines,” regarding Defendants’ or Plaintiff’s involvement in interstate commerce.

(Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-3, ¶ 15.) Tzul’s statements thus have virtually no support in the record and,

without more, are simply conclusory denials, insufficient to meet Defendants’ burden to establish

6 As discussed below, Defendants do not explicitly contest that they are engaged in

interstate commerce or that Plaintiff, while working for Defendants, engaged in interstate

commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. Instead, Defendants state only

that the Panaderia is a “local bakery and restaurant” that “do[es] not sell goods across state lines,”

(Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶ 15), and that “District Courts within New York City have found that

single location, local restaurants such as Panaderia []are not engaged in interstate commerce,”

citing only one such case, (Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 5 (citing Lamont v. Frank Soup Bowl,

Inc., No. 99-CV-12482 (JMS), 2001 WL 521815, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).) But, as discussed infra,

Defendants’ reliance on this lone decision and their assertion that Panaderia does not sell goods

across state lines is simply insufficient to establish a meritorious defense under the FLSA.

a meritorious defense.7 Accordingly, Defendants have not met their burden to establish that they

would be able to mount a meritorious defense against Plaintiff’s allegations of labor law violations.

2. Defendants Fail to Show a Viable Legal Defense

Defendants’ arguments as to the coverage of the FLSA are also unavailing. The FLSA

wage and overtime provisions apply to plaintiffs who are engaged in interstate commerce. See

Jacobs v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 577 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). A

plaintiff satisfies the “engaged in commerce” factor by establishing either that she “personally

engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce,”

(“individual coverage”) or that her employer was “an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce

or in the production of goods for interstate commerce” (“enterprise coverage”). See id. (citation

omitted); 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1); Albim v. 1656 Wireless Inc., No. 23-CV-1732 (DG)

(RML), 2025 WL 2791384, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2025) (citation omitted). Defendant Tzul’s

assertion that Panaderia does not meet the $500,000 revenue threshold is relevant only to FLSA’s

“enterprise” coverage, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii), but does not establish a complete defense

7 In fact, Defendants do not contest Plaintiff’s assertion that “Defendants willfully failed

to keep accurate and contemporary payroll records,” as required by the FLSA and NYLL. (SAC,

Dkt. 48, ¶ 36; see Mot. to Vacate, Dkt. 72, at ECF 4, ECF 4 n.1 (stating that “Defendants[’] records

are incomplete” and requesting permission to supplement the motion “with additional documents

should defendant locate them”); Tzul Decl., Dkt. 72-1, ¶ 18.) Keeping adequate records of

employees’ time and pay is the employer’s “non-delegable” duty. Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc.,

643 F.3d 352, 363 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing, inter alia, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c)). Under both the FLSA

and the NYLL, an employer’s failure to keep adequate records lowers the plaintiff’s burden of

proof regarding evidence of their time and hours. See id. at 362 (explaining that under the FLSA,

“if an employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate, an employee need only present ‘sufficient

evidence to show the amount and extent of [the uncompensated work] as a matter of just and

reasonable inference’” (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946)));

Sanchez v. Clipper Realty, Inc., No. 21-CV-8502 (KPF), 2026 WL 496555, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

23, 2026) (explaining that under NYLL Section 196-a, “when an employer fails to keep adequate

records, the burden shifts to the employer” (citation modified)). Thus, Defendants’ self-described

“incomplete” records show, if anything, that they are less likely to have a meritorious defense to

Plaintiff’s wage-and-hour claims.

against FLSA liability where Plaintiff may recover under individual coverage. See Day An Zhang

v. L.G. Apparel Inc., No. 09-CV-3240 (KAM) (SMG), 2011 WL 900183, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,

2011) (“[A]ny employee ‘engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce’ is

covered by the FLSA, irrespective of whether his or her employer is an enterprise engaged in

commerce as statutorily defined.” (citation omitted)), R. & R. adopted, No. 09-CV-3240 (KAM)

(SMG), 2011 WL 900950 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011).

Critically, Defendants have not presented any defense claiming that FLSA’s individual

coverage does not apply. Even if the Court were to consider such a claim, Defendants have not

provided a sufficient basis to find that individual coverage would not apply. Specifically,

Defendants provide no evidence as to whether Plaintiff engaged in interstate commerce, beyond

Defendant Tzul’s statement that Panaderia “do[es] not sell goods across state lines.” (Tzul Decl.,

Dkt. 72-1, ¶ 15.)8 Without more, Defendants “present [no] more than conclusory denials [in]

attempting to show the existence of a meritorious defense.” See E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Johnson,

No. 13-CV-6070 (AMD) (ST), 2020 WL 1452461, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (quoting

Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, Defendants

8 The Court notes that here, Plaintiff claims that her job responsibilities involved cooking,

preparing food, waiting tables, cleaning, and “miscellaneous duties,” (SAC, Dkt. 48, ¶ 28), and at

least one court in this district has found that restaurant employees with such responsibilities are

generally presumed to be engaged in interstate commerce as defined by the FLSA’s individual

coverage provision. See Chavez v. Roosevelt Tropical Corp., No. 23-CV-2413 (EK) (PK), 2024

WL 4244087, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2024) (“It is reasonable to infer that a restaurant worker

engaged in food service tasks handled tools and materials that were moved or produced in interstate

commerce.” (citation omitted)), R. & R. adopted, No. 23-CV-2413 (EK) (PK), 2024 WL 4242218

(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 18, 2024).

have failed to meet their burden to establish a meritorious and complete defense against FLSA

coverage and thus against Plaintiff’s FLSA claims in this case.9

* * *

Thus, Defendants have failed to show that they could mount any complete defense to

Plaintiff’s FLSA claims at trial. Having decided that Defendants’ default was willful and that they

would not be able to mount a meritorious defense, the Court need not consider the potential

prejudice to Plaintiff and denies Defendants’ request to vacate the judgment. See McNulty, 137

F.3d at 738 (citations omitted).

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Defendants willfully defaulted and cannot mount a meritorious

defense in this case. Additionally, the Court denies Defendants’ request to revisit damages since

Defendants have not met their burden to disturb the judgment and have not otherwise provided

sufficient evidence to contradict Plaintiff’s allegations. Thus, for the reasons stated above,

Defendants’ motion to vacate default judgment is denied in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: March 30, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

9 Defendants do not argue that they are not covered by New York’s labor laws. The Court

therefore deems that argument as conceded by Defendants.